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ABSTRACT
e concept of order in international politics, despite its very frequent use in all
strands of ir literature, is seldom explicitly addressed as an object of analytical re-
ection and denition, and remains oen opaque.is research aims to clarify the
nature of order as a concept within ir theory, by highlighting its constitutive ele-
ments and by positioning it within the horizon of current political-philosophical
and sociological discussions.is thesis starts with a literature review showing the
limitedness of the ways in which order is employed as a concept in many ir theo-
retical works, while underscoring its critical problematisation as the main path to-
wards its clarication. Following and integrating Nicholas Rengger’s seminal work
on the topic, this research argues that the concept of order, which entails the dou-
ble nature of a descriptive/explanatory but also normative account of reality, has
to be understood within a philosophical discussion of the political, lying between
the two poles of political theology (Carl Schmitt) and the sociological theory of
secularisation (Jürgen Habermas).
While introducing and discussing the two authors, this thesis illustrates the
roles which they have assumed in inspiring ir theoretical work (in critical theory),
pointing at the limits of their established readings within the discipline and oer-
ing new perspectives, which should essentially rely on a more direct critical politi-
cisation of the sacred. is thesis proceeds with an exploration of the problem of
order in the modern condition, through a reconstruction and a discussion of the
commonWeberian genealogy in both Schmitt and Habermas, focusing on the im-
portance of the sociology of religion for the conceptualisation of the political in
modernity (Schmitt) and of the concepts of rationality and rationalisation (Haber-
mas) respectively. Against this background, a critique of the Habermasian view on
secularisation is developed, as Habermas’s argument appears to be an incomplete
answer to the problem of the symbolic relations between the religious and the polit-
ical, and hence of his conceptualisation of political order, a problem which is also
reected at the level of international politics.
Note: translations of original texts in this thesis are done by the author unless
otherwise specied.
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INTRODUCT ION
is thesis addresses the question of how to better dene and frame the concept
of order in international political theory. Order is indeed a very recurrent term,
which is routinely employed in practically all strands of ir studies, although inter-
estingly, this widespread use in the literature does not correspond to an equally
important attention dedicated to its conceptual denition and clarication. e
starting point of this research is therefore the mapping of the ways in which or-
der has been conceptualized, rst in the domain of philosophical reections, and
subsequently in the specic context of international studies. Following a seminal
study by Nicholas Rengger on the topic, an analysis of the relevant literature shows
how the concept of order, which contains a normative-prescriptive as well as a con-
stitutive dimension, may be grasped eventually as the problem of identifying the
foundations upon which order has to be built.e modern historical evolution of
the concept of order in its transition from ancient and medieval formulations has
beenmarked by the increasing deconstruction of those concepts and beliefs, which
for centuries have provided relatively stable foundations for various formulations
of order. ese processes of deconstruction have le order in modernity without
an undisputed foundation for its formulation.1 Consequently, this research is in its
essence an attempt to clarify the possible trajectories opened up by this situation
and excellently summarized by the central question of Rengger’s work on the topic,
namely: “can order be meaningful at all, in the absence of something — God’s
plan, History, Nature — which guarantees it?”2 e clarication of this question
leads to an enquiry in the role of religious, particularly theological, ideas and nar-
ratives of politics, with special attention to the relevance of theological concepts
in sociological and political discussions.is research identies Carl Schmitt and
1Paul G. Kuntz (ed.),e Concept of Order, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968.
2Nicholas Rengger, International Relations, Politicaleory and the Problem of Order, London: Routledge,
2000, page 9.
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Jürgen Habermas as the two authors who may better represent the two poles be-
tween which the answer to the question of order’s foundations may be articulated.
On the one hand in fact, one possible radical orientation consists in the possibility
of reconstructing order by explicitly re-introducing theological and metaphysical
concepts into the theorisation of political order. e work of Carl Schmitt con-
sequently appears of utmost importance in this perspective, as he most explicitly
envisaged and theorized the constitutive link between theology, politics and law
in many of his works, particularly Politicaleology3 and Roman Catholicism and
Political Form.4 is research investigates therefore the way in which Schmitt has
built his argument with reference to political order from both a domestic and in-
ternational perspective, and the role that his work is currently playing within con-
temporary ir literature.
On the other hand, the radically alternative possibility is that of looking for
ways of reinstating a discourse of rationalisation of the religious, therefore defend-
ing the idea that political order in the modern era presupposes the rational decon-
struction of the religious and the metaphysical. In the domain of ir critical theory,
this research identies Jürgen Habermas as the thinker who has defended most
openly and profusely the idea that order in modern politics ought to be grounded
on some form of secularisationwith the consequent overcoming of theological and
theology-derived concepts.5
e core argument of this thesis is that the answer to the question of order
as framed within the context of ir theory can be formulated only through a prob-
lematisation of order and subsequently through a re-engagement with the critical
assessment of the role of religion, and especially of theology, for the construction of
social and political orders.is has to be contrasted with ways of understanding or-
der in ir theory, which either take for granted what order is, or what is meant to be,
3Carl Schmitt, Politischeeologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1934 (originally published in 1922).
4Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 2008 (originally
published in 1921).
5Jürgen Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Volume I, Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1981, especially the section “Einige Merkmale des mythischen und des modernen Weltverständnisses”, pages 72–
113.
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thus avoiding the intellectual problem of its denition, or do not go deeply enough
into the philosophical research of the core elements, which constitute the essence
of any conception of order. To the rst category, it is possible to inscribe all theo-
ries which, following Rengger’s taxonomic exercise, consider order as a problem to
be managed.6 e management of order, which may occur through the search for
equilibrium in the struggle for power (balance), through forms of socially shared
procedures, values andpractices (institutions, notably diplomacy and international
law) and through the establishment of international organisations, is in its essence
a way in which order escapes problematisation and can consequently be hidden
from the scope of theoretical investigation. By reducing order to “balance” and
its management, or to the “values” which are supposed to underpin the establish-
ment and maintenance of certain international institutions and organisations, the
concept of order becomes fragmented in a multiplicity of technical sub-questions
which contribute towards enhancing its opaqueness instead of paving the way to-
wards its clarication.
However, other strands of ir theory have instead looked at the question of
order as one entailing the challenge of dening its constitutive elements and prob-
lematising its nature by trying to avoid misleading shortcuts.7 ese strands of ir
theory, which are from the perspective of this research the most interesting, are
those characterised by a critical, self-reective nature, where the epistemological
presuppositions and normative implications of theoretical work have to be con-
stantly put under rational scrutiny and explicitly brought to the surface precisely
in order to avoid the opaqueness characteristic of ideology as false consciousness.8
However, the construction of critical theories implies in turn the solution of com-
plex questions revolving around the nature and the tools to be employed in exercis-
ing critique. From the perspective of the question of order, those critical theories
have attempted a problematisation of order, either in the direction of overcoming
current orders as arrangements of reality (in terms of distribution of power and
6Rengger,e Problem of Order, pages 35 ss.
7Rengger, ibidem, pages 143 ss.
8Raymond Geuss,e Idea of a Criticaleory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981, page 12.
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resources) for the sake of emancipation as liberation from alien domination and
oppression, or in the sense of underscoring the limits themselves of the question,
namely by exploring whether it is really a meaningful exercise to talk about order
and to use it as a category of thought within international studies.
Whether order remains opaque and underinvestigated and solely subjected
to practices of management, or becomes problematised, the interesting point to
be highlighted at this juncture is that ir as a discipline, particularly in its theoreti-
cal strand, not only has largely neglected an explicit conceptualisation of order, as
already mentioned, but in doing so it has also largely disregarded the rather rich
literature about order which does exist in other intellectual domains, especially in
philosophical reections on a large variety of topics: stretching from cosmological
and cosmogonical discussions in antiquity through to the methodological, episte-
mological and political discussions of modern philosophers. Even a limited review
of the philosophical literature on the topic of order reveals how this concept has
from the start been linked to debates revolving around the existence of the universe,
nature, and therefore also the nature of human collective existence (i.e. political).
Indeed for most of antiquity, and up until Augustine, Aristotle’s theory of order
remained prominent, whereby nothing in nature can be unordered, order being
as eternal as the universe (kosmos) and its nature (physis). Order is nothing else
but the supreme good, which exists both separately from the kosmos (i.e. the Aris-
totelian idea of God), but also, and this is what Aristotle means by order of taxis,
immanently in the world: precisely as the order of a rank of soldiers is both imma-
nent in their disposition, and separated from them in the person of their comman-
der. Already from the very start, therefore, the idea of order has been substantially
shaped by early reections coming from the perspective of a philosophical theol-
ogy.9
It was only with Augustine that the new Christian philosophical thought
started to dierentiate itself sensibly from the previous classical theories of order.
Augustine examined the problem of evil, namely the justication of its existence in
the world, which may not be compatible with a theory of complete immanence un-
9Helmut Kuhn, “e Case for Order in a Disordered Age”, in Paul Kunz, op. cit., pages 442–459.
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der the presupposition of the Christian idea of God as suprememoral good. Evil is
then conceptualised as the absence of good (and of the immanent God) as privatio
boni.10 e articulation of a philosophical theory of order had therefore to accom-
modate, at least from Augustine onwards, the reconciliation of theological, moral
and cosmological theories, a balance which thinkers have tried to keep through-
out the Middles Ages up to the modern era. Modernity has brought a much more
problematic relation with order by mirroring the dicult relation which has been
emerging between the picture of the world and nature as formulated by modern
science, the deconstruction of theological narratives of history, ethics and politics,
and eventually the attempts to entirely free the construction of human social and
political orders from the very idea of God.
is investigation about the nature of order in ir aims therefore at bridging
the gap between the philosophical debates on order and the way in which the dis-
cipline has so far neglected this theoretical concept. e recovery of this philo-
sophical and theological dimension, asmentioned above, is articulated through the
study of Carl Schmitt as the author who champions the explicit inclusion of the the-
ological in the theorisation, but also in the study, of politics (and of international
politics as well) and of orderwithin politics, and ofHabermas, who has put forward
and defended an idea of order in international politics grounded on a philosophi-
cally aware conceptualisation which takes into account theological thought in the
context of his theory of rationality (the founding principle of Habermasian order),
but eventually conceives modernity primarily as rationalisation and secularisation.
A better understanding of the problem of order, therefore, has to begin by captur-
ing the essence of the modern condition in the form either of a substantially failed
(Schmitt) or successful (Habermas) secularisation of political concepts, and then
to proceed through a discussion of the possible continued relevance of the theolog-
ical in political thought.
For Schmitt, order can ultimately be conceptualised in a theological language
as the katechon, the “something that restrains”, i.e. keeps the precarious being of
10Augustine, Enchiridion de de et spe et caritate iii, 11: “quid est autem aliud, quod malum dicitur, nisi privatio
boni”. Cf. De civitate Dei xi, 22: “cum omnino natura nulla sit malum nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis
boni” and Confessiones iii, 7, 12: “malum non esse nisi privationem boni usque ad quod omnino non est”.
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this world in existence, against the emergence of the Antichrist, the provisional
advancement of the forces of evil and the nal dissolution of the world with the
second coming of the Christ and the Last Judgment. e important point to be
retained in this formulation is indeed the transformation of theWeberian sociology
of religion in a political theology for the explanation of legal and political concepts,
and consequently the permanence of theological concepts, although disguised, in
the context of political and legal theories of the state and of law.
ForHabermas, order in international politics, as largely for any social domain,
lasts on the stratication of knowledge spurred by rationalisation practices which,
following his interpretation of Weber, have been historically proceeding as a ra-
tionalisation of metaphysical, religious and therefore theological accounts of the
world. In this sense therefore, the true, rational order is based on the overcom-
ing of theology, its imagery and its language, through what Habermas terms the
linguistication of the sacred (Versprachlichung des Sakralen), i.e. the progressive
clarication of the opaqueness ofmetaphysical to rational investigation by continu-
ous questioning of the validity claims onwhichmetaphysical accounts of the world
are based and the successive stratication of their critique.11 Particularly important
is the application of these social processes to the political and legal domain, where
Habermas is able to trace the regression of theology-derived narratives of legiti-
mation and sovereignty in favour of narratives of law proceeding from rational
conceptualisations of social and political life (secularisation), especially evident in
popular sovereignty, democratisation, constitutionalisation of fundamental rights
and the internationalisation of such instances.
e study of Schmitt, in comparison to the study of Habermas, presents a
number ofmethodological issues which have to be explained and dealt with. While
Habermas’s theoretical work, largely formulated between the 1960s and the 1990s,
may certainly still be considered as contemporary to today’s reader, needing there-
fore a rather limited eort for its historical contextualization, Schmitt is an author
who wrote the bulk of his literary production between the 1920s and the 1940s, in
11JürgenHabermas,eories des kommunikativenHandelns, Volume ii, Frankfurt amMain: SuhrkampVerlag,
1987, especially the section “Die rationale Struktur der Versprachlichung des Sakralen”, pages 118–169.
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a context and within an historical horizon in many ways very dierent from the
current one. Against the widespread tendency to read Schmitt outside his histor-
ical and intellectual context, this research articulates a reading of Schmitt which
intends to interpret his work by avoiding the double mistake of misplacement and
anachronism. Misplacement is here primarily understood as the way in which an
author is read largely outside the context in which he was operating, and his work
is immediately linked to audiences which were not the ones this particular author
was referring to at the time of writing. Anachronism is a particular form of tem-
poral misplacement in an author’s interpretation, whereby the reader expects the
author to contribute with his work to discussions, themes, and worldviews which
were not there at the time in which that work came into being.12 In the case of
Schmitt, misplacement operates in a great number of cases which attempt to read
him as a political theorist tout court, without any interposed lter.
is research highlights instead how Schmitt conceived himself always as a
jurist, and how his work consists of contributions which are an integral part of
the ongoing debates about the sociology of law against the background of a preva-
lent legal positivistic orientation in the German Rechtswissenscha. While reading
Schmitt directly as a political theorist may immediately lead to the creation of an
image of this author as a “maverick,” who conceived revolutionary writings little
related to the rest of political theoretical discussions in the early twentieth cen-
tury, with a more accurate contextualisation in the proper domain of legal sciences
Schmitt simply appears to be continuing the work of the Freirechtsbewegung, Eu-
gen Ehrlich and Max Weber’s sociology of law.is of course does not mean that
Schmitt’s works have no political-theoretical implications, but only that easy trans-
positions from law to politics have to be careful and circumstantial. Misplacement
also consists therefore in the mistake that Schmitt’s ideas can be immediately con-
sidered as a political theory which may be directly used in other contexts, both
social and historical.
12See David H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historicalought, New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1970.
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Temporal misplacement as anachronism occurs instead when Schmitt’s ideas
are immediately set against questions which pertain to the current world and its
political landscape, which is of course very dierent from the one of the 1920s and
the 1940s, almost in order to “test” the validity or the acceptability of Schmitt’s
theoretical work. It is of course not dicult to see for instance how much of
Schmitt’s work on international themes is permeated by the contingent struggle
against Weimar and Versailles, or how his theory of the Großräume as the form of
spacial re-organisation of the world aer the dismissal of the ctional equality of
the nation states is not something that anybody could easily and a-critically em-
brace in the early twenty-rst century, since it was conceived in the early 1940s.13
e choice of Schmitt and Habermas as key authors for the discussion of the
concept of order as developed in the present thesis, is justied against the historical
reconstruction of the concept of order in theWestern culture as arising from philo-
sophical theology and its projections onto dierent theoretical domains, including
the political one and therefore international politics.
Schmitt is in this context an author who oers a uniquely comprehensive read-
ing of the issue. On the one hand, he is the current standard reference for the very
concept of political theology, although, as it will be illustrated in Chapters 2 and
5, he was not the rst one to elaborate this concept, as it emerged from on-going
discussions in the domain between legal theory and sociology during the interwar
period. Of course, Schmitt’s political theology represents a particular way of formu-
lating this very concept, which may be considered inaccurate from the viewpoint
of a strictly theological perspective, overhauled by successive discussions and in-
terpretations, and no longer entirely relevant for the specic goal of a theory of the
state and law in today’s social and political context, so dierent from that of 1920s
Germany.
However, the Schmittian formulation can still be considered as valuable in
the way in which it identies the link between archetypical theological and politi-
cal categories, and consequently oers a convenient and direct access to the prob-
13See Carl Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazismus? Arbeiten zum Völkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik 1924–
1978, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2005.
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lem of order at international level from the philosophical-theological perspective,
which historically is, as it will be shown and argued, the most appropriate one.
Furthermore, particularly in the context of critical ir theories, Schmitt oers the
considerable advantage of being an author already well present, if not necessarily
well integrated, in the domain of international studies. e ourishing literature
on Schmitt and the number of ir scholars making use of his ideas testies their
vitality and continuous relevance.
e selection of Schmitt of a key author for this thesis relies therefore on the
outstanding relevance of his work for the conceptualisation of order as emerging
from the discussion of political concepts at the juncture between philosophy, so-
ciology and theology, but also from the prominence which Schmitt has already
acquired in critical ir studies. is thesis also aims at contributing to a better un-
derstanding of Schmitt and its relation to the ir discipline, as it will be illustrated
in Chapter 2.
e choice of Habermas proceeds essentially from the consideration that, as
already anticipated, while Schmitt has championed the recovery of the theological
within political theoretical discussions about the state and the law, Habermas is
the author of a vast work animated by the idea that the modern conceptualisation
of politics, and of political order, has to start precisely from the overcoming of
theological and metaphysical narratives. In this, of course, Habermas is not the
only author to articulate such position, but he is certainly outstanding for both
the breadth and depth of his position, as he has provided a philosophical system
which, starting from the premises of a fully developed discussion of epistemology
and communication theory, attempts to sketch a coherent theory of politics and
law. Habermas’s work is again widely used in international studies, particularly in
critical ir theory, precisely for the sophisticated intellectual foundations which is
able to provide to numerous contributions in this discipline.
In the context of twentieth century European intellectual history, Schmitt and
Habermas represent very dierent, if not opposed views, and reect in this the intel-
lectual transformation of continental thought in the aermath of the SecondWorld
War. However, while Schmitt in many ways epitomises an “old Europe” which has
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been largely destroyed by the war, and Habermas a brilliant attempt of reconstruc-
tion, from the perspective of theorising order, and perhaps more broadly, both
Schmitt and Habermas can be seen as the heirs of a sociological tradition going
back to Max Weber.e interesting element here is that, while Schmitt and other
intellectuals of his time were focusing on the recovery of the theological in the
exploration of political themes, in the post war culture those discussions did not
achieve the same level of attention as in the interwar period, and only fairly recently,
with the so called resurgence of religion, the relation between religion (and theol-
ogy) and politics has re-emerged as an important topic. Precisely in this context,
the Schmitt–Habermas pairing acquires a dierent outlook, when considering that
Habermas has in the last decade come back to the topic of religion in his theorisa-
tion of a democratic political system and society. It appears that the post war Eu-
ropean political theory, particularly in its critical strand, had somewhat neglected
the topic of religion, despite its prominence in the previous decades, in some sort
of long detour, which has nally come to an end.e present discussion of the con-
cept of order, constructed around the poles of a Schmittian and of a Habermasian
understanding of the matter, intends to highlight precisely this detour.is is also
reected in the way in which, Schmitt has been read and interpreted in the context
of critical theory, more specically by the Frankfurt School and by Habermas in
particular. is thesis argues (Chapter 4) that a problematic reading of Schmitt
has contributed to the underestimation of the importance of critical reections on
the relation between religion and politics, especially considering the prominence
of Habermas in the second half of the twentieth century and the inuence his work
has exerted on critical thinkers, particularly in the ir domain.
is thesis is articulated in ve chapters. Chapter 1 provides in its rst part
an overview of the meaning of “order”, and successively a review of its evolution
within philosophical debates from antiquity to the twentieth century. In the second
part of Chapter 1, a literature review is presented with the aim of illustrating the
current state of the debate on the concept of order within ir theory, eventually
highlighting the necessity of framing the issue of order in a discussion of political
theology and the permanence of theological concepts in the secularised context of
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modernity. Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas are introduced as the two authors
oering radical alternatives for an understanding of order within ir theory.
Chapter 2 concentrates on a reading of Schmitt which is informed by his con-
textualisation with reference to the legal theoretical debates he contributed to and
the consequent formulation of his political theology out of a sociological ground-
ing of law. e chapter provides a picture of Schmitt’s conceptualisation of order
in international politics and discusses the way in which his work has been received
within ir literature.
Chapter 3 focuses on Habermas by providing an overview of his sociological
and political theory, which leads to the articulation of a theory of international
order.e chapter also discusses Habermas’s direct interventions in the domain of
international politics, and the relevance of his work within critical ir literature.
Chapter 4 discusses the relation between the two authors as Habermas’s read-
ing of Schmitt, which is developed through an analysis of the relevant literature
both by and about Habermas, highlighting the problems inherent to Habermas’s
relation with Schmitt’s work.
Chapter 5 explores theway inwhich both Schmitt andHabermas are related to
Weber and his work on sociology of religion, secularisation and modernity. Partic-
ularly in the case of Habermas, his problematic relation to secularisation and the
“resurgence of religion” is considered against the background of his engagement
with the theologians.
Finally, the Conclusions recapitulate the ndings of this research and their
relevance for rethinking the concept of order in international politics.
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introduction
e chapter is composed by two parts. Part One is dedicated to a brief philologi-
cal description of “order” in its semantic dimension, followed by a more detailed
account of the way in which this concept has been investigated by philosophers
from antiquity to the late twentieth century.is account shall highlight the ways
in which the idea of order has transformed in the history of philosophical thought,
but it shall also provide a map of the related ideas and concepts which belong to
the same constellation as order.
Part Two provides rstly an overview of the various ir authors who have con-
tributed to a direct conceptualisation of order in the domain of international poli-
tics. As it emerges from the discussion of these authors, the concept of order has
been seldom the object of an explicit analytical reection, despite its almost ubiq-
uitous relevance for ir studies. Consequently, by following the work of Nicholas
Rengger, a re-ordering of the main strands of ir theory from the perspective of
order is developed with the aim of showing the constitutive elements of the ques-
tion of order in contemporary theoretical debate.is analysis concentrates more
specically on critical theory and introduces Habermas and Schmitt as the two au-
thors who have managed to capture the essence of the problem of order as found
in the relations between modernity, secularisation, and the permanence of the the-
ological within political concepts.
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part one — what is order?
1.1 a definition of the concept of order
1.1.1 On the Meaning of the Word Order: a Brief Philological Introduction
e English word “order” comes from the Latin ordo and possesses a wide range of
dierent meanings, which have been evolving in dierent directions of specialisa-
tion for each particular domain in which the word has been employed, but without
losing, very signicantly, the attachment to a certain core of semantic value, which
has travelled from antiquity to the present day.
Already in classical Latin,1 the word ordo presents a number of uses which
point to amore remote origin and a pre-existing path of dierentiation and speciali-
sation. According to the prevalent orientation in philological studies, ordo derives
from the Indo-Germanic root *or-, which may have indicated an upward move-
ment (cf. the Latin verb orior to indicate the rising of the sun or other celestial
bodies). It is possible that the original meaning in archaic Latin was related to the
specialist language of weaving, where ordo indicated “a thread on the loom”, and
its necessarily regular and “ordered” disposition, without which the very activity of
weaving becomes impossible. Hence it is not dicult to envisage how ordo came
to indicate the abstract quality of any regular disposition of elements. Classical
Latin writers therefore use the word with a variety of dierent meanings, e.g. a row
of seats in the theatre or a line of soldier standing abreast (a rank, a body of men
drawn up for battle), or a line or train of people, animals, vehicles.e use of this
word in military jargon would prove to be particularly long lasting and it possibly
gave rise to uses denoting the dierent political and social statuses of the Roman
population. Ordo started to indicate the rank of soldiers in a military formation,
or the formation itself (cf. Caesar De Bello Civili 2, 26: auxilia regis nullo ordine
iter fecerant or Sallust De Bello Jugurthino. 45, 2: ne quisquam ordine egredieretur).
1Cf. Alois Walde, Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitätsbuchhand-
lung, 1938, third edition by J.B. Homann.
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Because of the relevance of themilitary role of dierent social classes in the Roman
state, ordo began also to indicate the social class (ordo senatorius, equester, plebeius;
amplissimus ordo, i.e. the senate).
e word retained its original meaning of regular arrangement, and eventu-
ally of normal arrangement, i.e. an arrangement reecting an embedded normative
principle, or a temporal, or a logical criterion of succession. Cicero (O. 1, 40, 142)
oers in his works a number of interesting examples of the use of ordo, e.g. in his
denition ordinem sic deniunt compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis
(order is thus dened as the arrangement of things in suited and adapted places),
or in Div. 1, 55, 125: fatum appello ordinem seriemque causarum (I call fate the order
and the sequence of causes). Columella (12, 2) draws on this philosophical mean-
ing and applies it to a morally relavant domain: nihil esse pulchrius in omni ratione
vitae dispositione atque ordine (nothing ismore beautiful in every aspect of life than
arrangement and order).
“Order” in the English language has inherited most of the semantic areas cov-
ered by its Latin ancestor. Itmay indicate rank, grade or class, e.g. in a rank or order
of rows, wheels etc. or of mouldings, or a body of people belonging to the same
professional class, occupation or pursuit, when this is seen as a relatively separated
body from the rest of a society.2
It may indicate more specically a hierarchical arrangement of elements, or
groupings, as in the religious vocabulary indicating the various orders of angels as
in themedieval angelogy, or any analogous class of spiritual beings, a pervasive idea
of hierarchical order which owns much of his resilience to the fortune of the neo-
Platonic writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius during the Middle Ages. In this sense,
order has been used to designate particular bodies of persons living by common
consent under the same religious, moral and social regulation or discipline (e.g.
monastic order, the Templar order), and by analogy to the bodies of people who
have been granted special awards (e.g. the Order of the Garter).
2Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
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Order is widely used in architecture (the ve orders of classical architecture:
Tuscan, Doric, Ionic, Corinthian and composite), as well as in mathematics, where
its hierarchical connotation serves to classify functions, equations and other math-
ematical constructs.is taxonomic sense of the word order is equally expressed in
its use in biology, where it indicates one of the highest groups in the classication
of living and fossilised species, between the superior class and the inferior family.
Finally, order can indicate sequence, disposition, arrangement, succession in
space and time, of actions or events, and more generally the condition in which
everything is in its proper place and performs its proper function. Interestingly, as
also in the French ordre, order in English also indicates the command or imperative
instruction to carry out a certain task, ameaning which the Latin ordo did not have
and that seems to be derived from the activity itself of ordering and the necessary
instructions to carry out such a task.
1.1.2 Order and its Philosophical Formulations in the Western Tradition
1.1.2.1 Order in Antiquity
Philosophers3 have been dealing with the problem of dening order since antiquity,
the philosophical attention of the ancient Greeks rst focusing on the problems
of physics and thus the problem of describing the (ordered) functioning of the
material world. While we are indebted to the Romans, as illustrated above, for the
etymological origin of the word “order” and its semantic power, the philosophical
elaboration of the concept owns much to the Hellenic world. Signicantly, the
Roman ordo translated a plurality of words which Greek philosophers and writers
employed in their theoretical and literary works. On the one hand, order is κόσµος
[kósmos], a word related to the idea of ornament, decoration and embellishment
(cf. “cosmetic”), and from it related to the notion of decency, and therefore of
order as appropriateness.e word κόσµος also indicates the world or the universe
3For this part, cf. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Grürder, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 6,
Darmstadt: Wissenschaliche Buchgesellscha, 1984, pages 1250–1315.
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(Latin mundus), a use which was apparently created by Pythagoras (as referred
by Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum 2.1.1), but which was in any case already
well-established during the classical era, as witnessed by Heraclitus, fragment 30
(κόσµον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώpiων ἐpiοίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ
ἔσται piῦρ), and by Plato in Timaeus (27a: piρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόµενον ἀpiὸ τῆς τοῦ
κόσµου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώpiων φύσιν).
On the other hand, the Greeks used the words θέσις [thésis] or διάθεσις
[diáthesis], both derived from the verb τίθηµι [títhemi] (to set, to allocate), and
indicating disposition, arrangement, position (also in theoretical terms, as it is still
in use today, for the word θέσις, or state, condition). Nevertheless, θέσις does not
possess the normative dimension which was instead signalled by the Greeks with
the use of the word τάξις [taxis], deriving from the verb τάσσω [tásso], with the
original meaning “to arrange in a row”. Τάξις comes straight from the military lex-
icon and indicates the drawing up in rank and le, the disposition of an army, the
battle array (cf. “tactics”); from this rst meaning derives the more general mean-
ing of order, especially order for a specic purpose, and in that sense τάξις has been
widely employed in the philosophical language of antiquity, in relation to physics,
metaphysics, ethics or politics, and was then translated by the Romans into ordo
as a technical political term.
Τάξις characterises for Plato the very activity of the demiurge, who creates
order out of disorder (Timaeus 30a: εἰς τάξιν ἄγειν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας). In “e Laws”
(874 e 7), Plato arms that, because humans can attain a sense of the just (τὸ
δίκαιον) or the collective (τὸ κοινόν), if ever, only for a limited time, they need
good institutional order and law (τάξις καὶ νόµος), without which they would not
be dierent from the wildest beasts.
Aristotle arms, while refuting the idea thatmotion in the universemay have
had a beginning, that nothing in nature is unordered (ἄτακτον), as the physis is for
every being the cause of order. Aristotle targets any theory arguing for a genesis
of the universe, in that this would be contrary to the eternity of the world’s τάξις.
(De Caelo, ii, 14: ἡ δέ γε τοῦ κόσµου τάξις ἀΐδιος). is does not, however, solve
the problem of the possible dependence of the κόσµος on an original cause (αἰτία).
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Aristotle substantiates the relation between the κόσµος and the supreme ideas of
good and morally best (τὸ ἄριστον) with a metaphor.e supreme good can exist
as a being separately from the κόσµος, but at the same time as its immanent τάξις,
as in an army, in which in fact the supreme good appears both in the order and
disposition of the soldiers (ἐν τῇ τάξει), as well as in the commander, but especially
in the latter, as he does not consist in the order, but the order subsists through
him (Metaphysica, xii, 10, 1075a 11–15: οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ’ἐκείνη διά
τοῦτον).
In his political writings, Aristotle denes τάξις as a form of λόγος [lógos],
namely as a relation, which the constitution and the law of the state establishes be-
tween the dierent magistrates.e constitution (piολιτεία) is therefore τάξις, with
the exception of the three degenerated forms of government (tyranny, oligarchy
and democracy), because in them the rule is not exercised according to any order
(κατὰ τάξιν), but it is instead unregulated, arbitrary and undetermined (ἀόριστος).
Crucially, Aristotle arms that τάξις is the law (νόµος) (Politica, iii 1287a 18: ἡ
γὰρ τάξις νόµος), but on the other hand, that the constitution establishes the way
in which laws should be, and the constitution is the order (τάξις) regulating the
charges within the state structure concerning the modes of their attribution, the
question of who exercises the supreme power, and what is the objective (τέλος) of
the so constituted political community.4
A central tenet of the classical philosophical reection about order is that or-
der can be part of human experience only partially, as human life is constantly and
unavoidably characterised by some degree of disorder.is orientation did not be-
long exclusively to Plato and his followers in the context of the demiurgicmyth, but
was widely shared. Again for Aristotle, while the world of unmovable objects is in
perennial order and quiet (Ethica Eudemia i, 1218a), and there cannot be anything
against the natural order of things in the supralunar world, the sublunar world, i.e.
the world in which the humans live, and where the disordered may well exist, is
ordered only in a limited way (Meterologica, ii 358 a).
4Cf. Aristotle, Politica iv 1289 11, 25: piρὸς γὰρ τὰς piολιτείας τοὺς νόµους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται piάντες,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὰς piολιτείας piρὸς τοὺς νόµους. Πολιτεία µὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς piόλεσιν ἡ piερὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα
τρόpiον νενέµηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς piολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.
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is conceptualisation of order remained constant during the Hellenistic and
classical Roman period. As mentioned already above, Cicero, the Roman author
who arguably more than anybody else contributed to the creation of a technical
philosophical Latin language with the translation of Greek terms,5 formulated a
denition of order with rather Stoic overtones (composition rerum aptis and accom-
modatis locis), clearly predicated on what “the suited and adapted” are supposed to
be. Cicero highlights on this point the aesthetic idea embedded in the concept of
order, by resembling an ordered conduct of life to a harmonious speech (DeOciis,
i 144: talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, quemadmodum in oratione con-
stanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia), namely then characterized
by beauty, consistency and order (pulchritudo, constantia, ordo):
And it is no minor manifestation of nature and reason that man is the
only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation
in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, love-
liness, harmony in the visible world; and nature and reason, extending
such analogy from the world of sense to the world of spirit, nd that
beauty, consistency, order are far more to be maintained in thought
and deed, and the same nature and reason are careful to do nothing in
an improper or unmanly fashion, and in every thought and deed to do
or think nothing capriciously.6
Over four hundred years aer Cicero, the main tenets of his classical formu-
lation of order were still in place, as well reected by Augustine’s writings on the
topic. Augustine is important not only for the role which is classically attributed to
him as the conjunction point between the philosophy of (heathen) antiquity and
the Christian medieval world, but also because Augustine managed to merge the
discourse of order as τάξις together with Christian theology and political philoso-
5Richard Edwin Smith, Cicero the Statesman, Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1966, page 229.
6Cicero, De Ociis, i 14: Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque. quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit
ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum
aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque
ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque
conservandam putat cavetque, ne quid indecore eeminateve faciat, turn in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne
quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet.
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phy, thus envisaging the conceptual constellation of elements which, inmany ways,
still characterises the order problematique up to the present. Augustine dened or-
der as “the disposition of equal and unequal which confers to each one its proper
place” (De Civitate Dei, xix 13: ordo est parium dispariumque sua cuique tribuens
loca dispositio). While he still relies on the core structure of the Ciceronian idea of
order, he justies it in a dierent way, namely by establishing a stronger link with
the creationist Christian doctrine in relation to cosmology, therefore denitely dis-
tancing himself from any Aristotelian conception of the eternity of the universe,
and in the immanence of the Christian God in relation to theology. From a cos-
mological viewpoint, order is the principle which God has used in everything he
has created (De Ordine, i 28: ordo est, inquit, per quem aguntur omnia quae Deus
constituit), although it is not present in every creature in the same measure, but
the degree of order is reected by a hierarchy of all creatures (De libero arbitrio 3,
ix, 24: ordinem creaturarum a summa usque ad inmam gradibus iustis decurrere).
e order of the universe is also reected in the triadic nature of its constituents,
which always reects the triadic nature of God. e task of the human being is
to climb up to its creator by means of education and knowledge and, in relation
to these, through an ordered ethical life (ordo eruditionis and ordo vitae, cf. De
Ordine, ii 8 25 .).
e important contribution given by Augustine to the elaboration of a theo-
logical doctrine of order, which goes beyond the neo-Platonic inuences described
above, also consists in the integration that he oered of the problem of evil and its
articulation within the order created by God. Augustine’s thesis is that evil does
not contradict order, but evil itself is part of the divine order of things, although
it is not destined to return to God (De Ordine i, 6 15). e sin of man does not
consist therefore in a deviation from order, which is per se not possible, because
nothing lies outside the order of the world, but in the perversion of his task, when
the humanmind fails to direct itself towardsGod, and directs itself instead towards
another object (Cf. Epistula cxl 23, 56: Proinde rationalis creatura, sive in angelico
spiritu, sive in anima humana, ita facta est, ut sibi ipsa bonum quo beata at, esse
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non possit; sed mutabilitas eius si convertatur ad incommutabile bonum, at beata:
unde si avertatur, misera est).
1.1.2.2 Order in the Middle Ages
During the Middle Ages, the philosophical topic of order undergoes a number of
transformations, all of them related to the problematic integration of order within
theology and the philosophy of nature (naturalis philosophia). In the Early Middle
Ages, the conception of order as elaborated by the Fathers of the Church, and espe-
cially Augustine, remains largely unchallenged, but it is integrated with even fur-
ther neo-Platonic elements.is can be largely attributed to the Pseudo-Dionysius
and the inuence which he exerted on the philosophical and theological produc-
tion of the time, especially because his idea of the celestial hierarchy well suited the
above illustrated Augustinian conception of order, of which every creature is part,
albeit in a dierent way. It also found its apparent conrmation in the Scriptures
(Book of Wisdom, 11, 21: [B]ut thou hast ordered all things in measure and num-
ber and weight [mensura et numero et pondere]).7 Especially Scotus Eriugena, who
produced the Latin translation of the Pseudo-Dionysius, which widely circulated
during the Middle Ages, worked on the creation of a more coherent account of or-
der which could encompass all these dimensions.8 Other early medieval thinkers,
such as Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter the Lombard, continued this tradition with
relation to the aesthetic value of order. It was therefore not until the early scholastic
period that medieval philosophy would begin to problematise Augustine’s deni-
tion of order.9
e Augustinian denition of order (parium dispariumque sua loca cuique
tribuens dispositio), remained largely inuential for every medieval reection on
this topic, together with the highly revered opinion of the Fathers more generally.
However, some problems re-surfaced once Western theologians and philosophers
7Cf. Vulgata, Sapientia 11, 21: sed et sine his uno spiritu occidi poterant persecutionem passi ab ipsis factis suis
et dispersi per spiritum virtutis tuae sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.
8Wayne Hankey and Lloyd P. Gerson, “John Scotus Eriugena”, ine Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late
Antiquity, Volume 2, Chapter 45, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pages 829–840.
9John Marenbon, “e Twelh Century”, in John Marenbon (ed.),Medieval Philosophy, London: Routledge,
1998, pages 150–187.
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began towork on a systematic conciliation of the Fathers’ heritagewithAristotelian-
ism. e Augustinian conception of order could not be directly employed to de-
scribe the order inherent to the trinity (as God appears for Augustine to make use
of order to regulate the world, but without necessarily being part of that order),
and also its application to the natural world started to become problematic, as it
lacked the teleological dimension well present in the Aristotelian conception of an
immanent order of nature, and it needed to be expanded and formulated more ac-
curately in relation to non-material beings. Already William of Auxerre († 1231)
tried to expand the discussion on order by limiting the validity of Augustine’s def-
inition to the point of the pondus (weight), but excluding the mensura and the
numerus (measure and number, respectively) from the above reported scriptural
reference. On this track, Alexander ofHales († 1245) further expanded the problem
of order by envisaging dierent loci in which order manifests itself simultaneously,
namely in this and in the other world, in the past and in the future. e Augus-
tinian ordo became only one manifestation of the complex idea of order, namely
that static disposition of the already-created, while order still exists in other forms,
particularly in the immanent orientation of God’s creatures towards their original
creator or causa nalis. Alexander also developed his conception of order with an
aim to clarify the ways in which order’s multidimensionality is structural to the
immanent double aim of creation, namely the maintenance of the necessary con-
ditions for human life and existence, and for the eventual return to its creator, the
primus mobilis.10
AlbertusMagnus further expanded the dierentiation of the concept of order
and its articulation in dierent domains. He intended to reduce the neo-Platonic
element in the conceptualisation of immanent order, by arguing that not all beings
are immediately directed towards a reunion with the creator, but their position
within the creation is dictated by a natural order (here is the rst recovery of Aris-
totle’s conception of nature), which is oriented towards God in varying degrees. Or-
der is therefore immanent in the creation in the way in which Aristotle described it
in analogy to the ordered army, but with the important consideration that, to have
10Christopher M. Cullen, “Alexander of Hales”, in Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Companion to
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, Chapter 7.
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a comprehensive and dynamic order in nature, dierent manifestations of order in
dierent domains have to appear unequal. Again, as in the analogy of the army,
the overall order results from the unequal disposition of the parts.11
omas Aquinas worked on the elaboration of the concept of order by contin-
uing the expansion promoted by Albertus Magnus.12 Aquinas became particularly
concerned with the integration of the aesthetic dimension within order, as well as
with a more precise articulation of Augustine’s idea that the evil and the ugly are
still part of the general order of things as envisaged by God. e beauty (pulchri-
tudo) of the universe is realised by the continuous appearance and disappearance
of things, which is translated into a vast network of intertwined causes. omas
Aquinas sets the temporal order of things (ordo temporis) behind the substantial
order of things (ordo naturalis) in his hierarchical succession. Order is crucial in
Aquinas’s understanding of the metaphysical structure of the universe: despite the
fact that it has to remain accidental in the Aristotelian metaphysical scheme, its
emerges as a quality growing out of the single being and collectively posed at a
higher hierarchical position, as the bonum universi is a bonum ordinis, a bonum
commune produced by the collectivity of objects in the universe. Aquinas concep-
tualised this order in a twofold way: on the one hand order is the idea of world
order that God has, and God behaves in its realisation as an artifex in relation to its
articiata. is rst element in the theory of order guarantees the stability of the
world. On the other hand, ordered is also the continuous movement which char-
acterises every being in the universe, as every being is set in motion by another
one, and the original impulse comes from God himself, to whom everything will
eventually return.e bonum ordinis is such only if the world contains in itself the
full spectrum of dierent ways and degrees of being, and it is therefore a bonum
ordinis diversorum, i.e. an order (and beauty of the world) which arises out of the
specialisation of dierent forms of being and in the completeness of the collective
image.
11Mechthild Dreyer, “Albertus Magnus”, in Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, ibidem, Chapter 5.
12John H. Wright,e Order of the Universe in theeology of St.omas Aquinas, Roma: Università Gregori-
ana, 1957.
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As already in Aristotle,omas Aquinas operates a distinction between the
supralunar and the sublunar worlds, where the existence of order is less visible. In
particular, human beings and their societies are not naturally ordered, but the or-
der of collective social life (ordo politicus) can only be guaranteed by the order of
a distributive justice, which is described along the model of an army, where social
tasks are attributed to dierently ranked social classes for the attainment of the
common good. Aquinas also envisaged a concept of peace as deriving from an or-
dered world in which the diversity of the dierent elements has to be accompanied
by a respect of the limits which nature imposes on all things.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the reference to the order of the
divine justice recurrent in Aquinas does not implicate its constitutive nature, as the
divine wisdom is not committed to a precise order of things, since God’s free will
may well have decided to create a dierently ordered world.
e complex picture of Aquinas’s conception of order, which brought together
elements of dierent reections, such as Aristotelianism, Christianity and neo-
Platonism, managed to persist for a long time. e Scholastic understanding of
the problem of order, both in its metaphysical structure and in its political impli-
cations, was destined to last for centuries until the emergence of the double chal-
lenge of the reformation, and of humanistic renaissance. While certain renaissance
thinkers, such as Giordano Bruno, started to decouple the idea of order from that
of a transcendental being issuing or controlling it, understanding order therefore
as nothing but the way in which the universe as a totality (which is God) exists, the
Reformation thinkers, because of their specic conceptualisation ofGod, could not
follow that path.13 Martin Luther re-instated a largely Augustinian idea of order,
which continued therefore to resurface, with its core of neo-Platonic hierarchical
structure.
13Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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1.1.2.3 Order in the Modern Age
Only with René Descartes did a new idea of order start to nd its way intoWestern
philosophical thinking, one which is no longer metaphysical and ontological, but
methodological. Order is forDescartes amethod bywhich stable knowledge can be
attained, which is possible only by following certain established procedural rules,
which form the very Cartesian concept of order. Order is method and method is
order, namely “consisting of the order and disposition of what is the object of one’s
spiritual eye, with the aim of nding some truth.” For the rst time here, order is
neither rank nor value but an order of sequencing, which investigates the recipro-
cal relations between objects, and pertains therefore to the domain of mathematics
in its nature of a purely mental order, which follows exclusively the order of causal
links (ordre des raisons), without attempting any metaphysical investigation into
the “order of things”.14 is early modern conceptualisation of order is common to
Baruch Spinoza, for whom it does not consist in any property of things, but in a
principle determining human thinking, and for Gottfried W. Leibniz.is last au-
thor indicated with the word “order” a concept expressing a relation between given
elements, which is again no longer identied as a metaphysical property of objects,
but as the way in which reciprocal relations between objects occur, reecting the
original project of an ordered world in the mind of God.
is last position put forward by Leibniz indicates the way towards a new fu-
sion of the concepts of nature and of order as the one advanced by the physiocrates
during the eighteenth century.e evolution of the moral-philosophical investiga-
tion of order within human societies towards the creation of economic doctrines
was indeed initially based on the idea that there should be some correspondence,
if not clearly a coincidence, between the (allegedly natural) laws governing pro-
duction, consumption and economic prosperity, and the in-born aspirations of
the individual human (namely the human nature). So from this viewpoint, the
14René Descartes, Régles pour la Direction de l’Esprit, inOeuvres de Descartes (edited by Victor Cousin), Paris:
Levrault, Vol. 11, 1824–1826 [1628], page 224: Toute la méthode consiste dans l’ordre et dans la disposition des
objets sur lequels l’esprit doit tourner ses eorts pour arriver à quelques vérités. Pour la suivre, il faut ramener
graduellement les propositions embarassées et obscures á de plus simples, et ensuite partir de l’intuition de ces
dernièrs pour arriver, par le mêmes degrés à la connaissance des autres.
30
1.1 a definition of the concept of order
question of social order may not be solved by advocating the rise of some sort of
homines novi, able to reject their natural passions and inclinations, but on the con-
trary only by the integration of the intérêt personnel in an ordre immutable institute
par l’Auteur de la nature pour governer les hommes tels qu’ils sont, pour server à leur
bonheur temporel.15
Rousseau is of course the great champion of the opposite philosophical posi-
tion, arguing that the despicable situation of the human race was largely predicated
on the continuation of its contemporary, fundamentally evil forms of socialisation.
His philosophical position rests on a very clear dichotomy between the ordre de la
nature and the ordre social.e concept of order is nevertheless a concept, namely
a product of education and intellectual work, not something which ontologically
belongs to the universe, although it is possible to observe how the natural world
possesses an arrangement of its elements and it appears to the educated eye to be
regulated by laws and to proceed towards a certain goal, which remains neverthe-
less unknown. Où est l’ordre que j’avois observé? Le tableau de la nature ne m’oroit
qu’harmonie et proportions, celui du genre humaine ne m’ore que confusion, désor-
dre!16 Order in the context of human societies and civilisation is only possible with
the domination of passions and in new, dierent forms of socialisation which are
based on the sacrice of personal interest for the sake of the collective.
Kant’s discourse about order emerges in the discussion of the evidence of the
existence of God as formulated by the physico-theological position, at the time
extremely relevant, according to which the existence of God is proven by the ex-
istence of a natural order of the world which humanity can contemplate through
its aesthetic faculties. Already in his pre-critical production, Kant attacked this po-
sition on the point of the separation of God and nature. In a physico-theological
position, it appears that all natural order, and its course, has been established by
God in every single detail, while these in reality ow from the rules which govern
nature as a single mechanism. Later, in his critical works, he attacked again this
position in relation to his established conviction that the order of nature has its ori-
15Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière, L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, London–Paris 1767,
page 329.
16Jean-Jacques Rousseau, L’Émile ou de l’Éducation, in Oeuvres Complètes, Volume iii, Paris, 1859, page 326.
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gin in human understanding (menschlicher Verstand), as it captures all phenomena
(Erscheinungen) under its own laws, nature being nothing but those very phenom-
ena (Die Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit an den Erscheinungen, die wir Natur nennen,
bringenwir selbst hinein).17 In hisCritique of JudgementKant further articulated his
position, according to which the order of nature is indeed accessible by our cogni-
tive apparatus (Erkenntnisvermögen), in terms of a priori judgement, as this order
is not impossible to grasp for the humanmind.18 Indeed, if it were, it would be oth-
erwise impossible to grasp the order of nature. Newton could not have done what
he did, as he saw order and regularity intertwined within great unity, where before
him there appeared to be only disorder and chaotic multiplicity.19 Issuing from the
discovery of order in natural phenomena, the idea emerged that there must be the
possibility of tracing order and regularity in the course, apparently so chaotic and
unordered, of society and history.20 For Kant, the emergence of order is related
to conict and antagonism, as he believed that “all culture and art, and the most
beautiful social order are the fruits of unsociability (Ungeselligkeit), which is neces-
sitated by itself to self-discipline, as the ordered appearance of a forest emerges out
of the competition between the trees for sunshine.”21
17Immanuel Kant,Kritik der reinenVernun, Berlin: Ausgabe der PreußischenAkademie derWissenschaen,
1900, Volume iv, page 92.
18Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskra, ibidem, Volume V, page 175: Denn es läßt sich wohl denken: daß
ungeachtet aller der Gleichförmigkeit der Naturdinge nach den allgemeinen Gesetzen, ohne welche die Form eines
Erfahrungserkenntnisses überhaupt gar nicht statt nden würde, die specische Verschiedenheit der empirischen
Gesetze der Natur sammt ihrenWirkungen dennoch so groß sein könnte, daß es für unseren Verstand unmöglich
wäre, in ihr eine faßliche Ordnung zu entdecken, ihre Producte in Gattungen und Arten einzutheilen, um die
Principien der Erklärung und des Verständnisses des einen auch zur Erklärung und Begreifung des andern zu ge-
brauchen und aus einem für uns so verworrenen (eigentlich nur unendlich mannigfaltigen, unserer Fassungskra
nicht angemessenen) Stoe eine zusammenhängende Erfahrung zu machen.
19Immanuel Kant, Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, ibidem,
xx, page 58: Newton sahe zu allererst Ordnung u. regelmäßigkeit mit großer Einfalt verbunden wo vor ihm
Unordnung u. schlim gepaarte Manigfaltigkeit anzutreen war u. seitdem laufen Cometen in geometrischen
Bahnen.
20Cf. also Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Vorrede zu I,
Leipzig 1828, third edition 1828, page xii: Der Gott, der in der Natur alles nachMaß, Zahl und Gewicht geordnet,
der darnach das Wesen der Dinge, ihre Gestalt und Verknüpfung, ihren Lauf und ihre Erhaltung eingerichtet hat,
so daß vom großen Weltgebäude bis zum Staubkorn, von der Kra, die Erden und Sonnen hält, bis zum Faden
eines Spinnegewebes nur eine Weisheit, Güte und Macht herrschet, Er, der auch im menschlichen Körper und in
den Kräen der menschlichen Seele alles so wunderbar und göttlich überdacht hat, daß, wenn wir dem Allein-
Weisen nur fernher nachzudenken wagen, wir uns in einem Abgrunde seiner Gedanken verlieren: wie, sprach ich
zu mir, dieser Gott sollte in der Bestimmung und Einrichtung unsres Geschlechts im ganzen von seiner Weisheit
und Güte ablassen und hier keinen Plan haben.
21Immanuel Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, aa, viii, page 22: [S]o wie
Bäume in einem Walde eben dadurch, daß ein jeder dem andern Lu und Sonne zu benehmen sucht, einander
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With the French revolution, the idea of order becomes more dicult to con-
ceptualise according to established theological and/or naturalistic narratives, as
the revolutionary event itself seemed to embody a “new order”, or at least the striv-
ing towards a new order, which breaks with the previous forms and challenges
the homeostatic conceptualisation of what is ordered. Order becomes something
which can no longer simply lie within nature or human nature, or the human cog-
nitive capabilities, but emerges from the replacement of what was previously con-
sidered as ordered, but it may no longer be so.e relatively simple idea that order,
especially the order of the world, is chiey reected in the principle that everything
has (stably) its right place, is no longer sucient. Hegel has furthermore broken
the link between the naturalistic order andGod, by pointing out how the nite (das
Endliche) cannot be the basis for the construction of a rational concept of God.22
e disintegration of a widely shared idea of order during the nineteenth cen-
tury is also reected in the anarchist movement, which maintained that “order”
would continue to exist even in an anarchical society, which would actually consti-
tute a more authentic order, as put forward by Proudhon: “la plus haute perfection
de la société se trouve dans l’union de l’ordre et de l’anarchie”.23 Against the rise of
this re-formulation of order as an order-to-be, the nineteenth century reactionary
movement tried to reinstate the Christian conception of order and disorder within
the doctrinal context of the fall of man and original sin (Donoso Cortés),24 but
with extremely limited success.
Nietzsche, in his staunchly polemical relationship with his contemporaries
and in his élan in seeking a radically dierent future, also used and defended the
concept of order, by analysing his time as one in which the social order was slowly
melting away (wegschmelzen), thus prompting the necessity of thinking about new
nöthigen beides über sich zu suchen und dadurch einen schönen geradenWuchs bekommen; statt daß die, welche
in Freiheit und von einander abgesondert ihre Äste nach Wohlgefallen treiben, krüppelig, schief und krumm
wachsen. Alle Cultur und Kunst, welche die Menschheit ziert, die schönste gesellschaliche Ordnung sind Früchte
der Ungeselligkeit, die durch sich selbst genöthigt wird sich zu discipliniren und so durch abgedrungene Kunst die
Keime der Natur vollständig zu entwickeln.
22Cf. Georg. F. W. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993,
pages 265 and ss. Originally published posthumously in 1831–1841.
23Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Qu’est-ce que la proprieté, Paris: 1840, page 346.
24Donoso Cortés, Essayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, Madrid: 1851.
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orders, in which, despite the prominence of the idea of equality, the order of rank
and priority, both among humans and among things, should be preserved (die Ord-
nung des Ranges in der Welt aufrecht zu erhalten, unter den Dingen selbst — und
nicht nur unter den Menschen).25
e end of the nineteenth century is also the time in which the constella-
tion of elements making up the current order problematique takes its shape. If
Dostoyevsky identied as the problem of a whole era the craving for order and
the search for truth,26 then the automatic question is about how all this may be
achieved, in a time in which almost nothing is available to which one can attach
oneself. But, as highlighted by Émile Durkheim, how is it also possible that the
human will could integrate itself into an order of which the will itself has been the
conscious creator? How is it possible to derive a social order from the individual,
an order which goes beyond the individual? How can a law be binding for individ-
uals, when it is indeed their own product?27
In this context of increasing problematisation of order, its Kantian concep-
tion as a concept coming from the human intellect, rather than being a property
of the things in themselves, has remained prevalent in a number of theoretical ori-
entations. For Henri Bergson, reality is an order to the extent to which it satises
our thinking, as an overlap between subject and object.28 Hans Driesch posits as
the foundation of order the experience and self-determination of the thinking ego
(philosophical solipsism), which informs what is set as external, and requires valid-
ity from what is ordered.is author has categorised “order” per se as a “primitive
concept” (Ursachverhalt), which cannot be reduced to simpler concepts by further
analysis. With this “standardisation” of thought and, through it, thinking becomes
an autonomous something, and objects are posed, which in their complete entirety
form a unity, a system of the real.e ordered-monistic ideal, in which every sin-
25Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Leipzig: 1886, § 219.
26Fedor Dostoyevsky, A Raw Youth, originally published in 1875, translation from Russian by Constance Gar-
nett, New York: Macmillan, 1950, page 557.
27Émile Durkheim, Éducation et Société, Paris: Presses Universitaires Françaises, 1999, page 55.
28Henri Bergson, L’Évolution Créatrice, Paris: Presses Universitaires Françaises, 1959 (originally published in
1907), page 134 : D’une manière générale, la réalité est ordonnée dans l’exacte mesure où elle satisfait notre pensée.
L’ordre est donc un certain accord entre le sujet et l’objet. C’est l’esprit se retrouvant dans les choses.
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gularity of the being nds its own place in this thus conceived order, can never be
fullled, as order and being are never entirely overlapping.29 For Fritz Mauthner,
there is never any certainty about the extent to which nature reects our subjec-
tive order.30 is indeterminateness has characterized the problem of order to the
present, namely whether the ordering by the subject lies in the bringing to the sur-
face an inherent, innate possibility of order existing within things, or are meaning,
value and order instead given to the being from the outside, and is it therefore
exclusively dependent upon human freedom.
roughout the twentieth century, on the level of political and historical re-
ection, as already during the nineteenth century, the category of order has re-
mained tied to the polarisation between revolution and reaction, but in the con-
text of the changing meaning for both terms, with the gradual shi away from
liberal to socialist revolution, and from autocratic restoration to capitalistic reac-
tion. So, order has become a central component in most discussions involving
social-political ideology and its critique. Sigmund Freud recognises that order is
undeniably useful for (collective) human life, but argues on the other hand that
it is built, like every other cultural achievement (Kulturleistung), on the sublima-
tion of drives.31 eodor Adorno criticises the ideological defence of existing and
binding order (against Heidegger’s fundamental ontology) but on the other hand
he wishes to see the rise of a new order for the promotion of human dignity, and
without violence.32 Other authors have insisted on the inevitability of people in-
tegrating themselves into some sort of cultural-social, or even natural order, with
the goal of nding fullment for their own subjectivity.33 Arnold Gehlen articu-
lates an opinion according to which those institutions, which give to the human
(as a naturally limited being) norm and restraint, may also be the guarantors of its
freedom, as theymay be able to prevent the emergence of irreconcilability between
29Hans Driesch, Ordnungslehre. Ein System des nichtmetaphysischen Teils der Philosophie, Jena: Eugen
Diederichs Verlag, 1923, pages 39 ss.
30Fritz Mauthner, Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache, Stuttgart & Berlin: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung Nachvol-
ger Verlag, 1902, Vol. iii, page 589 ss.
31Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytiker Verlag, pages 52 ss.
32eodor Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966, pages 96 ss.
33Cf. Werner Maihofer, Vom Sinn menschlicher Ordnung, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann Verlag, 1957,
pages 51 ss.
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dierent positions.34 According to Carl Joachim Friedrich, the problem of order
should be articulated dialectically as a continuous competition between order and
other societal values (freedom, justice, security, etc ...), and therefore as a problem
of reciprocal limitation and conditioning of those values.35
Hans Barth has analysed the possibility of identifying, in the plurality of the
dierent possible arrangements of order, a supreme form of order, or an order gov-
erned by rules of last instance, but he has eventually come to the conclusion that
no such order can be found, because of human fallibility.36 As already pointed out
by Dostoyevsky, an order of ultimate validity appears to be out of reach in the con-
text of the modern world, while every proposed order seems to entail a relativistic
nature. PaulWeiss has reformulated this very ambiguity by stating that “depending
upon where one starts, one has a distinct way of ordering the entities comprising
the world”.37
Other authors have tried to resist this relativisation dri, especially by turn-
ing their attention to a genealogy of the concept of order as theologically derived.
Eric Voegelin has armed that the struggle around the truth of order consti-
tutes the substance of history, in the form of a continuous re-organisation of sym-
bolic re-interpretations of human existence, chiey expressed in the religious phe-
nomenon.38 ForHelmut Kuhn, the rst and last disposition of order for the human
lies in his capacity to relate to God (die letzte und erste Ordnungsbestimmung des
Menschen liegt darin, daß er capax Dei ist), and his consequent ability to orientate
himself to the righteous collective order of divine wisdom.39
34Arnold Gehlen, Urmensch und Spätkultur. Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen, Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann Verlag, 1964, second edition, pages 34 ss.
35Carl Joachim Friedrich,e Dialectic of Political Order and Freedom, in P.G. Kuntz,e Concept of Order,
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968, pages 339–354.
36Hans Barth,Die Idee der Ordnung. Beiträge zu einer politischen Philosophie, Zürich: Eugen Rentasch Verlag,
1958, pages 217–236.
37Paul Weiss, Some Paradoxes Relating to Order, in Paul G. Kuntz (ed.),e Concept of Order, Seattle & Lon-
don: University of Washington Press, 1968, 14–20, page 20.
38Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1987, Volume ii, pages 2 ss.
39Hans Kuhn, Ordnung im Werden und Zerfall, in Hans Kuhn and Franz Wiedmann (eds.) Das Problem der
Ordnung, München: Sechster Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, 1960, 11–25, pages 23 and 25.
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Despite the lack of a stable denition of order in analytical terms, with refer-
ence to its content, as highlighted amongothers byMartinHeidegger,40 the concept
itself has been signicantly diused in the social sciences, informing the meaning
of numerous technical terms such as structure, form, norm, system, institution.
is prominence of order within social scientic discussion has been largely artic-
ulated as a debate concerning the way in which dierent orders can be legitimised,
particularly following the work of Max Weber. Functional sociology has focused
on the question of the “motivational problem of order” by trying to understand
how to keep consensus around the existing social arrangements under particularly
demanding circumstances. For Talcott Parsons, “the remarkable thing about so-
cial order is not how perfect it is, but that it does exist at some sort of reasonably
tolerable level.”41
Structural anthropology aer Claude Lévi-Strauss has also sought to explain
the functioning of human societies in terms of orders and structures, which in turn
should be explained and classied in relation to their formal character, so that it is
possible, at least in principle, to envisage an “order of orders” (ordre des ordres) at
a very abstract level.42
Finally, Michael Foucault has, against structuralistic attempts to describe so-
cial orders, articulated the view that order presents itself as a complex problem
oscillating between the pole of those empirical orders which constitute the fun-
damental codes of a culture, such as language, schemes of perception, exchanges,
values and practices, and a second pole constituted by scientic and philosophical
reections about the meaning of order as an abstract concept. What he intends to
highlight is however that between these two dimensions there is a middle ground,
confused, obscure and dicult to penetrate analytically:
40Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, eleventh edition, 1967 (rst edition 1927)
page 52: Die Beherrschbarkeit des Mannigfaltigen in einer Tafel gewährleistet nicht ein wirkliches Verständnis
dessen, was da geordnet vorliegt. Das echte Prinzip der Ordnung hat seinen eigenen Sachgehalt, der durch das
Ordnen nie gefunden, sondern in ihm schon vorausgesetzt wird. So bedarf es für die Ordnung von Weltbildern
der expliziten Idee von Welt überhaupt. Und wenn »Welt« selbst ein Konstitutivumdes Daseins ist, verlangt die
begriiche Ausarbeitung des Welt-phänomens eine Einsicht in die Grundstrukturen des Dasein.
41Talcott Parsons, Order as a Sociological Problem, in Paul G. Kuntz, op. cit., 373–384, page 379.
42Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie Structural, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958, pages 347–348.
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It is here that a culture, imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders
prescribed for it by its primary codes, instituting an initial separation from them,
causes them to lose their original transparency, relinquishes its immediate and in-
visible powers, frees itself suciently to discover that these orders are perhaps not
the only possible ones or the best ones; this culture then nds itself faced with the
stark fact that there exist, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are
in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order;
the fact, in short, that order exists.43
is middle region is for Foucault a sort of primitive concept, where the au-
thentic being of order is hidden, but which continuously manifests itself in a plu-
rality of empirical modes. is fundamental form of the existence of order, this
experience of order in its primary state, appears systematically superior to any at-
tempt of analytical description, denition and codication of what order is. In
every culture, order is perceived and experienced, but its essence remains undis-
closed to explicit analytical articulation. According to Foucault, this very feature
of the concept of order, namely its opacity, both inspires and undermines its pro-
jections as social codes and as scientic and philosophical arguments. It inspires
them because the experience, but also the demand for order, prompts its social
production, and its intellectual investigation. It undermines them because no so-
cial code or philosophical idea of order can entirely cover and explain the variety of
empirical manifestations of order, thus prompting the critique of established social
codes and the reformulation of scientic and theoretical hypotheses.
1.1.2.4 Order in Philosophy: some concluding remarks
At the end of this review of the multifaceted landscape of the philosophical liter-
ature on the concept of order, it is possible to summarise a few important points.
From the very beginning, the concept of order has been theorised, as notably in
Aristotle, in connection with a philosophical theology trying to explain the rela-
43Michel Foucault,eOrder ofings. AnArchaeology of theHuman Sciences, London: Taviston Publications,
1970 (original publication as Les Mots et les Choses. Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines, Paris: Gallimard,
1966), pages xx-xxi.
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tion between the idea of God and the philosophical image of the world. Order was
in that context the logos which enables the immanence of the supreme good in the
world, and reected in the order of the physis. Order establishes itself therefore
immediately as a metaphysical concept.roughout antiquity, this way of theoris-
ing order proved especially successful, and lasted until early Christian theologians
started to envisage a way to bridge the problem of dening order with the idea of
evil as part of the order established by the creator, because nothing can deviate from
the order established by God (against the gnostic solution of an imperfect sublunar
world contaminated by elements escaping from the divine order).e Augustinian
conception of order continued to prevail throughout theMiddle Ages, and entered
a crisis only with the onset of modernity, as the idea of God was progressively re-
placed by that of nature, and the problem of order, as already in Descartes, became
absorbed in methodological and epistemological discussions about order as either
intrinsic to the studied object or as a structure of subjectivity. Kant articulated
his view according to the latter theoretical perspective, by dening order (of na-
ture) in terms of an a priori judgement, which enables the accessibility of order for
the human mind. However, this very idea of order as depending upon the deni-
tion of cognitive processes opened the way towards a relativistic disintegration of
the concept, in which a plurality of orders compete with each other and there is
no longer any element conferring stability to any particular conception of order,
a situation which characterises the philosophical landscape of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries up to the present, where also the political conceptualisation of
order starts to envisage the possibility, aer the French Revolution, of “replacing”
an order with another. e current predicament of order is therefore still charac-
terised by attempts to rephrase order in the direction of overcoming the relativi-
sation dri, either by re-establishing some sort of metaphysical conceptualisation
(Voegelin, Kuhn), or through a postmetaphysical, scientic anchoring.
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part two — order and international relations
1.2 order in the domain of ipt/ir theory
1.2.1 Order as recurrent concept in IR studies
In the context of current ir studies, the concept of order, and the use of this word,
is pervasive and almost ubiquitous. Nevertheless, as shall be discussed in more de-
tail, explicit reections about the nature of the concept within this social discipline
have been so far rather limited in scope and in number, especially when compared
to the frequency with which order is employed as a conceptual tool. Every stu-
dent of ir, in any branch of this discipline, has necessarily become familiar with
expressions such as world order, regional order, global order, Westphalian order,
post-Cold War order, new world order, economic order and so on. Geopolitics,
geo-economics, foreign policy analysis, international political economy, interna-
tional political theory: none of these domains refrain from a widespread use of the
term. In many professional publications, also recent ones, such as Francis Antony
Boyle’s Foundations ofWorld Order (1999),44 the edited volumeOrder and Justice in
ir (2003),45 GüntherAuth’s International Society and themaking of International Or-
der (2005),46 Andrew Hurrell’s On Global Order (2007),47Michális S. Michael and
Fabio Petito’sCivilisational Dialogue andWorld Order (2009),48 Sai Felicia Krishna-
Hensel’s Order and Disorder in ir (2010),49 the term “order” is incorporated into
the very title of the work, thus indicating its centrality, but not necessarily that an
analytical denition of order is the preoccupation, or one of the starting points, of
44Francis Antony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: the Legalist Approach to International Relations (1898–
1922), Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
45Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Order and Justice in International Relations,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
46Günther Auth, International Society and the Making of International Order, Münster: lit Verlag, 2005.
47Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order. Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007.
48Michális S. Michael and Fabio Petito (eds.), Civilisational Dialogue andWorld Order, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009.
49Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel’s Order and Disorder in ir, Farham: Ashgate, 2010.
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their intellectual work. Along with countless other possible examples, these works
largely rely on an implicit understanding of what order is, i.e. they treat “order”
as some form of primitive concept, as with the idea of “number” or “set” in math-
ematics, for which a further, more analytical deconstruction is not possible. In
most uses of the term and the concept of order in ir, the authors seem to imply
that order is a category the meaning of which is well-known and which needs little
clarication but for a possible degree of contextualisation (order for world politics,
for a region, for the economic organisation, etc ...). Alternatively, “order” is taken
as a symbolic representation of a current or proposed arrangement, however com-
plex (“current world order” or “new world order”), as the brachylogical expression
of “realist structures/systems” in a given setting, oen as a counterpart to the ef-
fort directed towards examining the regulation of the international realm through
normative and/or ethical societal bonds, as opposed to a certain Machiavellian un-
derstanding of international politics (as in the pair “order and justice”). However,
“order” may not necessarily be associated with realism, as norms, either legal or
ethical, can well create legal, moral, normative and conventional orders.
All these dierent uses of “order” are not new.ey have been present within
international studies essentially since its very beginning. And since its very begin-
ning this term has been under-examined. Both Edward H. Carr and Hans Mor-
genthau, for example, make extensive use of this term without giving an explicit
denition of the way in which they are using it and without listing the term in the
analytical indexes of their respective works, even in the current editions.
e confusion surrounding the word and the concept of order in the domain
of ir studies is therefore remarkable, as is the limited attention that it has attracted
in terms of its precise conceptualisation. As shown above, with the brief historical
reconstruction of the idea of order in its philosophical use, it is however clear at
this point that ordermaynot be simply considered as a primitive concept, requiring
and allowing no further analytical denition and deconstruction. On the contrary,
it appears that order has a complex, albeit obscure, constitutional structure, which
deserves further investigation. While it may be accepted that order is per se a con-
cept escaping a full and exhaustive articulation in all its components (as argued
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by Foucault), particularly proceeding on the path of a sheer logical-analytical de-
construction, there is denitely enough room for the identication of conditions,
components, references andmechanisms inherent to the idea of order, which shall
come primarily from the examination of its historical genealogy.
1.2.2 IReory and the concept of order: an examination
1.2.2.1 Raymond Aron
Despite the limited amount of reection on the concept of order in international
studies, a number of attempts have been formulated, with varying degrees of suc-
cess.
Raymond Aron advanced one of the rst attempts to clarify the meaning of
order in international politics. . According to a report published in 1966 by Stan-
ley Homan,50 during the Conference for the Conditions of a World Order held in
Bellagio (Italy) in June 1965, Aron tried to formulate a comprehensive denition
of the syntagma “world order”. Setting out to classify all this expression’s possi-
ble meanings, he envisaged ve possibilities concerning the particular concept of
“order”. e rst two are of purely descriptive nature, namely order as indicating
an arrangement or reality, or as the set of relations between the parts which form
that reality. Aron then proposed to dene order either as theminimum conditions
for existence, or alternatively as the minimum conditions for co-existence.51 Lastly,
another denition he oered was that of order as the set of conditions for a good
life. According to Homann’s report, Aron asked the other panellists to disregard
the last possible denition, and to focus instead on the denition of order as the
set of minimum conditions for coexistence. As also reected in his main work
on international politics, Peace and War,52 Aron was chiey preoccupied with the
examination of the contemporary international political situation, with the pur-
50Stanley Homann, “Report of the Conference on the Conditions of World Order, June 12–19 1965, Villa Serbel-
loni, Bellagio, Italy” in Dedalus, Volume 95/2, pages 455–478.
51Homann, ibidem, page 456.
52Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962.
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pose of creating a systematic narrative which could be backed by evidence coming
from political philosophy, sociology, history and diplomatic practices. It is there-
fore not surprising that the way in which he addressed the problem of order at the
1965 conference was so clearly dependent upon the contingency of current events,
rather than being open to a more abstract and general conceptualisation. Signif-
icantly, however, Aron’s denition of order as the minimum set of conditions for
co-existence is, on closer inspection, more promising than it appears. It is indeed
a combination of both descriptive and normative aspects of the problem of order,
a feature that will re-appear rather frequently in the examination of how order has
been conceptualised in international studies. It is also open to a potentially innite
variety of changes in the institutional structure in which this order is supposed to
exist. Co-existence was clearly imagined as a co-existence of states vis-à-vis other
states, as dictated by the historical circumstances of the ColdWar, but it is a deni-
tion which potentially may be applied to any other future or past form of political
organisation.53 As it does not prescribe specic ways in which co-existence shall
be organised, the denition can be adapted to a plurality of dierent normative
paradigms, thus envisaging the problem of historical change, and of shi between
dierent societal and political organisations.
1.2.2.2 Hedley Bull
A more systematic and deeper reection on order has been envisaged by Hedley
Bull in his seminal worke Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Poli-
tics,54 originally published in 1977. is book expressly contains a series of reec-
tions on what order is supposed to mean in the ir domain, and it has managed
to clarify important elements of what constitutes order and the problems that are
implied when dealing with this idea. Bull advances rst of all a reection on order
per se, before engaging with the issues of “world order” and “international order”:
53On this point see Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy,
London: Routledge, 1998, esp. Chapter 3, pages 32 ss.
54Hedley Bull,e Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
1977.
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[...] when we speak of order as opposed to disorder in social life we
have inmind not any pattern ormethodical arrangement among social
phenomena, but a pattern of a particular sort. For a pattern may be
evident in the behaviour of men or groups in violent conict with one
another, yet it is a situation we should characterise as disorderly.55
Order is therefore a recognisable pattern, but not any pattern, only those
which present further features, primarily of normative and moral content, as the
author explains:
Sovereign states in circumstances of war and crisis may be behave in
regular andmethodical ways; individualmen living in the conditions of
fear and insecurity, described in Hobbes’s account of the state of nature,
may conduct themselves in conformity with some recurrent pattern,
indeedHobbes himself says they do; but these are examples not of order
in social life but of disorder.
e order which men look for in social life is not any pattern or reg-
ularity in the relations of human individuals or groups, but a pattern
that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that
it promotes certain goals or values.56
For Ian Harris, the concept of order as advanced by Bull presents a number
of problematic aspects which the author does not explicitly recognise and identify.
e most important issue concerns the hybrid nature of a so-dened order, which
lies between a fact and a value.57 Order is indeed a fact, i.e. a status, an arrangement
of the world, as long as it is conceptualised as a pattern, but at the same time not
every pattern is an order: only those patterns which entail a particular normative
dimension. Bull draws on the Augustinian denition of order and envisages the
development of a theory of social values. As already illustrated above, Augustine
elaborated indeed a purposive conception of order, dened in functional terms,
55Bull, ibidem, page 3.
56Bull, ibidem, page 3–4.
57Ian Harris, “Order and Justice in the Anarchical Society”, in International Aairs, Volume 69, Number 4,
October 1993, pages 725–741.
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when he described it as “a good disposition of discrepant parts, each in its ttest
place”. Bull’s indication of his reliance on Augustine is very explicit:
[...] Augustine’s denition at once raises the question: ‘good’ or ‘ttest’
for what? Order in this purposive sense is necessarily a relative concept:
an arrangement (say, of books) that is orderly in relation to one purpose
(nding a book by a particular author) may be disorderly in relation to
another purpose.58
Bull seems to suggest that, while there are many possibilities for actively cre-
ating, or passively recognising, patterns within a given reality, only those patterns
which reect some normative goal can be correctly described as order. It would
therefore seem that whether or not a certain constellation of elements represents
an “order” is a question directly related to the normative values that inform the con-
stellation itself, and the pattern that characterises its internal organisation. ere
is therefore no “morally neutral” order, in the sense that order cannot be seen with-
out taking into consideration the normative dimension. Many dierent patterns
are indeed possible but only a very few of them can be considered order.e focus
of the problem of order shis from a denition of order to the problem of iden-
tifying those normative values which, once present in a pattern, make that same
pattern an order. e denition itself of order as a value, and the lack of an argu-
ment in which such thesis is articulated and justied, represents one of the most
signicant limitations of Bull’s conceptualisation of order, which remains indeed
largely conned to a phenomenological dimension.59
As already in the case of Aron, Bull seems to work on a conceptual deni-
tion which is conceived with the main goal of oering descriptive tools for the un-
derstanding of international political problems of the time, despite the seemingly
58Bull,e Anarchical Society, page 4.
59Ian Harris, “Order and Justice in the Anarchical Society”, op. cit., page 729: e intention implicit in Bull’s
project leaves the location of Order among values unclear and, indeed, treats it in a phenomenological rather
than in an explanatory way. Both of these characteristics may be traced to the informal manner in which Bull
treated Order as a value. He announced its character as a value without argument. While it is not needful to
insist upon logomachy in every connection, it is surely necessary to oer an explanation of why Order is to be
accounted a value. Bull’s omission of any such explanation obviously renders the place of Order among values
uncertain.
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philosophical drive, which does not, however, reach too far.e underlying practi-
cal preoccupation of Bull’s theoretical workmay also be seen in theway inwhich he
successively oers denitions of both “international order” and “world order”.e
rst considers order within the given framework of a world divided among states,
therefore encompassing a contingent situation that, although unlikely to disappear
any time soon from the current functioning of the international relations, was not
considered by Bull (and many others, in dierent fashions) as everlasting and nec-
essary:
By international order I mean a pattern of activity that sustains the ele-
mentary or primary goals of the society of states, or international soci-
ety.60
Bull was conscious of the nature of states as the social arrangement that char-
acterisesmodernity, but hewas also ready to envisage aworld inwhich stateswould
no longer play such a central role in the political organisation of human beings. If
so, what happens to order if international order is no longer possible, or viable? Bull
understood international order as a specic category of a broader conception of or-
der, which he called world order, representing the ultimate dimension in which a
political order for mankind can be formulated:
By world order I mean those patterns or dispositions of human activ-
ity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among
mankind as a whole. International order is order among states; but
states are simply groupings of men, and men may be grouped in such
a way that they do not form states at all. Moreover, where they are
grouped into states, they are grouped in other ways also. Underlying
the questions we raise about order among states there are deeper ques-
tions, of more enduring importance, about order in the great society of
all mankind.61
60Bull,e Anarchical Society, page 8.
61Bull, ibidem, page 19.
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e phenomenological and historical take on the problem of order in Bull’s
formulation becomes more evident when looking at his further description of the
contemporary world order as built on a system of states, which forms as well the
necessary antecedent of any successive, future formulation of order at a practical
level:
e rst global political system has taken the form of a global system of
states. [...] While the world political system that exists at present takes
the form of a system of states, or takes principally this form (we shall
contend later that a world political system is emerging of which the sys-
tem of states is only part), world order could in principle be achieved
by other forms of universal political organisation, and a standing ques-
tion is whether world order | might not better be served by such other
forms. Other forms of universal political organisation have existed in
the past on a less than global scale; in the broad sweep of human his-
tory, indeed, the form of the state system has been the exception rather
than the rule.62
Bull envisages a dierentiation between “world order” and “international or-
der”. While the order of the states is eectively equated with the current dominant
form of international order, world order or “order among mankind” appears as
something wider, more “fundamental and primordial” and even “morally “ supe-
rior.e superiority of the idea of world order over international order lies in Bull’s
conviction that “the ultimate units of the great society of all mankind are not states
(or nations, tribes, empires, classes or parties) but individual human beings, which
are permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or
that sort are not”.63 e moral priority of world order as the ordering of the whole
of mankind as constituted by individuals over international order is justied by
Bull again with the evaluation of order as an ethical and social value, which comes
in a dened hierarchy of values. In the context of this ethical evaluation, the “or-
der among all mankind” is to be treated as the “primary value”, and as superior to
62Bull, ibidem, page 20–21.
63Bull, ibidem, page 21.
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the “order within the society of states”. Importantly, Bull also adds that: “If interna-
tional order does have value, this can only be because it is instrumental to the goal
of order in human society as a whole.”64
e idea of world order is therefore a moral and philosophical prius, but his-
torically it has emerged as a recognisable and tangible topic only aer the creation
of a global political system, in the form of inter-state order.is is the rst element
of Bull’s formulation of world order. e second important element is that Bull
seems to suggest that a pure world order is a form of social and political arrange-
ment which puts the individual, and not a collective social body, at the centre of
world political life. In this sense Bull seems to have anticipated, as later conrmed
by Barry Buzan’s work,65 a strong drive within the English school for the expansion
of the classical liberal-individualistic spirit from the domestic political realm of the
nation-state to a global dimension.
Bull puts at the centre of his conception of order the idea that order cannot
exist without the previous creation of a society: at the international level this has
been the case with the idea of international and inter-state order: these and any
other form of order need the creation of an underlying social order, as could be
the case with a world order based on individuals (and based no longer or, better,
no longer primarily on collective bodies such as states), which implies the previous
creation of a world society or, in Bull’s own words, the great society of all mankind.
is conception of world order is nevertheless rather problematic. As al-
ready highlighted with reference to Ian Harris’s critique, Bull’s reection seems
phenomenological rather than conceptual and analytical. It poses order both as
fact and as value, but it does not advance a theoretical argument which may con-
nect the two dimensions and make them co-exist. Furthermore, even accepting
the idea of order as a value, namely a value coming from a certain arrangement of
things in the world, and an arrangement dictated by some normative principle, it
64Bull, ibidem, page 21.
65Barry Buzan, From International to World Society. English Schooleory and the Social Structure of Global-
ization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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is still unclear, and it is le undetermined, what constitutes this order-value and
the underlying normative principle.
1.2.2.3 Friedrich Kratochwil
Friedrich Kratochwil’s 1978 book International Order and Foreign Policy66 repre-
sents a more direct approach to the problem of order in ir with a more philo-
sophically sophisticated perspective, encompassing the problem of change in the
succession of dierent models of order. Kratochwil embraces an openly monistic
position, in epistemological terms, which clearly anticipates his later theoretical
work as constructivist. His view on order rests on the basic assumption that “the
analysis of international order requires a study of the processes by which particular
conventions — or “rules of the game” [...] arise, persist, change and decay [...] cru-
cial to this approach is the belief that human action is “rule governed” and that in
the process of interaction, the meaning of the various moves on each side becomes
intelligible to the participants, when they start to acquire a common background
knowledge”.67
Kratochwil’s idea of order is directly inspired by Hume’s account of conven-
tions, i.e. an order based on the spontaneous development of norms via socialisa-
tion in absence of a central authority, norms arising from the iteration of bargain-
ing relationships. In conjunction to this aspect, Kratochwil distinguishes between
international order and world order, in a way not dissimilar from Bull’s, focusing
on the rst as the domain in which such processes of socialisation (largely, between
states) have taken place. Order for Kratochwil rests on the way in which interac-
tions are established between the various actors and are in turn dependent upon the
symbolic order in which the formulation of expectations, from the side of the actor,
takes shape: “in iterative bargains precedents, customs and traditions” which can
“serve as guide posts for structuring expectations, thus making the coordination
of choices possible.” Furthermore, “the availability of commonly shared symbols
66Friedrich Kratochwil, International Order and Foreign Policy, Boulder co: Westview Press, 1978.
67Kratochwil, ibidem, page 2.
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allows an assessment of the moves of the other party, and may therefore allow for
the development of interactions without major disappointments”.68
ese structured expectations are the key elements of order in Kratochwil’s ar-
gument, as they are dened as the “most decisive variable” in both the creation and
the maintenance of order, while force is only one of the various ways in which ex-
pectations are shaped and organised. Internationally, the structure of expectations
depends on historical experience and on norms evolving out of iterative bargains,
although such a structure is subject to periodical, recurrent collapses as “no over-
arching loyalties or interests can be invoked”. A second way to create order relies
instead upon the manipulation of the symbolic universe and in the shaping of per-
ceptions. Kratochwil argues that groups are formed “through the invocation of
shared symbols”, allowing for the establishment of patterns in human action and a
common public space open to all.69
Kratochwil dras in such a way an idea of order that can be both norma-
tive and explanatory, thus encompassing the two basic criteria already indicated
by Aron. His model appears to be open to both the dialectical change of world pol-
itics and the acceptance of normative elements that reduce its determinism, and
manage therefore to create a conceptual bridge between an analytical dimension
of description and explanation, and the moral elements that are included within
the reection on the formation of convention based on expectation and the sym-
bolic language that allows reciprocal interaction.
1.2.2.4 James Rosenau
Similar to Kratochwil’s conception of order in international politics is the one ad-
vanced by James Rosenau, according to whom “global order consists of those rou-
tinized arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in the
time to the next”.70 Rosenau is not exclusively interested in order, but in the rela-
68Kratochwil, ibidem, page 13.
69Kratochwil, ibidem, page 13.
70James Rosenau, “Governance, Change and Order inWorld Politics”, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst O. Czem-
piel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in International Relations, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992, page 5.
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tionship between order as a set of routinized arrangements, and governance, where
governance is intended as those “activities backed by shared goals that may or may
not derive from the legally and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not
necessarily rely on police powers to overcome deance and attain compliance”.
Alternatively, Rosenau denes governance as “a system of rule that works only
if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it af-
fects)”.71
Rosenau poses in his work an interesting set of questions about both the na-
ture of order and the relation that the concept has with the reality of world politics.
He tries to address the issue of the origin of order by explaining it as a mediation
between voluntary arrangements and patterns emerging involuntarily from the un-
predictable interaction of the agents. He also introduces the intuitive distinction
between order as analytic and order as normative concept, where the rst is dened
in terms of its nature as description, the second as judgement. Rosenau points out
how analytical denitions of order can be charged of being devoid of any normative
judgement, and how the normative ones can be accused of not being a suciently
accurate description of the reality. While on the one hand neglecting this distinc-
tion can lead to the “risk of either clouding sound analysis with preferred outcomes
or confounding preferred outcomes with empirically faulty recommendations”, on
the other hand “no degree of sensitivity can prevent some confusion along these
lines”.72 Further adding to the confusion, Rosenau argues that this dierentiation
of empirical and normative order can be better illustrated by considering whether
“global arrangements marked by a high degree of disorder are to be considered
as a form of order”, in the sense that, eventually, what appears to be disorder can
be still described as an ordered system (e.g. a system of conicts), given that “a
vast array of diverse arrangements can qualify as forms of order”. e descriptive,
analytical order can especially indicate the “arrangements through which global
aairs move through time”.73 Nevertheless, Rosenau seems to side with those who
“associate order with minimal degrees of stability and coherence, so that periods
71Rosenau, ibidem, page 4.
72Rosenau, ibidem, page 10.
73Rosenau, ibidem, page 10.
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[...] marked by wars, exploitation” and “other noxious practices” are viewed as dis-
order, chaos, entropy. According to this formulation, which does remain vague
in its constitutive elements, order should “have a positive, normative connotation”,
even if sometimes “too much stability and coherence can be expressive of stagnant
arrangements” allowing “little or no progress”.74
Order in Rosenau’s formulation is further characterised by degrees of com-
plexity, as there are eectively “layers” of empirical order. Order is not constituted
solely by one arrangement, but by a stratication of arrangements. Indeed, those
patterns which constitute the order of international politics “recur at diverse sites,
at dierent rates, in various forms” and all together they comprise an “organic
whole”, as each pattern shapes and it is shaped by the others”.75 At the fundamental
level, Rosenau distinguishes within order in international politics three dierent
level of patterns: 1) the “ideational or intersubjective” level of what people “dimly
sense”, “perceive” and understand, identies those “arrangements through which
their aairs are handled”; 2) the behavioural level of “what people regularly or rou-
tinely do, oen unknowlingly, to maintain the prevailing global arrangements”; 3)
the “aggregate or political level”, namely the institutions and their reciprocal rela-
tions.76 Rosenau is also interested in the problem of change and in the transition
between dierent forms of order, which can be explained as the product of alter-
ation in one of the envisaged patterns, although this is not a satisfactory answer, as it
“ignores the key question of what underlies changes in the ideational, behavioural,
and institutional dynamics”. e exploration of this change appears to be partic-
ularly problematic, as the description and explanation of those patterns is in turn
dependent upon a plethora of scientic, normative, methodological and philosoph-
ical assumptions. Eventually then, there are “no nal answers to these questions”,
because “much depends on how order and change are conceptualised”.77
Despite being able to grasp a number of key points with reference to the prob-
lem of order, namely its complexity and its dependence upon a number of under-
74Rosenau, ibidem, page 11.
75Rosenau, ibidem, page 12.
76Rosenau, ibidem, page 14.
77Rosenau, ibidem, page 19.
52
1.2 order in the domain of ipt/ir theory
lying puzzles, the empirical and normative dimension and the problems of change,
Rosenau appears little interested in deepening the investigation about this concept,
while he decisively turns towards the analysis of questions which are pertinent to
the “unfolding international scene”.78
1.2.2.5 Robert McKinlay and Richard Little
A text addressing the issue of order in its constitutive elements is the 1986 book
by Robert D. McKinlay and Richard Little Global Problems and World Order.e
authors developed the core idea of order as a pattern, by highlighting the possible
existence of amultitude of equally recognisable patterns, once dierent epistemolo-
gies are applied to the same puzzle.79 eir reection about the nature of order in
international politics and social science more generally is formulated primarily by
taking into account the epistemological side of the identication of patterns within
a given puzzle. Knowledge is dened as the accumulation of explanatory patterns,
each of which is the product of a dierent epistemological approach, where episte-
mology is conceptualised as a “collection of methodological rules containing pos-
tulates and rules of inquiry”. As “there is no one body of knowledge but as many
bodies as there are epistemologies”, so there are also dierent recognisable patterns
within the same set of data being studied, and dierent orders. McKinlay and Lit-
tle push this rather radical view on the dierentiation of epistemologies and the
derived images of order as much to write:
ere are then many orders, each dependent on its own epistemology,
and since any epistemology can only be understood in terms of its own
rules, when then bodies of knowledge, based on dierent epistemolo-
gies, come into conict, that conict must be irreconciliable.80
While this is considered valid in general for any idea of order, more speci-
cally in the case of social sciences and clearly of ir studies what is considered order
must entail a further element of purpose or meaning. An order is only such when
78Rosenau, ibidem, page 20.
79Robert D. McKinlay and Richard Little, Global Problems and World Order, London: Frances Pinter, 1986.
80McKinlay and Little, ibidem, page 14.
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it is functional for the attainment of a certain aim, what the authors identify as
goal satisfaction. In the example of a set of books to be ordered on a bookshelf, it
is clearly possible to identify dierent criteria of order (from the thinnest to the
thickest, from the oldest to the newest and so on), but order in this case can only
make full sense if we entail the relation that the collection of books will have with
the person who is going to use those books, and therefore its interest in an order
which is functional for a certain goal satisfaction. From here, McKinlay and Little
arrive at their second conceptualisation of order, which must always “specify [an]
underlying goal”, as order is precisely dened “in terms of goal satisfaction or goal
attainment”. On the other hand, disorder and problems arise when this goal is not
achieved. ere is a continuity between the two denitions of order thus formu-
lated, lying namely in the fact that “any goal will be based, wittingly or unwittingly,
on a structural arrangement or pattern deemed necessary to pursue the goal.”e
structural arrangement becomes comprehensible only in the context of the goal.81
e problem of order is therefore decisively shaped by the purpose of the ordering
exercise, something that is outside the concept of order itself, and which belongs
to the realm of normative propositions.ese two authors continue in their book
with an analysis of the various conceptions of purposive order, inspired by dier-
ent ideological settings (liberal, socialist, realist) pointing to the divergent roots of
the various purposes and epistemologies, thus making an argument for the fun-
damental incommensurability of dierent formulations of order, as they depend
upon dierent sets of operational rules which regulate pattern identication and
creation.ese rules identify patterns as such “when otherwise disparate informa-
tion is arrayed in a coherentmanner”, and “pattern-creating is that process whereby
coherence and structure are provided in an area that would otherwise simply rep-
resent a confusion or a disarray”.82
WhileMcKinlay and Little could, in this early discussion of order and ir, iden-
tify some of the key characteristic of the issue, it also appears that their formulation
leaves at least three sets of questions unexplored: rst, the nature of this purpose,
and the relation between the agent/knower, the order and the purpose: a constella-
81McKinlay and Little, ibidem, page 16.
82McKinlay and Little, ibidem, page 268.
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tion that can be eectively expanded to comprehend the epistemological roots of
pattern recognition and the possible incommensurability of alternative epistemo-
logical perspectives (something of a Kuhnian argument); second, the problem of
change in order, and the shi between dierent purposes, epistemologies, and ulti-
mately dierent ideas of order; third, a clear distinction between order as “fact” (is
there an order in the world “out there”? Is the world in a state of order? Dowe need
a new order? And so on) or order as idea or project (how do we think about order?
How do we philosophically construct the purpose and the structure that an order
should entail?). Finally, these two authors, while they envisage an important point
when they identify the constitutive link between epistemological discourses and
conceptualisations of order, tend to confer to epistemologies amonolithic structure
which does not get problematised in the development of their argument.e later
insurgence of constructivism and other orientations in ir studies, characterised
by eclectic epistemological positions, suggests instead that clear-cut classications
of typologies of order in relation to the underlying epistemologies may well be an
oversimplication of the issue.
1.2.2.6 Stanley Homann
Stanley Homann has addressed the issue of order in its declination as “interna-
tional order” or “world order” in his essay “Is ere an International Order?”.83
Homann begins by considering that “the problem of world order is quite dier-
ent from that of domestic political order”, i.e. order among the social groups living
within the same political unit.is dierence is chiey attributable, in Homann’s
view, to anarchy (i.e. absence of central power above the units) and to “the ab-
sence or weakness of common norms”. He highlights the immediate emergence
of the double nature of the question of dening order as both analytical and nor-
mative, eventually encompassed by the question: “can there be both anarchy and
order?”.84 Homann conducts his inquiry about order along rather established
lines, essentially presenting an historical reconstruction of the various kinds of or-
83Stanley Homann, “Isere an International Order?”, in Janus and Minerva: Essays in theeory and Prac-
tice of International Politics, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987, pages 85- 121.
84Homann, ibidem, pages 85–86.
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der (based on empires, feudal structures and sovereign states), before presenting
a short reection about the way in which international political order has been
conceptualised. Again, this reection occurs largely in relation to a historical nar-
rative of established philosophical formulations, and leads to the identication of
twomodels.e rst model of order is that of “precarious peace or troubled order”,
which emerged out of the collapse of the theology-based Medieval order, yielding
“to the pressure of facts”, namely with the “appearance of the modern territorial
state of absolute sovereignty, the loss of authority by the pope and the church, the
secularization of natural law”. is form of order is characterised by the core pre-
occupation of coordinating forces “capable of ensuing a minimum of order”, forces
resulting from the “common sociability and common interests”, and directed to-
wards the creation and maintenance of common norms, i.e. of international law.85
e second model of order which has been historically advanced with the aim of
nding a philosophical systematisation of modern international politics has been
based on “the idea of war”, whereby “in the relations among states, everything is
war or the preparation of war”, while “common norms are fragile, temporary to the
quantity of power that supports them, dependent on a momentary convergence of
interests”.is second model, constructed on the literary reference ofucydides
and the reections ofMachiavelli, had its greatest theorist inomas Hobbes, who
formulated it “in its purest form”. 86
Homann utilises here a quite established conception of order within ir liter-
ature, one that does not go into the discussion of the very idea of order per se, but
focuses on an intuitively common perception of the topic in ir literature, well es-
tablished aer Bull’s main book on the topic, to which Homann explicitly refers.
is somehow simplistic handling of the problem of order enables him to move
forward with the discussion of the kind of order relevant to the time in which he
was writing, namely the later phase of the cold war. But the key features of order as
a theoretical concept still remain unexplored, as Homann fundamentally equates
order in its dierent formulations with the divergent ontological theories of inter-
national politics.
85Homann, ibidem, page 93.
86Homann, ibidem, page 93.
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1.2.2.7 Richard Falk
Richard Falk has attempted a systematisation of the issue of order in international
studies since the 1970s, with the launch of a research programme denominated
World Order Project Model (womp). e womp was essentially a research pro-
gramme developed in the us, aimed at critically re-assessing ir studies in relation
to normative values that could lead to the transcendence of the state-based system
of international relations. In Falk’s own words:
Founded on dissatisfactionwith the professional judgment that a statist
framework of world politics is here to stay, the world order approach
critically examines the durability and adequacy of statism, proposes
alternative political frameworks and considers strategies and scenarios
that might facilitate the transition to a post-statist type of world order.
Furthermore, it takes the realization of values (peacefulness, economic
well- being, social and political justice, ecological balance, and human
governance), rather than materialistic and technological gains, as the
decisive criterion of progress in human aairs.87
e womp focused on a series of “global issues” of inequality, poverty, access
to education, freedom etc. and proposed alternative views that could be more ef-
fective in tackling them than the dominant realist paradigm. is approach was
formulated as a combination of “analytic, empirical, ideological, and normative
concerns” in the denition of new world order, namely one which “involves study-
ing the extent to which a given past, present or future arrangement of power and
authority is able to realize a set of human values”. ose values have to be bene-
cial to all people, applicable to the whole world and must have some “objectivity
by their connection with a conception of basic human needs, as required for the
healthy development of the human person”.88
87Richard Falk,e End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations, New York and London
: Holmes & Meier, 1983, page 35.
88Falk, ibidem, pages 45–46.
57
1.2 order in the domain of ipt/ir theory
Falk’s work appears largely concentrated on order as a given state of aairs,
and his main preoccupation is to change that order, by proposing alternative ways
of organising human life. He relied on a distinction between international order
and world order that is indeed closed to Bull’s earlier formulation, and he under-
stood world order as the way in which the life of mankind as a supreme collectivity
can be organised.ewomp is therefore dominated by normative preoccupations
which stem from a cosmopolitan understanding of the world and the obsolescence,
and the inadequacy, of a state-based form of order, indeed a recurrent theme in ir
literature at least from its early founders (also E.H. Carr envisaged this possibility)
and continued today in various forms from dierent perspectives.
e main critique that can be raised against thewomp and Falk’s understand-
ing of order is the missing “dialectical” sense that the idea of order should entail.
Falk tends to focus on the contingent dominant world order (the state- based or-
der) while proposing alterations to it, and the introduction into the ir debate of
dierent instances. But what is missing is a broader reection on the nature of
order itself, how a certain order can arise, and evolve and be dismissed.e prob-
lem of change, in other words, as highlighted by Aron’s formulation of the issue,
remains underdeveloped in Falk’s work.
1.2.2.8 John Hall and T.V. Paul
John A. Hall andazha Varkey Paul,89 have oered a brief reection on the na-
ture of order in international studies, one which nevertheless captures and redis-
covers a number of interesting and important points. ey correctly frame the
problem of order as one of special complexity and therefore as open to controver-
sies, mainly because order “carries normative and ideological connotations” which
are in turn based on how social, political and economic systems are formulated.
ere is hence a latent relativism which is inherent in a certain perception of order,
since “order and peace to one group of nations and may be perceived dierently
by another”. Even more importantly, “dierences also arise due to the normative
89JohnA.Hall andazhaVarkey Paul (eds.), International Order and the Future ofWorld Politics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
58
1.2 order in the domain of ipt/ir theory
concern as to whether order implies a minimum condition of co-existence”, where
co-existence, a phrase that recalls both Aron’s and Homann’s discussion of order,
is articulated as the avoidance of “destructive warfare”, or, again quotingHomann,
an international arrangement allowing thewell-being and prosperity of all political
communities. Hall and Paul seem to concentrate, however, on the rst aspect of
co-existence and avoidance of full-scale military confrontations, especially in the
nuclear age, where therefore “the success of an international order is predicated on
the extent to which it can accommodate change without violence”.90
1.2.3 Mapping IReory Literature/Nicholas Rengger
Over a decade from it publication in 2000, Nicholas Rengger’s book International
Relations, Politicaleory and the Problem of Order still represents the standard ref-
erence on the concept of order within ir studies.91 While already Richard Falk had
envisaged the possibility of classifying the various ir theories according to their at-
titude towards the currently prevalent world arrangement into dierent categories,
Rengger has been able to carry out this project in a more accomplished way with
a rational investigation of the various fundamental positions in relation to order,
and consequently to read the entire landscape of ir theories from the viewpoint
of order and its conceptualisation. Rengger’s classicatory work is worth retaining
not only as it allows a partial overcoming of the limited amount of direct work on
the specic topic of order that it is possible to nd and reference, given the di-
culties that ir as a discipline has encountered in articulating a clear answer to the
question.92 It also represents a way in which it is possible to make the question of
order emerge from the implicit language of ir theories on this point, where the cat-
egory of order, although rarely scrutinised in an analytical fashion, is nevertheless
oen present.
90Hall and Paul, ibidem, page 2.
91Nicholas Rengger, International Relations, Politicaleory and the Problem of Order. Beyond International
Relationseory?, London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
92Rengger, ibidem, page 17.
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On the other hand, there is of course a series of limits that it is possible to en-
visage in such classicatory work. Firstly, as in every taxonomic exercise, there are
uncertain cases of attribution, and somehow arbitrary borders have to be drawn be-
tween contiguous theoretical perspectives. As every scholar familiar with ir theory
knows, already the canonical divisions between classes of theories (realism, liber-
alism, constructivism and so forth), which represent what are euphemistically re-
ferred to as “schools of thought”, “traditions” or “umbrella terms”, somehowpresent
an unavoidable oversimplication. On the other hand, this kind of simplication
appears dicult to overcome for didactical, and, in connection to this aspect, for
general orientation purposes. General taxonomic mapping of ir theory usually
proceeds on an already ambiguous criterion of labelling each theoretical work on
the basis of its ontological and/or epistemological foundations. e ambiguity of
this mapping is already inherent in the lack of uniformity in the guiding criterion,
given the absence of a stable denition of ontology for this particular social scien-
tic domain, and its complex relation to epistemological questions.93
Aer the publication of Rengger’s book on order in 2000, the landscape of ir
theory has not undergone signicant revolutions or radical transformations. e
main theoretical strands are largely the evolution or integration of paradigms and
research programmes which oen existed already during the 1990s, or even before.
Of particular interest from the perspective of the problem of order has been the
proliferation of works in the eld of “global justice”, and the broadening borders of
critical theory, which has further enhanced the status of historical sociology, neo-
Marxism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and feminist theory within the dis-
cipline.
e growth of global justice scholarship has produced attempts at synthetis-
ing, with a variable degree of success, instances issuing from emancipatory thrusts
with the re-conceptualisation of international institutions and international organ-
isation at a global level.e “global justice” ir literature has therefore concentrated
on the images of “global citizenship” and the social institutions which are supposed
93See on this point, Patrickaddeus Jackson,e Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy
of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics, London: Routledge, 2011.
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to give meaning to such a citizenship, and on “global governance”, namely the set
of legal and organisational arrangements which are seen as necessary in order to
tackle problems for which the nation states, even the most powerful ones, cannot
successfully act in isolation. is set of debates has generated even more integra-
tion between paradigmatic distinctions within ir theory, particularly between crit-
ical theory and liberal political theories, proving taxonomic exercises even more
challenging.94
e development of a richer critical literature in ir theory, particularly in
the direction of neo-Marxist and post-structuralist tendencies, and largely built
around the methodological tool of genealogical enquiry and conceptual decon-
struction, has further contributed to the relativisation of the boundaries between
strands of ir theory, by showing the historical and conceptual overlap of many
theoretical positions when observed from dierent viewpoints, namely the Marx-
ist critique of political economy, the feminist gender-based critique, and the post-
colonial critique against Eurocentrism.
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a number of limits to the classicatory
work of ir theories in relation to the problem of order, and the time elapsed from
the publication of Rengger’s book, his taxonomy exercise can still be regarded as
a useful tool for the sake of orientation and for a rational arrangement of an oth-
erwise hardly manageable material, when the limits of this classication are taken
into account, even more so when considering the latest developments in ir theory.
1.2.3.1 e Management of Order/Balance
Rengger operates a rst distinction between those theories which are exclusively
interested in an analysis of the world, its description and explanations, and those
which have a normative content and are therefore aimed at understanding the
world in order to promote a change, in a particular direction or telos.95
94Cf.omas Brooks, Global Justice and International Aairs, Leiden and Boston ma: Brill, 2012; Stephen C.
Roach, Criticaleory of International Politics : Complementarity, Justice, and Governance, London and New
York: Routledge, 2010; Kimberly Hutchings, Global Ethics: An Introduction, Cambridge ad Maiden ma: Polity
Press, 2010.
95Rengger, ibidem, pages 21 ss.
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To the rst “family” of theories Rengger attributes all those theories which
address order as an issue to be managed. e management of order is based on
the general acceptance of the practices of politics, and particularly for the mod-
ern world, of those practices arising from the politics of state sovereignty. Since
sovereignty and the structures of the state-system are understood as a non-modi-
able (at least non totally, and not in the present time) feature of the world, the
question of order is framed as the fashion in which those given elements can be
organised to avoid catastrophic outcomes (and especially war), but it also oen en-
tails cosmopolitan elements that can partially transcend the state-centred image of
world politics.e opposite approach to world order is based instead on the prob-
lematisation of the way in which world politics, and the issue of world order within
it, is normally understood, through the deconstruction of the various concepts on
which it rests, such as sovereignty, power, war, peace and so on.
Rengger distinguishes three groups of theorists whose understanding of order
is based on the preoccupation of its management, namely those who see order as
emerging from balance, or from forms of societal cooperation, and nally from
institutionalised regulative mechanisms.96 Clearly this classication encompasses
a large variety of theoretical positions, based on sets of very diverse political and
philosophical positions.
e management of order through balance is a characteristic feature of realist
theories of ir. Balance is predicated on the situation of anarchy where political
actors in the international domain have to operate.e concept of order emerging
from ir theories, based on an analysis of the conditions of balance (and the study of
imbalances and their consequences), is one in which “order” tends to be coinciden-
tal with an overall equilibrium of strategic forces.is conception of international
politics and order within it, as summarised by Michael J. Smith in his investiga-
tion about the realist tradition,97 rests on a series of axiomatic assumptions: the
universality of human nature, despite the variety of its manifestations, and within
this nature the inclination towards domination (animus dominandi); the hierarchi-
96Rengger, ibidem, page 22 ss.
97Michael J. Smith, Realistought fromWeber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1986.
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cally superior position of the collectivity vis-à-vis the individual in the ordering
of social life, which is chiey reected in the supreme role assumed by the state
in modern international politics; the ubiquitous and unavoidable character of the
pursuit of power by individuals and collectivities; and lastly, the possibility of oper-
ating a rational analysis of international politics precisely because this is ruled by
general laws governing human actions.e realist conception of order as balance is
therefore predicated on the mutual constraints generated by competing thrusts for
power, coming fromdierent actors. Since the key features of politics are not prone
to change, this excludes the possibility of a continuous modication of the driving
forces and principles of politics, which remain in their basic dynamics always the
same, and their historical patterns show a tendency to reproduce themselves over
and over.
Order as balance also poses, however, a tragic choice between the rules of
Machtpolitik and the moral implication of its consequences. In a famous passage
also quoted by Rengger, Morgenthau has summarised the dicult, if not impossi-
ble, coexistence of political and moral orders as follows:
To act successfully, that is according to the rules of the political art, is po-
litical wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably
evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among sev-
eral expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgement. In the
combination of political wisdom, moral courage and moral judgement
man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. at this
conciliation is nothing more than amodus vivendi, uneasy, precarious,
and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss
over and distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the
soothing logic of a specious accord.98
Within such a context, and in the framework of the abovementioned assump-
tions underpinning realist international political thought, order can only be the
98Hans Morgenthau, Scientic Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946, page 203; cf.
Rengger,e Problem of Order, page 42.
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way in which the world of politics and the moral destiny of manmay try to coexist,
albeit in a precarious way and only to a limited degree:
[...] in the absence of an integrated international society, the attainment
of a modicum of order and the realisation of a minimum of moral val-
ues are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable
of preserving order and realisingmoral values within the limits of their
power.99
Order is therefore primarily conceivable as domestic order, i.e. order within
the boundaries of a political community, or a state in the modern formulation of
political life. Outside the border of states, and between states, order can only be
conceived as a situation arising from the reciprocal strategic posture of the various
units and the management of the resulting system of rivalries and alliances.
As again noticed by Rengger, in the passage from classical realism to neo-
realism and with the introduction of microeconomic analysis to the study of inter-
national politics, the discussion on balance becomes more technically concerned
with the renement of its scientic criteria, while it loses its concerns about human
nature and the moral destiny of man, thus suggesting a conception of order that is
solely dependent upon the mechanics of the structure of inter- state politics.is
way of addressing the problem of order, from Kenneth Waltz’seory of Interna-
tional Politics,100 has been extremely important since the success of Waltz’s theory,
which has dominated ir studies in the last three decades. is has had profound
implications in diverting the attention for order as a topic, simply because the bal-
ance of power, as conceptualised by Waltz, “is not couched in terms of a response
to the problem of order”.is happens because neo-realism ceases to see order as
a problem, while it reduces it “simply to the status of an ‘organizing principle’ of a
systemwith no normative warrant at all”. Neo-realism turns decisively its attention
away from the problem of order, while concerning itself with other questions.101
99Hans Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination, London: Methuen, 1952, page 98.
100Kenneth Waltz,eory of International Politics, Reading (ma): Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1979.
101Rengger,e Problem of Order, page 49.
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Later developments of realist ir theories have not signicantly changed the
picture in relation to order, as order has remained largely an issue of “management”,
and little or no analytical exploration of the concept itself. Randall L. Schweller’s
neoclassical realism has distanced itself partially from the neo-realist argument by
advocating the recovering of investigation in both domestic political structures and
the formation and exercise of leadership for the understanding of international pol-
itics, which is therefore not exclusively shaped by structural arrangements and the
mutual interaction of the various units. Schweller has advanced the opinion that
“complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts that channel, medi-
ate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces”. ese processes
and their study are the key to understanding why “states oen react dierently to
similar systemic pressures and opportunities” precisely because “their responses
may be less motivated by systemic level factors than domestic ones”.102 But the
problem of order continues to remain framed as a question of management. e
same re-proposition of order as an issue to be managed can be found, albeit from
opposed perspectives, both in defensive and oensive structural realism.e rst,
largely developed by the same Kenneth Waltz in his later works,103 and by Charles
L. Glaser,104 explains the international behaviour of states as dictated by security
concerns and mutual threats in a competing environment.e second, largely for-
mulated by John J. Mearsheimer in hise Tragedy of Great Power Politics,105 while
it accepts the main tenets of the realist tradition, explains the behaviour of great
powers, predominantly in a historical perspective, as the product of policies aimed
at the maximisation of power, including the achievement of regional hegemony.
102Randall L. Schweller,Unansweredreats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princetonnj: Prince-
ton University Press, 2006, page 6.
103Cf. Kenneth Waltz, “e Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition”, in Ira Kaznelson and Helen V. Milner
(eds.), Political Science: State of the Discipline, New York: Norton, 2002.
104Charles L. Glaser, “e Necessary andNatural Evolution of Structural Realism”, in JohnA. Vasquez andColin
Elman (eds.), Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, Upper Saddle River, nj: Prentice Hall, 2003.
105John J. Mearsheimer,e Tragedy of Great Power Politics, London and New York: Norton, 2001.
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1.2.3.2 e Management of Order/Social Institutions and Organisations
In his classication of ir theories in their approaches to the question of order, the
second set of theories based on the idea ofmanagement of order is grounded in the
view that actors in the international realm do not live in a Hobbesian state of war,
but form, rather, a (however imperfect) society of some sort, i.e. an international
society.
While this concept has famously become the distinctive mark of the English
School, from the perspective of the problem of order the group of theories that go
under this category is denitely broader, and encompasses also all those authors
who see order in international politics as the result of established rules and social
practices, and hence order as a product of social interaction among the various
actors. is comprises therefore also a large part of constructivist theories. eir
answer to the problem of order, as already illustrated in the case of Hedley Bull, is
that order is a function of the social realm which produces it, in various dierent
degrees of depth. e existence of order in a certain time in world politics de-
pends on the health of the social bonds between the actors. But this in turn shis
the problem to the denition of order in an anarchical society, its nature and lim-
its, which is eectively the central topic in the critique of both the English School,
and constructivism. For Tim Dunne, “since states are the legitimate containers for
cultural dierence, the task for international society is to formulate norms and pro-
cedures” with the specic task of “separating and cushioning the units in the state
system”.106 Of course, English School theorists and constructivists have been preoc-
cupied with a progressive renement of their respective theories in the direction of
identifying and explaining the components of the social bonds which are supposed
to enhance and regulate inter-state relations, and hence international order. While
for the constructivist Nicholas Onuf this has led to an inquiry into the nature of
norms and specically about the formation of international law and international
106Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School, New York: St. Martin Press,
1998, page 11.
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institutions,107 for the English School scholar Barry Buzan this has signied the
investigation of ways in which the concept of international society may become
less reliant on methodologically opaque historical narratives and be re-formulated
instead on more systematic sociological foundations, characterised by greater con-
ceptual precision.108
Complementary to the conceptualisation of international order through in-
ternational social institutions, the third approach for the management of order is
based on the idea that order can be achieved by limiting the sovereignty of states
with the creation of supra-national organisations.is approach to order has been
especially important for the development of ir as discipline, since it has historically
represented the rst set of proposals coming from professional ir scholars for the
formulation andmanagement of international order, namely in the works of the in-
terwar liberal internationalists.109e institutional approach has a long tradition in
ir studies and expresses directly an established liberal view on politics at large.e
mainstream liberal view on order is characterised, as for the other two approaches
which understand order as an issue to be managed, by the acceptance of the basic
features of international politics as the product of sovereignty and state politics.
But according to Rengger, there is a series of cultural characteristics which has led
to the formulation of a specic liberal understanding of order: fear of the arbitrary
exercise of power (“liberalism of fear”);110 constitutional liberalism, individualism
and what he labels “cognitive liberalism”, i.e. the tendency to rely on scientic or
philosophical legitimation of political practices, aimed at maximising a set of har-
moniously existing liberties for all members of any given group, although not all
liberal authors share this last point.111 What ties together authors as diverse as Isa-
iah Berlin, William Kymlicka and John Rawls with their respective re-formulation
of the liberal tradition is the view on order whose “emphasis is on rights and, sub-
107Nicholas Onuf,World of OurMaking: Rules and Rule in Socialeory and International Relations, Columbia:
University of South California Press, 1989; “Institutions, Intentions and International Relations”, in Review of
International Studies, 28, 2002, pages 211–228.
108Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English Schooleory and the Social Structure of Global-
ization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
109David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), inkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis. Inter-War Idealism Reassessed.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
110Rengger, ibidem, page 103.
111Rengger, ibidem, page 104.
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sequently, on the conditions for securing such rights, in the rst place an emphasis
on constitutional forms and practices”. ese forms and practices have gradually
evolved into the contemporary set of domestic liberal-democratic institutions and
rules which form the constitutional architecture of states in theWestern world and
have been gradually extended aerwwii to a large part of the world’s states. At in-
ternational level, only a partial replication of such domestic order has been imple-
mented, following the same key principles of political organisation. International
institutions have been created with the aim of consolidating, and possibly, enhanc-
ing such rights and practices, but still within the framework of a world “largely
composed of sovereign states whose behaviour patterns are [...] determined by
their domestic political regime.” But this has to be complemented with social “obli-
gations and responsibilities”, which ensure a minimum of international order, par-
ticularly through the instruments of international law, operating “by virtue of the
express consent given by states”.112
is way of conceptualising the management of order in international poli-
tics has expressed itself in various ways, which are not always easy to distinguish
from the previously explained “institutional” approach, or from instances of the
broader “problematisation” of the order question, as it will be described below.e
study of international organisations within ir theory covers a very broad spectrum:
from Stephen Krasner’s essentially realist approach,113 which contains nevertheless
the foundations for a whole theory of “international regimes” constraining the be-
haviour of sovereign states via legal obligations and organisations, to functional-
ist positions concerned with the integration of state sovereignty and intergovern-
mental “governance”, the seminal works of David Mitrany114 and Ernst Haas are
exemplary here,115 until the latest developments, particularly in the direction of
112Rengger, ibidem, pages 105–106.
113Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, in
International Organization 36/2 (spring), 1982, pages 185–208. Also in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International
Regimes, Ithaca ny: Cornell University Press, 1983.
114David Mitrany, “Functional Approach to World Organization”, in International Aairs, Vol. 23, 1948, pages
350–363; A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966;e Functionaleory of Politics, New
York: St .Martin’s Press, 1976.
115Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1964.
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Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism,116 and nally towards the re-evaluation
of international organisations as tools for a global governance in the context of a
direct critique of the sovereign state, as found largely in David Held,117 omas
Pogge118 and Andrew Linklater.119 In these last authors, however, the management
of international order through the strengthening of international organisation in-
creasingly blends with more radical instances for the critical problematisation of
order, one which is supposed to subordinate the question of order to the hierarchi-
cally superior question, in a normative perspective, of human emancipation in the
international realm. is ambivalence may well be explained with dierent possi-
ble readings of Kant’s work, which oscillates between the two poles of the preser-
vation of inter-state peace (and order), and the expansion of civil liberties up to
the point of questioning the division of mankind into dierent political groupings,
and of highlighting instead cosmopolitanism as the path forwards for humanity.
is second possible interpretation has been particularly prominent in ir theory
following the famous labelling of Kant by Martin Wight as the key thinker of “rev-
olutionism”,120 as opposed to the realist (Hobbesian) and rationalist (Grotian) tra-
ditions.
1.3 the problematisation of order / critical theories
e classication of existing ir theories in relation to the problemof order, once the
category of “ordermanagement” has been exhausted, has been pursued by Rengger
116Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, in Antje Wiener and
omas Diez (eds.) European Integrationseory, New York: Campus, 2009, pages 67–87.
117David Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; Global Covenant: e Social
Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, Oxford: Polity, 2004.
118omas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, second edi-
tion, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008; Realizing Rawls, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
119Andrew Linklater,Men andCitizens in theeory of International Relations, London: MacMillan Press, 1982;
e Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1998; Critical eory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity, London: Routledge,
2007; e Problem of Harm in World Politics: eoretical Investigations, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
120MartinWight, Internationaleory: theree Traditions, edited by GabrieleWight and Brian Porter, Leices-
ter: Leicester University Press fore Royal Institute of International Aairs, 1994.
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with the creation of a second family of responses to the issue.121 is secondmacro-
group of theories should encompass all those theoretical approaches whose main
focus is the development of a critique to the dominant narrative of international
order as inter-state and inter-sovereign order. ese answers to the question of
order discuss ways in which inter-state order should be transcended, either in the
direction of emancipation, where interstate order has to be overhauled in favour of
a new conception that would rest on entirely dierent normative and philosophical
foundations, or in the re-interpretation of the question itself. is second line of
thought can ultimately lead to the discovery of the limits of the quest for order and
the de-construction of the related question.
e problematisation of order occurs therefore with dierent results, but pro-
ceeds in its essence fromaquestioning of the knowledge claims that underpin other
positions. is happens in a variety of ways, from the evaluation of the logical
coherence of dominant ir theory paradigms within a philosophical-analytical per-
spective, to the historical investigation of concepts, their genealogy anddeconstruc-
tion, to the discussion of social ontologies, epistemologies and the related norma-
tive implications. Problematisation is therefore characterised by various degrees of
self-reection, i.e. the explicit appreciation of the foundational problems underly-
ing every knowledge claim and their open discussion. Problematisation attempts
therefore to position itself as a defence against ideology as false consciousness, and
it is in this sense critical.122
e “emancipation” from a state-centred conceptualisation of international
politics has been promoted as a revisionist tendency against the prevailing theo-
retical orientation and the empirical state of aairs since the onset of the modern
condition, of which the state is the more characteristic political projection. e
key philosophical authors to provide the theoretical foundations for this line of
thought are easily identiable in the gures of Kant (as briey mentioned above)
and Marx, since both advocated in their writings new ways for an understanding
of international politics which was no longer exclusively concerned, as illustrated
121See Rengger,e Problem of Order, pages 143–188.
122Cf. Raymond Geuss,e Idea of a Criticaleory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981, page 12 ss.
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above, with its management but its transformation. At the very core of these pro-
posals for transformation lies a normative dimension, i.e. the idea of emancipation
as liberation from the “self-incurred tutelage” (selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit, as
in Kant’s famous denition ofWhat is the Enlightenment?) of those whose freedom
is constrained not only by the chains of oppression, domination and economic
exploitation (for Marx), but also of intellectual self-imposed limitedness (hence
the Kantian sapere aude!). e political reection at the international level devel-
ops therefore from the consideration that the rise of a truly free body of citizens
is not possible in an oppressive institutional context, both domestically and inter-
nationally. It is, in this sense, not an “authentic” order whose structural patterns
are not sustained by true justice.e problematisation of this false order requires,
in the current context, the re-discussion of the state-centred system and the re-
formulation of international political order on dierent propositions, which tran-
scend the state and its limits.123
ir authors who have engaged with this theoretical perspective have arrived
at this critical approach from dierent angles; although most of them share roots
in a common Kantian-Marxian ground the selection of arguments from these two
Urväter and their arrangement can greatly vary. It is possible to recognise at least
three main currents: one is directly related to the Frankfurt School, and particu-
larly its main contemporary heir, namely Jürgen Habermas. e second can be
related to Gramsci and his conception of hegemony. Its most important exponents
are Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Craigh Murphy. e third current can be seen
as deriving more directly fromMarxian themes and nds its main representatives
in Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg. Emancipation as the way of understanding
the problem of order invariably entails a double argument: a demonstration of the
arbitrariness, or even injustice of the present arrangement, and the proposal for a
new one, whose foundations can dier from one author to the next; they ultimately
all share, however, the conviction that order can exist, but it must be a dierent one.
123On this point, particularly noteworthy is the work of Andrew Linklater, as it will be addressed more sys-
tematically below, especially ine Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-
westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998; Critical eory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty
and Humanity, London: Routledge, 2007.
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e heirs of the Frankfurt School within contemporary ir theory can be iden-
tied largely with a group of theorists who have tried to translate in the ir domain
the sociological and political work of Jürgen Habermas, Habermas actually start-
ing to contribute directly to the international debate from the early 1990s onwards.
Besides the already mentioned David Held and Andrew Linklater, emancipatory
ir theory on Habermasian foundations also characterises the works of Christian
Reus-Smit,124omas Risse,125 Richard Shapcott,126 and Marc Lynch.127 As will be
illustrated in more detail in the Chapter 3, the relation between Habermas and ir
is complex and not free from contradictions. For the limited purpose of assessing
the role of this strand of theory in the context of the problematisation of order, it
is important to frame the integration of Habermas within ir critical theory within
the context of a multidimensional attempt to ground philosophical, sociological
and political discourses. is multidimensionality consists indeed in Habermas’s
outstanding intellectual eort in envisaging a critical theory which can respond
to a multiplicity of challenges: rstly, identifying and conceptualising stable foun-
dations for a renewed normative thinking, which he nds in a philosophical sci-
ence of language and intersubjective communication; this represents an attempt
to overhaul the tradition of German idealism on the one hand, and the limits of
WesternMarxism on the other, while integrating elements of Rortian pragmatism;
secondly, reinstating a philosophical discourse of emancipation, both at theoretical
level in terms of its denition, and in designing a new praxis to achieve it; thirdly,
in connection to the rst point, creating a historical narrative of the modern era
which may recover a prudent optimism about the future of philosophical reason
against existentialist despair, namely by recovering the project of Enlightenment;
fourthly, translating all this intellectual eort into a political commitment, which
passes through a re-denition of forms of democratic legitimation, with the cen-
124Christian Reus-Smit,e Moral Purpose of the State, Princetonma: Princeton University Press, 1999; “Imag-
ining Society: Constructivism and the English School”, in British Journal of Politics and International Relations,
4, 2002, pages 487–509; (ed.)e Politics of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
125omas Risse, “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics”, in International Organization, 54, 1,
Winter 2000, pages 1–39.
126Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001.
127Marc Lynch,e Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres, inMillennium: Journal of Inter-
national Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pages 307–330.
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trality of the public sphere, and the parallel critique of capitalism, particularly in its
neo-liberal fashion, whenever the development of market economies may become
an obstacle to political representation and the free participation of citizens in open,
public debates.
e translation into ir theory of Habermas’s philosophical, sociological and
political critical theory entails a conception of order which not only responds to
the issue of prioritizing emancipation over order, and therefore of envisaging new
forms of order which have to give way to emancipatory processes;it also intends to
respond to the requisites of a self-reective theoretical work, grounded in a criti-
cally established concept of rationality. Order should therefore descend from this
renewed concept of rationality, arising from intersubjective dialogue, in the con-
text of a set of conditions (material and immaterial) which should prevent, as far
as possible, the distortion of such communication. Order therefore exists, inHaber-
masian terms, at least as a set of formal requirements and preconditions, which do
not determine how such an order is supposed to be articulated in all details, but
which do guide its realisation in accordance with and adapting itself to dierent
circumstances. In this way, Habermas, together with the theorists who have taken
inspiration from his work, claims to have achieved a balance between the openness
of a self-reective, critical theory and the determination of concrete emancipatory
goals.
e second set of theoretical perspectives characterised by the problematisa-
tion of order, in the context therefore of a critical approach, is the one elaborated
by several ir scholars building on the intellectual heritage of Antonio Gramsci.128
Gramsci famously elaborated an analysis of the Italian Fascist regime and its abil-
ity to thrive not only on the basis of coercion, but especially through widespread
consensus, and he described this situation as one of hegemony within a given so-
ciety. Robert Cox has applied this idea to a description of world politics through
Marxist lenses, i.e. where the substance of international politics lies in the rela-
128On Gramsci in ir literature, see Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Rela-
tions, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993; Randall Germain andMichael Kenny, “EngagingGramsci:
International Relationseory and the Neo-Gramscians”, in Review of International Studies, 24 (2), 1998, pages
3–21; Alison J. Ayers (ed.),Gramsci, Political Economy and International Relationseory: Modern Princes and
Naked Emperors, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
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tions of production and economic exploitation, rather than in an ontology of state
power. Gramsci “used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between ma-
terial forces and ethico-political ideas”, which translates into the Marxian unity
of structure and superstructure, and where the dominant capitalistic elite “based
on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating
compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups”.129 Order
or, better, dierent possibilities of order, emerges from the construction of such
hegemonic blocks.e point for a critical theory, a label and a concept which has
been introduced in ir theory by the same Robert Cox in a famous 1981 article,130
consists precisely in debunking such ideological constructs and in promoting the
creation of counter-hegemonic blocks, namely alliances of the subordinate groups,
to achieve a dierent distribution of material resources. Stephen Gill has further
developed this analysis of the world by concentrating on the current condition of
a globalised economy and the hegemonic ideological construction represented by
neo-liberal economic and political doctrines, as well as by international institu-
tional arrangements.131 A similar set of concepts are to be found in the work of
Craig Murphy,132 who has specialised in the relations between the us and the pe-
ripheral areas of the capitalistic world.
A third strand of theories, rather closed to the previous approach in its still
marked Marxian roots and its sharp critique of the current neo-liberal interna-
tional order, is the one encompassed by the umbrella term of “historical sociol-
ogy”. is research programme is characterised by the historical investigation of
the rise of the modern condition through the study of capitalism, the state and war.
eda Skocpol dened historical sociology as “a continuing, ever-renewed tradi-
tion of research devoted to understanding the character and eects of large-scale
structures and fundamental processes of change”.133 In this denition, “structures”
129Robert Cox, “Labour and Hegemony” in International Organization, 31, 1977, page 387.
130Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States andWorld Orders: Beyond International Relationseory”, inMillennium:
Journal of International Studies, Volume 10, No.2, 1981, pages 126–155.
131Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
132Craig Murphy, “Understanding ir: Understanding Gramsci”, in Review of International Studies, 24, 1998,
pages 417–425.
133eda Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984,
page 4.
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refers directly to the Marxian vocabulary and indicates the relations of capitalistic
production: historical sociology is largely preoccupiedwith the description and un-
derstanding, from a long-termhistorical perspective, of themacro-transformation,
at continental and global level, which capitalism has produced in the world since
its rise from the beginning of the modern era. Already in the 1980s, Fred Halliday
argued that historical sociology provides a “second agenda” to ir studies,134 which
needs to be developed in the direction of the study of the modern state in its com-
plexity as social structure, i.e. “both as an actor in competition with other domes-
tic social formations, and in terms of its relations with other states and with other
actors in dierent territories”.135 Justin Rosenberg, while commenting on Antony
Gidden’s work, explained the historical sociological preoccupationwith the state as
the study of the “emergence of the nation-state system”, which is “understood from
the outset as part of the same process of internal consolidation.e (outward) po-
litical sovereignty [...] is the expression of an (internal) administrative and coercive
unity established at the expense of other, transnational and local, forms of political
power”.136 Michael Mann, Charles Tilly and ImmanuelWallerstein have all worked
within the domain of historical sociology, from dierent perspectives, in the eort
to describe the evolution of a global capitalistic system and to explain the political
consequences generated by this both internationally and locally. Despite the mul-
tiplicity of approaches within historical sociology, the problematisation of order
which occurs at its core descends again from the critique of the current arrange-
ment as the product of capitalistic forces of exploitation and oppression, while a
dierent order may be achieved through a new distribution of resources to be at-
tained with the possible overcoming of global capitalism in its current form.
A last strand of ir theories can be interpreted as those approaching the issue
of order in the form of a problematisation of the question itself, which goes as far
as casting doubt upon the possibility of such an investigation. Although also com-
134Fred Halliday, “States and Society in International Relations”, inMillennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 16, No.2, 1987, pages 215–229.
135Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology. Breaking Down Boundaries, London and
New York: Routledge, 1998, page 4.
136Justin Rosenberg, “A Non Realisteory of Sovereignty? Giddens’e Nation State and Violence”, inMillen-
nium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, pages 249–259, page 253.
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ing from a critical perspective, in these authors the sense of emancipation from the
state system is no longer present, because even in the assumption that emancipa-
tion, as illustrated above and as theorised bymost critical theorists, was “a plausible
interpretation of the current development of world politics”, this would still not “al-
ter the need for political criticism and would not really change the assumptions on
which it is based”.ere is therefore a possibility of refusing the problem of order
as a problem. As commented by Rengger, “[t]his particular ‘disposition of thought’
suggests that that we end the search for ‘order’ because in searching to secure it we
are looking for a chimera”.137
inkers who are engaged with this perspective predominantly go under the
label of post-structuralists, with an astonishing variety of arguments and tech-
niques that reect the philosophical foundations of their research programme. Au-
thors such as James Der Derian, David Campbell, Richard Ashley, William Con-
nolly and RobWalker can hardly be comprehended under a single heading, except
in their production of post-Nietzschean philosophy and their shared belief that
modernity has failed as an emancipatory project.
1.4 the contemporary debate
Even in most recent discussions on order within ir, a precise analytical denition
of the concept seems to be elusive, although some work has been concentrating
either in the direction of discussing “world order” as the current arrangement of
global aairs, or in the direction of an historical enquiry into dierent ways in
which systems of order were built in the past. World order discussions in contem-
porary ir studies seems to be mostly connected with the problem of reading the
present global political situation, and providing analytical tools for its understand-
ing, both from an intellectual and a policy-making perspective.
John Ikenberry has recently assessed the stability of the “liberal international
order”, reecting on a possible crisis of the American hegemonic system, which
137Rengger,e Problem of Order, page 180.
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he eventually frames not as a “crisis of failure”, but as a “crisis of success”, argu-
ing namely that the American-led international order which was largely shaped
aer 1945 has enjoyed tremendous success. It is an order “organised around open
markets, multilateral institutions, cooperative security, alliance partnership, demo-
cratic solidarity”.138 is “global system has boomed under conditions of hege-
monic rule exercised by the United States. It is expanding and integrating on a
global scale and creating economic and security interdependencies well beyond
the imagination of his original architects”.139 Precisely the new challenges (nan-
cial crisis, rise of China, resurgence of Russia, ...) opened by this great expansion
the liberal global order under us hegemony constitute the core of this perceived
crisis. e crisis of the liberal order, Ikenberry concludes, “is not an E.H. Carr
crisis. Rather it is a Karl Polanyi crisis [...] where liberal governance is troubled be-
cause dilemmas and long terms shis in the order can only be solved by rethinking,
rebuilding and extending that liberal order”.140
e image of a world order based on a set of dominant ideas is also present in
recent work published by Harold James, assessing the impact of the nancial crisis
on international order. His key questions concentrate around the understanding of
power shis and changes in the structure of world economy, with consequent alter-
ation of power distribution. Interestingly from the perspective of order, James also
wonders “What is the best way of ordering an economy, a society, or a polity?”141 A
possible answer to this question is sought in a historical reconstruction of past sys-
tems of international order, according to which “past versions of order [were] gen-
erated by particular countries which propagated a grand vision”.142 e examples
here are the “nineteenth-century British view of John Bright or Richard Cobden
about the universal benet of commerce”, and of course, during the second half
of the twentieth century, “the universalization of an American vision of commer-
138John Ikenberry, “e Liberal International Order and Its Discontents”, inMillennium: Journal of International
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010, pages 509–521, page 512.
139Ikenberry, ibidem, page 520.
140Ikenberry, ibidem, page 521.
141Harold James, “International Order Aer the Financial Crisis”, in International Aairs, 87 (3), 2011, pages
525–537, page 525.
142James, ibidem, page 525.
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cial prosperity”.143 James does not dig very deep in analysing the question of the
intellectual origins of such powerful ideas constituting the foundations of world
orders. He highlights how the rise and fall of dierent international orders can be
explained by a cyclical model of recurrent “backlashes and reversals of the process
of global integration”.144 For James, the “interchanges involved in globalisation do
not automatically establish a self-sustaining set of values”, but rather on the con-
trary, any set of values is constantly subverted by change and uncertainty, new en-
counters, possibilities and technologies.145 erefore, it appears that order among
human societies at a deeper level, namely the constitutive ordering of collective, or-
ganised human life, must “derive from some other source”. James wonders “what
are the sources of basic values regarding human dignity, human motivation and
conduct?”146
e answer he suggests refers to their religious origin, as he briey summarises
the well-known Weberian argument on the birth of capitalism from Calvinistic
worldviews. However, when the originalmotivationdisappeared, a feeling of empti-
ness started to emerge, and “that process of sucking out meaning from the eco-
nomic processes was what in Weber’s view produced a backlash”.147 Consequently,
societies have started to look for alternatives, and those solutions “tend to be nation-
ally specic”,148 implying a progressive disintegration of the globalWestern-centric
order. James takes the examples of the recently emphasised importance of a neo-
Confucian discourse in Chinese leadership, which seems to advocate the recovery
of virtues (thri, self-discipline, middle-ground and anti-extravagance) which the
West seems to have lost or abandoned.149 James’s last reection is therefore that “we
cannot simply understand economic life by observing its operation” as “we need to
think about an inner logic, and about how that logic corresponds with the nature
and the development of human character”.150
143James, ibidem, page 525.
144James, ibidem, page 536.
145James, ibidem, page 536.
146James, ibidem, page 536.
147James, ibidem, page 536.
148James, ibidem, page 536
149James, ibidem, page 537.
150James, ibidem, page 537.
78
1.4 the contemporary debate
Other authors’ work largely revolve around the theoretical re-elaboration of
realist themes. Particularly the alreadymentioned idea of order through hegemony
as articulated by Ikenberry is the focus of Ian Clark’s study of United States and
international order.151 Clark briey articulates his denition of hegemony as “an
institutionalised practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state
with the resources to lead”.152 His reections develop on the historical experiences
of dierent ways in which hegemony has manifested itself, and criticising the lim-
ited understanding of hegemony, which appears to be prevalent in the literature,
too much focused on the idea of primacy, as opposed to collective hegemony and
other possible formulations.e cipher of his argument in relation to order seems
to be that hegemony, in one form or another, is “one constructive element of [...]
international order”,153 as order seems to be generated by “concentration of power”
as its “inescapable component”.154
Also David Lake has contributed on the connection between order, hege-
mony and hierarchy, within the context of an English School approach to interna-
tional studies, especially following Barry Buzan’s idea of regional security complex
(rsc),155 whereby international actors in a certain region become so interrelated by
security structures that any event signicantly aecting the security of one actor
has a great impact on the others. Lake’s enquiry on the idea of order at regional
level recovers again in fact the idea of hegemony within the context of the rsc
theory.156 His argument tries to move beyond the idea that, in an anarchical envi-
ronment, there is no higher authority than that of the state.is, in Lake’s opinion,
derives from a “formal-legal conception of authority”, which is however not the
only possible one. He proposes instead to see how “states oen form hierarchies
over one other based on relational authority, which itself rests on social contract
151Ian Clark, “Bringing Hegemony Back in: the United States and International Order”, in International Aairs,
85 (1), 2009, pages 23–36.
152Clark, ibidem, page 24.
153Clark, ibidem, page 35.
154Clark, ibidem, page 36.
155Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,
Lynne Reinner Boulder (co) 1991, page 190.
156David Lake, “Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order”, in Review of International Stud-
ies, 35, 2009, pages 35–58.
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theories”.157ose theories rest on a dierent conception of authority, conceptualis-
ing it as an “emergent property or equilibrium of an exchange between a dominant
state and the set of citizens who comprise the subordinate state”.158 e idea of or-
der through hierarchy and hegemony arises here as a consequence of this exchange,
which “entails the provision by the dominant state of a social order of value to the
subordinate state in return for the subordinate’s compliance and legitimacy”.159 In
his analysis, Lake articulates the view that hierarchies cluster within regions, thus
creating regional orders.e essence of order lies in this case in the web of hierar-
chical relations between the states, “with many states possessing relatively similar
levels of subordination to the same dominant state”.160 Orders at regional levels
are dened as the consequence of “strong positive externalities of social order and
economies of scale in its production, and the mutually reinforcing legitimacy ac-
corded [to] the dominant state by local subordinates”.161
David Lake describes regional order in terms of how “states within an rsc
manage their security relations and range frombalances of power, to regional power
concerts, collective security organisations, pluralistic security communities, and in-
tegrations”.162 Finally, “social order is a local public good that oen extends beyond
the boundaries of any single subordinate state”.163 While order is provided domes-
tically by the state, international order is seen by Lake as an extension of this same
domestic order beyond boundaries, which spreads to states in a subordinate po-
sition within the rsc, and onto “other neighbouring states or those in positions
similar to that subordinate”.164
Amore sophisticated contribution on the topic of order has been put forward
by Georg Sørensen, in the rst part of an article discussing the post-Cold World
global political situation.165 Sørensen articulates his view that the current arrange-
157Lake, ibidem, page 36.
158Lake, ibidem, page 36.
159Lake, ibidem, page 36.
160Lake, ibidem, page, 40.
161Lake, ibidem, page 36.
162Lake, ibidem, page 36.
163Lake, ibidem, page 41.
164Lake, ibidem, page 41.
165Georg Sørensen, “What Kind of World Order?e International System in the New Millennium”, in Cooper-
ation and Conict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, pages 343–363.
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ment of international aairs has to be considered as an interregnum, where many
elements of the previous, pre-1989 order remain in place, but where a new and sta-
ble order has not been achieved yet. In doing so, he tries to analyse the characteris-
tics of the concept of order itself when applied to world politics. While world order
is “a governing arrangement among states”, however, echoing the above discussed
position advanced byHedley Bull, “not every governing arrangement among states
can qualify as aworld order”, but only those arrangements that “meet the current de-
mand of order in major areas”166 can be rightfully qualied as order. For Sørensen
it is however clear that order contains a normative dimension, and that “world or-
der” remains a “fuzzy concept”, since “theories do not concur on the substantive
content of world order dened as governing arrangements between states”.167 His
view is that any denition of order for international politics must address these
four dimensions:
(a) the realist concern of the politico-military balance of power; (b)
the liberal concern of the make-up of international institutions and the
emergence of global governance; (c) the constructivist concern of the
realm of ideas and ideology, with a focus on the existence or otherwise
of common values on a global scale; and (d) the ipe concern of the
economic realm of production, nance and distribution.168
Sørensen seems therefore to suggest that a certain normative drive, whose
identication remains however unclear, has to be successfully declined in the four
mentioned domains, if it has to qualify as a viable idea of international order. For
the present time he identies, without providing a theoretical backing of this view,
the “good life for mankind as a whole”,169 in opposition to good life for the popula-
tion of the nation state only, as the normative aimof political action at international
and global level.
e most comprehensive discussion about order in recent ir publication is
however the work of Andrew Phillips. In hisWar, Religion and Empire, he explores
166Sørensen, ibidem, page 344.
167Sørensen, ibidem, page 344.
168Sørensen, ibidem, page 344.
169Sørensen, ibidem, page 347.
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the question “what are international orders?” through an historical enquiry con-
centrating predominantly on the Roman and Western world, and the so called
“Sinosphere”. Phillips denes international orders as “the constellation of consti-
tutional norms and fundamental institutions through which co-operation is cul-
tivated and conict contained between dierent political communities”.170 He ad-
vances his formulation of order essentially along the lines of a constructivist ar-
gument, albeit stressing the importance of an “order-enabling material context”,
which clearly has its roots in the growing importance of ipe and certain strands of
critical ir theory. It is therefore the “combination of ideational andmaterial forces”
which promotes the transformation of international order.171
Secondly, Phillips recovers the idea of a central normative drive embedded in
any conception of order, as already discussed in previous authors, but it does so
within the framework of a dualistic understanding of the normative possibilities.
On the one hand, he identies an “Aristotelian” pole, whereby international orders
“seek to advance a normatively thick and culturally and historically contingent vi-
sion of the good”.172 On the other hand, the alternative pole entails an “Augustinian”
nature, one “dedicated to the basic objective of containing violent conict between
dierent polities with manageable bounds”.173 ese two possible dimensions in
the formulation of international order are supposed to be co-existent, with dier-
ent dosages, in every historical experiment of order.
For Phillips, international orders “are sustained through a combination of
authoritative institutions”, using shared standard of legitimacy to co-opt agents
within certain regimes, and “coercive institutions”, where agents are compelled by
means of “authorised practices of organised violence”.174 He is explicitly attempt-
ing to bring the discourse of violence in a discussion of order, thus integrating the
standard constructivist narrative of international politics. Order emerges therefore
from a combination of “the power moral suasion and the force of material sanc-
170Andrew Phillips,War, Religion and Empire:e Transformation of International Orders, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011.page 5.
171Phillips, ibidem, page 5.
172Phillips, ibidem, page 5.
173Phillips, ibidem, page 5.
174Phillips, ibidem, page 6.
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tions”, it “crystallise[s] at the intersection of ethical and coercivemodes of action”.175
e achievement of a certain order is namely attained, starting from a situation of
dis-order, through the “imposition of ethical and institutional restraints on agents’
freedomof action”.176 But of course not any kind of imposition, of ethical norm and
institutional mechanism can work as a viable idea of order. Indeed, international
orders should be understood “as systemic structures that cohere within culturally
and historically specic social imageries”.177
e resulting normative complex and the institutional setting “rest in turn on a
permissive order-enablingmaterial foundation”.178 Interestingly, the ideational side
of international order is premised on the actors sharing a common collective iden-
tity, “a web of shared meanings”, making the exercise of authoritative power viable
between dierent political communities. Phillips’s constructivist concept of nor-
mative complex appears to be at the very heart of his conceptualisation of order, it
provides the normative drive, the vectorial dimension of a particular arrangement
or political vision, enhancing its status to a proper order. ose normative com-
plexes, of which several examples are described and evaluated in his book, “pro-
vide actors with ‘maps of meaning’ necessary to navigate social life” and in their
form of social imageries they “encompass our most basic andmostly unarticulated
assumptions about social reality, extending even to those that condition our expe-
rience of categories as allegedly basic as time, space, language and embodiment”.179
Ultimately therefore, those normative complexes are nothing else but the answers
given by dierent cultures to “such basic questions as ‘who am I?’ and ‘what do I
want?’, oering agents what Taylor has referred to as the ‘inescapable frameworks’
operative in all societies that link concepts of the self with concepts of the good”.180
Order rests therefore on identity-constitutive norms which “provide societies with
a sense of the ultimate sources of morality”, and they serve the purpose of helping
175Phillips, ibidem, page 15.
176Phillips, ibidem, page 20.
177Phillips, ibidem, page 21.
178Phillips, ibidem, page 22.
179Phillips, ibidem, page 24.
180Phillips, ibidem, page 25.
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agents in orienting themselves in the world, particularly “in relation to the higher
purposes of collective action”.181
In sum, the contemporary debate about the concept of order in international
studies prompts two main reections: on the one hand, in various formulations,
the idea that order is essentially something to be managed rather than understood
in its constitutive elements remains prevalent in many strands of the discipline.
And even where a more nuanced problematisation of order manages to emerge,
highlighting the constitutive link between order and normative complexes or dif-
fuse social values, the discussion is oen very limited and, crucially, does not sys-
tematically consider and address the pre-existing literature on topic, being thus
forced the “re-discover” at each step research results which had already been pre-
viously articulated.
1.5 critical theory and the problem of order : modernity and
secularisation
From this broad-stroke picture of the way in which the problem of order has been
dealt with by ir theorists, a series of elements can be highlighted.
Firstly, as already shown above, the concept of order, despite its widespread re-
currence in International Relations studies, and more specically in the domain of
ir theory, has been seldom subjected to a thorough analytical scrutiny.is is even
more paradoxical when considering that order is so central to many theoretical ap-
proaches, that it is possible, as Rengger’s work demonstrates, to re-classify most of
ir theoretical literature around this concept. A second element to be highlighted
is that this under-conceptualisation of order occurs in a somehow stark contrast
to the intense attention dedicated to the same topic in the area of philosophical
studies, and in the tradition of metaphysics/theology in particular, as it has been
shown in the rst part of this chapter. To promote a more accomplished reection
on order in ir theory, the establishment of a stronger connection between the two
181Phillips, ibidem, page 25.
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literatures appears consequently essential.irdly, a more analytical appreciation
of the concept of order, which goes in the direction of establishing a functional
link with on-going debates in philosophical and sociological literatures, appears
to have its privileged starting point in reconsidering those theories of ir which al-
ready oer a modicum of critical problematisation of the concepts they are using,
and primarily those which systematically deal with the issue of their philosophical
foundations and underpinnings.182
e conceptualisation of order in the form of its deconstruction and recon-
struction along the lines of a renewed idea of emancipation appears to be predi-
cated upon ontological/epistemological foundations the problematisation ofwhich
represents the added value of a critical theory, in its awareness of the dangers of
reication and ideology. is has been reected primarily in the deconstruction
of dogmatic, a-critical ideas of order as inter-state order (primarily against realism
and neo-realism), in the search for alternatives. Crucially, this very work of de-
construction and Ideologiekritik has grounded itself in a general discussion about
the political concept of state (and consequently of the state-based international or-
der), as the distinctive political mark of modernity. e state, the theory of the
state and the inter-state world order appear consequently as the projection of the
philosophical underpinnings which sustained the very idea of modernity.183
However, the philosophical underpinning of the very idea of order has con-
stantly been established, in the pre-modern Western culture, in the foundational
concept of God (i.e. in theology-based theories of order) or, with the onset of
modernity, in other, secular ideas, which conveniently replaced God as the guar-
antor of order during the rise of modernity, namely ideas of nature, of history and
progress, but performing the same substantial role. As thoroughly described by
Habermas in his work, it is precisely in this process of secularisation and rational-
ization that the core of the modern enterprise can be found. e image of inter-
national order as inter-state order is therefore connected with the overcoming of
182On ir critical theories, see Steven Roach (ed.), Criticaleory and International Relations: A Reader, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2007.
183On the theories of the state in ir, see John M. Hobson,e State and International Relations, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
85
1.5 critical theory and the problem of order
purely theological concepts for the legitimation of political orders, at the domes-
tic as well as the international level, withomas Hobbes as the father of modern
political theory. However, the emergence of a progressive but paralyzing crisis of
modernity itself, starting at the end of the nineteenth century, has generated a situ-
ation where all modern systematisations of order have become subjected to radical
critique. As pointed out by Rengger, therefore, “[i]n terms of the ‘problem of order’,
the question is simple. Can order bemeaningful at all, in the absence of something
— God’s plan, History, Nature — which guarantees it?”184
e problem of the analytical conceptualisation of order shis therefore to-
wards an understanding of its foundations, as correctly captured by Rengger, and
particularly for a self-reective, critical theory, the problemhas to be framedwithin
the context of the discussion about modernity. e question raised by Rengger is
of primary importance and it constitutes the starting point of a discussion about
the relations betweenmodernity, secularisation, theology, the state and state-based
ideas of international order, which will be developed in the following chapters.e
eort for a clarication of the concept of order should develop primarily in the di-
rection of investigating the rise ofmodernity as secularisation (however dened) of
religious ideas and its impact on the theorisation of political concepts. Among all
ir theories described and analysed in the present chapter from the perspective of
order, it appears that a full appreciation of this constellation of philosophical prob-
lems lying behind order has been produced systematically only by critical theory,
and particularly in the work of Habermas. Because of the prominence that Haber-
masian ir theory has assumed in the context of theoretical studies, this research
concentrates on Habermas’s conceptualisation of order and its relevance for inter-
national political theory, also specically for the systematically self-reective ap-
proach that this thinker has applied throughout his work. Moreover, as described
above, Habermasian ir theory does not abandon the concept of order, advocating
its overhaul or dismissal; it aims instead at its re-formulation, which we are given
to understand is to be achieved through the establishment at its foundation of a
re-formulation of the idea of rationality.185
184Rengger, ibidem, page 9.
185Dirk Brockmeyer, Jürgen Habermas und die kommunikative Rationalität, München: Grin Verlag, 2007.
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However, the relations between the theory of the state, secularisation and in-
ternational order do not constitute an unexplored landscape in general. On the
contrary, they form arguably themost important part of one of themost prominent
twentieth century political thinkers, Carl Schmitt, whose work has been attracting
increasing attention from ir theorists, particularly in the critical camp.e under-
standing of Schmitt’s work, this research argues, is crucial for the correct reading
of the above described constellation of elements, and for critically re-thinking the
problem of order. As will be illustrated in the next chapter, Schmitt managed to
capture the essence of the parable of the state within modernity, when the latter
is understood as the re-elaboration of religious-theological concepts, and its impli-
cations for international order. Schmitt employed genealogical deconstruction in
a sort of ante litteram critical approach to the concept of the state, tracing its ori-
gin to the politico-theological debates of early modernity, while he formulated his
famous claim according to which “all concepts of the theory of the state are theo-
logical concepts”.186 Schmitt’s theoretical work develops precisely from a full aware-
ness of the importance of theology for a critical comprehension of the problem of
state, state-order and consequently international order in modernity. Schmitt is
therefore an unavoidable, key reference in any attempt to systematise a problem
of order which starts from the framework established by Rengger’s quoted ques-
tion, precisely because Schmitt has systematically highlighted the importance of
the religious, theological sphere for the understanding of politics.187
186Carl Schmitt, Politicaleology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translation by George Schwab,
Cambridge ma: mit Press, 1985, page 36.
187On this point, see Oliver O’Donovan,e Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Politicaleology,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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CARL SCHMITT AND IR
introduction
e exploration of the normative complexes underpinning possible conceptions
of order starts from considering the radical possibility of recovering metaphysical
and theological narratives of political legitimation and order, with the example of
Carl Schmitt and his political-theoretical work.
e present chapter focuses therefore on the work of Carl Schmitt and his
contribution to the discussion of order in international politics. It proceeds rst
with a contextualisation of this author, with the aim of providing some elements
for the evaluation of dierent readings of Schmitt’s work. is contextualisation
aims at situating Schmitt in the circumstances in which he was writing, both in
terms of his contribution to twentieth century intellectual debates, and in terms of
the political struggles characterising his most productive period between 1920 and
1950. Secondly, an exposition of the most important themes of Schmitt’s thought
is produced with the aim of overcoming the fragmentation of his work in relation
to the issue of order. irdly, a literature review is provided to illustrate the con-
tinuous and growing interest in Schmitt both in the eld political theory and of ir
theory more specically. A critique of the most common and current approaches
to Schmitt is developed by building upon the insucient contextualisation of this
author, the diculties inherent to the extrapolation of Schmitt’s ideas from their
original context, which seems to characterise most of the relevant literature and
poses specic problems for ir critical theory. In the last part, the relevance of po-
litical theology in its relation to the problem of order in modernity is highlighted
as the key factor for a theory of order.
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2.1 contextualisation of schmitt
Carls Schmitt always dened himself simply as a jurist and nothing else.1 Although
most of today’s readings of Schmitt concentrate on this author by portraying him as
a political thinker, a more accurate investigation of the circumstances in which his
oeuvre came into being can showhow, despite being conscious of the political impli-
cations of his legal-theoretical work, and despite his theoretical stance highlighting
the inevitable correlation between law and politics, Schmitt always moved himself
in the context of the legal-theoretical discussions characterising the German aca-
demic environment. As will be illustrated below, the bulk of Schmitt’s theoretical
work is shaped by, and can be understood as, a critique of the dominant tradition
of legal positivism.
Besides his chief interest in question of legal theory, Schmitt also published
numerous contributions addressing more specic constitutional and international
questions, but this occurred always from the perspective of the legal analysis of the
politics of Weimar and of the post-Versailles European international order, as will
be illustrated below. Schmitt’s work is therefore completely permeated by the two
circumstances, of the re-conceptualisation of law, the state and constitutional order
on the one hand, and on the other the dicult international situation of twentieth
century Europe. Both themes can eventually be traced to the common thread of
the destiny of the German state between the second Reich and the Bundesrepublik.
Schmitt’s identity as a jurist is important to keep in mind while reading his
work from the perspective of order, as he conceived order, particularly in the in-
ternational, as reected primarily in the law.ere cannot be therefore any sound
understanding of Schmitt’s idea of order, as it will be illustrated below, without a
grasp of his theoretical positions in relations to law, the state and the interstate,
which will be discussed in the following pages.
1Cf. Fulco Lanchester, “Carl Schmitt, un giurista davanti a se stesso. Intervista a Carl Schmitt”, Quaderni Cos-
tituzionali, 1/1983, pages 5- 34; also quoted in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, “Introducing the International
eory of Carl Schmitt: International Law, International Relations and the Present Global Predicament(s)”, in
Leiden Journal of International Law, 19/2006, pages 1–7.
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e landscape of German legal studies in the rst decades of the twentieth
century in which Schmitt operated was characterised by intellectual positions di-
rectly inherited from the previous century, which mirrored the complex political
and constitutional development of the German states and of the Reich aer 1871.
Historians have highlighted howGermany trod a dicult and unique path towards
the construction of its own modern Rechtsstaat, a Sonderweg characterised by the
prevalence, for a long period (1848–1919), of monarchical and reactionary forces
against the background of the substantial political apathy displayed by the German
liberal bourgeoisie.is Sonderweg can be seen as the reection of an intellectual
dierentiation from the English, French and American revolutionary experiences,
with their respective conceptualisations of the people or nation (le peuple, la na-
tion) grounded in natural law theories, in contractualism and explicitly taking into
account the economic dynamics of the society. e German nation (das deutsche
Volk) as theorised by Fichte, Herder, and the German Romantics is something very
dierent from the association of free humans arising from the collective will en-
shrined in a social contract. is dierence was reected in the domain of legal
studies by the elaboration of models of legal and constitutional orders which could
be alternative and specically “German”, with particular contrast to the French for-
mulation of the state and law.2
Most the nineteenth century discussions within legal studies in Germany re-
volved around the elaboration of a theory of the state which would translate into
legal and constitutional terms the organicist idea of the German nation.is is vis-
ible in the dierent spheres of Hegel’s philosophy of right, in theHistorische Rechts-
schule of Friedrich Carl von Savigny and in the general theory of the state (Allge-
meine Staatslehre). Hegel has famously broken with the contractarian and natural
law tradition, as he explained how the constitution should not be seen as the sum
of wills, nor as anything made by the people (ein Gemachtes), “but it is rather to
be conceived as the purely self-begotten and self-centred being, to be regarded as
the divine and perpetual, something above and beyond what is made”(denn sie ist
vielmehr das schlechthin an und für sich Seiende, das darum als das Göttliche und
2On the idea of German Volk, see Brain Vick, “e Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National
Identity in Nineteenth-Century Germany”, in German Studies Review, 26 (2), 2003, pages , pages 241–256.
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Beharrende, und als über die Sphäre dessen, was gemacht wird, zu betrachten ist.).3
e Hegelian state and its constitution is rational not as the result of the rationality
of its citizens and their representatives, but as the embodiment of the rationality of
the spirit.
Friedrich C. von Savigny and later his disciple Georg F. Puchta, in opposition
to the codication of the law which was a prominent movement in France and
yielded the Code Napoléon of 1806, elaborated the foundations of the Historische
Rechtsschule, an orientation in theorising the legal order as arising not fromnatural
law or a social contract, but from the historical evolution of the legal customs of a
nation.
e law is in the view of Savigny the product of theVolksgeist, and it cannot be
replaced by an articial, unhistorical, creation of the rational mind: it should not
be reduced to the positive dispositions of a code.is division of the legal sciences
(Rechtswissenscha) between “historical” and “unhistorical” is explicitly stated as
the dichotomy between the historical school of thought which “assumes that the
matter of law is produced by the whole past of a nation, but not by arbitrariness”
and emerges “from the nation’s innermost essence”, and the unhistorical school,
which “on the contrary assumes that the law is produced by virtue of arbitrariness
by the people endowed with authority, in total independence from the law of the
previous time, and only in accordance to the best persuasion, how brought about
by the present moment”.4 InDie Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenscha, Schmitt
does not hide his admiration for Savigny, whose name “should be inserted in a list
of the greatest Europeans”.5 is is important to keep in mind in the perspective
3Georg W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien des Philosophie des Rechts, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1911 (originally published
in 1821), page 225 (§273).
4Friedrich C. von Savigny, “Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschri”, in Zeitschri für Geschchtliche Rechtswis-
senscha, Berlin 1815, Volume 1, pages 1–17, page 6: Die geschichliche Schule nimmt an, der Sto des Rechts sey
durch die gesamte Vergangenheit der Nation gegeben, doch nicht durch Willkühr, so daß er zufällig dieser oder
ein anderer seyn könnte, sondern aus dem innersten Wesen der Nation selbst und ihrer Geschichte hervorgegan-
gen. [...] Die ungeschichtliche Schule dagegen nimmt an, das Recht werde in jedem Augenblick durch die mit der
gesetztgebenden Gewalt versehnen Personen mit Willkühr hervorgebracht, ganz unabhänglich von dem Rechte
der vorhergegangenen Zeit, und nur nach bester Ueberzeugung, wie sie der gegenwärtigen Augenblick gerade mit
sich bringe.
5Carl Schmitt, Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenscha, Tübingen: Internationaler Universitätsverlag,
1950, page 21.
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of the Schmittian elaboration of a theory of law which, with a dierent concep-
tualisation of the circumstances in which the law arises, shares nevertheless the
core assumption that the law cannot be simply reduced to a purely theoretical and
philosophical creature, as if its historical and social context may not matter.
e codicationmovementwithinEuropean legal studies had emerged largely
against the background of the natural law theories of the eighteenth century, and in
the nineteenth century it opened the way for the next historical step, namely legal
positivism.is position in its essence establishes the state as the supreme source
of the law, which becomes reduced to the codes and the other legal norms issued
by the state (law bills, decrees, etc...) and comes to depend upon the sheer will and
consideration of the legislator, without regard of historical factors. It is possible to
see how this identication of the law with the state would ultimately lead to a re-
verse overlapping of the state with the law, in other words an overlapping between
the Staatsrecht and the Rechtsstaat, as in Kelsen’s theory of law and the state. For
Schmitt, the prevalence of legal positivism which accompanied the history of the
nineteenth century marks the defeat of a sound idea of law (Recht), legal science
(Rechtswissenscha) and of the role itself of the jurist in his professional dignity, es-
pecially aer the liberal revolutions of 1848. While considering the rising trajectory
of legal positivism in the nineteenth century, Schmitt recalls BernhardWindscheid
proclaiming in 1854 during a speech at the university of Greifswald that “the dream
of natural law is over” (Der Traum des Naturrechts ist ausgeträumt), and Julius von
Kirchmann, who gave a speech in 1847 before the Juristische Gesellscha zu Berlin
entitled “e Worthlessness of Jurisprudence as Science” (Die Werthlosigkeit der
Jurisprudenz als Wissenscha), denouncing the substantial futility of the jurists in
a situation where “three corrective words from the legislator and entire libraries
become wastepaper” (drei berichtigende Worten des Gesetzgebers und ganze Biblio-
theken werden zu Makulatur).6
e landscape in which Schmitt’s work should be situated is therefore charac-
terised by opposing tendencies in the denition of the law, the state and the role
of the jurist, largely between legal positivism and the opposition against it. Nev-
6Schmitt, ibidem, pages 14–15.
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ertheless, this opposition is not to be understood as a Manichean dichotomy be-
tween completely disconnected options. Historically, legal positivism, as briey
mentioned above, owes its origin to this codication, which in its turn is indebted
to natural law theories, which legal positivism, paradoxically, was to overcome.
Schmitt’s portrayal of the opposition between legal positivism and Savigny’s His-
torische Rechtsschule also does not give a complete account of the role that the idea
of theVolksgeist has performed in the evolution of legal studies.e paradox of the
historical school lies in fact in a philosophical denition of the Volk and its history,
which eventually led to an anti-historical vision of the law.7 Furthermore, there are
other elements of continuity between legal positivism and Savigny’s conception of
law, which he regarded as complete and presenting no gaps (Lücken), an element
which Schmitt may have underplayed. For the legal positivists, as well, the law is
a unitary system, complete (i.e. with no gaps) and coherent, but against Savigny’s
view it is to be understood as positive, i.e. the law in force, made by norms and
commands and sanctioned exclusively by the state,. Moreover, the legal positivists
argue that the legal sciences have to deal exclusively with the positive norms and
their succession, hierarchy and structures, but not with anythingwhich lies beyond
the boundaries of this formalistic conception of law.
is last conception of the law is shared by a series of German legal thinkers
in the nineteenth century, whose work concentrated on the creation of a theory of
the state (Staatslehre), in which the state can be theorised from a sheer legal per-
spective, by assuming the denition of the state as a (public) legal person (rechtliche
Persönlichkeit), endowed with its own will. Authors like Karl von Gerber,8 Paul La-
band,9 Rudolf von Jhering (before he elaborated a teleological conception of the
law)10 and Georg Jellinek11 all developed a general theory of the state along the
lines of a purely legal theorisation, sometimes, as in the case of Gerber, even be-
7Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde,Die Historische Rechtsschule und das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Rechts,
in Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellscha, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zumVerfassungsrecht, Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, pages 9–41.
8Karl von Gerber, Grundzüge eines Systems des deutschen Staatsrechts, Leipzig, Bernhard Taunitz Verlag,
1865.
9Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reichs, in three volumes, Leipzig: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1876–
1882.
10Rudolf von Jhering, Der Kampf ums Recht, Wien: Manz Verlag, 1872.
11Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin: Häring Verlag, 1900.
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fore the creation of a German unied state.is movement continued in the early
twentieth century and in Weimar, with thinkers such as Gerhard Anschütz, and
Richardoma,12 but it soon started to encounter a sti resistance. e work of
Schmitt can be largely framed within this movement of resistance against legal pos-
itivism. Schmitt borrowed elements from its various components and theoretical
directions, while envisaging new ones, particularly in relation to a more sophisti-
cated sociological understanding of politics as the source of legal and constitutional
order, of the state and the problem of international order (nomos).
Indeed already at the beginning of the nineteenth century a crisis of the sys-
tem of law elaborated by legal positivism became more apparent. e sheer for-
malistic theorisation of the relations between the state, the society and the law
seemed more and more problematic. Well before the First World War and the
subsequent general crisis of the German state (collapse of the monarchical system,
revolution, new constitution), the rapid economic and social transformations tak-
ing place within the Reich made some of the tenets of legal positivism dicult to
defend, particularly the idea of the completeness of the law, andmore generally the
methodological argument that the legal sciences should be preoccupied simply and
exclusively with norms, and not the extra-legal historical and sociological circum-
stances in which they arise. e landscape of German legal studies at the end of
the nineteenth century is therefore characterised by the rise of an anti-formalistic
reaction against legal positivism, with jurists exploring alternative theoretical direc-
tions. Rudolf Jhering, in the second part of his theoretical production, promoted
a teleological idea of law, according to which a certain goal and the related inter-
est from the legislator are the true causes of legal norms, and that consequently
it is the task of the legal sciences to investigate such a goal (Zweck).13 Jhering’s at-
tack on legal positivism was therefore primarily aimed at showing the relevance of
non-purely legal concepts for the understanding of the law. Philipp Heck was the
legal theorist who systematized this position, expanded it and created a proper In-
12Gerhard Anschütz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11. August 1919. Ein Kommentar für Wis-
senscha und Praxis, Berlin: Stilke, 1926; Gerhard Anschütz and Richard oma (eds.), Handbuch des
deutschen Staatsrechts, in two volumes, Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1930- 1932.
13Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel Verlag, 1877.
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teressenjurisprudenz, whereby legal norms are conceptualised as decisions for the
regulations of determined conicts of interests.14 e gaps in the legal system have
to be covered by the judge expanding the existing legal norms in consideration
of the legislative decision and the underlying compromise of interests. Heck high-
lighted therefore not only the importance of the extra-legal fact, but also the non-
completeness of the legal system, against the prevalent legal positivist stance.
A more comprehensive attack against legal positivism took shape with the
Freirechtsbewegung (the “movement of free law”), which undermined the last stand-
ing dogma of legal positivism, namely that all law proceeds from the state. Her-
mann Kantorowicz, one of the key promoters of this movement, in his Der Kampf
um die Rechtswissenscha15 claimed that the law is a product of society as a whole,
and every domain of the society produces law, thus continuously lling the gaps
that the state-centred law system cannot cover.is is evenmore so for the activity
of the judge, who is not simply the master of the “logical machine” of pure legal
norms, but the creator of new law through interpretative decisions.
During the rst decade of the twentieth century, therefore, when Schmitt was
still a student, the situation within legal studies was ready for the development of
a sociology of law.is forms the primary achievement of Eugen Ehrlich.
e key concept employed by Ehrlich in his Grundlegung der Soziologie des
Rechtswas that of living law (lebendes Recht), in opposition to the law coming from
the law bills issued by the state (Gesetzesrecht), which allowed him to investigate
from a sociological perspective the existence of gaps in the state-centred legal sys-
tem, which indicated how the law, as a social product, is indeed the result of a strat-
ication and a synthesis of various instances in which the law itself is produced,
namely a “social law” (gesellschaliches Recht) as organisational dispositions of hu-
man associations, a law of the jurists (Juristenrecht), the product of the intellectual
work of the legal experts and professionals, and nally the law coming from the law
bills of the state and other legal dispositions and commands issued by state author-
14Philipp Heck, Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz, in Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (AcP)
No.112, 1914, pages 1–318.
15Hermann Kantorowicz, Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenscha, 1906.
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ities (staatliches Recht). Ehrlich is not simply interested in nding a denition of
law from a conceptual-formal perspective, but he is indeed interested in analysing
the social activity of the production of justice in society, a process which is car-
ried out by concrete individuals who, like artists giving shape to their artwork, do
synthesise the reality (Wirklichkeit) of social relations in legal concepts: “because
justice rests indeed on social currents, but it requires, in order to become eective,
the personal action of the individual. [...] Justice, as it is individually shaped in law
bills, judgements and works of literature, is in its highest expressions the result of
a genial synthesis of oppositions, like everything of greatness, which has ever been
created”.16
Schmitt’s intervention in the ongoing debates about the law, the state and con-
stitutional formswas followedby the anti-sociological reaction formulated byHans
Kelsen, who tried to recongure a legal positivistic approach to the problem of law
with the elaboration of a purely formalistic-conceptual doctrine, the reine Recht-
slehre. Already in his Zur Soziologie des Rechts (1912), Kelsen rejected the theses
of Ehrlich and of the Freirechtsbewegung, by arguing that the task of legal sciences
must remain that of the elaboration of legal concepts without being obfuscated
by sociological questions. While he accepts the point that sociology can certainly
conduct its exploration of law, he remarks upon the dierent methodological ap-
proaches between legal sciences and sociology, and the necessity of keeping them
separated.17
From this point onwards, the critical divisions of dierent orientations in the
conceptualisation of the law and of the state are essentially set. On the one hand,
Kelsen’s reactions to the attacks against legal positivism would amount to a unied
grand theory of law understood in a purely formalistic sense. On the other Ehrlich,
Max Weber and later — in a peculiar fashion — Carl Schmitt would concentrate
16Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, München and, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot Ver-
lag, 1914, page 162: Denn die Gerechtigkeit beruht zwar auf gesellschalichen Strömungen, aber sie bedarf,
um wirksam zu werden, der persönlichen Tat eines einzelnen. [...] Die Gerechtigkeit, so wie sie in Geset-
zen, Richtersprüchen, literarischen Werken individuell gestaltet wird ist in ihren höchsten Äußerungen das
Ergebnis genialer Synthese der Gegensätze, wie alles Großartige, das je geschaen worden ist.
17Hans Kelsen, “Zur Soziologie des Rechts, Kritische Betrachtungen”, in Archiv für Sozialwissenscha und
Sozialpolitik, Volume 34, Issue 2, 1912, pages 601–614.
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on the renement of a sociological enquiry into legal and political matters. Weber
would orient his investigation of the sociology of law in the direction of a sociology
of human action, and not of the legal norms as envisaged by Ehrlich, while devel-
oping parallel enquiries into a sociology of political power and its various forms
(Herrschassoziologie) and a sociology of religion (Religionsoziologie), as ways to
capture the essence of the modern state (and law) in its economic, political and
cultural dimensions. Schmitt’s starting point is therefore precisely the continua-
tion of a radical critique against legal positivism, which he pursues by denying all
its theoretical tenets: rejecting a purely formalistic approach to jurisprudence but
including the exploration of the sociological, political and even theological roots
of the law, re-discussing the dignity and the function of the jurist, denying the
completeness of the state-centred law system and stressing the necessity to enlarge
the scope of the investigation in order to encompass the true nature of the legal
phenomenon as social phenomenon.18
As it will be illustrated in the next part of this chapter, Schmitt’s work ad-
dresses the sociological understanding of the law in the context of the crisis of the
state, which forms the recurrent, almost ubiquitous, Leitmotiv of his theoretical
production.
From a domestic perspective, this crisis is congured as the degradation of the
concept of sovereignty with its increasing formalisation and detachment from the
existential circumstances in which politics is constantly situated. is is reected
in Schmitt’s radical critique of liberalism and particularly in the way in which lib-
eralism has, in his view, distorted the meaning of the law produced by the state
(Gesetz) and more in general in its ideological conceptualisation of the Rechtsstaat
within legal positivism. is distorted understanding of politics and the state has
been reected in a distorted conceptualisation of the law and of the role of the
jurists.e crisis of the state is reected on the other side also in Schmitt’s discus-
sion of international political order, which he reconstructs historically as a global
order in a world of states. As the state nds itself in a generalised crisis domesti-
18On Schmitt’s conception of law, see Michael G. Salter, Carl Schmitt: Law as Politics, Ideology and Strategic
Myth, New York: Routledge, 2012.
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cally, so internationally this very crisis manifests itself in the progressive collapse
of the legal order which had lasted for centuries from the age of discoveries in the
eenth century until the end of the nineteenth century. Again, Schmitt addresses
here the problem of order from the perspective of a legal-theoretical enquiry which
highlights the sociological roots of the legal phenomenon of international law, at-
tempting to disentangle it from ahistorical conceptualisations.19
2.2 schmitt and politics
2.2.1 e Political
Schmitt’s conceptualisation of the political is based on the presupposition that “the
political has its own criteria”, which are capable of producing their eects on “the
diverse, relatively autonomous areas of human thought and action, especially the
moral, aesthetic and economic, in a peculiar way”.20 According to Schmitt, all poli-
tics can be traced back to a fundamental dialectic, one that cannot be further simpli-
ed or analysed in more elementary parts, namely the opposition between friend
and enemy. Every political action can be traced back to this distinction. Exactly as
good and evil, beautiful and ugly, protable and unremunerative, do represent the
dialectic poles respectively in ethics, aesthetics, and economics so do friend and
enemy occupy these poles in politics.21
e enemy is here understood as a counterpart, as someone belonging to a
dierent legal and/or moral order, whose basic conception of order and justice
may even be opposed to the one held by those from whose standpoint the enemy
is observed.
Schmitt is explicit in arming that the concepts of friend and enemy are to be
understood in “their concrete, existentialmeaning (Sinn), not asmetaphors or sym-
19On this point, see Jerey Seitzer, Comparative History and Legaleory: Carl Schmitt in the First German
Democracy, Westpost ct: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.
20Carl Schmitt, Der Begri des Politischen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963 (rst edition 1932), page 25.
21Schmitt, ibidem, page 25.
98
2.2 schmitt and politics
bols” and they should not be “confused or diminished through economic, moral
and other representations (Vorstellungen)”, certainly not as an expression of private
and individualistic feelings and tendencies.22 It is also not necessary to personally
hate one’s political enemy.23
e author recalls here an important distinction that the Latin language al-
lows between inimicus and hostis. Inimicus (negative prex in- + amicus, friend)
refers to the private enemy, the hated rival, the moral antagonist, as opposed to
amicus, the moral ally outside the boundaries of kinship ties. e enemy Schmitt
is referring to is instead the hostis, a term that in classical Latin was used to de-
scribe the adversary on the battleeld, originally it simply designated the foreigner
or the stranger who did not belong to the community. Apparently, the word could
indicate in ancient times also the semantic area later covered by hospes (guest), and
may have derived from the verb hostio (to take revenge): the hostis was originally
the one who lived outside the legal framework of archaic Rome and hence did not
exist within an overarching jurisdiction that could cover both the Roman and the
foreigner, who may have resorted to vendetta as the basic form of compensation
for oences.24 Hostis is for Schmitt the enemy not in a moral sense, but exclusively
in a political dimension. He also recalls a similar dierentiation to be found in
the ancient Greek language between piολέµιος [polémios], a word directly coming
from piόλεµος [pólemos, war] and ἐχθρός [echthrós]. e two words are roughly
equivalent, respectively, to the Latin hostis and inimicus in their semantic value.
Interestingly for Schmitt, “the oen quoted passage [of the Gospel] »love your en-
emies« (Matthew 5:44 and Luke 6:27) reads »diligite inimicos vestros«, ἀγαpiᾶτε
τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑµῶν, and not: diligite hostes vestros; there is no mention of political
enemy”.25
e emergence of a friend-enemy dialectic can occur as a consequence of frac-
tures originating in every aspect of social life, religious, moral, economic, ethnic
or other, when the opposition between dierent orientations is strong enough to
22Schmitt, ibidem, page 27.
23Schmitt, ibidem, page 28.
24Cf. Walde, Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, op. cit., page 661 Alfred Ernout and Antoine Meilleit,
Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine, Paris: Klincksieck 1932, pages 300–301.
25Schmitt, Der Begri, page 28, emphasis in the original.
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generate a grouping of the people in opposing factions.26 Schmitt recognized the
existence of several degrees of intensity in the opposition between distinct human
groups, and only in extreme situations does the enemy become the one against
whom war as organized collective violence is waged. “e political opposition is
the most intensive and extreme opposition” and because of the possibly ubiqui-
tous emergence of political struggles, “every concrete contraposition (Gegensätz-
lichkeit) is more intensively political, the more it gets closer to the extreme point”,
namely the friend-enemy grouping.
As the enemy is not a private rival, nor the economic competitor or the adver-
sary in general (e.g. in legal, or even academic disputes), so the enemy also has to
be conceptualised as an organized collectivity (Gesamtheit), characterised by the
real possibility of— at least eventually— violent struggle against another similarly
organised collectivity. Precisely because of this collective character, the concept of
enemy is inherently and exclusively public.27 As the concept of the political has its
central feature in the “eventuality of struggle”, so the centrality of war for politics
appears in Schmitt’s argument at this point.e concepts friend, enemy and strug-
gle (Kampf ) get their realmeaning from the relation they have and keep “to the real
possibility of physical killing” (auf die reale Möglichkeit der physischen Tötung),28
although war is not to be considered the “goal and objective, or even the content
of politics”. It represents instead “the constantly present precondition, in the form
of a real possibility (of war), which determines human action and thinking in a
peculiar way and through that produces a specically political behaviour”.29
26Schmitt, ibidem, page 35.
27Schmitt, ibidem, page 27: Feid ist nur einewenigstens eventuell, d.h. der realenMöglichkeit nach kämpfende
Gesamtheit von Menschen, die einer ebensolchen Gesamheit gegenübersteht. Feid ist nur der öentliche
Feind, weil alles, was auf eine solche Gesamtheit von Menschen, insbesondere auf ein ganzes Volk Bezug
hat, dadurch öentlich wird.
28Schmitt, ibidem, page 31.
29Schmitt, ibidem, page 33: Der Krieg ist durchaus nicht Ziel und Zweck oder gar Inhalt der Politik, wohl aber
ist er als die reale Möglichkeit immer vorhandene Voraussetzung, die das menschliche Handeln und Denken
in eigenartiger Weise bestimmt und dadurch ein spezisch politisches Verhalten bewirkt (emphasis in the
original).
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2.2.2 e State
e Concept of the Political is only partially dedicated to a purely analytical discus-
sion of “the political” as philosophical category.e author is equally interested in
the state, and in the clarication of the idea of the state in the light of his discus-
sion of the political. More in general, the state remains constantly at the centre of
Schmitt’s writings, whether directly focused on political thought, constitutional
law, or international law, and from the very early works, such as Der Wert des
Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (1914),30 up until his last major publication
eorie des Partisanen (1963).roughout all his production, andwith increasingly
apocalyptic overtones, he is eager to make the point that the state nds itself in a
situation of steep decline, with potentially catastrophic consequences.is decline
is mainly to be attributed, as will be illustrated, to the erosive action of liberal ide-
ologies, and specically from a legal perspective, to the perversion of the idea of
law (Gesetz). Schmitt’s denition of the state matured during the late 1910s and the
early 1920s, a period in which Schmitt directly witnessed the turbulent times of
war, defeat and revolution in Germany. As his biographers agree, this has been a
decisive experience for his formation, and for the shaping of his theoretical orien-
tation. Before the war, Schmitt elaborated his view on the state along the lines of a
purely legal-theoretical argumentation, in the tradition of post-Hegelian philoso-
phy of law, namely as a member of a triad composed also by the individual and the
law, where the state assumed the role of mediator between these two poles. In this
rst formulation, “from the opposition between the norm and the real, the empir-
ical world follows the position of the state as a point of passage (Übergangspunkt)
fromoneworld into the other”.e state is consequently dened as the “legal entity
(Rechtsgebilde) whose meaning lies exclusively in the task of implementing the law
(Der Staat ist danach das Rechtsgebilde, dessen Sinn ausschließlich in der Aufgabe
besteht, Recht zu verwirklichen)”.31 But in 1927, when the Concept of the Political
was rst published, Schmitt’s denition of the state became much more complex,
30Carl Schmitt,DerWert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B.Mohr (Paul
Siebeck), 1914.
31Schmitt, ibidem, page 52.
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less reliant on sheer theoretical arguments, and heavily inuenced instead by soci-
ological sensibilities. In this period, a sort of conversion to a more explicit critique
of legal positivism emerges in all its power.e state appears now at the crossroads
of many instances, which may be grasped primarily within a historical reconstruc-
tion, something that Schmitt points to in rather genealogical terms: “the state is”,
he writes, “according to the meaning itself of the word and its historical manifesta-
tion, a condition of a special kind of a people” (Staat ist seinemWortsinn und seiner
historischen Erscheinung nach ein besonders gearteter Zustand eines Volkes), namely
“the decisive condition in a critical case and therefore, the condition par excellence,
when compared with the many thinkable individual and collective conditions”.32
e full appreciation of the state as a concept can only be achieved through the un-
derstanding of the general condition of the political (friend/enemy dialectic) and
the special circumstances which create the state as it emerges from the state of ex-
ception, which lies at the origin of both the state and its legal system, and from the
state of war.
Schmitt never abandoned, in the course of his exceptionally long and produc-
tive intellectual life, the idea that politics in his time could only be correctly under-
stood from a perspective capable of going beyond individualism, which apparently
does not represent, despite a pervasive contrary opinion, the characteristic cypher
of late modernity: “Our time”, so wrote Schmitt already in 1914, “is not an individ-
ualistic time”.33 is claim is largely grounded on a reection about the key tenet
of modern culture, which he identies in scepticism and technical precision: “A
time, which denes itself as sceptical and precise, may not call itself individualistic
in the same breath; neither scepticism nor the precise natural sciences are capable
of establishing any individuality”.34
e political for Schmittmanifests itself always in a collective dimension, only
belonging to a certain groupmaking sense of the political from the viewpoint of the
individual. As previously recalled, the fundamental political relation, the friend-
enemy dialectic, emerges out of a grouping of people in dierent, opposed factions.
32Schmitt, Der Begri, page 19.
33Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, page 6.
34Schmitt, ibidem, page 4.
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More precisely, “[p]olitical is always the grouping which is oriented towards the
case of emergency” (Politisch ist jedenfalls immer die Gruppierung, die sich an dem
Ernstfall orientiert).35e political entity, the supremeGruppierung, which Schmitt
perceives as the best t for this theoretical denition is then the state directed and
shaped by the problem of managing the state of emergency. e state is the “deci-
sive human grouping”, “sovereign” in the sense that “the decision about the decisive
case, even when it is the case of exception, has to belong to it because of conceptual
necessity”.36
Along this line, Schmitt develops the concept of the state in its relation to war
andwarfare. “To the state”, he writes “belongs the jus belli, i.e. the real possibility, in
a given case on its own decision, to identify the enemy and to ght him” (die reale
Möglichkeit, im gegebenen Fall kra eigener Entscheidung den Feind zu bestimmen
und ihn zu bekämpfen).37 e state has historically evolved in the direction of con-
centrating in itself increasing amounts of material resources, which had become,
by the time Schmitt was writing, “ungeheuer” (monstrous or terric), not least in
its capacity to wage war.e jus belli is also eminently reected in the power of the
state to “dispose of the life of humans” (das Leben von Menschen zu verfügen) , in a
“double possibility: to demand from themembers of one’s own people the readiness
to die and kill, and to kill the humans who stand on the enemy side” (von Angehöri-
gen des eigenen Volkes Todesbereitscha und Tötungsbereitscha zu verlangen, und
auf der Feidesseite stehende Menschen zu töten).38
On the other hand, following a well-established and explicitly Hobbesian tra-
dition, the normal role of the state in times of peace is that of policing, namely to
ensure “quiet, security and order” (Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung) and hence to
create that situation which is the necessary precondition for the validity of legal
norms, “because every norm presupposes a normal situation” and no norm can
have validity for a wholly abnormal situation. is is a very important point for
the understanding of Schmitt’s theory of the state: as the jus belli consists primar-
35Schmitt, Der Begri, page 36.
36Schmitt, ibidem, page 36.
37Schmitt, ibidem, page 42.
38Schmitt, ibidem, page 43.
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ily in the political act of determining who the enemy to be fought in war is, and
so the creation of peace and security domestically may well require the identi-
cation and the abatement of a domestic enemy, if present. Schmitt recalls at this
point the invariable presence within the legal orders of political entities, already
in antiquity, of regulations aimed at the achievement of this goal, namely what he
calls Feinderklärung (declaration of enmity), which may be substantiated in acts
of ostracism, bans, proscription etc. Ultimately, the creation of a domestic order
through the elimination of the internal enemy may assume, in its most extreme
case, the form of a civil war. Schmitt denes it as “the dissolution of the state as an
internally pacied, territorially self-comprehensive, and impenetrable by foreign-
ers, organised political unity” (Auösung des Staates als einer in sich befriedeten,
territorial in sich geschlossenen und für Fremde undurchdringlichen, organisierten
politischen Einheit).39 Civil war has a very important role in dening the political
identity of a collectivity or, better, it functions as a decisive process in relation to
the development and future of the political collective.
Power exerted by the political entity over the physical existence of humans
for the survival, perpetuation and aggrandisement of the political entity itself is
described by the author as the key feature of a political community, the distin-
guishinig trait in relation to other forms of human groupings. While a church, or
a religious sect, may well demand martyrdom of some of its members exclusively
for the salvation of their souls, this does not represent a political entity as long as
this power of life and death is not related to the earthly stance of the sect itself. If
this is the case, the sect or church ceases to be a mere religious organisation and
becomes a full-edged political community.40
In a society characterised by the dominance of liberal ideology, the conict
between the nature of the political as friend-enemy dialectic and the economic or-
ganisation of the society becomes particularly acute and it is taken by Schmitt as the
main feature of the problematic conceptualisation of the political within liberalism.
“In an economically determined (ökonomisch bestimmt) society, whose order, i.e.,
39Schmitt, ibidem, page 44.
40Schmitt, ibidem, page 45.
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whose predictable functioning takes place in the domain of economic categories,”
so thinks Schmitt, “under no possible viewpoint it is possible to demand the sacri-
ce of some member of the society, in the interest of the undisturbed functioning
of his life”, as this would clearly be a contradiction. As it shall be illustrated below,
Schmitt’s highlights the contradiction betweendenouncingwar asmurder andwag-
ing war in the name of “ending all wars”, i.e. the very idea of ghting wars, dying
and killing, for a normative principle. Schmitt’s theoretical position is instead that
“war, the readiness to die of ghting humans, the physical killing of other humans,
who stand on the enemy side, all this has no normative meaning, but only an ex-
istential one, and namely in the reality of a situation of actual ghting against an
actual enemy, not in some ideal, programme or other norm”.41
2.3 schmitt and international politics
e reality of the state as the prevalent form of political organisation in themodern
age represents themanifestation of the political within the historical circumstances
ofmodernity. As the friend-enemy dialectic implies the division of the world into a
plurality of political units, each of them being free to determine its destiny through
the exercise of its sovereignty, so the existence of one state implies the existence of
a plurality of states. e modern world is therefore necessarily a Staatenwelt, a
world of states. Schmitt criticised here two important tenets of the liberal interna-
tionalist political conception which dominated the interwar period during which
he was writing, despite the already evident setbacks that the post-wwi liberal inter-
national order was suering. e rst idea to be criticised is that of a prospective
world state, given the above described formulation of the political, any “political
world is necessarily a pluriverse, not a universe” (emphasis added). As long as the
state prevails as the dominant political form, “there will be a plurality of states and
there can be no world-“state” which encompasses the whole of the earth and the
41Schmitt, ibidem, page 46: Der Krieg, die Todesbereitscha kämpfender Menschen, die physischen Tötung
von andern Menschen, die auf der Seite des Feides stehen, alles das hat keinen normativen, sodern nur einen
existentiellen Sinn, und zwar in der Realität einer Situation des wirklichen Kampfes gegen einen wirklichen
Feind, nicht in irgendwelchen Idealen, Programmen oder Normativitäten.
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whole of mankind”.42 Schmitt is explicit in portraying the near-impossibility of
such a state, which would imply the elimination of any possible political opposi-
tion, and the creation of a perfectly de-politicised world. e whole of the earth
may be unied in such a world but still not in a political sense, because the pre-
supposition of its unity would be precisely the elimination of any politically driven
grouping: in such a hypothetical condition, there would still not be a world state,
as there would be no politics at all.43
e second idea that Schmitt attacks is that of humanity as a political category.
e author makes his point clear that “humanity is not a political concept”, as there
is “no political unit, no community and no state [Status; emphasis in the original]
corresponding to that concept”.44 Again within the Schmittian understanding of
the political as friend-enemy dialectic, humanity is not a political concept because
“humanity as such cannot wage any war, as it does not have any enemy, at least not
on this planet”. e concept of humanity is a concept inherently belonging to the
domain of de-politicisation, as “it excludes the concept of enemy, since the enemy
as well does not cease to be human and there lies not specic dierentiation”.45
From a historical perspective, Schmitt traces the emergence of the (still today)
dominant idea of humanity from the political landscape of the eighteenth century.
Within that context, the author claims, humanity was indeed “a polemical denial
of the then-existing aristocratic-feudal or class order and their privileges”.e hu-
manity of the liberal doctrines appears consequently to be a “social ideal construc-
tion” derived from “natural law and liberal-individualistic doctrines”, a network of
relations between individuals, which excludes the possibility of the political, as in
such an ideal world there is no place for collectivities as political unities. Human-
ity has consequently outlived its original polemical role, and it has evolved into a
powerful tool for ideological de-politicisation and for the advancement of partial
interests.46
42Schmitt, ibidem, page 50.
43Schmitt, ibidem, pages 50–51 and page 54.
44Schmitt, ibidem, page 52.
45Schmitt, ibidem, page 51.
46Schmitt, ibidem, page 52.
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2.3.1 Nomos and International Order
e centrality of the state-system and the consequently state-based idea of interna-
tional order are translated into a more general reection about the nature of inter-
national politics as emerging from the political as friend-enemy dialectic. While at
the national level the political struggle can determine the victory of one side and
for a certain time stabilize the dicult balance in the friend-enemy dialectic, out-
side the boundaries of the state this is not possible in the same manner. Within
the state, as already understood by Hobbes, the use of violence can be reduced to
times of exception, and it is otherwise outlawed. In the international sphere, the
lack of a supreme authority makes a similar solution impracticable. In Der Nomos
der Erde, arguably Schmitt’s most famous work, and clearly the most relevant from
an ir perspective, the problem of international order both at political and interna-
tional level is studied through the analytical lenses of the friend-enemy dialectic,
legitimation and political theology from a historical perspective.47
As the world and mankind is divided into politically opposed groupings, the
problem of organising the pluralism of the world and the management of the re-
sulting relations has been prominent since antiquity, well before the rise of the
modern state. e organisation and the management of these sets of reciprocal
relations between political units requires an original foundational act for the es-
tablishment of a common law (Recht), in this case clearly of an international law.
is foundational act, in Schmitt’s view, has the content of a division, distribution
and appropriation of land (Landeinteilung, Landzuteilung, Landnahme), which he
terms the “nomos” of the earth.e author believes that he has identied with this
concept the very act that forms the foundation of any law (Recht), both domestic
and international. e law appears indeed always as related to the ground, as the
human being is ultimately a “terrestrial” creature.e law is intimately tied to the
earth: the earth compensates the worker for his fatigue with its fruits, whereby
“every peasant knows the intimate measure of this justice” (Jeder Bauer kennt das
47Carl Schmitt,Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum. Berlin: Duncker &Humblot
Verlag, 1950. English Translation by G.L. Ulmen, Telos, New York 2003.
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innere Maß dieser Gerechtigkeit); the earth shows the lines dividing the dierent
portions of the soil which humanity has assigned to dierent activities and eco-
nomic destinations; the earth bears the signs of the ordering and locating which
is the expression of the social life of humans, enclosures, fences, walls, boundary
stones, houses and other constructions. In this division of the earth, in the nomos,
“family, tribe, clan and class, the type of property and of neighbourhood are made
publicly visible”.48 Schmitt contrasts the foundational character of the land and its
division in relation to the law, all aspects of the “telluric” nature of the legal sphere,
with the absence of such order on the sea, which “knows no such manifest unity
of space and law, of ordering and localisation” (das Meer kennt keine sinnfällige
Einheit von Raum und Recht, von Ordnung und Ortung).49 Schmitt recalls here all
the most important elements of his investigation of the opposition between land
and sea in legal thinking, which he had previously developed in Land und Meer,50
among which the principle of the freedom of the sea (das Meer ist frei) and the
historical connotations of the original absence of law on the sea, particularly re-
ected in the practice of piracy. Indeed, as documented by Homer, piracy did not
originally constitute a crime, and none of the Homeric heroes would have been
ashamed of being the son of a venturous pirate, simply “because on the open sea
there was no constraint or limit, no shrine and no holy place”.51
Schmitt is therefore adamant in declaring that the great foundational acts of
law have the character of localisation based on the land (Die großen Ur-Akte des
Rechts dagegen bleiben erdgebundene Ortungen), whose chief manifestations are
the appropriations of land, the foundation of cities, and of colonies (Landnahmen,
Städtegründungen und Gründungen von Kolonien).52
e appropriation of land (Landnahme) has for the political and legal life of a
community a great importance, as it gives a foundation to the legal order both inter-
nally and externally. Internally, among themembers of the human groupwhich has
48Schmitt, ibidem, page 13.
49Schmitt, ibidem, page 13.
50Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer. Eine Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2011 (originally
published in 1942).
51Schmitt, Der Nomos, page 14.
52Schmitt, ibidem, page 15.
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performed the land appropriation, the rst division and distribution of that land
“creates the rst order of all relations of possession and property” (die erste Ord-
nung aller Besitz- und Eigentumsverhältnisse).53 From this rst division of the land
ows the internal legal ordering of the political community, both in the sense of
the regulation among private subjects and their relations, and of the establishment
and conduct of a public law. In terms of the internal eects of the division of land,
Schmitt highlights how this also generates “a sort of super-property (Obereigentum,
emphasis in the original) of the community in its collectivity”, which does remain
valid “even when the subsequent distribution is no longer a sheer collective prop-
erty (Gemeinschaseigentum) and recognises the fully “free” private property (Pri-
vateigentum) of the single person”.54 Externally, the appropriation of land estab-
lishes the status of the group of humans performing the appropriation against other
groups or powers which also are in the process of land appropriation, or possession.
Schmitt rejects clearly and openly any suggestion of legal positivism, by stating how
the intellectual construction of international law is not grounded in thought, but
in the reality of land appropriation and division. And there is not only one kind
of law, the positive law of the state, but on the contrary there are “several kinds of
law”: alongside the law of the state there is a law which precedes the state, which is
external to the state, as well as a lawwhich exists between the states (Es gibtmehrere
Arten von Recht. Es gibt nicht nur die Staatliche Legalität, sondern auch vor-, außer-
und zwischenstaatliches Recht).55 e plurality of dierent kinds of law is bound to
the plurality of land appropriation processes, each founding a dierent law, so that
“in international law [...] in every period of history arise coexisting empires, coun-
tries and peoples, which develop diverse orders for their coexistence”. Of these
legal orders, the most important part consists in the principles and procedures,
both public and private, for territorial change (Gebietsänderung).56
e appropriation of land should not be understood, Schmitt is eager to pre-
cise, as a “sheer construction of the thought”, but as “a fact of legal history, and as
53Schmitt, ibidem, page 16.
54Schmitt, ibidem, page 16.
55Schmitt, ibidem, page 51.
56Schmitt, ibidem, page 51.
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a great historical event”, despite the obscurity that may surround such events, es-
pecially if they occurred in remote times.57 e appropriation of land is moreover
the determining turning point which stays “at the beginning of the history of ev-
ery people becoming sedentary, of every collectivity (Gemeinwesen) and of every
empire (Reich)”. An appropriation of land marks “every beginning of a historical
era”, and it precedes, logically and historically, the creation of a new order.58 Con-
sequently, Schmitt is ready to state that “the history of international law up to this
point is a history of land appropriations”, which have successively encompassed
more and more of the Earth’s surface, land and sea, until the creation, from the
sixteenth century onwards, of the rst global order, encompassing the whole of
the planet. is new global order grew out of a new stage of human spacial con-
sciousness (ein neues Stadiummenschlichen Raumbewußtseins).59 While indeed all
pre-global conceptions of spacial order were completely tied to the ground, even
when they included dominion on the sea, this situation has been transformed dur-
ing the age of discoveries, “as for the rst time the earth was comprehended and
measured by the global consciousness of the European peoples” (als die Erde zum
erstenmal von dem globalen Bewußtsein europäischer Völker erfaßt und gemessen
wurde).60 Only with the discovery, exploration and appropriation of new lands on
a global dimension did the rst nomos of the Earth come into being, a form of in-
ternational order which was based on a particular relation of spacial order of the
land with the spacial order of the sea, an arrangement which supported “for 400
years a Europe-centric international law, the jus publicum Europaeum”.61
e Nomos of the Earth, aer the initial explanation of the key relevant con-
cepts, develops a full historical reconstruction of the transition from pre-global
international law systems, specically the European medieval conception of world
politics, to the jus publicum Europaeum and its crisis, which formed during the
nineteenth century and erupted in the rst half of the twentieth century. In
Schmitt’s reconstruction, the medieval order of Europe is the historical and logical
57Schmitt, ibidem, page 17.
58Schmitt, ibidem, page 19.
59Schmitt, ibidem, page 19.
60Schmitt, ibidem, page 19.
61Schmitt, ibidem, page 19.
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predecessor of the modern order (the jus publicum Europaeum) and had emerged
from the land appropriations occurring at the time of the migrations (Völkerwan-
derung). Despite being “very anarchical”, if comparedwith the smooth functioning
of a modern organisation, and despite all the wars and feuds, it was “not nihilistic,
as long as it did not lose its fundamental unity of ordering and location” (Ordnung
und Ortung).62
e European civilisation which emerged from the migrations understood it-
self primarily as Christendom, the communion of all true Christians under the
guidance of the Catholic Church. e territorial denition of its order was ex-
tremely precise, and articulated in a division of the world between the soil (Boden)
of the non-Christian, heathen peoples, whichwasmissionary land (Missionsgebiet),
that of the Muslims, which was identied as a hostile area to be conquered and an-
nexed with crusades, and the Byzantine empire, which constituted a special legal
case in itself.63 Schmitt explains the unity of the respublica Christiana as the man-
ifestation of Imperium and Sacerdotium, both centres of legal and political author-
ity of medieval Europa, whose authority came from the spacial tie (Anknüpfung)
to Rome and the continuation of the ancient locations (Ortungen) of the Christian
faith.64 is relation of continuity relied on the “concrete location of Rome, not
in norms and general ideas” and in the continuity between the international law
of the Middle Ages and the late Roman empire whose nature of Christian empire
was translated onto the legal order of the Middles Ages. Schmitt argues indeed
that “substantial to that Christian empire is that it is not an eternal empire (ewiges
Reich), but it restraints (im Auge behält) its own end and the end of the present
aeon (das Ende des gegenwärtigen Äon) and nevertheless is capable of a historical
power” (einer geschichtlichen Macht fähig ist). e author introduces at this point
one of his most controversial concepts, that of the katechon, which nds its histor-
ical roots precisely in the role that the empire, its order and its legal system had
within the political-theological conception of late antiquity and the Middle Ages.
Schmitt argues that the continuity of the idea of a Roman empire is due to a “deci-
62Schmitt, ibidem, page 26.
63Schmitt, ibidem, page 27.
64Schmitt, ibidem, page 28.
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sive concept, with massive historical impact”, namely that of the “restrainer, of the
kat-echon” (Der entscheidende geschichtmächtige Begri seiner Kontinuität ist der
des Aufhalters, des Kat-echon).65 e concept of the katechon comes from a phrase
of Paul (Second Epistle to theessalonians 2:5–7),66 while the apostle is revealing
what will happen at the end of days, namely the coming of an Antichrist, before the
second coming of Jesus Christ in his glory, and the last judgment.e Antichrist,
and the end of the world with him, is checked by “something that restrains it”, a
phrasewhich inAncientGreek can be expressedwith a simple participle of the verb
κατέχω (katécho), meaning to restrain, to hold back. is participle appears rst
in its neutral form τὸ κατέχον (something that restrains) and in the next phrase
as masculine ὁ κατέχων (he who restrains). According to Schmitt, the whole of
the Medieval self-understanding of history and politics can be explained with the
concept of the katechon: the authority of the Fathers and theological authors like
Tertullian, Hieronymus and Lactantius Firmianus, as well as other traditions, all
agreed on the point that “only the imperium Romanum and its Christian continua-
tion explain[ed] the stability of the aeon and preserve[d] it against the overwhelm-
ing power of evil”.67
Schmitt traces the dissolution of the medieval world order to two main his-
torical phenomena.e rst one is the discovery of the NewWorld and the conse-
quent acquisition of land by the European powers. As already described above, the
change in the spatial understanding of the world promoted a change in the way in
which the legal and political order had to be theorised. e second phenomenon
was the loss of religious unity with the Reformation and the subsequent religious
wars, which prompted the elaboration of a new political order on the continent to
be organised around modern states and their interactions.is transformation oc-
curred largely with a supercial abandonment of the theological understanding of
65Schmitt, ibidem, page 29.
66e textus receptus of the Greek version is the following: “Οὐ µνηµονεύετε ὅτι ἔτι ὢν piρὸς ὑµᾶς ταῦτα
ἔλεγον ὑµῖν;καὶ νῦν τὸ κατέχον οἴδατε, εἰς τὸ ἀpiοκαλυφθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ καιρῷ: τὸ γὰρ µυστήριον
ἤδη ἐνεργεῖται τῆς ἀνοµίας: µόνον ὁ κατέχων ἄρτι ἕως ἐκ µέσου γένηται.” (2es 2:5–7). e New King
James’s Bible (1982) translates it as “Do you not remember that when I was still with you I told you these
things? And now you know what is restraining, that he may be revealed in his own time. For the mystery of
lawlessness is already at work; only he who now restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way.”
67Schmitt, ibidem, page 30.
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history (the katechon) for the creation of rational explanation patterns in the consti-
tution and legitimation of political and legal practices.e new nomos of the Earth,
the rst global one, was created as the result of the appropriation of enormous land
areas previously occupied by non-Christian, ‘heathen’ aboriginal populations and
political communities, and the subsequent division of the planet into roughly two
areas: Europe, where the continent was re-organised around sovereign states, and
the rest of the world, which was open to European exploration, discovery and an-
nexation. Schmitt explores the ways in which the planet was divided by exploiting
innovative techniques in navigation and cartography, and the resulting emergence
of demarcation and amity lines,68 and the legal doctrines which jurists envisaged
in order to legitimise and regulate the land appropriations taking place outside Eu-
rope, and especially of course in the Americas.69
e medieval understanding of territorial order and its theological articula-
tions had important consequences for the way in which war was regulated. e
medieval category of just war (justum bellum) was to serve the purpose of either
defending the Christian lands from non-Christian aggression, or of expanding,
through conquest and annexation, non-Christian lands (e.g. the Spanish recon-
quista). In this context, what was to be considered “just” was decided by the church
and more specically by the theologians. With the emergence of a new spacial, le-
gal and political order, the image of war changed.e concept of just war became
completely transformed. Decisive for the determination of a just war was no longer
the authority of the church, but “the sovereignty of the states, having equal rights”
(die gleichberechtigte Souveränität der Staaten). What was decisive in the determi-
nation of the just war was no longer the causa i.e., the motivation behind waging
war, but the formal circumstances in which the conict occurred, namely the in-
dividuation of a justus hostis: just became the war fought by regular combatants
under the ags of sovereign, recognised, equal states on European soil.70
For Schmitt, who considers—as illustrated above— the possibility ofwar and
armed conict as inherent to the very nature of the political, this “legal formalisa-
68Schmitt, ibidem, pages 54–69.
69Schmitt, ibidem, pages 69–109.
70Schmitt, ibidem, pages 91 and 113–114.
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tion” has represented, “for two hundred years a rationalisation and humanisation”,
as itmanaged to produce a “domestication of war” (Hegung des Krieges).71 Schmitt’s
expression “Hegung des Krieges”, which recurs in many places of theNomos and in
other works, is dicult to translate into other languages. Étienne Balibar has high-
lighted this diculty, asHegung indicates “both that the state limits war to rational
goals, that »civilizes« its means and its modes of declaration and conclusion, and
that it protects its existence in such a way as to protect itself from the devastating
eects of an ideology of suppression of conicts”.72
Schmitt has explained how the transition between the international order of
theMiddles Ages and the modern era has required a double separation, of two pre-
viously indivisible thoughts: the separation of the “moral-theological-ecclesiastical
from the legal and state argument” and the separation “of the jusnaturalistic and
moral question of justa causa from the typical legal-formal question of the justus
hostis [the legitimate, legal enemy], which becomes distinguished from the crim-
inal” (Verbrecher).73 is transformation is both the product and solution of the
religion wars which took place in Europe during the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries.
is newly conceived Eurocentric system of international law and interna-
tional order, which Schmitt labels the jus publicum Europaeum, is carefully de-
scribed in the central part ofe Nomos of the Earth74 as the system based on a
hierarchical ordering of spacial regions and their reciprocal relations.e system
was Eurocentric in that the soil of the European states (the state itself as political
ordering is determined by its territory) had a special status in relation to the rest
of the world, divided between the “free sea” and all those extra-European territo-
ries, theatres of competition between the states for exploration, occupation and
appropriation. Schmitt is clear in stating that the two systems of legal conduct in
international political aairs, one for the European soil and the other for the rest of
the planet, were mutually dependent, and that the European order could not have
71Schmitt, ibidem, pages 91.
72Étienne Balibar,We the People of Europe? Reections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton nj: Princeton
University Press, 2004, page 138.
73Schmitt, Der Nomos, pages 91.
74Schmitt, ibidem, pages 111–185.
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existed without the specic spacial structure envisaged aer the discoveries. is
spacial structure (Raumstruktur) allowed the existence of “a domestic law (Binnen-
recht) of the European sovereigns on the background of enormous open spaces”. 75
For Schmitt though, what is more pressing ine Nomos of the Earth is the de-
scription of how this system of international order, which in his view had produced
the precious achievement of a domestication of war, comes to a generalised crisis
towards the end of the nineteenth century, and collapses in the twentieth.76 It is
important to understand how Schmitt inscribes this reection on international or-
der as jus publicum Europaeum and its disbandment in the context of his broader
legal-theoretical work on the state and its crisis. What had produced order from
the end of the Middle Ages had been the state as the new katechon, and that or-
der or nomos had subsequently disintegrated, as a reex of the broader crisis of
the state, into a chaotic transition whose end, at the time Schmitt was writing, was
far from being visible. His book points therefore at the “question of a new nomos
of the Earth”,77 although without being able to oer an immediate solution to the
problem, which entails instead a broader approach to the crisis of the state and its
foundations, namely its political theology.
Schmitt’s account of the crisis of the jus publicum Europaeum stresses in its
essence the loss of the spacial consciousness which has characterised its rise a few
centuries earlier, a loss which manifested itself in the confusion between the legal
status of the European and the extra-European soil. e author traces this grow-
ing confusion back to the Congo conference of 1885, which created the Free State
of Congo. Despite this being considered as a peripheral event, “this was a symptom
that the up to that point specically European international law was slowly dissolv-
ing itself, without being aware of it”.78 is small crack enlarged rapidly within a
few years, in which more and more non-European sovereign entities were admit-
ted as legitimate members of the international order (China, Japan, Siam etc ...).79
“e great problem of a spacial ordering of the earth completely disappeared from
75Schmitt, ibidem, page 120.
76Schmitt, ibidem, pages 188–299.
77Schmitt, ibidem, page 188.
78Schmitt, ibidem, page 200.
79Schmitt, ibidem, page 204.
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consciousness” (das große Problem einer Raumordung der Erde ganz aus dem Be-
wußtsein verschwand).80 e confusion was amplied by the inability of the jurists
of the late nineteenth century to promote a defence of the established order, which
Schmitt attributes to the rise of legal positivism, and compares this “abdication” of
the jurists’ custodial role in relation to international order and law, to the ousting
of the medieval theologians from the same domain in the early modern era.81
e crisis of the jus publicum Europaeum is the crisis of the European state
also in themanifestation of the decline of a continent vis-à-vis the rest of the world,
but particularly against the position of the United States of America in the interna-
tional order and its long term eects. ese have manifested themselves in a fur-
ther break with the spacial ordering of the nomos, with the proclamation in 1823
by President James Monroe of the “Monroe Doctrine”, which claimed the “West-
ern hemisphere” as the area of non-intervention of the European powers, thereby
rejecting any further act of colonisation and declaring that any such act would be re-
garded by the us as an act of aggression. While Schmitt underscores the diculties
in dening the terms of the doctrine and their historical evolution,82 the point he
intends tomake is that the doctrine represented a break with the nomos and the jus
publicum Europaeum as it was based on the idea of denying the validity of the spa-
cial arrangement on which the nomos was based, considering how the geographic
line determining the hemisphere “create[d] a free range for its own [American]
land appropriations. Crucially, however,the attitude of hostility towards the old
monarchical Europe did not mean that the us was renouncing its belonging to the
sphere of European civilisation and of the European international law community
(europäische Völkerrechtsgemeinscha).83
e progressive disintegration of the old nomos was largely accomplished ac-
cording to Schmitt during the FirstWorldWar and specically with the Paris Peace
Conference, in which the hierarchical relation of superiority between Europe and
the extra-European world was not just abandoned, but was to a certain extent re-
80Schmitt, ibidem, page 203.
81Schmitt, ibidem, page 212.
82Schmitt, ibidem, pages 256–270.
83Schmitt, ibidem, page 261.
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versed, although there was no formal discussion of the balance between Europe
and the extra-European powers in the sense of a spacial re-ordering of the world.
e land of the defeated enemies became “the main object of a new division of
land”, but those enemies were indeed “two purely European, even central Euro-
pean, [...] Great Powers and bearers of the European international law, Germany
and Austria-Hungary”.84 e Paris Conference and its legal consequences in the
forms of treaties and the League of Nations is portrayed by Schmitt as an authentic
disaster for the maintenance of order in the world and in its intellectual articula-
tion at legal level, as “this world conference did not create in any way a world order
(Weltordung)”, but rather on the contrary, “it le the world in its previous disorder
(Unordnung), it liquidated two European Great Powers, two pillars of the hitherto
existing order, and carried out a new division of the European soil”.85
But most importantly, the Paris conference undermined the great achieve-
ment of the domestication of war during the previous centuries, depriving the en-
emy of a legitimate standing by condemning thewar itself as a crime and the enemy
as a criminal.e dismissal of core mechanisms that existed under the old jus pub-
licum Europeaeum opened the way for conicts between political entities in a new
mortal, total struggle for the annihilation of the adversary, ultimately leading, in
Schmitt’s view, to the catastrophic situation of the Second World War, in which
the goal of the Hegung des Krieges totally escaped from the liberal management of
world order. In Der Nomos der Erde, Schmitt expressed his deep concern for the
disintegration of the jus publicum Europaeum and its capability not to prevent, but
to constrain and discipline wars. He envisaged in fact wars as fundamentally un-
avoidable, and warned again the attempt of “abolishing all wars” as a promise of
more and more devastating total wars to come. e lack of understanding from
the liberals of the key dynamics of politics as a friend-enemy relation, prevented
the liberals from realising the dangers of trying to impose a single moral standard
to the whole planet. And this is even more serious when it is considered — as
Schmitt remarked — that the phenomena of neutralisation of one-sided policies
84Schmitt, ibidem, page 213.
85Schmitt, ibidem, page 213.
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are constantly at work to present the interests of a dominant power as the interests
of everybody, or the inherent good, or the scientic truth.
e collapse of the system of international law at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, reversed for Schmitt an achievement that enabled for several cen-
turies the co-existence of a pluralism of political communities on the European
continent, avoiding the self-destructive religious wars of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. Schmitt saw a radicalisation of these kinds of conicts as a prob-
able path of future history, largely by analysing the ideological clash implied in the
nomos of the world during the Cold War. Nevertheless, Schmitt also proposed
an alternative view, one in which several elements of his thought could ow to-
gether, namely the re-organisation of world order and of international law around
the idea of Großraum.86 Schmitt elaborated namely the vision of a world in which
major states are capable of re-grouping around them minor societies within the
framework of spheres of inuence or Großräume, continental spaces in which the
hegemon state projects its ideology and legitimacy as the dominant élite does at
domestic level, while relations between Großräume are built on a system roughly
similar to that of the jus publicum Europaeum. ey interact therefore on equal
grounds according to the principle of non-intervention, with respect of the bor-
ders that divide their spheres; the archetypal example Schmitt was referring to was
the Western hemisphere as presented in Monroe’s doctrine. Schmitt’s understand-
ing of pluralism is hence a radical one. e world can be plural only insofar as
the bearers of dierent ideas of order and justice, and of normative values for hu-
man life, remain not only distinguished but also physically divided, and the Earth
itself has to be partitioned accordingly. Any attempt to bring mankind together in
one single political project is nonsensical, because it would mean to deny the na-
ture itself of politics and of political freedom, which means precisely division and
the choice of separate ways. Any international political order, old or new, should
86In line with the prevailing practice in the English language literature on the topic, I leave this term in the
original German, since no accurate translation seems to be available. Großraum (plural: Großräume) is a
compound of the adjective groß (great) and the noun (der) Raum (space, cf. Eng. room), and indicates in
Schmitt’s political theory the geopolitical articulation of a great power which projects its economic, military
and ideologicalmight onto otherminor sovereign entities, in a stronger sense than the pure ‘sphere of inuence’
but without direct, formal annexation of their territories and populations.
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be based on a clearly stated Landnahme and consequent territorial division of the
planet.87
In sum, Schmitt sees a continuity between domestic and international politics
in their both being an expression of a friend-enemy dialectic. Nevertheless, at an
international level, and when it comes to addressing the issue of a global dimen-
sion of politics, the dialectic remains fundamentally unresolved and it can only be
managed through the construction of an order that does not rely on normative
values, but exclusively on procedural rules. e goal of the international order is
hence minimal: to allow the contiguous existence of dierent, incommensurable
political realities and to constrain and regulate war. Schmitt work, particularly in
e Nomos of the Earth, is focused overwhelmingly on an historical narrative, on
an order which he sees as hopelessly lost by the time he was writing. But the crisis
of that order, namely the irreversible crisis of the order of the world as a world of
states, was no less than a reex of the crisis of the state from within.88
2.4 schmitt and ir literature
It is possible to identify three main dierent themes within current ir literature
in dealing with Carl Schmitt and his work. First, Schmitt-related research concen-
trates on the identication of the inuence he exerted on realism and its canonical
ir authors, particularly on Morgenthau. A second recurrent theme is the call for
the full integration of Schmitt’s work in the ir canon, an advocacy which nds
its main strategy in stressing the great relevance for international studies of most
of Schmitt’s intellectual production in the period between the 1930s and 1950, cul-
minating ine Nomos of the Earth. is plaidoyer for Schmitt is clearly rather
well-grounded when it points to how Schmitt’s works directly cover central topics
of international politics and law, while they oer a continental perspective which
may be considered complementary to the critique of liberal internationalism ad-
87On the Schmittian theory of Großräume, see also Michiels Horgel, Die Großraumtheorie von Carl Schmitt,
München: Grin Verlag, 2004.
88On the nomos in relation to spaciality and statuality, see also Stephen Legg, Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl
Schmitt, New York: Routledge, 2011.
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vanced by E.H. Carr. Related to this second theme, also a third one can be seen as
emerging from the eort to claim recognition for Schmitt’s position in the history
of the discipline and his relevance in today’s debates. From a dierent perspec-
tive, which is not entirely that of intellectual history and genealogy, it nonetheless
presents itself as an attempt to engage with Schmitt’s ideas in order to promote,
through a selection of these ideas, a critique of ideology, and (neo-) liberal ideolo-
gies more specically. Frequently, in authors who are promoting their research in
this direction, Schmitt’s work becomes increasingly disentangled from the histor-
ical context where it was formed, and projected — sometimes arduously — onto
current questions of international politics.
e attention given to the work of Carl Schmitt, particularly in the English
speaking international academia, has been developing rst of all, and particularly
in the us, as the consequence of genealogical studies on realism, and of Morgen-
thau’s realism in particular. is has led a number of scholars to investigate the
reciprocal relations between the two, and to evaluate the role played by Schmitt in
the construction of the classical realist position.e relation betweenGerman con-
servatism and American realism has been underscored in a still signicant study
byAlfons Sollner89 from theAmerican viewpoint, and byMorgenthau’s biographer
Christoph Frei from the perspective of German intellectual history.90 Another in-
teresting study byHans-Karl Pichler has highlighted the relations betweenMaxWe-
ber, Schmitt andMorgenthau from the angle of their social methodology, whereby
Morgenthau’s ideas of objectivity in social sciences are explained through the re-
ception of Schmitt, and where grasping Schmitt’s inuence on Morgenthau may
clarify “why and how Morgenthau, in Politics among Nations, throws the Webe-
rian limitations on the objectivity of the social sciences overboard and indulges in
absolute statements.” Pichler has argued that “Morgenthau’s solution to the value-
determinacy of social science lies in his conception of politics as a realm of per-
petual conict and struggle for power and domination,” and namely in his inter-
89Alfons Sollner, “German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau’s Political Realism”, in Telos, 72, pages 167–
172, 1987.
90Christoph Frei, Hans Morgenthau. Eine intellektuelle Biographie, Bern: St.Gallen Studien zur Politikwis-
senscha, 1994. (English translation: An Intellectual Biography, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2001).
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pretation of international politics as determined by the supremely “valued end, i.e.,
the national interest, pursued by all state-leaders”, which becomes at the bottom
line national self-preservation. e identication of the national interest and self-
preservation in its minimal form as the constituent element of international pol-
itics, according to Pichler, “allows Morgenthau to overcome the dilemma of the
value determinacy of social science, analyse international politics ‘objectively’ in
the abstract and draw universal patterns from it”, thus establishing a link with the
Weberian methodology, although crucially “Morgenthau’s ideas on the nature of
politics and ‘the Political’ [...] were informed by the German political thinker Carl
Schmitt”.91
More recently a series of publications have clustered around this point, focus-
ing in particular on the famous “Six Principles of Political Realism” of Morgen-
thau’s Politics among Nations92 and their relation to Schmitt’s friend-enemy dialec-
tic as articulated in his e Concept of the Political, a thesis present in Michael
Williams’s two pieces of work on the topic93 and further developed by Alexander
Akbik.94 e latter even tries to demonstrate that Schmitt produced his dialecti-
cal analysis from rening of Morgenthau’s doctoral thesis, although the prevailing
opinion remains that “Morgenthau’s thinking clearly bears themarks of his engage-
ment with Schmitt. [...] his understanding of politics as undetermined realm of
pure will reects a similar position (and Nietzschean-Weberian heritage) on the
specicity of politics, and he shares the view that the essence of sovereignty lies in
the capacity for decision.”
e analysis of the Schmitt-Morgenthau relationship apparently leads to the
idea that “Schmitt’s concept of the political provides a key position against which
91Hans-Karl Pichler, “e Godfathers of Truth: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’seory of Power
Politics” in Review of International Studies, 24 (2), pages 185–200, 1998.
92Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. e Struggle for Power and Peace. sixth edition, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
93Michael Williams, “Why Ideas matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism and
the Moral Construction of Power Politics” in International Organization, 58, pages 633- 665, 2004.
94Alexander Akbik, Carl Schmitt’s Inuence on Hans Morgenthau’s early Writings, paper presented at the Eu-
ropean Consortium for Political Research Conference (ecpr), Dublin 2010.
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Morgenthau’s understanding of a limited politics emerges”.95 Williams would re-
peat this position in his Realism Reconsidered.96
William Scheuerman has dedicated extensive work to Schmitt’s intellectual
role, and also to his relations with Morgenthau,97 which he summarises as both au-
thors converging on a certain pessimistic view of human nature: “[t]he youngMor-
genthau [...] was fascinated by Schmitt’s ‘concept of the political’, which he deemed
a provocative but ultimately inadequate starting point for understanding political
conict.” Scheuerman is therefore not convinced by the narrative of a strong ge-
nealogical lineage between the two, although he is ready to admit the existence
of important areas of overlap, as “both authors opt to ground their rather sober
and arguably bleak visions of political life in pessimistic versions of philosophical
anthropology”, which eventually prompt them, although in dierent fashions “to
describe many familiar features of contemporary international politics as based in
human nature and probably immune to reform”.98
From a more legal, and less philosophical, perspective comes the work of
Martti Koskenniemi99 who argues that Schmitt’s view of law as a domain of politi-
cal struggle inuenced Morgenthau’s international realism by drastically reducing
his condence in the power of law, and of international law in particular. Also
on the value of international law in Morgenthau and Schmitt is a study by Chris
Brown,100 in which he identies some common features such as the “bracketing”
of war, characteristic of the jus Publicum Europaeum, as the most eective basis
for restraining on the use of force, and the idea that, in the current international
order, these restraints have been undermined. But the dierence between the two
95Michael Williams, op. cit., page 648.
96Michael Williams, Realism Reconsidered. e Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
97William Scheuerman,Carl Schmitt.e End of Law, Oxford: Rowman and Littleeld Publishers, 1999, pages
225–251.
98William Scheuerman, “Realism and the Le. e Case of Hans J. Morgenthau”, in Review of International
Studies, 34, pages 29–51.
99Martti Koskenniemi,e Gentle Civilizer of Nations.e Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
100Chris Brown, “e Twilight of International Morality. Hans J. Morgenthau, Carl Schmitt and the End of the
Jus Publicum Europaeum”, in Michael C.Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: the Legacy of Hans Morgenthau
in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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emerges in the interpretation of the historical events that lead to the demise of that
legal world order. In Brown’s reading, Schmitt produced the narrative that the jus
publicum Europaeum was caused by the universalism and liberalism of a new in-
ternational law associated with the us and, to a lesser extent, Britain; Morgenthau
saw instead this historical change as the product of the combination of universal-
ism and nationalism, which has been crucial in challenging the universal ethics of
the old order.
Independently from his relation to Morgenthau and the theorisation of real-
ism in international studies, other ir scholars have been investigating Schmitt’s
work in an attempt to nd elements useful in the construction of new critical per-
spectives, especially relying on the anti-liberal polemical potential in this author.
is strand of the revival of Schmitt within ir studies can be correctly understood
onlywithin the broader framework of the relation between Schmitt and the English
speaking academic world of political theorists. In that context, it is possible to rec-
ognize a distinctive rise in the interest in Schmitt starting from George Schwab’s
work on the concept of exception published in 1970,101 followedmuch later bymore
general studies by JosephW. Bendersky (1983)102 and Paul Gottfried (1990).103 is
group of works, despite their great exegetic value, have been subjected to harsh
criticism for their allegedly inadequate way of dealing with Schmitt’s anti-liberal-
democratic sentiments, not to mention his implication with the National-Socialist
regime, as lamented Stephen Holmes,104 William Scheuerman,105 and Dirk Bla-
sius.106
A counter-argument has been formulated both in the direction of a histori-
cal contextualisation of Schmitt’s work and an evaluation of his real commitment
to the nsdap and its policies. Particularly Paul Gottfried has spent considerable
101George Schwab,e challenge of the Exception : an Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between
1921 and 1936, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970.
102Josef W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt,eorist for the Reich, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
103Paul Gottfried,inkers of Our Time: Carl Schmitt, London : Claridge Press, 1990.
104Stephen Holmes,e Anatomy of Antiliberalism, Cambridge (ma): Harvard University Press, 1993.
105William Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt. e End of Law, Lanham & Oxford: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers,
1999.
106Dirk Blasius, Carl Schmitt: Preussischer Staatsrat in Hitlers Reich, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht,
2001.
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eort in trying to disentangle Schmitt the thinker from the complex biographical
picture of his life, especially concerning the period 1933–1945. Aer the end of the
Second World War, Schmitt defended his actions by portraying himself largely as
a victim of circumstances, as Benito Cereno or Epimetheus. For Gottfried, “both
comparisons were defective”, as he was “neither a pure victim of historical circum-
stances nor someone who had plunged into a disaster entirely of his own making.”
A mixed judgement emerges therefore, whereby, considering the historical envi-
ronment in which Schmitt lived, he “displayed poor judgement in dealing with a vi-
cious tyranny. On the other hand, he had neither bought on that tyranny nor been
able to convince its leaders of his political compatibility”. As successively pointed
out by a number of biographers, there are two periods to be considered in Schmitt’s
engagement with the National Socialist dictatorship. e rst, between 1933 and
1936, in which Schmitt perhaps cultivated the idea that it would have been possible,
for the intellectuals, to exert some sort of restrain and guidance on the regime from
within, and the second, aer 1936, when he “pursued tactics of survival, however
dierently they may have been viewed outside of Germany”, aer he was publicly
attacked by the ss. In sum, Gottfried’s point is that the study of Schmitt’s work
should focus on his uttering of “grim truths that democratic idealists [of Weimar]
chose to ignore”, and consequently on a more contextualised reading of this au-
thor. Gottfried portrays Schmitt as a “Teutonic Cassandra”, who was “scorned as
a moral cynic” because he highlighted how “appeals to violence were inherent in
the quest for a universal state”, and whose “demystication of politics in the twen-
tieth century earned much animosity and little gratitude”. Finally, the branding
of Schmitt as a “moral relativist” as a consequence of “his conception that political
ideas are necessarily polemical weapons” can be refuted by the realist consideration
that “mendonot live in theGarden of Eden” and, continuingwith this theologically
charged biblical metaphor, that the pretence of the contrary “ignores the empirical
evidence of Original Sin and makes the world a more dangerous place.”107
Diverging from a rather unproductive direct clash between apologists and de-
tractors, the debate has fortunately assumed dierent tones, with a series of stud-
107Gottfried, Carl Schmitt, page 46.
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ies which, despite their broader condemnation of Schmitt’s positions, have tried
new interpretations of his work, something found especially in the contributions
of JohnMcCormick,108 David Dyzenhaus109 and Renato Cristi.110ese three inter-
pretations of Schmitt’s work point to dierent directions: McCormick sees his cri-
tique of liberalism as an all-out attack againstmodernity in its technological dimen-
sion, thus giving to Schmitt a very Nietzschean connotation. Dyzenhaus focuses
instead on the relations between Schmitt’s anti-liberalism and his problematic con-
ception of the law and legal order, appreciating his intellectual sophistication but
remaining polemical against his overall intellectual and political intentions. Cristi
puts forward the rather fascinating idea that Schmitt could be seen as the repre-
sentative of a new strand of liberalism, namely of authoritarian liberalism, whose
main polemical target was therefore not liberalism, but democracy.
Schmitt’s attacks on liberalism have clearly attracted the attention of radical
critique because of a common enmity towards liberalism, although from the op-
posite political direction. Chantal Moue observes that “a confrontation with his
thought will allow us to acknowledge, [...] an important paradox inscribed in the
very nature of liberal democracy”.111e paradox develops through the assumption,
rst of all, that democracy and liberalism are two dierent things. If we accept
Schmitt’s claim that democracy presupposes unity, and that it consists in the iden-
tity between the rulers and the ruled (the demos or Volk), then we need a criterion
in order to determine who is supposed to be part of that demos, as “[w]ithout any
criterion to determine who are the bearers of democratic rights, the will of the peo-
ple could never take shape”.112 Moue aims at establishing a reading of Schmitt, or
better at extracting some elements of his work, which may constitute a theoretical
platform to enforce the idea that “the identity of a democratic political community
hinges on the possibility of drawing a frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’ [...]”. In doing
108John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. Against Politics as Technology, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997.
109David Dyzenhaus (ed.), Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, Durham: Duke University
Press, 1998.
110Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy, Cardi: University of
Wales Press, 1998.
111Chantal Moue (ed.),e Challenge of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso, 1999, page 38.
112Moue, ibidem, page 42.
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so, she builds her theoretical project on the axiom that “democracy always entails
relations of inclusion-exclusion”.113 e paradox of liberal democracy is then re-
vealed, in her view, as the impossibility of establishing a rational consensus without
exclusion. Moue insists therefore on the identity of the demos and its denition
as the crucial instance in politics, one which cannot be completely exhausted with
the establishment of constitutional foundations, but which is a process that must
remain at least partially and potentially open to continuous redenition. Indeed,
the articulation of the demos is not something that involves the accommodation
of all interests: it develops instead as a hegemonic project: “once the identity of the
people — or rather its multiple possible identities — is envisaged on the mode of a
political articulation, it is important to stress that if it is to be a real political articu-
lation, not merely the acknowledgement of empirical dierences, such an identity
of the people must be seen as the result of the political process of hegemonic articu-
lation.” InMoue’s view of radical democracy, “[d]emocratic politics does not con-
sist in the moment when a fully constituted people exercises its rule”, [but] rather
in “[t]he moment of rule”, which “is indissociable from the very struggle about the
denition of the people, about the constitution of its identity”. is identity how-
ever is not and should not be static and monolithic, and it should constantly nd
itself in a process of re-construction, as it “can never be fully constituted, and it can
exist only through multiple and competing forms of identications”.114
Following a seminal study by Ellen Kennedy,115 Andreas Kalyvas116 has fur-
ther expanded the project of the inclusion of some Schmittian elements in a radi-
cal theory of democracy, this time focusing on the critique of liberalism as liberal
constitutionalism and the liberal theory of law. His work, although massively con-
centrating on the reconstruction of Schmitt’s thought and in that sense less cre-
ative than that of Moue, represents in any case an important contribution for the
understanding of the complex relations between democracy, pouvoir constituant
and sovereignty, thus building a valuable conceptual linkage towards the topic of
113Moue, ibidem, page 43.
114Moue, ibidem, page 51.
115Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
116Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary. Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Hannah
Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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exception and the interpretive work of Giorgio Agamben, which will be briey in-
troduced below. Kalyvas117 has therefore contributed to paving the way for a new
approach to this author, which essentially complements Moue’s earlier political
reading through an attempt to establish a sophisticated historical and theoretically
rich reection on the possibilities of radical democracy. Kalyvas has rejected “the
adversarial logic of pure refutation and confrontation”, and the “unwillingness to
take Schmitt’s engagement with democratic theory seriously”,118 while trying to “ar-
gue that Schmitt’s attempt to recover and reconstruct the concept of the consti-
tuting power of the sovereign will as the source of a self-instituted political com-
munity can have major ramications for contemporary democratic theory”.119 His
intentions are directed towards the re-appreciation of “Schmitt’s rescue of the cat-
egory of constituent power from oblivion”, which forms the object of a reection
about the foundations of the political community, by “provid[ing] us with the nec-
essary theoretical resources for a fresh reconstruction of the emancipatory content
of radical democracy.” Kalyvas intends to overcome the lack of a theory of law
in the context of theories of radical democracy, and argues for the usefulness of
Schmitt within this project. e argument for this is that “one attributes the his-
torical failure of radical models of democracy to, among other things, the absence
of a systematic reection on institutions, rules and norms, an absence that permit-
ted liberalism to monopolize the eld of modern legal and constitutional theory,
then Schmitt’s work can form the starting point for rethinking issues bearing on
the relationship between law and democracy”.120
Giorgio Agamben121 has drawn largely from Schmitt’s conception of politics,
taking as a starting point the suspension of the Weimar constitution that charac-
terised thewhole legal life of theirdReich, and thus re-formulates the Schmittian
exception as the possibility for the state (or better the political power or sovereign)
to suspend the law, and to manage the political situation in a grey zone between
117Andreas Kalyvas, “Who is afraid of Carl Schmitt?”, in Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 25/5, pages
87–125, 1999.
118Kalyvas,Who is afraid of Carl Schmitt?, page 110.
119Kalyvas, ibidem, page 110.
120Kalyvas, ibidem, page 111.
121Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, Translated by Kevin Attell, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005.
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the law and the absence of law. Agamben has concentrated his analysis particularly
on the Bush administration and on the suspension of normal legal regimes in the
face of the globalWar on Terror, thus anticipating a themewhich will be developed
further by ir academics more recently. In doing so, he has expanded his analysis
with the inclusion of biopolitics and therefore integrating a Foucaultian element
in his analysis. Although inspired by Schmitt, Agamben’s exception has been criti-
cised as being a distinct theoretical formulation by Jef Huysmans, who has argued
how “[t]he Schmittian idiom works largely within a legal-constitutional framing
of politics and arranges political stakes and dynamics through a specter of dicta-
torship.”e Schmittian system of thought in Huysmans’s reconstruction revolves
around “a dialectic between law and politics”, the “sovereign guarding the dialectic
by deciding on legal transgressions as well as on conditions inwhich the institution-
alized normative processes have become inoperable” (thus triggering the process
of the establishment of a new constitutional order), “the structuration of a politics
of fear by making enemy⁄friend distinctions the organizing principle of politics”
and nally “the erasure of the »people« as a political multiplicity by a conception
of nationalist politics that amalgamates the people into a unity produced by the
leadership”. Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state of exception instead “works
with the total collapse of the dialectic between anomie and law and a biopoliti-
cal conception that organizes political stakes and dynamics through a specter of
life.”is conception rests on the the exception becoming “the rule, as there is no
relation between law and anomie, law and politics—both exist in completely sep-
arate spheres”. Within this picture, “life is no longer mediated by objective forms
such as law and becomes naked biological being,” therefore prompting biopolitical
power to act “directly upon naked life with no legal or other mediation”. Finally,
Agamben’s use of the Foucaultian idea of “naked, anomic life displaces societal
categories of life, such as class, legally mediated interests, and property relations,
turning biopolitics into a struggle between the direct enactment of power upon
this life and the anomic excesses of life that “resist” the sovereign biopolitical gov-
ernance”.122 Despite this accurate set of criticisms, Agamben’s work can be seen as
122Jef Huysmans, “e Jargon of Exception — On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society”, in
International Political Sociology, 2, 2008, pages 165–183, page 180.
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a major contribution in the eld of political theory, and one which has attracted
further attention to Schmitt’s work: particularly from an international perspective,
not to mention the strand of biopolitical international studies with a “Schmittian”
tone .123
In the context of scientic literature produced by ir scholars, the attention
given to Schmitt has risen, arguably, as a consequence of debates taking place
within other disciplines, primarily in legal studies and political theory. e main
focus of this renewed interest in Schmitt has beene Nomos of the Earth, but an
awareness that a more comprehensive reading of Schmitt’s work is necessary has
been gaining momentum, partially as a response to methodological and historical
issues. is trend should ideally achieved an established reading within the disci-
pline not only of theNomos, but of a whole Schmittian “international thought”, one
which “lies at the intersection of international relations [sic], international law and
international history, while drawing at the same time on philosophy and political
and legal theory”.124
Odysseos and Petito have been particularly active in trying to link the debate
on Schmitt’s work in international law and political theory to the current issues
of international politics, and specically around us interventionist policies. e
leading idea has been that the world nds itself aer the 9/11 terrorist attacks in an
“international state of exception” and it is consequently nownecessary to nd a new
nomos, a new principle of international order, to be established in order to end the
exception. As has been shown, this idea appears to be inspired by the work on the
state of exception as formulated by Agamben. Odysseos and Petito’s edited volume
123Cf. Jef Huysmans, “International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception”, Security
Dialogue, 37/1, 2006, pages 11–29; Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon (eds.), Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Dif-
ference, Aberdeen and Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univesity Press, 2006; Aihwa Ong,Neoliberalism as Exception,
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006; Julian Reid, e Biopolitics of War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal
Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006; Deborah
Cowen and Emily Gilbert (eds.) War, Citizens and Territory, New York: Routledge, 2008; Charles Barbour
and George Pavlich (eds.) Aer Sovereignty. On the Question of Political Beginnings, London and New York:
Routledge, 2010; Andrew W. Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter- Terrorism, London and New
York: Routledge, 2010.
124Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, “Introducing the Internationaleory of Carl Schmitt: International Law,
International Relations, and the Present Global Predictament(s)”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 19,
pages 1–7, 2006.
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e International Politicalought of Carl Schmitt (2007)125 is one of the authorita-
tive references in this area and contains a variety of positions that cover all issues
in which Schmitt’s work is or should be taken into consideration: the meaning of
sovereignty and spheres of inuence in today’s unipolar/multipolar world,126 hu-
manized war and international intervention,127 partisans, terrorist and global war
on terrorism.128 Most of the contributions in Odysseos and Petitos’s book, as well
as Douglas Bulloch’s thesis,129 substantially promote as their main goal the inclu-
sion of Schmitt in the canon of ir literature, by showing, in an exegetical fashion,
the relevance of his reection for this discipline, particularly when it is possible
to draw parallels with Morgenthau and Burnham,130 or in the case of Schmitt’s cri-
tique of the Just War tradition.131 Even Chris Brown, despite his extremely critical
and unsympathetic approach to Schmitt, ultimately admits the importance ofe
Nomos of the Earth and its unrecognised status within the canon of ir literature. He
namely argues that although “Schmitt’s normative position is impossible to sym-
pathize with...the clarity with which he develops his argument is admirable, as is
his recognition of the changes in world order that took place in the seventeenth
and again in the twentieth centuries.” Furthermore, Brown praises the way “[h]e
presents an account of the European states-system[,] which is rather more com-
pelling than the version of international society associated with English School
writers [Buttereld, Wight, Bull], or with the much less clearly dened a-historical
world of modern neo- realist theorists [Waltz, Baldwin].” Brown’s conclusion is
125Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds.),e Internationalought of Carl Schmitt. Terror, Liberal War and
the Crisis of Global Order. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
126Cf. Alessandro Colombo, “e »Realist Institutionalism« of Carl Schmitt”, Chantal Moue, “Carl Schmitt’s
Warning on theDangers of aUnipolarWorld”, Danilo Zolo “e Re-EmergingNotion of Empire and the Inuence
of Carl Schmitt’sought” in Odysseos and Petito, ibidem.
127Chris Brown, “From Humanized War to Humanitarian Intervention: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of the Just War
Tradition” in Odysseos and Petito, ibidem.
128Alain De Benoist, “Global Terrorism and the State of Permanent Exception: the Signicance of Carl Schmitt’s
ought Today”; Gary Ulmen, “Partisan Warfare, Terrorism and the Problem of a New Nomos of the Earth” in
Odysseos and Petito, ibidem.
129Douglas Bulloch, Carl Schmitt. A Conceptual Exegesis and Critique of ireory. PhD Dissertation, Interna-
tional Relations Department,e London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2009.
130Mika Luomaaho, “Geopolitics and Grosspolitics. From Carl Schmitt to E.H. Carr and James Burnham”, in
Odysseos and Petito, op. cit.
131Chris Brown, “e Twilight of International Morality. Hans J. Morgenthau, Carl Schmitt and the End of the
Jus Publicum Europaeum”, in Michael C.Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: the Legacy of Hans Morgenthau
in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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therefore ultimately that “[t]he Nomos of the Earth is a book that should be on the
reading list of any international relations theorist”.132
David Chandler133 has been of the opposite opinion, pointing out the contra-
dictory ways in which Schmitt has been re-appropriated by critical theorists, from
Moue to Odysseos and Petito. His critique of this appropriation starts from the
alleged “superciality of the readings of Schmitt within much of critical ir”, which
would “suggest that the grounds for the revival of interest in Schmitt’s work should
be sought not so much in his analytical strengths as in the analytical weaknesses
of those who seek to use him.”e revival of Schmitt is described by Chandler as
a manoeuvre to escape the limitedness of certain strands of critical theories, “to
evade confronting the diculties of those who seek to ground their radical claims
either in ethical universals or in their deconstruction.” He further explains that
these critical theorists have failed to capture “Schmitt’s ontology of the relations
between sovereign power, the use of force and international legal order has been
pushed aside.” Consequently, Schmitt “cannot provide a refuge for today’s critical
theorists.” e fact that Schmitt is being used in critical theory without signi-
cant engagement with the analytical content of his work represents for Chandler
an ominous sign that critical theorists, in doing so, “highlight the exhaustion of
their own critical perspectives and the fact that even a political and legal theorist
explicitly hostile to an emancipatory perspective has more to oer than they do
themselves”.134
Odysseos and Petito135 have replied to these criticisms by charging Chan-
dler with a “reductionist, anti-juridical (and, therefore, hyper-realist) reading of
Schmitt”.
However, what is noteworthy in this debate is theway inwhich it clearly shows
the relative immaturity of the topic of “Carl Schmitt” in current ir studies, partic-
ularly when it comes to the reading ofe Nomos of the Earth, or ofe Concept
132Chris Brown, ibidem, page 67.
133David Chandler, “e Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: e Last Refuge of Criticaleo-
rists?”, inMillennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 37, No.1, pages 27–48, 2008.
134Chandler, ibidem, pages 47–48.
135Louisa Odysseos and Fabio Petito, “Vagaries of Interpretation: A Rejoinder to David Chandler’s Reductionist
Reading of Carl Schmitt”, inMillennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2009, pages 463–475.
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of the Political, and even more when an overarching systematisation of Schmitt’s
thought is attempted. Itmay be true that Odysseos and Petito’s approach to Schmitt
can be charged with methodological fallacy but there is nevertheless little doubt
that their pioneeringwork, and Schmitt’s international thought in general, has been
so far largely neglected in core ir studies. eir contribution forms in any case a
valuable starting point, even as an object of critique.
William Hooker136 has published a remarkably detailed work about Carl
Schmitt and International Relations. Hooker acutely observes that the debate about
Schmitt and his legacy resemble a contest between those who are interested in this
author and “become engaged in a process of exhumation” and those who “try to
keep him buried.” He identies two extremes of the debate in the position of those
scholars who think of Schmitt as “an arcane and reductive Nazi who has little to
oer” and those who recognise the destructiveness of Schmitt but appreciate his
seductive and even dangerous potential.137 Hooker concentrates on a reconstruc-
tion of Schmitt’s international thought (a termwhich he always uses in quotations)
and focuses on the exploration of Schmitt’s “apocalyptic tone”, in order to under-
stand whether this may essentially be considered simply as a metaphor, and how
it can be explained. For Hooker’s strenuous defence of liberal positions, this apoc-
alyptic tone clearly indicates however that “Schmitt regards the global ascendance
of liberalism as a catastrophe”.138 While assessing Schmitt’s theory of Großräume,
Hooker is quick to dismiss it as “essentially a fudge”,139 and more generally he ac-
cuses Schmitt of not being able to go beyond the crisis of order as an “order of
states”, working on the theoretical perspective of order per se, and hence on a way
to reconstruct an order despite the crisis of the state.140 He is also extremely dis-
missive of those readings of Schmitt which point to the link between his work and
the theological understanding of political theories, for instance Heinrich Meier’s
136William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s Internationalought: Order and Orientation, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
137Hooker, ibidem, page 2.
138Hooker, ibidem, page 4.
139Hooker, ibidem, page 200.
140Hooker, ibidem, page 195.
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booke Lesson of Carl Schmitt.141 So “whilst most readers will admit to there be-
ing great validity in a religious reading of Schmitt...for political readers, religion in
Schmitt is an embarrassing sideshow somehow to be ignored, explained away, or
conceded to obscure German-speaking theologians to debate”.142 e apocalyptic
tone of Schmitt seems to be explicable therefore, in Hooker’s view, only as the pro-
jection of extreme personality traits, extravagance or perhaps neurosis. Very little
is le to be appreciated from the perspective of today’s reader of Schmitt, let alone
for the political theorist. Schmitt’se Concept of the Political is reduced to “the
one normative prescription”, namely “that life should be serious”.143 Hooker consid-
ers thate Concept of the Political leaves an open answer to the question: “why
should we value the seriousness of a specically political life, when the alternative
is a peaceful world of fun and entertainment?”144 Hooker believes that Schmitt
tried to answer this question precisely through the extravagant use of religious and
theologically informed ideas on history and politics.
Hooker’s book is therefore extremely dismissive of Schmitt’s relevance to to-
day’s political thought, and perhaps even more so to the ir theorist, although in
many respects it can be considered a rather problematic study of the relevance of
Schmitt, bordering on teratology.
Hooker’s study relies on a stratication of studies about Schmitt’s work, par-
ticularly concerning his possible relation with ir theory, which overwhelmingly
concentrate on the problem of full admittance or full rejection of the author into
the list of the legitimate sources for the discipline. A similar phenomenon has been
taking place in the domain of general political theory. So, while the contest between
dierent readings of Schmitt has concentrated largely on biographical aspects and
the implications of reading his work in relation to possible legitimation instances
of authoritarianism, a rather de-contextualised use of Schmitt has arisen.145 Apart
141Hans Meier, e Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between Politicaleology and
Political Philosophy, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
142Hooker, ibidem, page 195–196.
143Hooker, ibidem, page 197. Emphasis in the original.
144Hooker, ibidem, page 197.
145A very interesting contribution on the various readings of Schmitt is still Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen,
“Uses and Abuses of Carl Schmitt”, in Telos, 122, 2002, pages 3–32.
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from the above mentioned historical literature focused on the relations between
Schmitt andMorgenthau, other readings, with perhaps the exception of Agamben,
seem to consider Schmitt as a contemporary writer, who wrote in an historical con-
text and for audiences who were essentially the same as those of an author working
in the late twentieth century, or at the beginning of the twenty-rst. Radical authors
working in the direction of the recovery of the Schmittian friend/enemy dialectic
for the sake of a critique of liberal ideologies, are not of course conducting any oper-
ation whichmay be considered fully illegitimate. Aer all the critique of liberalism,
the friend/enemy dialectic and the denition of an organic Volk are central, recur-
ring themes in Schmitt’s work, as previously shown in the rst part of the present
chapter. In addition, Odysseos and Petito’s interest in Schmitt, which concentrates
on the state of exception projected at the level of the international, with the idea of
a new nomos, are of course using central concepts of Schmitt’s thought in the do-
main of international politics. Nevertheless, what is missing from these readings of
Schmitt is that Schmitt’s work requires a constant eort of contextualisation, which
in the current readings of Schmitt is still too limited. Firstly, as previously shown,
Schmitt should always be seen as a jurist writing about subjects which are relevant
to the elaboration of legal concepts. is applies particularly toe Nomos of the
Earth and more generally to Schmitt’s studies of international order, from his early
attacks against Versailles to theeory of the Partisan, where the goal of Schmitt’s
reection is a better formulation of legal concepts and the reconstruction of their
historical evolution. Secondly, Schmitt’s work has to be read as a legal-theoretical
eort in the context of the ongoing struggle between legal positivism and the reac-
tion to it, which in the case of Schmitt, following the Freirechtsbewegung and the
early sociology of law draed by Eugen Ehrlich, has developed as a peculiar socio-
logical and historical understanding of the concepts which inform the legal system,
particularly at the deepest levels of constitutional foundations. Schmitt is a polit-
ical theorist only to the extent to which his work tries to capture the sociological
essence of the political as a collective and historical phenomenon. e clarica-
tion of the concept of the political serves the purpose of establishing the premises
for a theory of law which should not be based, as in Kelsen’s reine Rechtslehre, on
the evaluation of the positive norm as a datum, but must possess an independent
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understanding of the circumstances which make the legal phenomenon possible,
and which actually give birth to the law and the state. Ine Nomos of the Earth,
the same theoretical goal is pursed in the context of the foundation of a legal or-
dering of the relations between dierent political communities. In Odysseos and
Petito’s transposition of Schmitt into the post 9/11 context of international politics,
this dimension remains largely out of the scope of their investigation, where nomos
seems to indicate purely and simply any possible overall re-arrangement of interna-
tional legal order and does not take into account the crucially important question
of the division and distribution of land, i.e. the material, geographic division of
the planet, which is the pillar of Schmitt’s understanding of international law as
nomos.e question is of course not therefore whether Schmitt is right in consid-
ering any legal ordering of international politics to presuppose a division of land
and the hierarchical organisation of countries and peoples (and therefore the ques-
tion of what kind of land division may produce a suitable order for today’s world);
more important is to understand that Schmitt was writing in a context (the late
1940s) in which those questions were still largely plausible, and secondly and most
importantly, that the nomos Schmitt is thinking about is the order of the world as
a world of states (i.e. necessarily terrestrial entities),the crisis of the state opening
up the question of a new nomos. Understanding Schmitt means therefore neces-
sarily to deal with his conceptualisation of the state, and its crisis in relation to the
impact that this may have on the international sphere. Schmitt’s theoretical eort
is always primarily directed towards an understanding of order as issuing from the
state, and of disorder as issuing from its disintegration, and only secondarily as an
international order, which derives from those existentially meaningful facts that
create the political community, the law and, in the modern context, the state.
Hooker’s work is peculiar in that it is capable of correctly identifying many
important traits of Schmitt’s work, but it appears incapable of going beyond the
question of whether we may simply be able to transpose Schmitt’s theory into
the twenty-rst century, which is of course both anti-historical and anachronistic.
ere is denitely something correct in Hooker’s identication of Schmitt’s core
message of “life being serious”, but this only supercially captures its essentials..
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Schmitt is indeed envisaging a sociological theory of existential themes, which he
articulates in a theological language, precisely the language which Hooker refuses
to take into consideration as the main interpretative tool for reading Schmitt, the
quasi-neurotic element which is better le to the obscure discussion of German
speaking theologians.
Schmitt’s theory of order is in reality precisely the development of his explo-
ration of existential themes, of course in the sense of collective existence (i.e. po-
litical), which assumes the vocabulary of religious themes because it is in this lan-
guage, Schmitt thinks (aswill be illustrated, in continuationwithWeber’s reection
on religion), that a sociological analysis of the pragmata inherent to the creation
of political order can be more accurately described. Essentially Schmitt is the au-
thor of a sociology applied to the origin of the state and of law, which assumes the
language of a political theology. e core of his political theory lies consequently
between a sociology of religion and of modernity (and therefore of the state) and
a sociological theory of law. Unfortunately, this dimension is still largely missing
in most of the current readings of Schmitt, which focus on aspects of this thought
which, however important, may not lead to the full appreciation of this author and
his possible contribution to theoretical ir and political theory.
2.5 schmitt ’s political theology/ concluding remarks
Schmitt’s theoretical work when considered under the perspective of the problem
of order, as it has been shown above, concentrates on the idea of the state and
its crisis, and the implications which this has for international politics. e order
which Schmitt saw in the jus publicum Europaeum was based on the state, and
consequently the elements upon which the existence of the state is based are the
pillars of the international order as it existed before the crisis.e erosion of those
elements— in the logic of Schmitt’s argument— leads to the crisis of both the state
and the international order, while there is apparently no new order which may re-
place the old one. Schmitt’s explanation of the international order as international
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law in a world of states, as it has been described, is constantly intertwined with the-
ological images, particularly with regard to the concept of katechon.e katechon
is nevertheless not simply a metaphor or a literary device which Schmitt uses in
order to embellish his argument with Biblical references, not — or not only — the
expression of a devout spirit. It ts indeed into the larger picture of the parallel be-
tween legal and theological thought, which Schmitt developed into a full political
theology at the core of his thought, possibly the highest achievement of his theo-
retical mind. Again, as will be further discussed in this and the following chapters,
Schmitt’s political theology has to be situated within the context of the audience
Schmitt was referring to in the 1920s, when his political theological argument was
rst formulated in the context of analogous eorts to attack legal positivism, in an
attempt to clarify the sociological foundations of the state and law, and thus save
them from their ongoing degeneration.
Ironically, the idea of a parallel between legal and theological thought is largely
owed to the early work of Hans Kelsen, the key representative of legal positivism
in the twentieth century and Schmitt’s intellectual adversary, who in his work Gott
und Staat (God and the state), drew a series of parallels between legal and theolog-
ical thinking.146 Kelsen starts his investigation with a psychoanalytical reection
about the relation between the child and the father as explained by Sigmund Freud.
It is indeed the father who “intrudes as a giant (Riese), as an overwhelming power
(Gewalt) into the soul of the child, and becomes for the child the authority (Au-
torität) par excellence”.147 Consequently, every authority will then be experienced
as the paternal one, especially the relation with God, and from here Kelsen devel-
ops his parallel between the relation between God and the human, and the relation
between the state and the individual, i.e. religion on the one hand, and the legal
system on the other. e parallel is reinforced by Kelsen’s conception of religion
as a “social ideology”. Historically, this ideology “is originally identical with that
social ideology, which can be indicated in the broadest sense as the state; at this
146Hans Kelsen, “Gott und Staat” originally published in Logos: Internationale Zeitschri für Philosophie der
Kultur, Volume 11, 1922–1923, pages 261–284, also available in Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik, Neuwied am Rhein
and Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag, 1964, pages 29–55.
147Kelsen, Gott und Staat, page 34.
137
2.5 schmitt ’s political theology/ concluding remarks
stage of the evolution the notions of God and state coincide: the national god is
simply the divinised nation through personication”.148 But the idea of God, in
Kelsen’s view, is also a “personication of the order of the world” (Personikation
der Weltordnung).149 e modern state as well is “in its essence conceptualised as
a person and it is as such the personication of an order: the legal order”.150 Here
Kelsen highlights the paradoxical concept of the relation between God as person-
ication of (natural) order, which on the other hand establishes God as a being
which transcends nature (despite nature being the expression of God’s will), and
the state, which is the personication of legal order (the norms), but on the other
hand is also a dierent thing, transcendent from the legal order as God is from
nature (or “the world”). Kelsen recognises therefore that the study of the relations
between God and the world is “the proper object of theology”.151 However, Kelsen
continues to think of religion as a form of social ideology, in that God as person-
ication of the order of the world, namely as hypostatisation, does get confused
within the “more primitive forms of thinking” — with the object itself of the hy-
postatisation, thereby generating an unnecessary “double”. So arises the apparent
problem (Scheinproblem) of the relation between a certain object (i.e. the order
of the world in this case) and its hypostatisation (God).152 In the domain of legal
sciences instead, at least in Kelsen’s own formulation of the problem, because this
kind of confusion does not arise, as it is clear that the state is identical with the law,
and the law with the state, this Scheinproblem is not the object of reection and
investigation for the Rechtswissenscha, but exclusively the law in itself, which is
constituted by norms.153 Kelsen here rescues legal science from a complete parallel
with theology, which would instead be further developed by Schmitt.
Schmitt’s book Politicaleology was published in 1922 and it can be clearly
read as an answer to Kelsen’s argument. Schmitt wants to establish a sociological
and philosophical argument for the development of a complete parallel between
148Kelsen, ibidem, page 37.
149Kelsen, ibidem, page 38.
150Kelsen, ibidem, page 39.
151Kelsen, ibidem, page 39.
152Kelsen, ibidem, page 39.
153Kelsen, ibidem, page 40.
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theology and Rechtswissenscha, an argument which intends to highlight the im-
portance of theological concepts not only for their analogy to legal ones, but ac-
tually because of the genealogical link between theology and law. Again, however,
the point of contention remains concentrated at the nature of law and its system,
as well as the dispute between legal positivism, which Schmitt accused of being a
teratological development eroding the state, themodicum of order which it did cre-
ate historically both internally and externally, and the Schmittian sociology of law.
While Kelsen has insisted on the complete identication of the state with the law,
Schmitt is eager to develop the point that these are indeed two dierent, albeit in-
terrelated, entities precisely as God, and the world as the expression of God’s will.
Schmitt attacks in the Political eology the legal positivistic proposition which
considers the system of positive law as complete and thus rejects the existence of
any gap (Lücke) in it. Schmitt argues instead that there cannot be any explanation
of the origin of legal order without accepting that that order arises from something
which pre-exists the order, and that it is not covered and regulated by the norms
which do constitute that order.
e legal order created by the state arises therefore from the very foundational
act of creating the state, an existential condition which captures the essence of be-
ing sovereign (i.e. sovereignty) as being in a state of exception. Schmitt opens his
writing of political theology precisely, and famously, with this line “Sovereign is he
who decides on the exception”.154 e exception is the gap in the legal system, the
gap which, in the theoretical view of legal positivists, does not exists: “[the] excep-
tion, which is not codied in the existing legal order, can at best be characterised as
a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state”, although crucially “it
cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law”.155 As
the exception cannot be formally predetermined by means of a descriptive norm
which regulates its occurrence, the declaration of the state of exception implies a
decisionwhich happens outside the legal system, although it is legally relevant: here
is the gap in the legal system, here is the foundation of the state and its order.e
154Carl Schmitt, Politicaleology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, English translation by Georg
Schwab, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 1985 (originally published in 1922), page 5.
155Schmitt, ibidem, page 6.
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mark of sovereignty is then “the authority to suspend valid law”,156 and the legal or-
der “like any other order, [...] rests on a decision and not on a norm”.157 Schmitt is
now ready tomake the point that, in the case of exception, it is possible to detect the
power of the state, albeit there is no longer a system of norms in operation, which
has been suspended. is proves that the state cannot be considered as identical
with the legal order.158 Of course, Schmitt articulates also an explicit attack against
Kelsen, by arming that “Kelsen solved the problem of the concept of sovereignty
by negating it”,159 while the problem should be instead that of understanding the
content of sovereignty as a decision and as an act of will. Schmitt then oers his ver-
sion of the parallel between theology and Rechtswissenscha, precisely at the point
Kelsen drew the line of incompatibility between the two. Schmitt baldly arms in-
deed that “all signicant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised
theological concepts”.160 is link between the two domains can be explained not
only in terms of their respective historical development, i.e. “because they were
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby [...] the omnipotent
God became the omnipotent legislator”,161 but also in terms of structural analogy.
Analogical thinking is the key to understanding this transformation from the the-
ological to the legal, a transformation which took place “in the last centuries”.e
example he gives is that of the concept of the exception, which “is analogous to the
miracle (Wunder) in theology”.162
Schmitt’s sociology of law as a reection on the transposition of theological
concepts in the legal domain is largely articulated as an enquiry in intellectual his-
tory. e emergence of legal positivism as the modern way of thinking about law
and the idea of the “modern constitutional state” are a reection of the triumph-
ing “deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world”.
e rejection of the miracle, of any act of God which breaks the rules governing
the world established by God himself, forms the background idea for the rejection
156Schmitt, ibidem, page 9.
157Schmitt, ibidem, page 10.
158Schmitt, ibidem, page 12.
159Schmitt, ibidem, page 21.
160Schmitt, ibidem, page 36.
161Schmitt, ibidem, page 36.
162Schmitt, ibidem, page 36.
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of the idea itself of exception, which becomes extended into the domain of poli-
tics with the consequent exclusion of “the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid
legal order”.163 Schmitt is eager to make clear, however, that this deistic turn in
politics was not without its detractors, and it was the task of those theists, “conser-
vative authors of the counterrevolution” (Louis Bonald, Joseph deMaistre, Donoso
Cortés) who attempted “to support the personal sovereignty of the monarch ideo-
logically, with the aid of analogies from a theistic theology”.164 Aer having exam-
ined a series of cases in which the state has been explicitly compared to God, and
the legal science to theology, Schmitt further develops the idea that the concept of
sovereignty can be grasped theoretically only with the suspension of the validity
of the established normative order. In this sense, therefore, the “systematic anal-
ogy between theological and legal concepts presupposes a consistent and radical
ideology”, i.e. one which may allow the theorist to go beyond the existing order.165
e deistic theoretical environment in which legal positivism has arisen, because
it does not contemplate the possibility of the exception as the suspension of order,
cannot consequently produce a valid understanding of sovereignty.is is very vis-
ible, Schmitt argues, in the Kelsenian conception of law: “the distinction between
the substance and the practice of law” which constitutes the logical presupposition
for the exploration of sovereignty, “cannot be grasped with concepts rooted in the
natural sciences”, while Kelsen operates precisely in this context.166 Schmitt wants
instead to show how the concept of sovereignty can be grasped solely via a sociol-
ogy of law, which requires a specic methodological approach. e sociology of
law he has in mind does not simply amount to “a spiritualist philosophy of history
as opposed to a materialist one”.167 is is the limitation of the authors of coun-
terrevolution, who fought radical materialist philosophy with radical spiritualist
philosophy of history. Schmitt’s sociology is a “sociology of concepts” which “tran-
scends juridical conceptualisation oriented to immediate practical interest”. It is
a sociology aiming “at discovering the basic, radically systematic structure and to
163Schmitt, ibidem, pages 36–37.
164Schmitt, ibidem, page 37.
165Schmitt, ibidem, page 42.
166Schmitt, ibidem, page 42.
167Schmitt, ibidem, page 42.
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compare this conceptual structure with the conceptually represented social struc-
ture of a certain epoch”.168
Contrary to other sociological attempts, particularly Marxist sociology,
Schmitt’s sociology is not concerned with the question “whether the idealities pro-
duced by radical conceptualisation are a reex of sociological reality” or indeed, on
the contrary, “whether social reality is conceived of as the result of a particular kind
of thinking and therefore also of acting”.169 In the specic case of the concept of
sovereignty, Schmitt makes the point that there is a sociology of sovereignty “when
the historical-political status of themonarchy of that epoch is shown to correspond
to the general state of consciousness that was characteristic of western Europeans
at that time, and when the juristic construction of the historical-political reality
can nd a concept whose structure is in accord with the structure of metaphysical
concepts”.170 Schmitt’s sociology is therefore heavily conditioned by the historical
reconstruction of concepts (Begrisgeschichte), but this only represents a prepara-
tory work, the rst stage in the understanding of sovereignty.is understanding
can be reached only by means of a “radical conceptualisation”, “a consistent think-
ing that is pushed back into metaphysics and theology”, and is aimed at capturing
“the metaphysical image that a denite epoch forges of the world”.171 rough that
image, every specic epoch understands immediately whether a certain political
organisation is appropriate or not: “the determination of such an identity is the
sociology of the concept of sovereignty”.172
If sociology of law has its goal in the reconstruction of the metaphysical im-
ages that a specic epoch has produced so as to conceptualise its order, than that
image can be understood and explained only through the same symbolic language
in which it was formulated.is language is, in the case of western European cul-
ture, the language of political theology, namely analogical description of political
concepts through ideas, words and images from the theological. Schmitt can there-
fore sketch a narrative of the political theology as it developed through moder-
168Schmitt, ibidem, page 45.
169Schmitt, ibidem, page 45.
170Schmitt, ibidem, pages 45–46.
171Schmitt, ibidem, page 46.
172Schmitt, ibidem, page 46.
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nity, starting from the Cartesian God, the sole architect of the world, who is mir-
rored by the absolute king as the sole bearer of sovereignty and legislative power.173
Descartes’s conception remained a constant during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, as did of course that ofomas Hobbes,174 but this image of the archi-
tect of the world became increasingly problematic when the idea of disentangling
causation (creation) from legislation emergedmore prominently. Schmitt explains
the apparent disappearance of the idea of God from politics with the progressive
advance of “exclusively scientic thinking” within the legal science, whereby “the
general validity of a legal prescription has become identied with the lawfulness
of nature”, which knows no exception. In this image of a world regulated once for
all by the great architect, the architect himself becomes pleonastic, as “themachine
now runs by itself ”: God has been successfully pushed aside.175 With Rousseau an-
other transformation of sovereignty takes place, i.e. its translation into the concept
of general will: a quantitative transformation occurs, by which “the decisionistic
and personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was lost”.176 is transfor-
mation represents for Schmitt a serious step in undermining the state. e state
was created by the singular will of the absolute monarch, but now “the unity that a
people represents does not possess this decisionistic character”.177 Rousseau’s con-
cept of the general will of the people can be identied as the element of modern
theorisation of politics largely responsible for the loss of a clear conceptual link
between sovereignty and decision, thus paving the way for the progressive erosion
of any space for decisionism against the background of a complete formalistic le-
galisation of political life and of the state which is, in Schmitt’s view, illusionary.
However, this turn has also been well represented in a parallel between state the-
ory and theology, as “to the conception of God in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries belongs the idea of his transcendence vis-à-vis the world”, which mirrors
the same period’s “to the philosophy of states belongs the notion of the sovereign
vis-à-vis the state”.178 e following century saw instead an attempt to revive the
173Schmitt, ibidem, page 47.
174Schmitt, ibidem, pages 47–48.
175Schmitt, ibidem, page 48.
176Schmitt, ibidem, page 48.
177Schmitt, ibidem, page 49.
178Schmitt, ibidem, page 49.
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idea of a political theology as envisaged by the authors of the Restoration (Louis
Bonald, Joseph De Maistre, Donoso Cortés), which was counterbalanced by the
radical intellectual projects, which “opposed all existing order”, with “their ideologi-
cal eorts against the belief in God altogether”.179 Schmittmentions at this juncture
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Auguste Comte and Mikhail Bakunin as the key gures
waging their “battle against traditional religiosity”, their aim being that “concep-
tions of transcendence will no longer be credible to most educated people, who
will settle for either a more or less clear immanence-pantheism or a positivist in-
dierence toward any metaphysics”.180 In a specular movement, “the development
of the nineteenth-century theory of the state displays two characteristic moments:
the elimination of all theistic and transcendental conceptions and the formation
of a new concept of legitimacy”,181 which is to be grounded solely on a positivis-
tic understanding of law and the state. e illusion becomes complete with the
alleged elimination of the idea of God from politics and the prevalent dogma of
the completeness of the law system.
is is the point at which Schmitt’s theory of the state and constitutional
power can shed light on the problem of order for international politics. Interna-
tional order in an order of states was possible as long as the sacred core of the state
was correctly conceptualised as the inherent, actual possibility of decisionism and
of friend-enemy dialectic. e crisis of the order of the state emerges precisely
when the sense of what a state is supposed to be, which can be traced back to polit-
ical theology, gets lost, precisely in the process of modernisation: not only as secu-
larisation, but as an occultation of political theological ideas. In Schmitt’s political
understanding of religion and theology, it is not just the idea of God which is sup-
posed to inuence politics, although the conceptualisation itself of God, and the
way in which this occurs, is always a political phenomenon. From the perspective
of the problem of order, Schmitt is pointing to a path which engages actively with
both the evolution of the concept of order as it has been constructed in philosoph-
ical discussion (and as illustrated in the previous chapter) and with the question
179Schmitt, ibidem, page 50.
180Schmitt, ibidem, page 50.
181Schmitt, ibidem, page 51.
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posed by Rengger in relation to the origin of a possible concept of order for today’s
ir theory. Rengger is indeed wondering what may be the place of God, nature and
history in the foundations of order, as he echoes philosophical discussions about
the relevance of order, its foundation, and the locus of its formulation. e possi-
ble ante litteram answer suggested by Schmitt is that political order always entails
a sacred nucleus the description of which in sociological terms cannot proceed
along the lines of an exclusively rational-scientic discourse, although it can be
performed by assuming the forms of theological language and its imagery.
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introduction
is chapter returns to the signicance of Habermas for the conceptualisation of
order within critical ir theory in the context of his relevance for international stud-
ies. e chapter illustrates, by means of a discussion of Habermas’s contribution
to the topic, the possibility of exploring ways of conceptualising order which are
based on the stability of secularisation and its impact on thinking about political
legitimation in modernity, as opposed to the previously discussed Schmittian re-
appraisal of political-theological ideas.
e Habermasian conception of order is here articulated by means of a thor-
ough discussion of its constitutive elements, which are to be identied in the key
tenets of Habermas’s sociological theory (the theory of communicative action)
and his conception of politics based on the construction of dialogic communities
grounded in the philosophical scheme of the ideal speech situation. Secondly, this
chapter illustrates the contribution given by Habermas directly to international po-
litical debates, with particular emphasis upon the crisis of the nation state in the
context of globalisation, the critique of neoliberal ideology and nally Habermas’s
own proposal for a neo-Kantian project of world order.irdly, this chapter exam-
ines the way in which Habermas has entered ir debates, frommethodological and
epistemological questions (the “third” and “fourth” debates) to the “zib debate” in
Germany and the positions of those theorists who have articulated critical remarks
with reference toHabermas’s theoretical approach.e examination ofHabermas’s
inuence on ir authors shows the extent to which his ideas, and consequently his
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conceptualisation of international order based on rationalisation, have permeated
the problematisation of order in critical ir theory.
Habermas’s conception of order is therefore one based systematically on the
re-evaluation of Kantian themes and the strengthening of democratic mechanisms
in the light of his sociological theories. Order is conceptualised again in terms of
law, whereby the law is conceptualised largely along the lines of Kelsen’s legal pos-
itivism, therefore in a predominantly procedural and formal fashion, as opposed
to the above discussed Schmittian understanding of law as a battleeld of opposed
political wills.e Habermasian conception of order oers the advantage of being
a fully articulate response, although of course debatable, to the question of the “nor-
mative complexes”, to recover Andrew Phillips’s expression, which are supposed to
underpin any conception of order.
Habermas has developed an interest in questions of international politics and
world order rather late in his academic career, and seemingly largely as part of
an evolution from a more longstanding preoccupation with questions of domestic
politics and justice at state level.1 He has developed his conception of politics, and
international politics in particular, on the basis of historical and philosophical re-
ection on the nation state, its normative premises and its dynamic evolution. His
attention has been captured by issues of international politics, a reaction to the cri-
sis of the nation state brought about by globalisation processes, essentially from the
early 1990s. His main interest has however clearly remained with the sociological
and philosophical theory of modernity, from its deep ontological structures to its
(largely political) empirical implications.
1See Matthew Specter, “Habermas’s Politicalought, 1984–1996: A Historical Interpretation”, inModern In-
tellectual History, 6, 1 (2009), pages 91–119.
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3.1.1 A sketch of Habermas’s thought on sociology, ethics and politics
Jürgen Habermas is unanimously considered one of the heirs of the Frankfurt
School,2 his work concentrating on the construction of a critical theory of society
based on the linguistic-rational analysis of communication.3 Habermas’s sociolog-
ical theory can be read as a re-formulation of a Western Marxist argument which
attempts to go beyond the crisis of the rst generation Frankfurt School, namely the
irresistible pessimism of Max Horkheimer andeodor W. Adorno as expressed
inDialektik der Aufklärung (e Dialectic of Enlightenment),4 a collection of essays
written during the years 1939–1944. In this work, the two authors advanced a radi-
cally sceptical view of the possibility of a critical theory of sociology with an eman-
cipatory function by highlighting the drive to domination and oppression inherent
in the very concept of rationality. Habermas’s sociological theory starts precisely
from the idea of rescuing rationality from this extreme pessimism and scepticism,
reinstating the meaning of critique and the possibility of emancipation, by aiming
at a comprehensive reconstruction of the concept of rationality.5 In a nutshell there-
fore, Habermas’s work can be summarised, as explicitly recognised by the author
himself, as an attempt to save, restructure and restart the “project of modernity”.6
Habermas’s core idea for such a project of reconstruction is rst of all the critical
evaluation of post-Hegelian philosophy and sociology, namely a critical appraisal
2On Habermas within the context of critical theory and the Frankfurt School, see Garbin Kortian, Meta-
critique. e Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas, translated by John Raan, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1980; Raymond Geuss,e Idea of a Criticaleory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981; David M. Rasmussen, Reading Habermas, Oxford: Blackwell,
1990; Rick Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Criticaleory, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996; M.B.
Matuštík, Jürgen Habermas. A Philosophical-Political Prole, Oxford: Rowman & Littleeld, 2001.
3Habermas has been working on this theoretical project for several decades starting from the early 1960s
until the 1990s, with the publication of his opus maius:eorie des kommunikativen Handelns in 1981 (English
Translationeeory of Communicative Action, byomas McCarthy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987).
4Max Horkheimer andeodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Amsterdam, Querido, 1947 (English
translation by Edmund Jephcott:e Dialectic of Enlightenment, Stamford: Stamford University Press, 2002).
5Jürgen Haacke, “eory and Praxis in International Relations”, inMillennium: Journal of International Stud-
ies, Volume 25, No. 2, 1996, pages 255–289, especially pages 257–259.
6Jürgen Habermas, “DieModerne— ein unvollendetes Projekt” inKleine Politische Schrien (i–iv), Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981, pages 444–464.
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of any research that is grounded in the study of the intentions of the single actor
(as notably in the sociology of Max Weber) and based therefore on a conception
of reason deriving from a philosophy of consciousness, which has characterized
European thought from Hegel up to the present.7 e cause of Horkheimer and
Adorno’s failure lies, according toHabermas, in the progressive reduction of reason
(Vernun) to mere rationality (Rationalität), which further reduces to sheer instru-
mental rationality (Zwecksrationalität) as the only narrative of rationality, a prob-
lem which Habermas envisages as particularly prominent within Marxist thought
and in the logic of the paradigm of production.8 New foundations for a critical
research programme can be discovered in the rationality of interaction between
individuals, and therefore in paradigms of communication. Only the study of ra-
tional patterns in intersubjective communication can lead to forms of knowledge
and of social organisation that can foster emancipation processes.9 Habermas has
consequently formulated a new denition of emancipation, which should indicate
the enhancement of individual autonomy made possible by a process of learning
taking place both in each person and in the society as a whole. As such, the in-
dividual and the society learn through stratication of knowledge acquired with
the constant practice of communicative actions and discourse, under particular
conditions that exclude distortions and only recognise the rule of the better argu-
ment. Spaces of communication within society are, therefore, crucially important
inHabermas’s thought in order to achieve emancipation, which is the ultimate telos
of his social theory.is kind of emancipation distances itself from revolutionary
commitments or class struggle while approaching a possible resemblance to the
more universalistic form of man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.10
e core of Habermas’s sociological theory is constituted by formal pragmat-
ics (which he calls universal pragmatics), i.e. by the theoretical denition of those
7Jürgen Habermas,Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1983, pages 9 ss. and “Untiefen der Rationalitätskritik”, in Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985, pages 132–137.
8Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, pages 79–86.
9Habermas, ibidem, page 103.
10Cf. “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit”, Immanuel
Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung, Berlin: Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaen, 1900 [1787], page 33.
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necessary conditions which allow mutual understanding among rational actors
through communication.11 Language and interpersonal communicative actions are
therefore the foundations of his theoretical building. His social ontology identies
the two constitutive elements of a society in the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and the sys-
tem (System).12 Lifeworld refers directly to a sphere of linguistic communication.
It can be dened as the repository formed by shared meanings and understand-
ings, and the background or horizon that makes ordinary symbolic interactions of
communication possible. Lifeworld also indicates all those structural components
(institutions, social norms and practices) that are responsible for social reproduc-
tion.13 e system is constituted instead by sedimented structures and established
patterns moving according to an instrumental logic and rationality. It can substan-
tially be seen in the two sub-systems of power and money.14
e specic function of the system is to provide the material reproduction
of society. Both lifeworld and the system generate integration inside society, al-
though in dierent ways. Lifeworld realizes social integration by embodying the
semantic context that enables communication. Communication itself can change
the content of lifeworld, while this remains open to change and revision, through
discussion and discourse; discourse is understood in Habermas’s theory of com-
munication as the rational dialogic verication process of those necessary condi-
tions of communication called validity claims.e kind of integration generated by
the lifeworld is therefore transparent, since any part of it can come under rational
scrutiny. e system generates integration in a dierent way. As industrialisation
and modernisation proceed, society becomes more complex. As such, the burden
of creating integration that falls on communication and discourse would become
simply too heavy and impossible to handle.e system therefore provides a form
of integration that is based not on a dialogic interaction of subjects (a pattern of
discourse logic), but on an internal instrumental logic, even independent from the
11Jürgen Habermas, “Was heißt Universalpragmatik?”, inVorstudien und Ergänzungen zureorie des kommu-
nikativen Handelns, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, pages 353–440.
12Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Volume I, pages 171–293.
13Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983, page 348;eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Volume I, pages 182ss.
14JürgenHabermas,Die neueUnübersichtlichkeit. Kleine politische SchrienV, Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1985, page 189.
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subjects who operate it, and aimed at self-dened achievements. e system can
therefore ease the burden of the task of integration that falls on the lifeworld, but
it necessarily operates inside the lifeworld and produces side-eects that can re-
veal themselves as devastating. A modern society is therefore characterised by the
continuous struggle between lifeworld and system.15
3.1.2 Historical Evolution of the Society
In the eory of Communicative Action, Habermas, drawing on Piaget and
Kohlberg’s account of evolutionary psychology and recalling the obvious Hegelian
precedent, describes the history of human evolution through dierent stages (an
old idea of Auguste Comte, but in nuce already present in theology since antiquity),
and reconstructs the emergence of lifeworld as we know it in the current modern
world.16 Archaic societies are the rst stage in this reconstruction, where the life-
world is built around a mythos-based architecture, inaccessible to reective the-
matisation. Traditional societies represent the next step and are characterised by
the development of centralised metaphysical or theological world-views, partially
open to a reective thematisation of the lifeworld. Finally, modernity, the current
age, sees the emergence of established rational instruments of conceptual analysis,
able to demolish the authority of traditional world-views and consequently pave
the way for the Weberian disenchantment (Entzauberung) or rationalization of
the lifeworld. In today’s world, the level of emancipation and self-consciousness
achieved by modern societies make both metaphysics and theology — explana-
tions and narratives that have characterized previous stages of development — no
longer viable. Habermas is very careful in stressing that this part of his work can-
not be considered a philosophy of history or, more precisely, a form of historicism.
His aim in this historical reconstruction is that of extracting a normative guideline
that he sees emerging from the self-understanding of modernity and its history,
15On this point, see Hugh Baxter, “System and Life-world in Habermas’seory of Communicative Action”, in
eory and Society, 16, 1987, pages 39–86.
16Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of the Society, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
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to be used as a benchmark of historical events, as he wishes to extrapolate a logic
of historical development for its dynamics. He is careful in underlining that the
above explained evolutionary pattern does not represent any form of progress, nor
a kingdom of ends as in Kant, and that history can move in both directions. His
conception of the problem of interpreting modernity (and emancipation within
modernity) comes therefore close to the Kantian idea that — even if there is not
such a thing as progress in history in a noumenal dimension — it is the norma-
tive duty of the philosopher to presuppose it as present in order to allow history to
conform to the philosopher’s thought, in a self-fullling prophecy model.17
3.1.3 Habermas and Ethics
Habermas’s theoretical work about formal pragmatics and his sociological theories,
both synchronic and diachronic, all ow into his account of politics, in particular
his conception of ethics as the trait d’union, which links the construction of his
theory of communicative action with the idea of justice and hence with his under-
standing of law, state and democracy. Discourse ethics as the basis of his concept
of justice has the task of providing a foundation for the universal validity claims of
moral norms in today’s pluralistic societies, against any ethical scepticism and rel-
ativism. Habermas’s conception of justice is both formalistic and procedural, and
designed in such a way to avoid anymaterial denition involving a pre-determined
Weltanschauung. It is based on the two principles of universalisation and of una-
nimity.e rst one is formulated byHabermas as the principle according towhich
“all aected can accept the consequences, and the side eects [of the norm’s] gen-
eral observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests
(and the consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for
regulation).”e principle of unanimity recites instead that “only those norms can
17On Habermas and the philosophy of history, see Jürgen Habermas (interviewed by Jean-Marc Ferry), “e
Limits of Neo-Historicism”, in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 22 (3), 1996, pages 1–8.
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claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all aected in their
capacity as participants in a practical discourse”.18
Habermas’s ethics is designed as the product of an ideal discourse situation
in which decisions are taken through rational analysis of norms by means of col-
lective discussion, between all those people who are involved in the eects and
consequences of those decisions, and with discussion rules guaranteeing the equal
and fair participation of everybody, so that the nal agreement ultimately rests on
unanimity around the best argument.19
Justice for Habermas does not have a material content, nor does it indicate a
fundamental cultural or traditional value; it is instead procedural and formal, thus
largely drawing on the Kantian precedent, but also distancing itself from Kant in
the way it identies the locus of the search for justice not in the internal forum of
consciousness, but in a collective dimension of dialogical participation. Although
formal, Habermas rejects any allegation of formalism,20 by indicating how — in
his model— themoral dimension (Sittlichkeit) as opposed to abstract ethical rules
(Moralität) is taken into consideration at the point at which any real community
will engage in an actual discussion, and in that concrete, empirical situation the
characters of any particular culture will be introduced and will be able to operate
so long as they do not depart from the given denition of justice. Justice at social
level has consequently to be realised in the interpersonal dynamics of collective
life, in the polis through open discussions that take place in that ideal, immaterial
agora that Habermas has several times theorised as the public sphere.
18Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main
1983, page 76
19See also Jean-Marc Ferry,Habermas et l’étique de la communication, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1987.
20See on this point: G. Finlayson, “Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moraleory Apply to Discourse Ethics?” in
Peter Dews (ed.) Habermas, A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pages 29–52.
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3.1.4 Habermas and Law
As the Habermasian political philosophy looks for just and widely accepted social
orders, his philosophical denition of justice is central to his attempt to design
a political system which can coordinate collective life and strengthen social inte-
gration. e question is, then, how practically this denition and conception of
justice can be introduced as a working tool within society. Habermas attributes
this function to law.21 e law acquires the necessary function of social integra-
tion within modern societies, where validity and facticity (Geltung und Faktizität),
namely the binding force of rationallymotivated convictions (Überzeugungen) and
imposed enforcement of external sanctions have gone dierent ways.e law reg-
ulates the strategic interactions through which the social actors understand each
other outside the spheres of actions already regulated by custom and habit (Sitte
und Gewohnheit), oering therefore a middle ground between discontinuing com-
munication and acting strategically.22
Law is created in the form of positive regulations through legitimate demo-
cratic procedures, in a harmonic relation between coercion and autonomy. Law is
conceived as the key formofmediation between lifeworld and system (as discussed
above).23 Habermas attributes this function of social integration to law on the ba-
sis of its factual coercive power, which is however matched by an inquiry into the
legitimacy of each norm of law, so that each normmust be proofed and recognized
as legitimate through interactive processes of understanding in law-making proce-
dures. While the construction of a just and free society is impossible to achieve only
with an integration provided by dialectics of money or power, this is seen byHaber-
mas as the task of modern law, thanks to its self-regulating nature. He believes that
the tension between the coercive nature of norms and the question of their validity
21Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen
Rechtsstaates, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, pages 15–22.
22Faktizität und Geltung, page 43.
23Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, page 61–62.
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can be essentially overcome through the democratic procedures of autonomy (in
the Greek original meaning of autonomía, in German Selbstgesetzgebung).24
rough a rather complex inquiry into dierent traditions of philosophy of
law, Habermas concentrates his eorts in aiming to clarify the relation between hu-
man rights and democracy on the basis of his discourse theory. What Habermas
wants to show at this juncture is that — although stemming from a common origi-
nal need for regulation of social life— law andmorality are in today’s complex and
pluralistic societies separate domains, and law in particular exclusively relies upon
the rational justication (Rechtfertigung) of its norms, which are provided by the
agreement of those who are subjected to it, and who are in the meantime also the
source itself of the law. e law diers from morality because it is not primarily
directed to the free will of the actor, but to the individual arbitrariness (Willkür);
it relates to the external relations of the persons and it is endowed with coercive
powers.25
e legitimacy of norms of law is based on the principles of rationality and of
autonomy, politically grounded on the sovereignty of the citizens. Rationality and
real autonomy can be assured only if a set of fundamental human rights are guaran-
teed in order to provide the necessary environment for open forms of discussion,
rights that constitute the key juridical values of the society and are inscribed in a
constitution. Noticeably Habermas does not look for a way of assuming human
rights from the perspective of a philosophy of consciousness. e link between
human rights and popular sovereignty is simply explained: human rights institu-
tionalise the conditions of communication for a rational political will-formation.26
Here the Habermasian conception of justice becomes therefore the main concept
around which the thinker designs his project of a just society and a just political
24Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, Studien zur politischen eorie, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999, page 293 (English translation:e Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Politicaleory by
Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greif, mit Press, Cambridge 1998).
25Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, page 143.
26Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1998, page 175 (English translation:e Postnational Constellation: Political Essays translated, edited, and with
an introduction by Max Pensky, Polity Press, Cambridge 2001).
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system: one where norms are valid only if they are approved by all people possibly
aected within the framework of rational discourses.
Habermas analyses the law from two complementary perspectives, as it is pos-
sible to reconstructively study the legal system at the same time from the inside in
its normative content, and to describe it from the outside as a component of the so-
cial reality; the two viewpoints are therefore that of legal studies, and of sociology.
An appropriate study of the law should encompass both dimensions, as the sheer
philosophical formulation of the concept of law without any regard for its aspect as
empirical system of social action would be empty, and because, on the other hand,
an exclusively sociological description of the law would be blind in relation to its
internal meanings and symbolic dimension.27
Habermas recovers the ancient division of positive and natural law. Particu-
larly the latter is explained by this author as a fruitful intuition, according to which
positive law should be modelled around principles of natural law. Habermas em-
braces this ancient intuition, articulating the view that a legal order can only be
legitimate, when it does not contradict moral principles. In this way positive law
remains linked to the moral domain. Of course though, in the context of a post-
traditional moral order, morality and law remain dierentiated: morality is now
solely a form of cultural knowledge (eine Form kulturellen Wissens), while the law
is made mandatory at the institutional level of the society.28 Habermas explains
in this fashion the dichotomy between moral and law, whereby therefore the fun-
damental rights (Grundrechte), which constitute the bulk of constitutional norms,
should not be understood as sheer reproductions (Abbildungen) of moral rights,
and the political autonomy not as the reproduction of the moral one.29
e validity of legal norms relies on a legally composed discursive process of
law production, with the approval of all members of the law community (Rechts-
genossen).30 e process for the creation of law, which combines elements of the
Habermasian theory of communicative actionwith a theory of the state and democ-
27Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, page 62.
28Habermas, ibidem, page 137.
29Habermas, ibidem, page 138.
30Habermas, ibidem, page 141.
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racy, is to be considered as rational and fair only if a series of principles are re-
spected, namely popular sovereignty, the guarantee of the legal protection for the
individual, the legality of public administration, and nally the separation of the
state and the society. e elaboration of such a theory of the state and law consti-
tutes the core of Habermas’s theory of politics, with important consequences for
his conceptualisation of international politics and international order, which are
rationally derived from the principles of the communicative action theory. e
legitimate law is produced by communicative power and this is in turn converted
into administrative power through legitimately enacted law.31
Domestic political order is grounded in a theory of democracy having its core
in the principle of popular sovereignty, whereby all state authority is derived from
the people (Volk), andwhere the subjective right of equal opportunity to participate
to the democratic will formulation is combinedwith a legally institutionalised prac-
tice of civil self-determination (staatsbürgerliche Selbstbestimmung).32 e princi-
ple of popular sovereignty entails the transfer of legislative powers to the totality
of the citizens, which is implemented by means of representative bodies for delib-
eration and decision making according to the parliamentary principle.33 From the
logic of discourse democracy the principle of pluralism is immediately derived, to-
gether with the necessity to integrate the parliamentary formation of opinion and
will (Meinungs- und Willensbildung) of the political parties with an informal, and
open to all citizens, opinion-formation, anchored in a political public sphere.34e
participation of all citizens to the formation of laws, and the law-driven administra-
tive system, require the introduction of the principle of guarantee of a comprehen-
sive individual legal protection (Prinzip der Gewährleistung eines umfassenden indi-
viduellen Rechtsschutzes),35 and the consolidation of the principle of the legality of
the administration (Prinzip der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung).36 e last impor-
tant principle for a functioning legal system is the separation between the state and
31Habermas, ibidem, page 209.
32Habermas, ibidem, page 209.
33Habermas, ibidem, page 210.
34Habermas, ibidem, page 211.
35Habermas, ibidem, page 211.
36Habermas, ibidem, page 213.
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the society, which primarily reects, according to Habermas, a liberal approach to
the idea of state, especially in the German context.37 is principle presupposes
the existence of a civil society (Zivilgesellscha), namely associative relations and a
political culture which are suciently detached from class structures. Civil society
is supposed to absorb and neutralise the unequal distribution of social positions
and the power dierentials resulting from them, so that social power comes into
play only insofar as it facilitates the exercise of civic autonomy and does not restrict
it.38 Interestingly, while Habermas is ready to acknowledge that the idea of a state
as pouvoir neutre rising above the pluralism of the civil society has always entailed
ideological elements, nevertheless it is important that the administrative system
(in the form of executive power or sanctioning power) should never become pray
of the political struggle between the dierence social powers which interact at the
level of the political process emerging from the civil society.39 For Habermas, the
institutions of a constitutional state are supposed to secure an eective exercise
of the political autonomy of socially autonomous citizens, by accomplishing essen-
tially two tasks: they enable the communicative power of a rationally formedwill to
emerge and nd binding expressions in political and legal programmes; secondly,
they allow this communicative power to circulate throughout society via the rea-
sonable application and administrative implementation of legal programmes, so
that it can foster social integration through the stabilisation of expectations and
the realisation of collective goals.40
3.2 habermas and politics
3.2.1 e nation-state
Habermas’s approach to politics is characterised by a complex historical narrative
about the evolution of political forms from the medieval to the modern. His con-
37Habermas, ibidem, page 215.
38Habermas, ibidem, page 215.
39Habermas, ibidem, page 216.
40Habermas, ibidem, page 217.
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ception of politics presents itself as deeply embedded in a historical analysis, largely
indebted to a methodological model already present in Max Weber’s work. Haber-
mas constantly focuses on two interrelated but nevertheless distinct dimensions:
one is the evolution of normative issues as visible in changing forms of legitimation;
the second is instead a monitoring of the economic forms of social organisation,
particularly capitalism. Habermas conceptualises the nation state as a powerful
and well-functioning solution to two sets of problems that European political au-
thorities encountered while entering modernity. On the one hand, questions arose
relating to the legitimation of power in a context of growing religious and cultural
pluralism, wherein increasingly political authorities could no longer claim divine
origins to their power. On the other hand, new social phenomena emerged from
the economic transformation of societies towards capitalism. e creation of the
nation state laid the foundations of a new Legitimationsmodus, which in turnmade
possible a more abstract, new form of social integration.41 e nation state in its ju-
ridical, institutional dimension is described byHabermas as a product of two paral-
leled processes, one acting inside its borders and leading toward the creation of the
modern state, the other oriented toward the outside and giving form to what can
be intended as a nation, from the perspective of international relations. e rst
process is that of increasing centralization of power inside the borders of medieval
kingdoms and in the person of the king (or princeps in a more abstract denomina-
tion). Only the state is now sovereign, the state maintains internal peace and order,
and it is able to defend itself from external attacks. is is the second process of
the formation of the nation state, the external one. From the Peace of Westphalia
(1648) onwards, states gained external sovereignty through recognition by other
states, on the principles of equality and independence. Internal sovereignty indi-
cated the capability of maintaining order within borders and external sovereignty
the capability of self-assumption in an anarchical environment of competing pow-
ers.42 e question of legitimation is particularly relevant because the solution
successively envisaged for it led several centuries later to the rise of the democratic
nation state, and through the study of this process it is possible to distinguish— in
41Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, op.cit., page 135.
42Habermas, ibidem, pages 131–132.
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Habermas’s view— the peculiarities of the relation between nationalism and repub-
licanism, a relation that is crucial to understanding the European political order as
it emerged through the short twentieth century, and crucial to the question of Eu-
ropean unity today. Habermas argues that in response to the above mentioned
dual challenge (questions of legitimation and capitalistic revolution) the nation
state answered with a political mobilisation of its citizens, made possible by exist-
ing national consciousness, which in turn enabled a more abstract form of social
integration with political decision-making structures, which had also changed.43
e transition to the democratic nation state is marked by the transformation of
private subjects, with their guaranteed sphere of autonomy, into citizens endowed
with rights deriving from their status and who actively participate in the practice
of the political authority, which nds its legitimation in the citizens themselves, in
the principle of popular sovereignty. But this conceptual transformation lacked the
necessary force to give shape to a self-conscious nation of citizens. In order to spur
political mobilisation, a new idea was required, an idea that could bind the minds
and hearts of people more strongly than abstract concepts of popular sovereignty
(Volkssouveränität) and human rights.
3.2.2 e modern rational state
It is only with the French Revolution that a new concept of the nation arises; a
concept no longer intended as gens or ethnos - an ethnicity-based community inte-
grated by common region of settlement, language, customs and traditions (but not
necessarily by the existence of a common form of political organisation).e new
concept, and the new use of theword “nation”, marks a shi towards an understand-
ing of the nation itself as the source of sovereignty.e democratic community of
will (demokratischeWillensgemeinscha) replaces the ethnic relation.e nation is
intended as the community of those who belong to the same political community
(demos), made up of citizens. Citizenship nds its identity not in shared ethnic-
ity and culture, but in the practices of citizens, who actively exercise their right of
43Habermas, ibidem, page 135.
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participation and communication.44 Habermas relates the concept of citizenship to
the idea of self-denition elaborated by Rousseau. Real citizenship can only exist if
there is popular sovereignty. Rousseau and Kant rst intended popular sovereignty
not as an expression of limitation or reversion of monarchic power, nor as a top-
to-bottom transfer of power from the monarch, but instead as the transformation
of authority (Herrscha) into self-legislation (Selbstgesetzgebung). is meant an
overcoming of the Hobbesian conception of a pact with authority (Herrschasver-
trag), whose place is taken by the social contract (Gesellschasvertrag) as an ab-
stract model for the kind of, and way of, constituting authority (political power),
which legitimates itself in the full realization of democratic self-legislation.45 Polit-
ical authority loses its character as a power determined by natural order and any
trace of violentia is supposed to be eliminated from the auctoritas of state power.46
Quoting Kant, Habermas explains how the transformation of the idea of citizen-
ship underwent a form of abstraction from the previous requirements of belonging
to a certain ethnic group or a particular form of life, where “only the concurring
and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each
[...] can be legislative”.47
In an association of free and equal citizens, the consent achieved through
discussion and commitment relies ultimately on the unity of a consensual pro-
cedure. A constitution (Verfassung), the expression of a formal consent, is the
form in which this procedure for the production of opinions and the agreement
on decisions has been established, through discussion and approval by all. Mem-
bership of a democratic political community means that each member is entitled
to a set of rights and duties (Rechte und Pichte) which all together form a citi-
zenship status. is status xes in particular the democratic rights that the single
individual can vindicate (in Anspruch nehmen) in order to change his substantial
juridical situation, a concept oen referred as active citizenship (aktive Staatsbürg-
erscha). Drawing onTaylor’s ideas, Habermas admits that the universal principles
44Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, page 636.
45Habermas, ibidem, page 637.
46Habermas, ibidem, page 637.
47Immanuel Kant,DieMetaphysik der Sitten, Berlin: Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie derWissenschaen,
Volume vi, 1910 [1797], page 313 .
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of a democratic state do need a sort of political-cultural anchorage. Constitutional
principles can provide this sort of anchorage when taking form in social practices
and can become the driving force of a project (necessarily dynamic) of production,
of an association of the free and equal.ose constitutional principles are directly
connected with the motives and views of the citizens, because of the position they
occupy in the context of national history. As main examples Habermas indicates
two of the oldest democracies, both with amulti- cultural society: Switzerland and
the United States.ese two nations demonstrate that a political culture in no way
has to be necessarily grounded on a common ethnic, linguistic and practical ori-
gin for all citizens.48 Patriotism has therefore to be inculcated as constitutional
patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), relying on a liberal political culture, and on
a form of loyalty to fundamental principles of law, which enables the existence of a
common state for a society made up of dierent ethnicities and cultures. Citizens
of a democratic state do not need to seek the foundation of their status in the na-
tional identity of a people (Volk). Democratic citizenship requires the socialization
of all citizens in a common political culture, independently from the plurality of
dierent cultural forms of life.49
3.3 habermas and international politics
3.3.1 Beyond the nation state: globalisation
According to Habermas, while the nation state has historically, with neurotic at-
tention, watched its borders, those borders have now been pierced by irresistible
transnational processes. ose processes are able to progressively weaken the na-
tion state, which loses the power of performing, partially or completely, its social
and political tasks. As anticipated, the nation state has been the optimal environ-
ment for the birth and the growth of capitalism, and the latter has substantially
contributed to the formation and strengthening of the nation state, together with
48Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, page 642.
49Habermas, ibidem, page 643.
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the modern system of interstate relations.50 But capitalism has also taken on a
global dimension from the very beginning, and those two elements now no longer
strengthen each other. Now the power of the capitalist system has extended on an
unprecedented scale, creating networks of production, trade and communication
which extend beyond the material and legal capability of the single nation state to
regulate and bring even the most powerful nations under (democratic) political
control.
e trends summed up under the heading of “globalization” jeopardize the
comparatively homogeneousmake-up of populations internally, and hence the pre-
political basis for the integration of citizens, through immigration and cultural
segmentation. States which are becoming increasingly entangled in the interde-
pendencies of a global economy and global society are additionally forfeiting their
capacity for autonomous action, and with it their democratic substance.51
Habermas sees the eects of globalization on the nation state specically oper-
ating in three crucial areas: the loss of control capabilities, the growing legitimation
decits in decision-making procedures and the growing incapacity to implement
directional and organizational policies which create legitimation. Loss of control
capabilities is especially meant to denote the situation in which the state, as a con-
sequence of its lost autonomy, is no longer able to protect its citizens from the exter-
nal eects of decisions taken by other actors, or from chain-reactions the origins
of which lie beyond its borders. Habermas recognizes in this category both “spon-
taneous trans-border events” such as environmental disasters, organized crime, se-
curity risks generated by new technologies, the arms trade, epidemics and events
that are consequences of policies of other countries (with people hit by those con-
sequences not taking part in the decision-making process which brought them
into existence). Nation states try to deal with problems and questions of a regional
and global scale through policy coordination, inter-governmental regimes, treaties
and agreements.e democratic legitimation of these policies relies on the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the governments, and therefore only in an indirect way can
50Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, page 147.
51Jürgen Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999, page 89. (English trans-
lation: Time of Transitions by Ciaran Cronin, Polity Press Cambridge 2006).
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they claim legitimation from the citizens. But the more numerous and important
the questions regulated through interstate procedures become, the more political
decisions will be emptied of any democratic opinion and will-forming processes
(Meinungs- und Willensbildung), which take place exclusively in the national are-
nas. is is especially evident in the case of the European institutions.52 But the
most important of these three aspects is the increasingly limited capacity of nation
states to intervene. e nation state could previously make use of a legitimation-
boosting social policy, protected by solid borders that clearly marked its space of
manoeuvre and that of the internal, national actors.e functional integrity (funk-
tionale Vollständigkeit) of the national economy meant that the state had a role
in providing those complementary factors (above all capital and organization), to
which the labour supply was directed, in order to become productive.53 e nation
state was previously the framework wherein the republican idea of the conscious
conditioning of the society took place and was institutionalised. Typical was the
conception of a complementary relation between state and economy on the one
hand, and internal policies and interstate politics on the other. But this model is
only suitable as long as national politics can have an inuence on the “economy
of the nation” (Volkswirtscha). In the heyday of Keynesian policies, economic
growth depended on factors that generated not only prots, but also benets for
the whole population, thanks to mass consumption (under the pressure exercised
by free trade unions), new technologies in the production processes (on the basis of
independent research) and the longer education, and thus greater qualications, of
labour forces (due to an expanded education system).54 Habermasmakes the point
that, in the time prior to the currentwave of globalisation, “national economies pro-
vided a range of opportunities for redistribution that could be exploited, through
wage policies and — on the side of the state — welfare and social policies, to sat-
isfy the aspirations of a demanding and intelligent population”.55 Under the new
globalisation regime those circumstances have dramatically changed, in particular
when referring to the relation between capital and the role of the state; in Haber-
52Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, page 90.
53Habermas, ibidem, page 91.
54Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, pages 146–147.
55Habermas, ibidem, page 147.
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mas’s words: “footloose capital has, so to speak, been released from its duty to
stay at home in its search for investment opportunities and speculative prots can
threaten to exercise its exit options whenever a government imposes burdensome
constraints on domestic business conditions in an attempt to protect social stan-
dards, maintain job security, or preserve its ability to manage demand”.56
He identies in particular the danger of globalisation in the form of the un-
controlled eects that economic transformations can producewithin the economic
and social structures of the advanced democratic states of Europe, especially fo-
cusing on the two phenomena of long-lasting unemployment and the impoverish-
ment of sections of the population that form a kind of under-class (Unterklasse),
those essentially marginalised from both the socio-economic and political life of
the nation-state.
e dramatic employment problems in the former FirstWorld stem not from
classical international trade relations but from globally interconnected relations
of production,57 whereby “high wage policies have become a provocation to ratio-
nalization measures. e growing menacing power of mobile enterprises against
locally-based trade unions is marked by mass rings. At the same time, national
governments have lost the capacity to collect tax resources from the domestic econ-
omy in order to stimulate growth and therefore to ensure the material foundations
for their legitimation.”58 Habermas wonders if the end of the nation state can also
possibly mean the end of any form of political socialisation. e future could see
citizens being discharged into a world of anonymous relations, in which they must
decide between system-created options according to their own preferences and yet
dominated by the behavioural model of the transnational corporation. is op-
position between the rise of a global economic system and the helpless attempts
to exercise a normatively organised political inuence upon this system is part
of a more general development, which Habermas identies as a process charac-
terised by the complete disorganisation of world society, as it disintegrates into an
56Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, pages 91–92.
57Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, page 147.
58Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, page 92.
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unordered mass of self-reproducing and self-directed functional systems.59 ose
systems, “like Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature, [...] form environments
for one other. ey no longer speak a common language. Lacking a universe of
inter-subjectively shared meanings, they merely observe one another and behave
toward one another in accordance with imperatives of self-preservation”.60
Habermas is thus concerned with safeguarding the future not of the nation
state model per se, but of democracy beyond the historical experience of the na-
tion state. In Habermas’s view, the question is not if there is a way of preserving
the nation state and therefore preserving democracy in the era of globalisation.e
real question and challenge is — for all those who recognize the positive value of
democracy — how to keep democracy alive outside the national framework, with-
out the anchorage to the centuries-old structures of the declining nation state.e
path he embraces is essentially that of putting politics at the centre and adopting
a perspective in which it becomes possible to create an eective normatively or-
ganised control system for economic development and for its social and political
eects, a path that will lead him to discuss the possibility of a domestic world poli-
tics.
3.3.2 e critique of neo-liberal ideologies
Habermas recognizes that globalisation is not only an economic andmaterial prob-
lem, but also a cultural one, and in particular he identies the status of neo-liberal-
ism as its ideological engine.61 is cultural struggle revolves substantially around
the transmission and interpretation of liberal ideas, which maintained a pivotal
role in the political tradition of the Enlightenment. As illustrated above, Haber-
mas sees his own work as an attempt to re-establish the project of Enlightenment
onmore solid foundations, aer the setbacks suered during the twentieth century.
e crisis of liberalism is consequently not an alleged degradation of the inher-
59Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, page 150.
60Habermas, ibidem, pages 150–151.
61Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004, page 174.
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ent normative value of this tradition, which remains fundamentally intact, but the
consequence of neo-liberalism establishing itself as the dominant interpretation of
those values. is process has been dramatically accelerated since the end of the
ColdWar and the illusionary triumphalism à la Fukuyama that gainedmomentum
in the United States. Especially during the years of the G.W. Bush administration,
the alliance between neo-liberalism andneo-conservativism generated an ideology
that resembles some sort of socialDarwinism. It betrays the solidaristic component
of liberal ideas (particularly in Habermas’s interpretation of Kant). Habermas’s re-
sponse to the current crisis of liberalism has therefore taken the shape of a double
attack on neoliberalism as economic and political doctrine, aimed at the incon-
sistency of some fundamental pillars of the neoliberal foundation. He criticizes
neoliberal policies, rst in their normative and theoretical content, and also in the
practical results of their implementation: as anticipated, he views those policies as
the main ideological engine of globalisation, rather than a valuable solution to the
social problems thrown up by globalisation itself.
From the normative point of view, Habermas stresses how neoliberal eco-
nomic thought subjects to intense debate issues of minimal social standards and
equal distribution of wealth, the relation between social justice and market e-
ciency.62 It claims that the market would be able to guarantee not only an optimal
cost/benet ratio, but also a socially equal distribution of resources. e attack
on neoliberalism focuses on the normative conditions required to have ecient
markets and on the mechanisms that should lead to social justice throughmarkets.
In particular, Habermas’s analysis stresses that neoliberalism nds one of its basic
operational concepts in exchange equality (Tauschgerechtigkeit). According to this
principle any exchange that takes place as a consequence of an agreement, and con-
sequently by the will of both sides under known and standard conditions, contains
an equivalent good/price ratio. Parties should have the same freedom to make de-
cisions independently. A market (institutionalized through contract freedom and
property rights) is therefore more ecient the more free competition can be found
in it, and it is in this sense “just”.63 e neoliberal idea of freedom is bound here
62Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, page 140.
63Habermas, ibidem, pages 141–142.
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to a normatively reduced concept of the person, the “rational chooser” (rationaler
Entscheider), independent of both a moral discourse (a moral actor considering
in his decisions the interests of all subjects involved, on an equal level) or of a po-
litical discourse (a political actor or citizen of a res publica who takes part as free
and equal amongst others in the public practice of self-legislation).ose subjects
“are not required to take any mutual interest for one another into account; they are
thus not equipped with any moral sense of social obligation. e legally requisite
respect for private liberties in which all competitors are equally entangled is some-
thing very dierent from the equal respect for human worth of each individual”.64
From this conception neoliberals derive their idea of the democratic state as a
mere instrument for the defence of private freedoms: stripped, however, of any fur-
ther dimension of freedom save the private one, in particular with no real reference
to political autonomy. Habermas’s attack on neoliberalism on political grounds is
based on the conviction that “neoliberalism is [...] unreceptive to the republican
idea of self-legislation, according to which private and civic autonomy mutually
presuppose one another. It closes itself o from the intuition that citizens can be
free only if they can regard themselves as both the authors and the addresses of the
law at the same time”.65
Habermas criticizes the neoliberal view of the subordination of the state to the
imperatives of a global social integration, throughmarkets and the model of an en-
trepreneurial state, which completely departs from the project of the de-commodi-
cation of labour and the state protection of lifeworld resources.66 Neoliberal con-
cepts of both the individual and the state suer from normative reduction, and this
can explain the evident lack of concern for questions of social justice, a mentality
swinging between tolerance, indierence and cynicism.67
Another important theoretical tenet of neoliberalism should be rejected, the
one assuming that — under certain premises — spontaneously self-regulating sys-
tems can rise in societies (and in a world society as well), thus making unneces-
64Habermas, ibidem, page 142.
65Habermas, ibidem, page 143.
66Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, pages 92–93.
67Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, page 143.
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sary norms that are issued on the base of political authority. Habermas defends
instead the model of a society which regulates itself through a political collective
will, expressed in appropriated constitutional institutions and procedures, made
explicit in public norms and grounded on the idea of popular sovereignty and hu-
man rights.68 He indicates how the famous “invisible hand”mechanism has indeed
brought about failures, or at best can be considered to represent a myth that is not
supported by reality. He identies the balance of power system as one instance of
its failure, the creation of global markets as another.69
From a more practical point of view, Habermas denies that markets could
possibly lead to a socially just distribution of wealth. He accepts the capacity of
markets to distribute information eciently to wherever it is needed for economic
activity. However, this process takes place precisely because the market mecha-
nism excludes any sensitivity to external costs and understands no information
that is not expressed (or which cannot be expressed) in the form of a price. Be-
sides, Habermas denounces the counterfactual and utopian nature of the neolib-
eral description of the market as being endowed with an equalising force, since it
is obviously unrealistic to assume that people can have the same chances of taking
part in the market and making prots. Real markets reproduce — and increase —
the pre-existing comparative advantages of enterprises, households and people.70
Even when assuming that the world is heading towards a neoliberal telos through
a process of world economic liberalization and the unlimited mobility of all fac-
tors of production (including labour resources) towards a goal of global and equal
prosperity due to global markets, national and worldwide inequality is doomed to
dramatically expand in the meantime, until the process is completed. Even on this
assumption, we would still have to accept a transitional period, both at the national
and at the global levels, marked not only by a drastic increase in social inequity and
fragmentation, but also by the decay of moral standards and cultural infrastruc-
tures.us, from a temporal point of view, we must ask how long it would take to
traverse the “valley of tears” and what sacrices would have to be made along the
68Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, page 151.
69Habermas, ibidem, pages 152–153.
70Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, pages 143–144.
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way. How many people would have to suer the fate of marginalization and being
le by the wayside? How many irreplaceable achievements of civilization would
be sacriced to “creative destruction” in the process?71
Habermas warns that the phenomena of social degradation caused by neolib-
eral policies can endanger the future of democracy. Democratic procedures and
arrangements (which oer citizens the possibility of collective self-armation and
politically eective action to tackle their social life conditions) are voided of their
importance as long as the nation-state loses its functioning capacity, and the ma-
terial basis for vast number of citizens to exercise their right to political participa-
tion is diminished. Neoliberalism clearly contradicts the core ideas of the liberal
tradition and cannot consequently claim to be its rightful interpretation for today’s
world.
3.3.3 Habermas’s neo-Kantian project of world order
As an eect of globalisation, today’s world is constantly transforming itself from a
patchwork of dierent societies enclosed within the borders of nation states into
a world society (Weltgesellscha). Habermas perceives here — besides the dan-
gers that have to be fought in order to preserve the achievements of mankind in
democracy and human rights — the necessity of shaping new forms of world gov-
ernance which have to take into account these news dimensions.is is the point
at which he turns more openly to the issues of international politics. In Der ge-
spaltene Westen he proposes a kind of philosophical normative understanding of
today’s dynamics in international relations: entailed with a strong emancipatory
commitment, this presents itself as a re- elaboration of Kant’s project of perpetual
peace.72
71Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, page 93.
72ImmanuelKant,Zumewigen Frieden, Berlin: Ausgabe der PreußischenAkademie derWissenschaen, 1900,
pages 341–386 (originally published in Riga, 1795; English translation available in Immanuel Kant, Political
Writings— edited by Hans Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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He recovers the Kantian idea of juridication (Verrechtlichung) of interstate
relations, which is the attempt of binding states’ behaviour to a framework of prin-
ciples of law, in a similar way as the citizens of a state are bound by the internal
law system of that political entity. Kant wrote that the rst and foremost of those
principles should of course be the condemnation of war as a legitimate tool in in-
ternational politics. However, this would require the adoption by all states of the
internal constitutional form of a republic (i.e. a state of free and equal citizens act-
ing in accordance to principles of rational rule). is juridication can be made
possible not by the creation of a super-state as a federation of nation-states (a rst
elaboration that Kant lately abandoned) but instead by a league of nations (Völker-
bund). Habermas sees as a crucial element in this conception the fact that — for
the rst time in the history of this discipline — it is not only states and commu-
nities (i.e. composite political bodies) that are considered as subjects and actors
of international law, but single individuals, too, are taken into account as directly
entitled to rights, and not in the mediated form of the extension of their status of
citizens of this or that state. As anticipated, he considers most of the contemporary
problems of today’s world to be of a social and economic nature. Poverty, diseases,
famines and underdevelopment do pose questions of justice between all human be-
ings. In this way, they cannot simply be restricted to a matter of inter-state debates
and cooperation, although that dimension still remains the main means to design
and implement policies and agendas. In a similar way, ecological issues impacting
all humans reveal our essential commonality as inhabitants of the Earth.
While on the one hand it is absolutely premature to speak of any possible
project of a world state or a world government, it is possible to approach the prob-
lem of international justice by considering the possibility of a world domestic pol-
itics without world government (Weltinnenpolitik ohne Weltregierung). How to
practically do this is not completely explained by the author. However, in prin-
ciple, the main task should be, on the one side, the construction of more eective
legal frameworks for international cooperation, and on the other, the strengthen-
ing of the incipient world public opinion (Weltöentlichkeit), which at the moment
expresses itself most notably in the activities of thosengos and transnationalmove-
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ments promoting respect for human rights, economic cooperation and fair trade,
and conservation of the environment. In particular, the re-shaping of international
legal frameworks and organisations should be carried out at two dierent levels:
global, and regional.
Starting from the latter, Habermas sees — clearly based upon the model of
the European Union — that a regional approach can be much more fruitful in
tackling most political and social issues.is discourse of juridication of interna-
tional law and the consequent articulation of a legal understanding of international
order has been clearly expressed byHabermas, particularly with regard to the inter-
national position of Europe and the meaning of the European project, not just of
the continent, but for the entire international community. ese ideas have been
again re-elaborated in a recently published contribution,73 which is aimed at dis-
cussing the current crisis of the European Union, while oering a possible vision
for its future. Indeed for Habermas, “the eu can be understood as a decisive step
on the path to a politically constituted world society” (politisch verfasste Weltge-
sellscha).74 e juridication of the international is clearly seen, particularly in
Europe, as a mechanism for the immediate “domestication of interstate violence”,
directed towards pacication, but at deeper level, precisely through “the restraint
of the anarchical struggle for power, and the enhancement of cooperation between
states”, this pacication can make the construction of supranational capabilities to
act (Handlungsfähigkeiten) possible.75 is shi is advocated by Habermas with a
“transnationalisation of popular sovereignty in the form of a democratic federation
of nation states (Bund von Nationalstaaten)”.76 e legal order in which this newly
formulated political community should be grounded requires on the one hand the
submission of the nation states to the law issued by this supranational federation
or union, and on the other, that the constitutional power is shared by the totality
of the union’s citizens with “a limited number of constituent states (eine begrenzte
Zahl von verfassungsgebenden Staaten)”. ose states operate according to a man-
73Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011.
74Habermas, ibidem, page 40.
75Habermas, ibidem, page 46.
76Habermas, ibidem, page 47.
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date from their peoples for the cooperation towards “the foundation of a supra-
national commonwealth (die Gründung eines supranationalen Gemeinwesens)”.77
From an intellectual viewpoint, the underlying idea is here that the civilisational
role of the European unication emerges in the light of cosmopolitanism going a
step further.78
Habermas’s view on the process of European unication is centred on the idea
of a shared sovereignty, where the creation of a supranational entity means also the
creation of a sovereign and unitary European people, but this does not entail the
abolition of nation states, which instead remain in place as constitutive elements of
this constitutional architecture.e nation states “are as democratic Rechtsstaaten
not only actors on the long historical path to the civilisation of the authoritarian
core of political rule, but also stable achievements (bleibende Errungenschafen) and
living forms of an ‘existing justice’ (Hegel)”.79
is “division of sovereignty” between citizens and member states should be
reected in a reform of the eu institutions, where the legislative power is shared
and the Commission becomes equally responsible in front of both the European
Council and the Parliament.80 is feature dierentiates a nation state, even when
it is constitutionally articulated as a federal state, from the Habermasian project
of the eu. A federal state is namely constituted exclusively by the totality of its
inhabitants, while the foundation of the eu “can retrospectively be thought so that
the participant citizens (or their representatives) from the beginning are split into
two personae”: each citizen appears in the constitutional process of Europe both as
a citizen of Europe and as a citizen of his country of origin.81
is approach contrasts with a global one, where rivalries between great pow-
ers are more acute and oen thwart any practical action. e advantage of a re-
gional approach is also clear in the further spread of democracy, which reveals itself
as much more eective and endowed with powerful stabilisation eects when ac-
77Habermas, ibidem, page 47.
78Habermas, ibidem, page 47.
79Habermas, ibidem, page 72
80Habermas, ibidem, page 49.
81Habermas, ibidem, page 70.
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companied by strong reconciliation policies and the development of supranational
nets of solidarity on a regional scale.
At the global level, the cosmopolitan re-organisation of world politics can
occur in its essence via a newly conceived role of an enhanced and modied un
system, whereby however this “politically constituted community of states and
citizens” should limit its scope to the “core functions of ensuring peace and the
global implementation of human rights”.82 Habermas wants to expand the above
explained set of considerations about the nature, purpose and role of the European
Union for the pacication of Europe and the civilisation of political authority to the
rest of the planet, whereby the theoretical image of a constituent cooperation (ver-
fassungsgebende Kooperation) between citizens and states on the example of the
eu may show the path on which the existing international community of states
(Staatengemeinscha) may be complemented in a cosmopolitan community (kos-
mopolitische Gemeinscha) through a community of world citizens (Weltbürger).83
e example of the European Union is especially important from a historical per-
spective because of two innovations, namely the submission of the member states,
and their monopoly of violence, to the communitarian law, and the division of
sovereignty between the constituent subjects of the citizens (Bürger) and of the
state peoples (Staatsvölker).84
e translation of these results to the global level implies a shi in the per-
spective from which world politics is normally observed, described and explained,
namely from the image of a world divided in more or less competing state enti-
ties and separated political communities, to one in which world politics is sim-
ply the domestic politics of mankind. is new perspective would be enhanced
through the cosmopolitan bond of world citizens (kosmopolitische Verbindung der
Weltbürger).85 is perspectival shi is according to Habermas undeniably neces-
sary in the long run, the more problems in the ecological, economic, nancial and
82Habermas, ibidem, page 85.
83Habermas, ibidem, page 86.
84Habermas, ibidem, page 83.
85Habermas, ibidem, page 83
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security sphere demand political initiatives which escape the capabilities of the sin-
gle nation states, however mighty.
For the achievement of more ambitious goals however, there are currently,
in Habermas’s view, formidable hurdles, as the functioning of a global political
governance system not only lacks a shared political will, but also of global actors
with a legitimate mandate and capable to implement any agreed deal.86 Habermas
is in any case not advocating the construction of a world republic, but simply of
a system in which nation states and world citizens share sovereignty, an objective
which may be achieved with the creation of a general assembly participated by
representatives of both citizens and states, where dierent perspective of justice
(Gerechtigkeitsperspektiven) are brought together. is world parliament should
systematically consider this double perspective especially in its role of interpret of
the un Charter.87
Within the horizon of this new way of organising a system of world gover-
nance, “[a] democratic juridication of the United Nations clearly requires [...] the
improbable feedback connection (unwahrscheinliche Rückkoppelung) of the world
parliament to the opinion and will formation of the world citizens, who would be
periodically be called to elections”.88 Habermas remains however sceptical with ref-
erence to the functioning of a world public sphere, which still appears to possess
little structure.89 e diculty in going beyond the attainment of a limited num-
ber of political goals descends precisely from the fact that the tasks of the United
Nations are political and legal, and not simply moral. However, the creation of a
global solidarity of all human beings is considered by Habermas as possible in the
name of sheer humanity (“we all are familiar with everyday situations, in which
we feel ourselves obliged to solidarity with strangers, with anybody with a human
face”),90 precisely in relation to the two above mentioned tasks of preserving inter-
national peace and fostering human rights. Habermas is namely convinced that
it is possible to ground a new world order on a reformulated role of international
86Habermas, ibidem, page 85.
87Habermas, ibidem, page 87.
88Habermas, ibidem, page 89.
89Habermas, ibidem, page 89.
90Habermas, ibidem, page 91.
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law, where this law is the embodiment of a set of key moral principles (distributive
justice, prosecution of crimes against humanity and aggression wars) which can
be found “in the moral core of all great world religions and of those cultures they
inuence”.91
While the citizens of the world do not have the homogeneity necessary to
the creation of a world state (based on solidarity between all free and equal citi-
zens), Habermas is convinced that the foundation of world citizenship can nd
sucient support in the general acceptance of that set of human rights inscribed
in the un Charter and in both un declarations of 1948 and 1966. Human rights are,
then, the core aroundwhich the international community and humanity as awhole
can reshape world order with the aim of promoting peace and tackling the serious
problems faced by world society today.e universal acceptance of human rights
stems from the universal validity of any well-constructed rational discourse, conse-
quently recognizable and valid for all rational beings, independently indeed from
other remarkable and profound cultural and religious dierences.is is the core
idea of justice, which can bring under its normative validity all nations and states
of the world, the true political foundation of a world democratic order of (perpet-
ual) peace, with the double role of directly addressing both state government and
(world) citizens. From this core idea of justice, the system of international relations
should nd its regulatory mechanisms in juridical norms, actually proceeding fur-
ther along the path of juridication already taken — with alternating fortune —
aer 1918 with the League of Nations and again aer 1945 with the United Nations
Organisation, under the powerful lead of the United States of America. Juridi-
cation assumes in this context also the meaning of “constitutionalisation” (Konsti-
tutionalisierung), i.e. the creation of a supranational juridical order and authority
similar to the way in which citizens within each state are subject to the domes-
tic order and authority, based and established through the autonomy of the same
subjects around a set of common fundamental values: those inscribed in the con-
stitution. If human rights are the core values around which it is possible to build
91Habermas, ibidem, page 92.
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an international order, then the un Charter can be understood as an early dra of
the constitution of the international community.92
3.4 habermas and international relations
3.4.1 Habermas and IR literature
e use of Habermas within the context of ir literature is characterised by a multi-
faceted approach to his work, which in the course of the last thirty years has played
a signicant role in a variety of debates. Some of these debates are not at rst ob-
viously related, as they concern dierent aspects of the discipline. However, they
may be considered to be ultimately tied together by the overarching preoccupation
with methodological and epistemological issues. Habermas’s relevance for ir stud-
ies has arguably increased with the gradual but steady growth of those sociological
inquiries, particularly of amethodological nature, that have characterised the disci-
pline at least from the late 1970s, but especially from the early 1980s onwards, with
the mounting critique of the neo-realist hegemony and the subsequent debates
about the nature of ir critical theory.
Habermas emerges in ir debates rst within metatheoretical discussions —
the so called third and fourth debates, as dened below — around the ideological
nature of neo-realist theories. is is due to Habermas’s prominence within anti-
positivistic epistemological positions in philosophy and sociology, in his 1968 book
Technology and Science as Ideology93 and especially in his Knowledge and Human
Interests,94 of the same year. A second area in which Habermas has appeared as a
crucially important gure stems directly from the rst one, and the resulting cre-
ation of an established domain within critical studies in ir. e creation of that
domain has led to internal debates centred upon the nature of critique, and the di-
92Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, pages 157–160.
93Jürgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenscha als “Ideologie“, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968
(English translation by Jeremy J. Shapiro: Technology and Science as Ideology, Boston: Beacon, 1970).
94Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968. (English transla-
tion by Jeremy J. Shapiro: Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston: Beacon, 1972).
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rection that a critical approach to ir studies is supposed to take.is second area is
therefore one that entails a debate about the validity of the Habermasian approach
to critique — namely, his theory of communicative action, (henceforth tca) —
in contrast to others, mainly those more heavily engaged with post-structuralism.
Related to this area, although within a dierent context, is also the use of Haber-
mas’s work in terms of social constructivism, a social theory of international poli-
tics, which originally emerged from the German ir community and their journal
Zeitschri der Internationalen Beziehungen starting in 1994, and which prompted a
signicant level of debate. Finally, Habermas’s inuence in this area has also been
growing as a result of the evolution of theories of justice, both political and moral,
which have informed the criticalmovement and beyond, when confrontedwith the
rise of a normative ir theory — especially aer Beitz95 -, and the transformation
spurred by globalisation dynamics. Habermas’s relevance in this eld has been con-
centrated on the design of democratic global governance institutions, whereby the
tca plays the role of the theoretical sociological foundation for a cosmopolitan the-
ory of justice and of political practice, thus expanding the reach of a Habermasian
critical theory of ir.is is also the eld to which Habermas himself has directly
contributed, although in a rather limited fashion, leaving the eld mostly to his in-
terpreters.is sub-area of Habermasian inuence on ir studies is directly related
to the reading in the international context of Habermas’s works on the theory of
law and of the democratic state, as illustrated above, particularly as articulated in
Between Facts and Norms, the Inclusion of the Other.
3.4.2 Habermas and the fourth debate
JürgenHabermas was rst introduced into the discipline of ir by Richard Ashley,96
within the framework of the broader critique of neo-realism, andmore specically
95Charles R. Beitz, Politicaleory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
96Richard Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests”, in International Studies Quarterly, 25/2, 1981, pages
204–236.
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its positivistic epistemological underpinnings, a discussion which Yosef Lapid97
labelled as “third debate” but which omas Diez and Jill Steans,98 drawing on
a pre-existent argument formulated by Ole Wæver,99 have re-baptised “fourth de-
bate” with the intent of distinguishing the sheer critique of positivism from the
emergence of a more autonomous post-positivist strand of ir studies. Ashley’s use
of Habermas was in this context related to the Habermasian critique of positivism,
and particularly positivism in social science, as being the ideological disguise un-
der which, instead of the promotion of science and knowledge for the advance-
ment of the human condition (emancipation), the task of science became that of
looking for mere technical solutions for all problems, including those of a social
nature, thus taking most, or all, of the dominant social arrangements as a given.
Ashley used Habermas’s notion of “knowledge-constitutive interests”, whereby hu-
mans have a transcendental interest in “securing freedom from unacknowledged
constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication
and understanding that deny humans the capacity tomake their future through full
will and consciousness”,100 an interest which goes beyond technical interests (con-
trol over nature) and practical interests (maintenance of mutual communication
and understanding). A similar position was subsequently articulated by Robert
Cox101 in a dierent fashion. But Ashley has successively shied away from Haber-
mas’s sociology, ending what Darryl Jarvis102 has named a “heroic phase” of his
work, followed by a “subversive phase”, in which he has moved closer to fully post-
structuralist positions,103 in this sense distinguishing himself from those who have
97Yosef Lapid, “eird Debate: On the Prospects of Internationaleory in a Post-Positivist Era”, in Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 33/3, 1989, pages 235–54.
98omas Diez and Jill Steans, “A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations”, in Review of Inter-
national Relations, 31, 2005, pages 127–140.
99Ole Wæver, “Figures of Internationalought. Introducing Persons instead of Paradigms”, in Iver Neumann
and Ole Wæver (eds),e Future of International Relations: Masters in Making, New York: Routledge, 1997,
pages 1–37.
100Richard Ashley, Political Realism, page 227.
101Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relationseory”, in Robert O.
Keohane (ed.) Neo-Realism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
102Darryl S.L. Jervis, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline,
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999.
103Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, inMillen-
nium: Journal of International Studies, 17, pages 227–262, 1988.
—, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War”, in J. Der Derian and M. Shapiro (eds.) Interna-
tional/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings in World Politics, Lexington ma: Lexington Books, 1989.
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instead continued to introduce Habermas’s sociology (and philosophy) into ir. It
is possible to identify essentially twomainHabermasian voices in the continuation
of this debate: the rst is Mark Homann, and the second Andrew Linklater. Ho-
mann104 envisaged and advocated the further development of ir theory as critical
theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, but especially through Habermas,
as a means to progress beyond the existing paradigms, in order to “create a new
focus within the discipline of International Relations that is post-realist and post-
Marxist”.105
Linklater106 has also indicated the Habermasian way as the one which a post-
positivistic, and already clearly established (although extremely diverse) critical
school of thought in ir studies, should have taken, especially considering the de-
bates concerning the nature of the state and state power, particularly around the
idea of inclusion/exclusion in political communities, that were dominant at that
time. On this point, Linklater suggested that “Habermas’s analysis of social learn-
ing sets out some of the fundamental ideas which can be incorporated within a
sociology of logics of inclusion and exclusion in international relations [sic]. More
specically, it may be useful to ask if modes of inclusion and exclusion are the
result of the interplay between the sorts of learning processes which Habermas
identies.”107
By this point, however, the relevance of Habermas becomes less related to
the critique of positivism in the social sciences; the attention paid to his work, as
already clearly visible in Linklater, begins to focus on the nature of critique, and in
the ir context the sort of critique that ir studies should embrace and why, as well
104Mark Homann, “Criticaleory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, inMillennium: Journal of International
Studies, Volume 16, No. 2, pages 231–249, 1987.
—, “Conversations on Critical International Relationseory”, inMillennium: Journal of International Studies,
Volume 17, No. 1, pages 91–95, 1988.
105Homann,”Criticaleory”, op. cit., page 244.
106Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the eory of International Relations, London: MacMillan Press,
1990.
—, Beyond Realism andMarxism: Criticaleory and International Relations, London: MacMillan Press, 1990.
—, “e Question of the Next Stage of International Relationseory: A Critical-eoretical Point of View”, in
Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 21/1, pages 77–98, 1992.
107Linklater, “e Question of the Next Stage”, op. cit, page 95.
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as questions of justice at the international level, which will be discussed in the next
two sections.
3.4.3 Habermas and critique
e question of critique in ir theory, namely theway inwhich a critical theory of ir
should be formulated, its goals, tools and philosophical foundations, has fractured
the broader camp of the anti-positivists since the 1980s. Robert Keohane, in a fa-
mous paper with the title International Institutions: Two Approaches,108 suggested
that the ir discipline was divided between a “rationalist mainstream” and a periph-
ery of fragmented “reectivist” approaches, which ultimately constitute, up to the
present, the landscape in which we can situate the Habermasian contribution to
the creation of a critical ir theory. In this sense it is important to distinguish be-
tween a “critical theory” of ir, which encompasses all post-positivist, reectivist
approaches, from a “Criticaleory”, the one that explicitly draws on the cultural
heritage of the earlier Frankfurt School (particularly Horkheimer), and then of
Habermas. ose who do not share a Habermasian orientation in critical studies
tend to rely more heavily on a neo-Gramscian analysis or alternatively on the intel-
lectual heritage ofNietzsche and his condemnation ofmodernity, through the lter
of Foucault and Derrida’s work. is latter set of positions are normally grouped
under the denomination of post-structuralism.
e fragmentation of the reectivist camp109 can be seen as a result of the
nal turn taken by the rst generation of the Frankfurt School with Horkheimer
and Adorno’spublication of e Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), as already de-
scribed above. A loss of hope in the understanding of the Enlightenment as an
emancipatory project for mankind, the central theme of this work, is certainly the
starting point of dierent strategies in philosophical and sociological research, ei-
ther directed at the acceptance of this negative condition and the elaboration of
108Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches” in International Studies Quarterly, 32, pages
379–396, 1988.
109Nicholas Rengger and Benirkell-White (eds.), Critical International Relationseory Aer 25 Years, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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further analyses of it, or alternatively rejecting Horkheimer and Adorno’s conclu-
sions, with the elaboration of new paths on which human emancipation could pro-
ceed. Habermas’s critical thought, particularly with the systematisation attained in
a comprehensive sociological theory (the above mentioned tca), gestures towards
this direction and preserves therefore a core of optimism about the nal destiny of
mankind and its emancipatory trajectory.
3.4.4 Critical IReory
Within ir literature, Andrew Linklater is the scholar who has developed the most
comprehensive inclusion of Habermas’s work — in an attempt to establish his tca
as the central theory in the critical movement, a theory distinguished by its “de-
sire to foster an “inter-subjective conversation” aimed at mutual understanding
and communication free from ideological domination.” For Linklater, this conver-
sation has been grounded “in the interest of discovering the universal conditions
of communication and so avoided what was oen held to be a notorious pitfall
of post-positivism, moral relativism, by providing a formal and process-oriented
rather than a substantive denition of political alternatives”.110
In his successive works Linklater111 develops an argument for the overcoming
of the state as the centre of the ethical foundation of political life. He has stressed
the irrationality and arbitrariness of the dierence between moral obligations due
to fellow citizens and those due to the rest of mankind, pointing to how the ten-
sion between the dimensions of “man” (a member of the human race) and those of
“citizen” has been constantly solved by giving preference to the latter. Linklater sets
out to demonstrate that injustice arises precisely from this logic of exclusion, while
110Diez and Steans, “A Useful Dialogue?”, op. cit., page 134.
111Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the eory of International Relations, London: MacMillan Press,
1990.
—. Beyond Realism andMarxism: Criticaleory and International Relations, London: MacMillan Press, 1990.
—,e Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998.
—, International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, London: Routledge, 2000.
—, Criticaleory and World Politics: Citizenship, sovereignty and humanity, London: Routledge, 2007.
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the normative goal of his work is to foster inclusion by enlarging the boundaries of
the community beyond the narrow horizon of state-citizenship. Inclusionary polit-
ical communities must be organised around democratic institutions, based in turn
upon discourse ethics (Diskursethik). With this term Linklater explicitly refers to
Habermas’s tca and its subsequent developments in the eld of moral and poli-
tics.112 Linkalater believes that discourse ethics could provide the guidelines for
a legitimization of political decisions based on fairness and grounded in uncon-
strained, open and non-exclusionary dialogue. e political community is here
essentially conceived as a dialogical community, in which the only prevalent force
must be that of the better argument, and any deliberation has to be built around rea-
soned consensus. Resting on rational foundations, this normative project can be
extended to all rational beings, i.e. potentially to the whole of mankind, and pave
the way towards a world political community and world citizenship. A world citi-
zenship comprehensive of world democratic representative institutions — Haber-
mas refers to “domestic world politics” orWeltinnenpolitik—113 becomes therefore
the most advanced concept around which a normative model of world order has
been elaborated by this strand of Criticaleory in ir.
A rather similar theory, although much more oriented towards sociological
analysis and Praxis, has been put forwards by David Held, who has also conducted
explorations of the meaning of critique and its theoretical elaboration.114 Held has
stressed the importance of keeping emancipation at the centre of critical thinking,
while adapting its meaning and practical formulation to a world radically trans-
formed by globalisation processes,115 essentially through a re-elaboration of democ-
112Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen
Rechtsstaates, Frankfurt amMain: SuhrkampVerlag, 1992 (English translation byWilliamRehg: Between Facts
and Norms, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 1996).
—,Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischeneorie, Frankfurt amMain: SuhrkampVerlag, 1996
(English translation by Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grei:e Inclusion of the Other— Studies in Political
eory, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2000).
—, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998 (English
translation by Max Pensky:e Postnational Constellation, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2001).
113Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, page 164.
114David Held, Introduction to Criticaleory: from Horkheimer to Habermas, London: Polity Press, 1989.
115DavidHeld,Democracy and theGlobal Order: From theModern State to CosmopolitanGovernance, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995.
—, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a NewWorld Order (with Daniele Archibugi), Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1995.
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racy. For Held, “globalization, global governance and global challenges raise is-
sues concerning the proper scope of democracy, and of a democracy’s jurisdiction,
given that the relation between decision- makers and decision-takers is not nec-
essarily symmetrical or congruent with respect to territory”. 116 Held has stressed
the necessity of promoting a more comprehensive (social democratic) agenda for
global governance in the long run. e answer to that necessity lies in a new so-
cial democratic multilateralism,117 and in the full implementation of a global social
democratic polity articulated in an expanding framework of states and agencies
bound by the rule of law, democratic principles and human rights. at kind of
global polity would need to establish an overarching network or democratic public
fora, covering cities, nation states, regions and the wider transnational order, with
the aim of establishing a deliberative process the structure of which is grounded
(in truly Habermasian fashion) in an expectation of rationally acceptable results.118
Another important ir author who has worked onHabermas’s tca and its pos-
sible application in the eld of ir studies is Fred Dallmayr,119 whose work is char-
acterised by a political-philosophical engagement with questions of inter-cultural
conicts, seemingly in response to Samuel Huntington’s famouse Clash of Civ-
ilizations,120 as he admits: “Habermas’s recent eort to develop a global or gen-
uinely cosmopolitan model of rational communication along cross-cultural lines
[...] is a model which, while recognising the importance of cultural and historical
dierences, seeks to obviate the danger of an impending clash of civilisations”.121
Dallmayr tries in reality to formulate a dicult synthesis between dierent philo-
—, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
—, Global Covenant: e Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, London: Polity Press,
2004.
—,Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
116Held, Global Covenant, page 98.
117Held, ibidem, page 107.
118Held, ibidem, page 109.
119Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounters, Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1996.
—, “Conversation across Boundaries: Politicaleory and Global Diversity”, inMillennium: Journal of Interna-
tional Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, 2001, pages 331–347.
—, Integral Pluralism. Beyond Culture Wars, Lexington ky:e University Press of Kentucky, 2010.
120Samuel Huntington, e Clash of Civilisations: Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996.
121Dallmayr, “Conversation across Boundaries”, op. cit., page 346.
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sophical perspectives, bringing Gadamer, Oakeshott and Habermas closer to each
other by stressing the relevance of their hidden dialogue when the common ele-
ment of the primacy of communication, conversation and language is considered.
Specically on Habermas, Dallmayr appears profoundly fascinated by the possibil-
ity of engaging and including the Other through a rationally constructed proce-
dural mechanism that can provide fairness and mutual understanding, but on the
other hand he appears conscious of the very controversial status ofHabermas’s tca,
and he appears to side at least partially with the post-structuralist criticisms against
Habermas. Dallmayr advocates therefore amiddle ground solution betweenHaber-
mas and Oakeshott in the synthetic concept of a thick dialogue, where “the mode
of communication is no longer narrowly tailored to rational validity claims, but
open to vernacular experiences”.122
In this respect, thick dialogue remains closely attentive to the “suerings of
vulnerable creatures”. In Dallmayr’s reading of Habermas, “dialogue here is no
longer a simple ego-alter ego interaction, but rather an encounter between mu-
tually decentred agents involved in a transformative event”. is transformation
occurs with a degree of reciprocal emotional involvement, whereby the “thick con-
versation” becomes meaningful with the emergence of “love and friendship; both
of which involve a form of self-transgression, in the sense that both are predicated
on self-giving rather than an attempt to appropriate or assimilate the other.” Dall-
mayr is eager to make the point that such conceptualisation of thick conversation
“may well be the most urgent need in our world today.” It is in this sense important
to highlight the idea of self-transgression inherent to the opening towards recipro-
cal love and friendship, precisely because “the point of such conversation is not to
dominate, manipulate, or lecture others ‘from on high’, but to take them seriously
in their lifeworlds as members of the global community.” In other words, then, for
Dallmayr, “the urgent need today is not so much to analyse, rationalize or control
dierent lifeworlds, but rather to befriend people in their lived contexts all around
the world”.123
122Dallmayr, ibidem, page 346.
123Dallmayr, ibidem, page 346.
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e limits of Dallmayr’s position remain tied to the rather eclectic nature
of his work in this domain. e way in which Habermas is introduced into the
broader picture of intercultural dialogue is indeed appealing, especially in terms
of the overall normative direction of Dallmayr’s work, but it cannot avoid the dif-
culty, indeed the impossibility, of integrating philosophical systems which are
based on very dierent, if not fundamentally opposed, intellectual assumptions.
3.4.5 Habermasian Constructivism
In parallel to Linklater andHeld’s re-elaboration and adaptation ofHabermas’s tca
to the ir studies, another important discussion occurred in the 1990s within the
German ir community, an exchange between “rationalists” and “constructivists”,
which is normally referred to as the “zib debate”, from the name of the journal
in which it took place: Zeitschri der Internationalen Beziehungen.124 e debate
started with a paper by Harald Müller125 in which he stressed how rationalist ac-
counts of interstate cooperation ignore communication, the nature of language
and its rational structure, and that such an omission undermines rationalist the-
ories on cooperation. is is better described, explained and even enhanced by
incorporating a Habermasian analysis of the phenomenon, whereby it is precisely
in the dynamics of communication that cooperation andmutual agreement can be
achieved through exchange of argument, in a dialogical environment free of distor-
tions. In Müller’s narrative of the opposition between communicative and other
forms of social actions, “Communicative action depicts an interaction in which
actors attempt to coordinate actions by reaching agreement on the denition of
the situation and the norms to be applied to it. In contrast to strategic action, ac-
tors do not pursue their interests by deception, promises or threats. Rather, actors
try to gain agreement by proposing and evaluating arguments.”126 Müller’s initial
124See GerardHolden, “e State of the Art in German ir”, inReview of International Studies, 30, pages 451–458,
2004; Nicole Deitelho andHaraldMüller, “eoretical Paradise— Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas”,
in Review of International Studies, 31, page 167–179, 2005.
125Harald Müller, “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikativen Handeln”, in Zeitschri für Internationalen
Beziehungen, 1, 1994, pages 15–44.
126Deitelho and Müller, “eoretical Paradise”, op. cit., page 168.
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position127 was successively strengthened by the contributions of other scholars128
before being internationalised,129 although the same author has lately recognised
the limit of Habermasian theory in its applications, when the ndings of empirical
research lead him to the conclusion that “arguments are eective to the degree that
they are able to resonate with wider-held beliefs of the recipients. is so called
“match”-argument highlights the necessity for speakers to use reasons that are in-
telligible to their audiences.” Another problem arises in relation towho is uttering a
certain argument, as “speakers seen as trustworthy persons who legitimately claim
moral authority or credible know- ledge, are more successful with their argumen-
tation.”130
omasRisse has emerged from the zibdebate as another proponent ofHaber-
mas’s tca within the ir theory domain, gradually reaching a theoretical position
very similar to that of David Held, together with a common interest in the empir-
ical issues of global governance and North- South relations.131 With Müller and
Risse, nevertheless, a movement is discernible away from a full critical theory of
ir towards a more moderate Habermasian constructivism. Risse’s attempt to apply
Habermas’s tca to international politics has been explicitly introduced as a way
to bridge the gap between constructivism and rationalism, in the conviction that
the epistemological dierences between the two are not incommensurable. Risse’s
initial epistemological point is that “regarding epistemology, constructivists of var-
ious orientations disagree among themselves as to the possibility of making truth
127Harald Müller, “Spielen hil nicht immer. Die Grenzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes und der Platz dereo-
rie des kommunikativenHandelns in der Analyse internationaler Beziehungen”, inZeitschri der Internationalen
Beziehungen, 2, pages 371–391, 1995.
128Especiallyomas Risse-Kappen, “Reden ist nicht billig. Zur Debatte um Kommunikation und Rationalität”,
in Zeitschri der Internationalen Beziehungen, 2, pages 171–189, 1995.
129Cf. omas Risse, “Let’s Argue! — Communicative Action in World Politics”, in International Organization,
54/1, pages 1–39, 2000; and Harald Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and Allat: Communicative Action, Ratio-
nalisteory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations”, in European Journal of International
Relations, 3, pages 79–99, 2004.
130Deitelho and Müller, “eoretical Paradise”, op. cit., page 175.
131omas Risse, “Die Macht der Menschenrechte. Internationale Normen, kommunikatives Handeln und poli-
tischer Wandel in den Ländern des Südens”, (with Anja Jetschke and Hans Peter Schmitz) inWeltpolitik im 21.
Jahrhundert, Volume 7, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2002.
—,Menschenrechte—Globale Dimensionen eines universellen Anspruchs. (ed. with Nicole Janz) Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlag, 2007.
omas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl (eds.), Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter
Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008.
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claims and generalizations in social sciences. But the methodological, epistemo-
logical, and ontological dierences between, say, sophisticated rational choice and
moderate social constructivism are usually vastly overstated”. For Risse indeed it
is possible to conceptualise every mode of action “an ideal type that rarely occurs
in pure form in real life”. If it is true that empirical “games” played by “real actors”
are normally a combination of a variety of social interaction modes, then the “dif-
ferences amongmetatheoretical orientations, such as rational choice capturing the
logic of consequentialism, on the one hand, and social constructivism encompass-
ing both rule-guided and deliberative behavior, on the other”, should not be exag-
gerated. Consequently, Risse argues for a pluralistic approach to epistemology, by
articulating that view that, “if behavior in the real social world can almost always
be located in some of the intermediate spaces between [logic of arguing, logic of
consequentialism and logic of appropriateness], one single meta-theoretical orien-
tation probably will not capture it”. A reection on epistemological problems is
useful precisely in capturing this dimension, and the controversies arising in this
area of studies “mainly focus on how far one can push one logic of action to account
for observable practices and which logic dominates a given situation”.132
Risse’s approach can be seen as one of the several attempts to reduce the diver-
gences between scientic assumptions of rationalism and epistemological claims
of social constructivism, aer themost famous example of AlexanderWendt Social
eory of International Politics.133 Habermas’s ideas play a pivotal role in the work
of Christian Reus-Smit, whose constructivist approach is dominated by the idea of
the stratication of knowledge within society, which is reected in the social con-
struction of practices and norms also at international level. Reus-Smit’s theoretical
position appears as a rather sophisticated integration of historical sociology, Haber-
masian discourse theory and constructivism,mainly centred on those evolutionary
processes and discourse-permeated properties of political structures, including the
norms of international society.134 ose norms are part of a discursive and histori-
cal process which constructivists have neglected to explore, but it is precisely these
132Risse, “Let’s Argue”, op. cit., page 3.
133Alexander Wendt, Socialeory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
134Christian Reus-Smit,e Moral Purpose of the State, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
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“discursivemechanisms [as described byHabermas] that link inter-subjective ideas
of legitimate and rightful state action to constitutional fundamental institutions”.135
Reus-Smit has concentrated on the issue of legitimacy and how this is produced,
namely through a discursive process and mechanisms of moral persuasion, which
he explains in pure Habermasian fashion in the example he puts forward, whereby
“actors seeking legitimacy make legitimation claims that appeal to particular so-
cial values, actors whose support is desired make their own legitimation claims
(appealing to the same or dierent values, with the same or dierent interpreta-
tions), and through this whole process the architecture of social norms is consti-
tuted and reconstituted”. e legitimacy of an actor, in Reus-Smit’s Habermasian
re-elaboration, can be established and maintained “when its self-representations
and institutional interpretations resonate with the normative expectations of other
actors”. While crises of legitimacy may constantly occur, these can only be solved
when these normative expectations are reconciled, and “when the discordance that
has eroded social recognition is overcome”. Legitimacy crises are “resolved through
a [...] process of communicative clarication or reconstitution, [...] between the
representations and interpretations of the actor in crisis, the expectations of other
actors, and the communicatively constituted norms of the social order”.136
3.4.6 Contra Habermas: Alternative Critical Paths
is overview of Habermas’s impact on ir studies cannot be concluded without
returning to the issue of critique in ir and the debate that emerged aer a critical
strand was established in this discipline, at least from the 1980s onwards. While, as
illustrated above, Linklater and Held have promoted a view of critique along the
lines of the Frankfurt School and the Habermasian tca, this move did not attract
a vast consensus within the critical movement, not even, eectively, a majoritarian
one. As we have seen, Habermas has built his philosophical and sociological posi-
135Reus-Smit, ibidem, page 26.
136Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy”, in International Politics, 44, pages 157–174, 2007,
page 172.
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tion around the rejection of Horkheimer and Adorno’s pessimistic conclusions in
their Dialectic of the Enlightenment and on the possibility, instead, of re-building
and accomplish the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment.137 His work, from
his critique of positivism in social sciences to the full elaboration of the tca, is
in any case presented as a quest for truth, and his universal (formal) pragmatics
as a product not of metaphysical investigation, but of a philosophical science of
language, upon which it is possible to promote a rational discourse of politics and
ethics.
Habermas’s rejection ofe Dialectic of the Enlightenment can be seen more
broadly as a rejection of Nietzsche’s negative view on modernity, which is instead
the starting point of many of those ir theorists who, while participating in the
anti-positivist current, tend the see the foundation of their theoretical work in the
philosophies of Foucault andDerrida, who were themselves strongly inuenced by
Nietzsche’s work.138 While Habermas’s critique of postmodernism has been largely
based on the argument of relativism, his theory and its indirect use within ir has
been criticised on the opposite groundof his commitment to universalist categories
and principles. In particular William Connolly,139 in his discussion of the issue of
pluralism, has highlighted the tendency to link diversity to fragmentation, where
this latter concept reects a situation of incompleteness, which has to be restored
through the occupation of an authoritative centre. Connolly suggests instead a
network model, without centre, based on interconnections and an ethos of plural-
ism, with the idea of “convergence” at its core, which should remain nevertheless
“only one ideal to pursue among others”.e challenge is the creation of a “political
culture of multi-dimensional diversity”, which will also be the milieu where “the
quest for convergence oen gives ground to the pursuit of multiple connections of
respect across persisting dierences, issuing in what might be called a political cul-
137Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985. (English translation by Frederick Lawrence:e Philosophical Discoure of Modernity.
Twelve Lectures, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 1987).
138Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, ineories of International Relations, Basingstoke: PalgraveMacMillan,
pages 161–187, 2001.
139William Connolly,e Ethos of Pluralization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
—, “Cross-State Citizen Networks: A Response to Dallmayr”, in Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Volume 30, No.2, 2011, pages 348–55.
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ture of positive connections through relations of agonistic respect”. is positive
pluralistic ethos, when conceived within the boundaries of the state and its polit-
ical community, would allow the citizens to “cultivate presumptive receptivity to
new drives to pluralisation, coming to terms self-critically with how old patterns of
diversity oen encourage them to exclude or marginalise emerging constituencies
to whom they could otherwise connect positively”. A thick political culture has to
be sustained by a “network pluralism”, although “this is a thickness in which the
centre devolves into multiple lines of connection across numerous dimensions of
dierence.” Network pluralism cannot be simply reduced to “national pluralism,
enclave (fragmented) pluralism, or procedural images of secular public culture.” It
requires a “general ethos to sustain itself ”. However, this ethos may not take the
form of “a robust set of commonalities grounded in the same source” nor can it be
the sheer expression of a “general commitment” to shared procedures. Connolly
clearly makes the point instead that “a positive ethos of network pluralism negoti-
ates reciprocal self-modesty, presumptive generosity and forbearance in relations
between a variety of interdependent constituencies”.140
Kimberly Hutchings141 has developed a series of arguments criticising Haber-
mas, whom she understands “as a theorist working in a predominantly Kantian
mode, whose critical theory replays Kantian paradoxes both in terms of its account
of the critical work of the philosopher and of its account of morality, politics and
history”.142 Firstly, in parallel with a broader discussion of Kant’s critique, Hutch-
ings has argued that Habermas has incurred in a contradiction similar to the one
already present in Kant’s work and model of critique (to whomHabermas continu-
ously refers). One may in fact envisage in Kant’s philosophy the aporia of a reason
that is supposed to discover its own limits (transcendental a priori categories), but
which should do this by stepping beyond those very limits, in order to establish
them as a foundation for critical thought. We cannot see those limits, if we do
not escape the constraints of reason rst, but then we are no longer able to justify
140Connolly, “Cross-State Citizen Network”, op. cit., pages 351–352.
141Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
142Kimberly Hutchings, “Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism and ir”, in Review
of International Studies, 31, 2005, pages 155–165, page 156.
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and explain them rationally, or the process that leads to their discovery. Haber-
mas apparently incurred in a similar contradiction. While it may sound intuitively
plausible that there are formal pragmatics to be discovered in patterns of commu-
nication (under particular circumstances and when communication is aimed at
understanding), Habermas’s critique appears, again, grounded in something that
its author cannot demonstrate, only positing it as a hypothesis.143 But then, if for-
mal pragmatics are instead simply to be viewed as a hypothesis — as Hutchings
suggests — does not this mean that Habermas is actually engaged in some form
of metaphysics? is, then, is another possible paradox, formal pragmatics can-
not be proven by Habermas, and thus in this way resemble a form ofmetaphysi-
cal construction. But the philosopher intends them as precisely those ontological
elements that allow the overhaul of metaphysics. Hutchings claims further that
Habermas, in his account on the evolution on modern societies, and by proposing
a separation between a dynamics and a logic of history, relies on a belief that some
sort of progress is actually taking place, and a belief in the form of dialogic ratio-
nality nding its way through superior processes of rationalisation. But again, the
formal pragmatics that should enable this logic to proceed through history cannot
be proven and remain a hypothesis. Habermas appears at this point as the author
of a philosophy of history, despite his claims to the contrary.
A second attack onHabermas’s position has beenmoved byHutchings within
feminist ir theory, where the polemic with Habermas has concentrated on his for-
mulation of the public sphere. is Habermasian public sphere, it has been ar-
gued, is a hopelessly gendered construction, and has therefore little to oer from
a feminist emancipatory perspective.144 Hutchings explicitly argues that with re-
gard to “his substantive sociology and social-psychology of modernity, Habermas
appears to have little to oer feminists”. His narrative of modernity dedicates very
limited investigation to gender issues and “incorporates some elements which fem-
inists have identied as inherently masculinist within the liberal tradition”. On a
143Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, pages 71–72.
144See also Nancy Fraser, “What’s Critical about Criticaleory? e Case of Habermas and Gender”, in New
German Critique, 35, 1985, pages 97–131; Brooke Ackerly, “Women’s Rights Activists as Cross-Culturaleorists”,
in International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3/3, 2001, pages 311–46.
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macrosociological level, Habermas’s theory of social ontology as based on a life-
world/system distinction and the modern public sphere has been subjected to crit-
icism for the way in which it “does little to challenge the liberal private/public dis-
tinction”. Particularly the family “as in traditional liberal theory, becomes brack-
eted out of consideration as a sphere of power and a potential focus for discur-
sive critique in the public sphere.” With respect to his socio-psychological account
of the individual, “Habermas appears to endorse a conception of the human sub-
ject which embodies the rationalist bias of the Western philosophical tradition of
which feminists have been consistently critical.” As Hutchings explains, this bias is
grounded “on a binary logic in which the feminine is denigrated as the “other” of
reason, and a great deal of feminist philosophical argument has been developed to
re-think and overcome that logic”. Particularly with the endorsement of Kohlberg’s
account of moral maturity, “Habermas sets himself against arguably the most in-
uential argument in feminist moral and political theory, which is Carol Gilligan’s
case in In a Dierent Voice for the distinct, but equally valuable mode of post- con-
ventional moral reasoning displayed by women as opposed to men”.145
Habermas’s attempt to establish a new route towards emancipation, through
rational enquiry based on a philosophical science of language and communication,
does not go unchallenged: on the contrary, it has proven very controversial. Par-
ticularly due to a lack of consensus concerning the meaning of critique within the
ir literature, despite the importance of Linklater’s position, the philosophical pre-
suppositions found in the dierent strands of critical theory cannot easily reach a
synthesis, despite their largely shared Marxist root.e dichotomy between those
who fundamentally accept the theses of Horkheimer and Adorno’se Dialectic of
Enlightenment, and those who, like Habermas, reject them in the continuing hope
of nding new ways towards emancipation, is not just the result of academic dis-
putes, but of the historical experiences of the Western world in the twentieth cen-
tury, namely the rise of totalitarianism, and the question of whether or not those
experiences still allow any space for the exercise of such intellectual optimism. De-
spite the end of the Cold War, globalisation and 11/9, it seems that most of the
145Hutchings, “Speaking and Hearing”, page 156.
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fundamental orientation in the intellectual work of critical theory has not moved
away signicantly from the post SecondWorldWar historical perspective, towhich
most of the current political imagery also remains tied. is can also explain the
rather univocal interpretation of Habermas and his work, which does not present,
as may be expected for an author of such prolicness and complexity, a variety of
dierent readings, but only of dierent applications in a variety of elds, in social
sciences and, within ir, in a number of sub-elds and specialist discussions.
It is possible to hypothesise that the state of Habermas’s interpretation, as well
as the fragmentation of critical theory, will remain unchanged in its key dimen-
sions as long as future major historical events do not divert our attention from the
Second World War, thus introducing a new perspective into the Western world.
3.5 concluding remarks
In this chapter the role of Habermas in envisaging a theory of order for interna-
tional politics has been explored by identifying the constitutive elements of his
theoretical position, which are to be understood in the context of his intellectual
project for the reinstatement of modernity as rationalisation, and by examining
Habermas’s impact on ir studies through its articulation within various debates.
Habermas presents a possible theorisation of order that descends directly from
the re-conceptualisation of rationality, which constitutes the fundamental core of
his concept of order. e dialogic nature of Habermasian rationality implies the
reconstruction of a political theory according to the concept of dialogic commu-
nities and the consequent re-thinking of democratic legitimacy as a continuous
mediation between the public sphere and the representative institutions produc-
ing the law. At the international level, order should be constructed along similar
lines (to the extent that the contingent circumstances of the incomplete rise of a
world public sphere makes this possible), moving in the direction of a progressive
constitutionalisation of international law principles, by means of expanding and
strengthening the current un system.
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However, the Habermasian model of order has not escaped criticism, and
from several quarters, essentially clustering around the feasibility of an inter-sub-
jective turn in the study of rationality, and around the possible non-inclusiveness of
the public sphere as envisaged by Habermas. As will also be highlighted in the suc-
cessive chapters, for the sake of the conceptualisation of order it appears thatHaber-
mas’s reconstruction of rationality as emerging entirely from a post-metaphysical
perspective still has to prove the crucial point of the eective overcoming of meta-
physics, and of religious and theological accounts of order in favour of a scientic
understanding of order as an entirely socially determined logos.
Despite the controversial aspects of Habermas’s position, his inuence on ir
critical theory has been substantial, as it has entered numerous debates, both epis-
temological andmore specically political, generating a number of re-elaborations
and adaptations to the specicity of the discipline. In this sense therefore, the
Habermasian idea of order as emerging from rationalisation forms the core of the
philosophical underpinnings for the positions of several ir theorists, despite their
dierences, particularly, as discussed above, for Andrew Linklater, Chris Reus-
Smit, David Held and Fred Dallmayr. Nevertheless, particularly in the case of is-
sues related to intercultural dialogue, as highlighted by Dallmayr and his idea of
“thick dialogue”, there seem to be important elements of political life which are not
clearly accommodated in the context of a conceptualisation of the political based
on dialogical communities, and the resulting political order.
If the concept of order, as shown in Chapter 1, has been since the beginning
originating from philosophical and theological discussions, it appears that the con-
ceptualisation of order as in the Habermasian fashion is dependent on a previously
established context of successful secularisation (in the form of linguistication of
the sacred and consequent deconstruction of theological narratives of politics). Of
course, Dallmayr seems to suggest, here there could be a Eurocentric bias in the
theoretical model, as the sort of secularisation commonly found in the Western
world may not be encountered in every part of the planet. From here arises there-
fore the necessity of shiing the conversation from the rational evaluation of valid-
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ity claims to the establishment of friendship.146 is is a signicant point, which
highlights the unresolved relation with the metaphysical, the mythical and the the-
ological within Habermas’s model of order, which appears to be dependent on an
account of successful secularisationwhich, as illustrated by the previous discussion
of Schmitt’s position in Chapter 2, is far from being suciently stable.
Going back to Rengger’s question on what can guarantee order in the mod-
ern condition, while Schmitt indicates how order is still based, at its foundations,
on metaphysical and theological accounts of the world and of politics, but simply
disguised as a consequence of secularisation, Habermas represents the opposite
radical perspective. While Schmitt claims ultimately that secularisation has not
been able to transform the essence of politics, Habermas is convinced that mod-
ern politics presupposes a successful process of secularisation, i.e. one in which
the deconstruction of the mythical and the metaphysical has been carried out to
the point of their complete overhaul, and secondly (and most importantly), that
such a successful secularisation has taken place, thus creating a break with previ-
ous ways of conceptualising order, while a new way, typically modern, can nally
arise.
It is therefore important to explore the ways in which these two radically op-
posite forms of conceptualising order have been interacting, particularly in the
fashion in which Habermas has established his position vis-à-vis Schmitt, and in
the exploration of Schmitt and Habermas’s engagement with the specic problem
of secularisation, which this research investigates through a reading of the com-
mon genealogy of the two authors with Max Weber and his sociology of religion.
e next two chapters are therefore dedicated, respectively, to Habermas’s reading
of Schmitt (Chapter 4) and to their engagement withWeber (Chapter 5) and theol-
ogy.
146Dallmayr, Conversations across Boundaries, op. cit., page 346: e lessons of these observations for global
diversity are evident. Conceived in terms of self-transgressive friendship, thick conversation may well be
the most urgent need in our world today. e point of such conversation is not to dominate, manipulate, or
lecture others ‘fromon high’, but to take them seriously in their lifeworlds asmembers of the global community.
Dierently put: the urgent need today is not so much to analyse, rationalize or control dierent lifeworlds, but
rather to befriend people in their lived contexts all around the world.
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introduction
Once the two radical possible perspectives from the conceptualisation of order in
response to Rengger’s question about its guarantee within the context of moder-
nity have been described, it is possible to explore how they interacted, in order to
further clarify, by highlighting dierences and possible convergences between the
two theoretical positions, the constellation of elements which are at the basis of
the concept of order and of the problems inherent to its conceptualisation. is
chapter provides consequently an examination of Habermas’s reading of Schmitt,
which serves the purpose of understanding the way in which Habermas has con-
fronted the issue of Schmitt’s political theology in the context of twentieth century
culture. It rst presents a contextualisation of the problematic use of Schmittwithin
the Frankfurt School, particularly aer Herbert Marcuse’s 1934 articlee Struggle
Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State. From the analysis of Haber-
mas’s early work on the public sphere, some authors have envisaged the possibility
of a direct inuence of Schmitt on Habermas, although with closer scrutiny it ap-
pears dicult to argue that Schmitt has ever represented a key source forHabermas.
Secondly, this chapter concentrates on the explicit judgement formulated byHaber-
mas on Schmitt in a brief publication entitled Die Schrecken der Autonomie: Carl
Schmitt auf Englisch (literally: e Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English),
where Habermas presents the rather problematic view that Schmitt should be con-
sidered in essence exclusively as a theorist of fascism, belonging to a romantic tra-
dition of thinkers who go back to the Right Hegelians.is chapter also illustrates
Habermas’s later re-appreciation of a Schmittian concept, namely the Großraum,
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for the provisional organisation of order in international politics. Finally, an eval-
uation of Habermas’s reading of Schmitt emphasises the way in which Habermas
has carefully avoided any direct engagement with Schmitt’s political theology, de-
spite the important genealogical link which both share with Max Weber’s framing
of religion and theology in the modern context. is point is highlighted as the
key factor in terms of the conceptualisation of order in both authors.
habermas ’s engagement with schmitt : a brief overview
In general, Habermas’s engagement with Schmitt’s work has been characterised by
various movements, and it can be roughly divided in three dierent periods.
Initially, while still operating within the framework of a critical, largely Marx-
ist, social theory of the late capitalist society (Spätkapitalismus), Habermas incor-
porated in his work some of the key tenets of the Schmittian attack on liberalism,
the ideology of the bourgeois. is is particularly evident in his early volume on
the public sphere,1 where Habermas recovers some of Schmitt’s themes and reec-
tions about the evolution of the Rechtsstaat and law (Gesetz) in relation to the ideas
of public sphere (Öentlichkeit), publicity (Publizität) and capitalistic dynamics.
Another phase is characterised by the rejection of Schmitt’s positions on the
role of the state and law, and the nature of politics, whereby Habermas embraces
those readings of Schmitt which consider the latter not only a fascist, but a theorist
of fascism.
e third and most recent phase is the one in which a recovery of Schmittian
concepts such as that of Großraum has taken place.is is particularly interesting
from the perspective of international studies, and appears concentrated mostly on
a reection about the post 9/11 world published under the title of Der gespaltene
Westen (e Divided West, Habermas)2 and successively in Ach, Europa.3
1Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öentlichkeit, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1962.
2Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004.
3Jürgen Habermas, Ach Europa, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008.
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4.1 the first habermas , schmitt and the frankfurt school
In Strukturwandel der Öentlichkeit (e Structural Trasformation of the Public
Sphere) Habermas explores a series of topics held together by the centrality of
the public sphere for the evolution of bourgeois culture, in the historical-political
perspective of eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal revolutions, with a con-
stant attention to the relations between the public sphere, the state and the market.
Habermas understands this set of relations as a complex domain: on the one hand
the public sphere has been the dimension wherein the political consciousness of
the bourgeoisie has rst risen, and it has become central in the coordination of po-
litical eorts against the old regime. It has successively evolved as the framework
of intellectual discussions about the forms and mechanisms of the bourgeois, the
liberal state, at least in those countries where the victory of this social class was
achieved (but with the notable exception of Germany until 1919), and particularly
about the concept of law (Gesetz) as the privileged tool for the management of
the constitutional state, as well as the role of the parliament (Parlamentarismus).
On the other hand, the liberal state has emerged as the legal-institutional order in
which, besides ideals of emancipation and equality, the private possession, accu-
mulation, and management of economic wealth has been enshrined in the forms
of law.
Famously, Habermas’s work on the public sphere has been centred on the argu-
ment that the bourgeois Öentlichkeit became subjected to distortive forces (origi-
nating in the bureaucratic management of power and in the capitalistic dynamic of
money and prot) which have induced a structural modication of its role, both in
terms of its validity as domain of free and equal communication and exchange of
ideas, and as the intellectual powerhouse of sound liberal (and later: liberal demo-
cratic) institutions, particularly parliaments and their legitimation.
Habermas identies the historical cause of this transformation in the in-
creased complexity of late nineteenth century liberal societies, which were aected
by increasing contradictions, particularly the growing political inuence exercised
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by economic concentration on an unprecedented scale (which had to be countered
with the expansion of the surage) and the failures of the market economy, which
prompted the emergence of more intrusive regulation, if not direct governmental
intervention. ese clearly ran counter to the original idea of a liberal state rest-
ing upon the economic foundation of production and trade of goods, on a limited
scale, and on the compromise of a clear separation between state and society.4 e
rise of massive power complexes in the most advanced economies gradually led to
a transformation of the classical liberal state into a Rechtsstaat. e eects on the
public sphere have been of the greatest concern for Habermas: the Öentlichkeit,
the domain in which culture is produced and spills over into state and state politics,
became a territory of conquest for a cultural industry, while the reasoning public
was degraded to a culture-consuming public (kulturkonsumierendes Publikum).
e political impact of this transformation is evident in the loss of reciprocal
inuence between public sphere and liberal institutions. Professional politicians
have become increasingly, and later totally, caught up in the structures of power
and the need to control political parties. Modern parties have become instruments
for the construction of collective will, no longer in the hands of the public, but in
the hands of those who control the party apparatus.5 As such, the parliamentarian
regime loses its referent within society, precisely because there is an ongoing fusion
between the state and the society, which in Habermas’s reconstruction of the clas-
sical English parliamentarism, and of the classical English bourgeois public sphere,
ought to be kept separated. It has to be nevertheless observed that this very recon-
struction of the English, especially the Victorian political-institutional landscape,
has been heavily criticised for its alleged historical inaccuracy.6 Habermas’s posi-
tion in the Strukturwandel comes to the conclusion that parliament has lost its func-
tion, in the absence of a working public sphere, and yielding to pressures generated
by systems of money and power. With the transition from the liberal parliamen-
tary political system to the new system of mass (liberal) democratic Rechtsstaaten,
4Habermas, Strukturwandel, pages 229 ss.
5Habermas, Strukturwandel, page 246.
6Cf. Wolfgang Jäger, Öentlichkeit und Parlamentarismus. Eine Kritik an Jürgen Habermas. Stuttgart: W.
KohlhammerVerlag, 1973; Hartmut Becker,Der Parlamentarismuskritik bei Carl Schmitt und JürgenHabermas,
Berlin: Duncker und Humblot Verlag, 1994.
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the issue that consequently emerged was the legitimacy of political authority, and
the representation of the electorate. Habermas has consequently spent a large part
of his academic work and his social-political commentaries on the theoretical con-
ceptualisation and critique of alternative legitimation mechanisms in the context
of a mass society.
e transition from bourgeois to mass political regimes, the decline and cri-
sis of parliamentarism, the crisis of legitimation: none of these elements were
particularly new to the academic audience in Germany in the early 1960s when
Strukturwandel der Öentlichkeit rst appeared, not only because of the debates
about the possible best constitutional form for the new Bundesrepublik, but espe-
cially because Habermas’s critique of parliamentarism resounded with many ele-
ments of the well-known 1924 critique put forward by Carl Schmitt in his Die geis-
tesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Paliamentarismus (e Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy).
As will be illustrated shortly, the parallels between Habermas and Schmitt
in the critique of liberalism did not go unnoticed for long. But it is rst of all
important to remember that the context in which Habermas was working at that
time, and specically with reference to the critical Frankfurt School and its tra-
dition, had a well-established disdain for Schmitt’s work. e standard approach
to reading Schmitt from a Marxist-critical perspective had been outlined in Her-
bert Marcuse’s 1934 essayDer Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staat-
sauassung (e Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State).7
While Schmitt had a certain resonance within the Frankfurt School in the 1920s
and 1930s, aer that time any positive appraisal of Schmitt as a source of inspira-
tion, or critique, substantially disappeared and his work became the target of an
all-out confrontation. It is clearly plausible, although not entirely explained,8 that
this break took place mostly due to Schmitt’s siding with the nsdap aer 1933.
7Available in Herbert Marcuse, Negations. Essays in Criticaleory, London: Allen Lanee Penguin Press,
translation by Jeremy J. Shapiro, 1968, pages 3–42.
8Becker, Der Pariamentarismuskritik, page 132.
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Marcuse’s article endeavours to establish an automatic link between Schmitt,
existentialist philosophy and fascism, a link which appears to be at the core of
Habermas’s reading of Schmitt and the broader critical scholarship on Schmitt. In
this article, Marcuse highlights what he perceives to be a continuity between liber-
alism and fascism, as the latter has indeed managed to preserve most of the status
quo in the material distribution of wealth and has brought no fundamental change
in the power structure of society, as observed from a Marxist perspective. Mar-
cuse argues indeed that “since the social order inherited by liberalism is le largely
intact, it is no wonder that the ideological interpretation of this social order ex-
hibits a signicant agreement between liberalism and anti-liberalism.” Even more
precisely, “important elements of liberalism are picked up and then reinterpreted
and elaborated in the manner required by the altered economic and social condi-
tions”.9 Marcuse has thus created a discourse whereby the 1930s political landscape
appears to be divided into three camps: the Marxist-critical, dying liberalism, and
fascist anti-liberalism. It is important to notice here that the whole category of anti-
liberalism is assumed to collapse entirely in fascism, and this is the device which
is used to associate Schmitt with the theorists of fascism, such as Möller van den
Bruck, Gunther Ipsen and Alfred Bäumler. Schmitt is rst quoted in Marcuses’s ar-
ticle in a footnote,10 for his contribution to the critique of liberalism as developed
ine Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy.is comes at a crucial juncture in Mar-
cuse’s discourse, where he is explaining the deconstruction of the rational value
of liberalism as operated by the promotion of heathen-folkish (heidnisch-völkisch)
realism. Schmitt is then quoted explicitly as Marcuse reconstructs the problem-
atic relation between a theory of fascism which promotes anti-intellectualism as
its ag, and the need to justify the ethic of heroism and sacrice. Here Schmitt is
understood to give some sort of negative denition of the fascist existential ethic,
whereby “[in] the universal struggle against reason, justication by knowledge can
no longer count as justication.” Marcuse argues in fact that, “to the extent that
totalitarian theory moves within the bounds of scientic discussion, it becomes
aware of this problem.” He articulates his attack on Schmitt by underscoring the
9Marcuse, op. cit., page 12.
10Marcuse, ibidem, page 16, footnote 27.
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legitimating function of the Schmittian argument, i.e. the concept of the exception
in relation to fascism, whereby “sacricing one’s own life and killing other men
are demanded. Carl Schmitt inquires into the reason for such sacrice: “ere is
no rational end, no norm however correct, no program however exemplary, no so-
cial idea however beautiful, and no legitimacy or legality that could justify men’s
killing one another”. What then, remains as a possible justication?” For Marcuse,
Schmitt’s answer to the question is a dogmatic assertion of an inescapable reality,
namely “that there is a state of aairs that through its very existence and presence
is exempt [emphasis in the original] from all justication, i.e. an “existential”, “on-
tological” state of aairs — justication by mere existence. “Existentialism” in its
political form becomes the theory of the (negative) justication of what can no
longer be justied.”11
From this sketchy answer to the problem of the existentialistic foundations
of fascism, as possibly supplied by Carl Schmitt, a whole fascist theory of politics
seems to be derived, which has at its core the very concept of the political and its
friend-enemy dialectic. In such a theoretical construction, “political relationships
and conditions are interpreted as existential ones, as in accordance with Being”.
Furthermore, “political conditions and relationships are now posited as the most
emphatically signicant factors “deciding” existence.”is total polarisation of the
political means that “all relationships are oriented in turn toward themost extreme
“crisis,” toward the decision about the “state of emergency”, of war and peace. [...]
e basic political relationship is the “friend-enemy relationship”.12
is existential interpretation of Schmitt’s theory of politics leads Marcuse
to envisage a Schmittian backing for the theoretical denition of the fascist state,
whereby Schmitt’s critique of depoliticisation in liberal society and politics opens
the way to a total politicisation. Marcuse is explicit in arguing that “behind all eco-
nomic, social, religious and cultural relations stands total politicisation. ere is
no sphere of private or public life, no legal or rational court of appeal that could
oppose it.”ese forms of total activation and politicization “do away with the in-
11Marcuse, ibidem, pages 30–31.
12Marcuse, ibidem, pages 35–36.
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hibiting neutrality of broad strata of the population and create [...] new forms of
political struggle andnewmethods of political organisation.e separation of state
and society, which liberalism had attempted to carry out in the nineteenth century,
is abolished: the state takes over the political integration of the society.13 Marcuse
concludes by quoting Schmitt again in a footnote, where he links Schmitt’s quote
aboutHitler’sMachtergreifung on January 30, 1933, namely “on that day, Hegel died”,
to the fate of existentialism as the self-proclaimed heir of German Idealism; Mar-
cuse thinks instead that “its [of Idealism] decisive achievements were preserved in
a new form in scientic social theory and the critique of political economy [i.e. the
Marxist critical movement]. Today the fate of the labor movement, in which the
heritage of this philosophy was preserved, is clouded with uncertainty”.14
Returning to Habermas’s reading of Schmitt, it is clear that Habermas oper-
ated in an environment that was openly hostile to the reception of Schmitt’s ideas,
and hemay have introduced references to Schmitt’s work in hise Transformation
of the Public Sphere only with extreme caution. It was with the essay Öentlichkeit
und Parlamentarismus, published by Wolfgang Jäger in 1973, that the lines of con-
nection between Schmitt and Habermas were rst highlighted in a more system-
atic way.15 Jäger’s essay did not arouse an emotional response comparable to Ellen
Kennedy’s 1986 article.16 While Jäger limited his analysis to the critique of parlia-
mentarism and the parallel between Schmitt’se Crisis of Parliamentary Democ-
racy and Habermas’se Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Kennedy
broadened the scope of her enquiry by encompassing in her analysis the whole
of Schmitt’s anti-liberal position on the one hand, and on the other the whole of
the Frankfurt School’s critique of liberal-capitalistic societies. As noted by Peter
Haungs, Kennedy’s article appeared in the mid 1980s at a time of crisis for the
Frankfurt School, and its impact was probably further aggravated by this circum-
13Marcuse, ibidem, page 36.
14Marcuse, ibidem, pages 42.
15Jäger, Öentlichkeit und Parlamentarismus, especially part vi and the conclusion, pages 78–87.
16Ellen Kennedy, “Carl Schmitt und die »Frankfurter Schule«. Deutsche Liberalismuskritik im 20. Jahrhundert”,
in Geschichte und Gesellscha, 12, 1986, pages 380–419.
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stance.17 Becker has highlighted how Jäger anticipated some of the elements upon
which Kennedy would later build amore comprehensive argument concerning the
connections between Schmitt and Habermas’ critiques of parliamentarism.18
Jäger pointed out that Habermas’s critique of late parliamentarism, at the time
of the degradation of the bourgeois public sphere, strongly echoed Schmitt’s state-
ments on the same historical reality, by stating that “the largely identical diagno-
sis put forward by both authors about the historical and modern parliamentarism
remains undisputed. Beyond the manifest result of the diagnosis, this is under-
scored by the fact that Habermas in his »Strukturwandel der Öentlichkeit« does
sometimes name Schmitt as chief witness [Kronzeuge] of his analysis”.19 A second
element of continuity between the two is nally also the “ambivalence of this idea
of parliamentarism in its scientic signicance.” On the one hand, “the negative
result of an analysis on modern parliamentarism is unequivocally compared with
a »genuine« parliamentarism as it existed in the past, and this negative result is
marked by the loss of function by the parliament”; on the other hand “the idea of
parliamentarism dazzles in its peculiar twilight of ideal-typical and empirical or
ideological and real content”.20
Again Ellen Kennedy has pointed instead to a deeper similarity between
Schmitt and Habermas’s views on democracy, despite the divergence in terms of
normative orientations and the debate on a way out from the legitimation crisis in
mass societies; according to her reconstruction of the relations between the two
authors, Habermas’s approach “contains, despite the signicant dierences in nor-
mative goals and political ideals which divide Habermas from Schmitt, the same el-
ements and the same formal argumentation, which constitute the core of Schmitt’s
critique of liberal ideas and institutions”.ese elements are listed by Kennedy as
“the denition of democracy as a substantial identity, the critique of liberal democ-
racy and its institutions (political parties, state bureaucracy and public opinion), as
17Peter Haungs, “Diesseits oder jenseits von Carl Schmitt? Zu einer Kontroverse um die »Frankfurter Schule«
und Jürgen Habermas”, in Hans Meier, Ulrich Matz, Karl Kurt Sontheimer and Paul-LudwigWeihnacht (eds.),
Politik, Philosophie, Praxis, Festschri für Wilhelm Hennis zum 65. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1988.
18Becker, Der Parlamentarismuskritik, pages 132 ss.
19Jäger, Öentlichkeit und Parlamentarismus, page 78.
20Jäger, ibidem, page 78–79.
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undemocratic at heart, the emphasis of plebiscitarian legitimacy in opposition to
legality, and nally the construction of a close relation between the principles and
the reality (Wirklichkeit) of the liberal constitution as the decisive methodological
approach to an analysis of the West-German political system”.21
Kennedy’s views have been rather predictably rebued by Habermas himself,
who has pointed out the unbridgeable dierence between Schmitt’s decisionism
and his own conception of democracy, whereby political authority operates within
the Rechtsstaat under the double condition of the continuous necessity and possi-
bility of legitimation, and this very legitimation having argumentative nature.22
It is probably fair to argue that, while Kennedy has been able to identify an
important area of underlying relations between Schmitt and Habermas, it is dis-
putable whether this can take the form and the label of a rather straightforward
genealogical relation. From a comprehensive overview of both author’s research
interests, it is not dicult to notice that Habermas’s general research direction over
the course of his life, particularly whenever it came to issues of political and legal
theory, did in fact involve discussions of topics which were almost invariably the
same as those previously studied by Schmitt. is not only made engagements
with Schmitt inevitable, even if such engagements were normally non-explicit and
indirect, but also led to Habermas participating in discussions heavily inuenced,
at the very least, by Schmitt’s work.
Habermas has indeed dedicated a signicant amount of eort to trying to nd
new denitions of the concepts of sovereignty and legitimation — both at the cen-
tre of Schmitt’s interests — and shares with his alleged adversary the fundamen-
tal feeling of hostility towards a set of established social structures. Particularly
in thee Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, the starting point of this
inquiry is a dissatisfaction with the degeneration of the public sphere in late capital-
istic societies, and the consequent critique of the social arrangements which have
caused such an involution.e resulting critique of parliamentarism, as illustrated
above, shares a number of common features with Schmitt’s 1924 work, although
21Kennedy, “Carl Schmitt und die »Frankfurter Schule«”, op. cit., pages 402–403.
22Becker, Der Parlamentarismuskritik, page 134.
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aiming at a dierent political outcome. Schmitt’s primary concern in his critique
of parliamentarism, besides the contingent attack on Weimar, was that of debunk-
ing liberalism as the ideology grounded on the illusionary idea that political con-
frontation can always be peacefully reduced to and settled through discussion and
reconciliation in institutional frameworks, while it proceeds in reality on contin-
uous processes of neutralisation and depoliticisation, whereby political problems
are never solved, but simply hidden and systematically postponed, until the un-
avoidable nal breakdown. Habermas has advanced analogous arguments in both
his sociological and in his political works, arguing that the prevalent form (in late
capitalistic societies) of liberal thought is indeed amisinterpretation of the original
core of liberal values and doctrines.
Particularly in his attack on neo-liberal socioeconomic policies, he has high-
lighted their ideological, instrumental functions, which cover the advancement of
systemic elements (systemic is here understood in the Habermasian social ontol-
ogy of the dynamic of money and power), to the detriment of the Lebenswelt, ul-
timately leading to the pathological situation of social anomy and consequently
of a severely dysfunctional democracy, if not to its disappearance. Of course, the
macroscopic dierence in this case is the opposite ultimate view on liberalism as
such, which is for Schmitt an inherently decient set of political theories, while it
retains for Habermas a core of validity which survives current wrongful practical
interpretations, and whose full recovery has constituted probably the most impor-
tant driver in his political thought.23 e analogous structure in the Schmittian
and Habermasian critiques of liberalism is particularly evident in the parallel be-
tween Schmitt’s ‘depoliticisation and neutralisation’ as categories of degeneration
of liberalism, and Habermas’s description of the ‘colonisation of the Lebenswelt’
in his tca. While Schmitt is ready and willing to formulate an all-out attack on
liberalism, not being himself philosophically attached to this political school of
thought, he points out the destructive nal outcome of liberalism caused by the
prolonged articial suppression of genuine political conicts beneath the lid of a
23On Habermas’s reading of liberalism, see Stephanie Morrow, “rough the Eyes of Habermas:e Heritage
of Liberalism and Deliberative Politics”, in Studies in Social & Politicalought, 20, 2012, pages 70–84.
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universalised ethos, leading to social disorder (taraxe).24 Habermas believes in the
possibility of rescuing the core of liberal values by formulating them in a rational,
non-ethical philosophical system, where political conict is not denied or hidden,
but is fully exercised, although in the form of argumentative competition within
the anarchical space of the public sphere, under conditions of fairness. Habermas
seems therefore receptive to the idea that depoliticisation and neutralisation are
teratological developments in certain degenerated strands of liberal systems, and
that re-politicisation of social life has to be re-established in order to avoid catas-
trophic consequences, or in any case simply in order to guarantee the smooth func-
tioning of a rational and just social and political order. Clearly, as in his reply to
Kennedy’s reading of the Strukturwandel against Schmitt’s critique of parliamen-
tarism, Habermas stresses his loyalty to fundamental liberal values as a substantial
dierence which separates himself from Schmitt.
All these elements are nevertheless not enough to envisage a genealogical link
owing from Schmitt to Habermas.e existence of broad areas of overlapping in-
terests between the two can be easily explained by the recurrence of problems and
questions in the political-philosophical eld which remained unresolved through-
out the German state’s lengthy and severe instability, which lasted well beyond the
end of the Reich and encompassed the dicult birth of Adenauer’s Bundesrepub-
lik. On the other hand, Schmitt and Habermas both work within a philosophical
horizon which, decade aer decade, still presents itself in very similar if not the
same terms, namely the persistence of the problem of the legitimation of political
authority in modernity, the role of positive law in politics and the coordination of
economic and political order, both domestically and internationally.25
In conclusion to this initial examination of Habermas’s reading of Schmitt, it
can be condently stated that despite the existence betweenHabermas and Schmitt
of overlapping positions on very broad topic areas, there is little evidence of Schmitt
being a direct source of inspiration for Habermas in his critique of the public
sphere. As shown, the Frankfurt School largely tended to assimilate Schmitt to
24Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt, pages 60–62.
25See also Brett R. Wheeler, “Law and Legitimacy in the Work of Jürgen Habermas and Carl Schmitt”, in Ethics
and International Aairs, 15 (1), 2006, pages 173–183.
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the “theoretical fathers” of National Socialist Germany, and this attitude, as it will
become clearer in the next section, is widely shared by Habermas.26
Finally, an irreconcilable point of divergence between the two in their ap-
proach to political theory, and theories of order especially, is rooted in Habermas’s
emancipatory approach as the driver and the telos of political action and political
life, as opposed to Schmitt, for whom the ultimate goal of history and the ultimate
goal of political life as it unfolds through history remains mysterious, although
it has been formulated and re-formulated in mythical form. Paraphrasing Sorel,
Schmitt has indeed stated that “only in myth can the criterion be found for decid-
ing whether one nation or a social group has a historical mission and has reached
its historical moment. Out of the depths of a genuine life instinct, not out of rea-
son or pragmatism, springs the great enthusiasm, the great moral decision and the
great myth.” e political consequence of this line of thought leads Schmitt to af-
rm that “the enthusiastic mass creates in direct intuition a mythical image that
pushes its energy forward and gives it the strength for martyrdom as well as the
courage to use force. Only in this way can a people or a class become the engine
of world history. Whether this is lacking, no social and political power can remain
standing, and no mechanical apparatus can build a dam if a new storm of histor-
ical life has broken loose. Accordingly, it is all a matter of seeing correctly where
its capacity for myth and this vital strength are really alive today. In the modern
bourgeoisie, which has collapsed into anxiety about money and property, in this
social class morally ruined by scepticism, relativism, and parliamentarism, it is not
to be found”.27
As will be illustrated below, this way of portraying political life would become
for Habermas increasingly unacceptable, because of its incompatibility with his en-
gagement with a re-evaluation of liberalism under the auspices of a harmonisation
of Kantian and Marxist threads, in the greater project of recovering the Enlighten-
ment and bring it to completion. As a theorist of politics who considered irrational-
26See also Richard Wolin,e Frankfurt School Revisited and Other Essays on Politics and Society, New York:
Routledge, 2006.
27Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1926 (English translation by Ellen Kennedy, e Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Cambridge (ma) and
London: mit Press, 1988), page 68.
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ism a viable alternative to mass democracy, and who contemplated the possibility
of legitimising the use of violence in political activity, Schmitt would eventually
face an outright condemnation from Habermas, who would consider him as a the-
orist of fascist, thus explicitly returning to the traditional line of argument of the
Frankfurt School as determined by Marcuse in the 1930s.
4.2 habermas ’s mature reading of schmitt ’s theoretical work
Habermas’s direct comment on Schmitt’s work as a whole is limited to a short arti-
cle entitled Die Schrecken der Autonomie: Carl Schmitt auf Englisch (literally: e
Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English) written at the publication in the
United States of the English translations e Concept of the Political and of e
Critique of Parliamentarism. Habermas attempts in this brief essay, successively
published in Eine Art Schadensabwicklung (A Kind of Settlement of Damages),28
to persuade his Anglo-Saxon readers of the risks that an uncritical approach to
Schmitt’s work can entail. Habermas starts by claiming that it is dicult to imag-
ine the integration of Schmitt within the context of Anglo-Saxon discussions, since
“the intellectual (geistig) prole of this man and his political destiny (politisches
Schicksal) belong to a very German tradition (eine sehr deutsche Tradition)”,29 and
by immediately referring not simply to the link between Schmitt and the nsdap,
but directly to Adolf Hitler, who ‘was fateful to him’ (ihm zum Schicksal wurde).30
Habermas portrays Carl Schmitt as a highly sophisticated intellectual, erudite
and especially gied in literary skill, but on the other hand he presents him as a ter-
atological product of mainstream “mandarin” German academia of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, itself a manifestation in turn of the German “excep-
tion”, namely the backwardness of that country in terms of political development.
Habermas insists on Schmitt’s expressionistic understanding of politics, inspired by
28Jürgen Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwickung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987, page 103–114.
29Habermas, ibidem, page 103.
30Habermas, ibidem, page 103.
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Ernst Jünger’s In Stahlgewittern,31 as a friend-foe dialectic, as the highest manifes-
tation of a rened backwardness which, instead of promoting self-critical analyses
and investigations of the historical and intellectual causes of this very phenomenon,
elaborates theories in order to justify it, legitimises it and even proclaims its sup-
posed superiority vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxonmodel. Interestingly, while Habermas
refers, in this initial sketching of Schmitt, to the Concept of the Political and to Po-
liticaleology, he considers Schmitt’se Leviathan in the Stateeory ofomas
Hobbes,32 as his masterpiece (Hauptwerk), a peculiar choice when the overwhelm-
ing majority of publications about Schmitt concentrate either upone Concept of
the Political, Politicaleology, Constitutionaleory ore Nomos of the Earth. It
may even be easily argued, on the contrary, that Schmitt’s monograph on Hobbes
is probably one of the least-read of his books. Here Habermas concentrates mainly
on Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes, whereby Schmitt would have simply projected his
own theory back on Hobbes, particularly the idea that the state is a continuously-
impeded civil war (der fortwährend verhinderte Bürgerkrieg), the authority which
checks the revolutionary resistance (den revolutionären Widerstand niederhält).33
Schmitt developed in his Hobbes-monograph the idea that theHobbesian state has
undergone a process of degeneration from a real Rechtsstaat (a state in which the
sovereign-monarch uses the law and legal mechanisms, but is not himself subject
to immutable laws), to a Gesetzstaat:
In the European continental states, the monarch-ruled, absolutist state
of the eighteenth century has been replaced by the bourgeois state of
the nineteenth century. Under the name ‘Rechtsstaat’ is here disguised
a system of legality (Legalitätssystem), functioning with written laws,
and especially legal codications (Gesetzeskodikationen), and based
31Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), a prominent writer of the twentieth century German literature, is still considered
as an extremely controversial gure, both in Germany and abroad, for his conservative-nationalist political
views. His In Stahgewittern (published 1920, English translation: Storm of Steel) is a literary re-elaboration
of his war time diaries, written during the First World War on the Western front, a work which has been
interpreted as an apology of warfare and militarism, oen contrasted to the pacist stance of E.M. Remarque’s
Im Westen Nichts Neues (published in 1928, English translation: All Quiet on the Western Front).
32Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre desomas Hobbes, Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt,
1938.
33Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, page 105.
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on a man-made constitution (auf einer von Menschen gemachten “Kon-
stitution”). It is known for long, that the bourgeois Rechtsstaat is in
reality just a Gesetzstaat.34
Schmitt reconstructed the downfall of the absolutist state through the methodolo-
gies of the history of ideas, by focusing on the relation between the state and re-
ligious matters, concerning the private confession of the individual citizen, as op-
posed to the public faith which has been conceptualised by Hobbes as the theologi-
cal-political pillar of the modern absolutist state. Hobbes— according to Schmitt’s
reading—would have provided a space of private freedom, an individual religious
belief (named confession), a private belief as opposed to the practice of a collective,
public space in which religious practices are allowed only as consistent with a state-
driven, public faith. And it would be from this core of private freedom in confes-
sional matters that the bourgeois public sphere would be born, and later expanded
far beyond the religious realm into politics and the institutional life of the state. In
Schmitt’s reading, this was the original aw in the Hobbesian articulation of the
state, which would eventually dismantle its whole architecture aer the seizure of
legislative power by the bourgeois, and the establishment of a Gesetzgebungsstaat.
Habermas confutes this analysis by pointing out how Hobbes developed his
concept of sovereignty from the very beginning in strict relationwith the positivisa-
tion of law (Positivierung des Rechts). He argues namely that “positive law requires
already, as a consequence of the concept itself, a political legislator, who shall no
longer be bound by the hierarchically superior norms of natural law — and it is
to that extent sovereign.” Consequently for Habermas “the seed of the evolution
towards the Rechtsstaat is planted already in Hobbes’s idea of a sovereign legislator
— who is bound to the medium of positive law — the very seed that Carl Schmitt
sees as a great doom, which he would like to derive from the neutralisation of
state authority against private religious powers (gegenüber den privaten Glaubens-
mächten).35
34Schmitt, Der Leviathan, page 101.
35Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, page 106.
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Habermas links Schmitt’s critique of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat to the politi-
cal situation in the Weimar republic and portrays it as an attempt to de-legitimise
the constitutional arrangement of the rst genuinely liberal democratic German
state, whereby Schmitt aimed at portraying the whole process of liberalisation and
democratisation as a degradation, leading to his forming an argument in favour of
inevitable dictatorial rule for the restoration of state power. In this sense therefore,
Habermas attempts to diminish the scholarly value of Schmitt’s work by tying it
to the contingent political situation of Weimar. Furthermore, Habermas regards
Schmitt’s genealogical investigation into the origin of the Leviathan myth and its
position in Jewish culture as the beginning of a powerful anti-Semitic argument for
the ideological construction of the image of the Jews and their cultural heritage as
a sworn enemy of the state. Habermas turns successively towards the question of
why Schmitt is still taken so seriously into account by German and European aca-
demics, despite his links to the National-Socialist past, the alleged anti-Semitism
in some of his 1930s works and the lack of self-critique aer 1945, when Schmitt
portrayed himself as the “Benito Cereno of the European international law”,36 in
his memoirs entitled Ex Captivitate Salus.37 Habermas explains Schmitt’s lasting
inuence by referring to three main grounds: rst, the high quality of Schmitt’s
work as an academic, and particularly as an expert of public and international law
(Staatsrechtler); secondly, the fact that Carl Schmitt “was a good writer”38 and was
a competent and acute observer and critic of his time, but more importantly “he
conserved, in all the clarity of his language, the gestus of the metaphysic (behielt
er... den Gestus des Metaphysikers), who can lead to the profundity and at the same
time unveil a disdainful reality”.39
Schmitt is additionally still important because he had, and has, disciples, and
disciples of disciples, having le behind a considerable inuence in the study of
constitutional matters, and he has continued to be a source of inspiration for ju-
rists, historians and philosophers. irdly, Habermas traces the importance and
36Benito Cereno is the hero of the eponymous novella byHermanMelville’s (published 1855). While considered
by everybody the captain of a pirate ship, he is in reality a hostage of those same pirates.
37Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus. Erinnungen der Zeit 1945/1947, Berlin: Becker & Humblot, 1950.
38Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, page 109.
39Habermas, ibidem, page 109.
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relevance of Schmitt and the contemporary study of his work to the continuous
fascination that the “young conservatives” (die Jungkonservativen) can exert. His
reconstruction of the historical era in which Schmitt was writing some of his early
major works, namely during the 1920s, stresses how “the right-Hegelianism le be-
hind a tantalising void, aer the sociological enlightenment of a Max Weber had
stripped state authority of the aura deriving from the close relationship of reason
and religion.” According to Habermas, the conservatives “at that time, [...] wanted
to cope with the loss of the aura, but they could not put up with the banalised busi-
ness of an administrative state dominated by party democracy (sich ... mit dem ba-
naliserten Geschä eines parteidemokratisch beherrschten Verwaltungsstaates nicht
abnden). On the one hand they had become cynical and they saw through the
bare mechanism of the regime; on the other, against all this the substance and the
secret of the battered sovereignty had to be renewed — and through an act of un-
precedented exaltation”.40
Habermas proceeds therefore by portraying Schmitt as the right man to per-
form this task and to respond to the exigencies of the conservative political thought
at that time:
Carl Schmitt, who drew on the same experiences of Martin Heidegger,
Gottfried Benn and Ernst Jünger, was able to satisfy this vague desire
(Sehnsucht). All these authors met with their pseudo-revolutionary an-
swers this desire of the extremely old in the extremely other, and they
always return to the old. Even today this message has not lost its ap-
peal — above all in some marginal (verschwitzte) subcultures, mainly
of leist provenience.41
Aer referring almost en passant to the relevance of Schmitt in French philos-
ophy during the 1980s and its orientation towards Nietzsche andHeidegger, Haber-
mas concentrates on the possible relevance of a Schmittian Denkmotiv when con-
sidering the parallel that has been generated in theological discussions between
the theology of liberation and a political theology of counterrevolution, a parallel
40Habermas, ibidem, page 109.
41Habermas, ibidem, page 109.
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which nds its origin in that part of political Catholicismwhich tries to explore the
legitimacy of modernity. e question requiring an answer is, then: “can moder-
nity create and stabilise its normative orientations from itself in the consciousness,
or must it — as the anchorless product of a decomposing secularisation — be re-
called within the horizon of salvic history and cosmology?”42
Habermas ultimately believes that Carl Schmitt has no coherent political thou-
ght, as he oscillated between dierent poles, together with but at the same time in
opposition to political romanticism. e core of Schmitt’s thought, Habermas ex-
plains, lies in the aesthetic of violence (Ästhetik der Gewalt),43 whereby a set of sur-
realistic meanings is irradiated from the model of a sovereignty created from noth-
ing but the violent destruction of the normative. Schmitt’s theory of politics and
particularly his critique of parliamentarism can be understood— for Habermas —
only in the misconceived separation of liberalism and democracy, where the mis-
take is that liberalism has always entailed the generation and sharing of opinions
and will do so in a political public sphere. Democracy is hence egalitarian partic-
ipation channelled through the medium of public discussions.44 e division of
public discussion and democratic manifestation of will leads to the conception of
the demos as capable of expression only through acclamation of a dictatorial lead-
ership (decisionist Caesarism) and to a conception of its necessary homogeneity,
also in ethnic terms. Habermas lastly suggests that Schmitt’s core argument strikes
at the heart of western rationalism, containing an apology for precisely those ele-
ments around which a critique of totalitarianism was formulated, particularly by
Arendt.
Habermas’s reading of Schmitt reects the general Frankfurt School orienta-
tion towards this author, already developed during the 1930s, as illustrated above.
Habermas here clearly wishes to stress Schmitt’s connections to theNational Social-
ist regime, to the point of making him one of the possible ideologues of European
fascism, if not directly, nevertheless at least accidentally. is has subtle implica-
tions: by shaping his reading of Schmitt in this way, Habermas seems to suggest
42Habermas, ibidem, page 111.
43Habermas, ibidem, page 112.
44Habermas, ibidem, page 113.
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that readers should maintain a distance from this author, since Schmitt was so
clearly associated with something as inherently evil and unacceptable as National
Socialism. Nevertheless, Habermas is confronted with a problem: there are many
professional intellectuals who still refer to Schmitt as a valuable contribution to
the theory of politics, even beyond the relatively closed circle of those who can be
dened as his heirs. Schmitt’s work is also taken extremely seriously by those who
ultimately confute and dismiss his fundamental theses. is creates the awkward
situation whereby Schmitt cannot be easily dismissed, since the work of many in-
tellectuals, above any suspicion of National Socialist sympathy, cannot be simply
downplayed as misguided, or irrelevant, or biased.45
Habermas therefore frames his attack on Schmitt by describing him essen-
tially as the exponent of a long tradition in German academia and the intellectual
community in general, which can be traced back to the Hegelian Right and the suc-
cessive crisis which occurred politically with the collapse of the Kaiserreich, and
intellectually with the rational analysis of the relations between power and religion
as advanced by Max Weber. As explained above, this sudden change in the polit-
ical and intellectual landscape le a dangerous void in the minds of conservative-
oriented intellectuals, and according to Habermas it was Schmitt who took over
the task of reviving certain central topics of conservative Hegelianism, which may
share in the historical responsibility for the rise of Nazism, in order to resume
their intellectual and possibly political projects, which were and remain, for Haber-
mas, extremely close to theNational Socialistmovement and oriented towards anti-
emancipatory practices.46 ere are nevertheless a series of problems in this repre-
sentation of Schmitt and the successive impact of his thought.
e rst problem is in that tendency, not exclusively proper to Habermas, to
depict Schmitt as a political romantic, even if Habermas cannot possibly ignore
45Indeed, literature on Schmitt or Schmittian themes is currently very voluminous already and it is growing
at fast pace. Alain the Benoist has recently published a 528-page bibliography exclusively listing Carl Schmitt
studies: Alain de Benoist, Carl Schmitt: Internationale Bibliographie der Primär- und Sekundärliteratur, Graz:
Ares-Verlag, 2010.
46e connection between Hegel and authoritarianism is however complex and much disputed. See for in-
stance Jon Stewart (ed.),e Hegel Myths and Legends, Evanston il: Northwestern University Press, 1996, Part
2.
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that Schmitt himself had devoted an entire book to the subject of political roman-
ticism, and had rejected this theoretical position and intellectual orientation by
1919.47 Habermas tends to portray Schmitt and the Schmittians as romantics who,
although rationally aware of the untenability of romantic propositions, continue
to reproduce romanticism in unconscious ways. In the case of Schmitt this is nev-
ertheless extremely dicult to demonstrate by pointing at specic works. If ro-
manticism can be dened as the idealisation of a certain past age which is taken
as a model to be re-established and reproduced in the present and the future, then
Carl Schmitt can hardly t into this denition. Schmitt does not use in his work
extensive historical reconstruction and does not identify any possible ‘golden age’
in the periods, systems of government or historical political realities with which
he engages; he is well aware that past systems of government can no longer be
reproduced in an era— the modern one— in which technological change has pro-
duced substantially new realties and problems incompatible with past models.48
Even when dealing with the question of international order (ande Nomos of the
Earthmay seem at rst reading a nostalgic study of a past systematisation of order)
Schmitt is explicitly conscious of the fact that past systems collapse for unavoidable
historical reasons, that a new order can consequently only be established by look-
ing forwards, and by trying to integrate into the dimension of law precisely those
elements which acted as game changers. Clearly, Schmitt oen advocates the reten-
tion of certain key regulatory principles, particularly evident again in the case of
the Nomos, but this can hardly constitute a form of romanticism.
is can be directly linked to the second problem in Habermas’s reading of
Schmitt: the alleged continuity between Schmitt and the Hegelian Right. ere
are a number of inconsistencies between the intellectual position of Schmitt, and
the Jungkonservativen, which prevents his integration in the mentioned category.
Schmitt was in his life and thought rather detached from the mandarin, Protestant,
right-Hegelian academic and social world of theKaiserreich. WilhelmineGermany
was a protestant Reich in which Catholics such as Schmitt were at best sidelined
47Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1919.
48Jerey Herf, Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and theird Reich, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, page 116 ss.
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and viewed with a certain degree of suspicion in the intellectual and social circles
of upper-class Prussia.49 It would be a mistake to identify the Schmittian theo-
logical dimension in the analysis of political and legal theory with the Hegelian
identication of the state, and the Prussian state in particular, with the supreme
stage of self-realisation (Selbstwerden) of the Hegelian Absolute. Even if it is true
that in both perspectives one can nd a common reference to the central concept
of God, Schmitt does not gesture in his work towards alleged theological realities
on which political structures can be or should be built. His analysis is concep-
tual, cultural and historical: he observes the impact of theological ideas upon the
political, he highlights their importance and argues that they will continue to be
important in the future of Western, and German, political discourse. As will be
discussed at a later point, it is precisely as a continuation of Max Weber’s rational
analysis of the relations between religion and political power that Schmitt was able
to establish his research perspective. Schmitt’s work additionally distances itself
from Hegelianism in his thought’s lack of systematisation. Schmitt does not oper-
atewithin a theological-philosophical system; he elaborates his analyses, in a rather
post-Nietzschean fashion, as an incursion into theoretical elds with a spirit of lit-
erary critique and the aim of suggesting alternative narratives. Rather than doing
philosophy in a Hegelian way, or in any ‘traditional’ sense, his aim appears to be
that of shiing the viewpoint of his readers on certain topics, and debunking the
ideological superstructures which may prevent this shi from occurring.50
It is tempting to see a line of continuity between Schmitt and the Jungkonser-
vativen when observing how close Schmitt became to certain right-wing political
circles— and theReichswehr—in the late years of theWeimar republic, and speci-
cally toGeneral Kurt von Schleicher, whowas considered by PresidentHindenburg
to be the right candidate to lead a dictatorship, with the aim of bringing the dead-
lock of Weimar politics to a patriotic solution (the so-called Querfront). Neverthe-
less, Schmitt’s involvement was arguably dictated more by personal ambition and
the prominence of his Berlin acquaintances in the late 1920s and early 1930s rather
49Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt:eorist for the Reich, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983.
50An interesting contribution of this point has been articulated by Renaud Baumert, Carl Schmitt, Entre Tac-
tique etéorie, Paris: Gallimard, 2012.
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than ideological anity and a compatibility of political projects. If we identify the
Hegelian Right tradition with the political allegiance to Prussia and the house of
Hohenzollern, a tradition indeed which remained monarchist during Weimar, we
can surmise that such an ideology was never the fundamental political orientation
of Carl Schmitt. Intellectually, Schmitt intervened in the debates about the future
ofWeimar with ideas which were indeed supportive of the dictatorial solution (par-
ticularly his interpretation of article 48 of the Weimar constitution), but this was
not related to a philosophical-political orientation which considered a dictatorship
to be the best constitution, Schmitt considering it instead to be the only politically
and legally viable alternative to the internal stalemate of Weimar’s politics, and the
exceptional international situation around the German state. Schmitt considered
Weimar to be an ill-born state, the fruit of untenable compromises between weak
political and social forces (largely the spd and the Catholic Zentrum), themselves
far from representing the overwhelming majority of the German citizens, who in
great numbers regarded the Weimar state as undesirable. 51
In any case, Habermas’s point in trying to trace a genealogy of Schmitt’ po-
litical orientation appears rather problematic. On the one hand, Schmitt would
allegedly oer a new perspective and fresh inspiration to the Right Hegelian tra-
dition and its followers: because of the highly systematic nature of this very tra-
dition, however, it is hard to imagine that Schmitt could easily be incorporated
into it. Schmitt was able instead to work on topics which were indeed coincidental
with the core of the Right Hegelians, namely the relation between the theological
and the political, history and law, but he addressed them in very dierent ways.
His eort was in fact all about demonstrating how, precisely as a consequence of
MaxWeber’s work, the old positions of Hegelian conservatism had become unten-
able, but that at the same time the relevance of the religious and the idea of the
impact of myth had been substantially enhanced. If this is true in relation to Right
Hegelianism, it is even more so when it come to the overall evaluation of Schmitt’s
political thought. When Schmitt explores Cortés and DeMaistre’s works and looks
for traces in this literature of conservative and even reactionary political thought,
51Cf. Gopal Balakrishnan,e Enemy: As Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, London and New York, Verso,
2000, pages 139–154.
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he does not do so with the idea of re-habilitating those authors, nor the systems
of thought in which they operated; he carefully selects a series of relevant topics
which — despite the demise of the philosophical system in which they have been
conceived —may still oer helpful insights, precisely in relation to the problem of
religious values and the constitution of political-legal sources of authority. If Max
Weber worked out a rational understanding of the relations between religion and
politics, this is not something which Schmitt desires to subvert. On the contrary,
this is precisely Schmitt’s starting point: the collapse of religious-metaphysical ex-
planations of the political (and of power specically) are at the same time also the
way inwhich religious topics, myths andmetaphysics have found their way into the
‘scientic’ enterprise of sociology, not only as subjects of rationalistic debunking,
as in the positivistic understanding of the scientic sociology, but also as legitimate
variables of a rational explanatory discourse, when sociology, with MaxWeber, be-
gins to embrace a verstehen epistemology based on a Nietzschean perspectivism.
Habermas’s evaluation of Schmitt’s work as it emerges in Die Schrecken der
Autonomie appears to be heavily conditioned by Schmitt’s infamous reputation,
acquired already in the 1930s from the Frankfurt School and more so aer 1945
with the process of de-nazication. is reading of Schmitt, however, as shown
in this section, is extremely problematic and cannot withstand a closer analysis of
Schmitt’s work and his general intellectual orientation, especially in the face of any
attempts to link himwith a Right Hegelian tradition, as opposed to aWeberian her-
itage in the study of social and political phenomena. As will be illustrated in the
next part, however, Habermas would eventually present a quite dierent orienta-
tion towards Schmitt and would ultimately recognise as meritorious his diagnosis
of the interaction of international law and international politics. From the perspec-
tive of order, it emerges how Habermas has been elaborating an image of Schmitt
as intellectual which essentially prevents a more direct engagement with the sub-
stantial claims advanced by Schmitt, whose work is largely dismissed, rather than
discussed.e crucial point of the Schmittian understanding of secularisation and
of the permanence of the theological in modern political concepts goes therefore
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unnoticed and it is not the subject of a thorough discussion on the point of political
theology in its relation to politics, the law, the state and international order.
4.3 the unexpected partial re-conciliation
e third reading by Habermas of Schmitt’s work is linked to a more direct engage-
ment with topics of international politics, which tends to escape Habermas’s atten-
tion in most of his writings dedicated to actual political issues, German domestic
politics instead playing the dominant role. By the beginning of the 1990s, however,
the debate on globalisation started to intensify in Germany, and the boundary be-
tween discussions on domestic and international politics began to weaken, partic-
ularly in relation to the European Union and the underlying political project. As
previously illustrated, this course of events induced a reluctant Habermas to en-
ter the international political debate with a series of contributions, most notably
critiques of globalisation vis-à-vis (social-) democratic political regimes (in Die
postnationale Konstellation), and successively by confronting the turn in us for-
eign policy under G.W. Bush, and the ensuing fracture in transatlantic relations.
In reference to this latter point, Habermas has shown a great interest in follow-
ing the evolution of the eu, as the bearer of a positively critical position against
a set of us foreign policies, and above all in the formulation of analyses of the
world situation, including possible alternatives to the dominant neo-liberal model
of world order. In hisDer gespalteneWesten,52 he published an extensive analysis of
the global political landscape, concentrating on the question of normative and le-
gal standards and their intellectual implication in political and legal theories.e
main opposition he envisages is that between the continuation, aer a necessary
re-formulation, of a certain Kantian project, primarily reected in the evolution
of international law along the line of an increasing democratisation, and the surge
of a hegemonic liberalism (hegemonialer Liberalismus), founded on a misreading
of liberal ideas, which is eectively an ideological cover-up for an imperial project.
Aer considering these tendencies, Habermas recognises nevertheless that hege-
52Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004.
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monic liberalism and a neo-Kantian project do not exhaust a possible list of alterna-
tives, to which he also adds: the neo-liberal project of a world market-society with
diminished relevance for the state (das... neoliberale Design einer entstaatlichten
Weltmarktgesellscha), largely discussed in his previous Die postnationale Konstel-
lation, published at the height of the Washington consensus in the pre-9/11 world;
the post-Marxist scenario of a diuse empire without a centre of power (das post-
marxistische Szenario eines zerstreuten Imperiums ohneMachtzentrum); and nally
an anti-Kantian project of Großraum-based orders (das anti-Kantische Projekt von
Großraumordnungen).53 In the rst two cases, the category itself of international
law is denied a prominent place in the construction of world order, which may be
solely based on market forces. Particularly for Hardt and Negri’s empire, the con-
tribution given for a reection on the future of international law is very limited,
due to an exclusive concentration on dynamics of power (and money). Neverthe-
less, “the proper dialectic of the history of international law cannot be deciphered
through a fully de-formalised concept of law. Even to the egalitarian-individualist
universalism of human rights and democracy we have to allow a »logic«, which
interferes with the dynamic of power”.54
is belief that the law possesses a logic which can go beyond a sheer dialec-
tic of power (interestingly, an argument very well exposed by Schmitt himself in
his early work Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen),55 prompts
Habermas towards considering a Schmittian interpretation of globalisation pro-
cesses and their consequences for the state and interstate legal relationship. Since
“Schmitt has confronted the universalist presupposition of the Kantian project all
his life long”, his work should be taken into account when looking at “those who
vindicate the supremacy of the right upon the good on contextual grounds, or sus-
pect any universal discourse of being the concealment of particular interests on
rational-critical grounds”.56
53Habermas, ibidem, pages 184–185.
54Habermas, ibidem, pages 187.
55Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1914.
56Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, page 187.
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Habermas begins therefore with a cautious, but surprisingly open, descrip-
tion of Schmitt’s work in the eld of international politics, which distances itself
sharply from the previous hostility towards the intellectual foundations, the prac-
tical outcomes, and the biographical aspects of Schmitt’s work. Habermas displays
in this writing a degree of appreciation for two important arguments put forward
by Schmitt in his publications on international law: rst, the critique of the »dis-
criminatory concept of war« (diskriminierender Kriegsbegri ) coupled with the in-
creasing legalisation (Verrechtlichung) of international relations; second, the “re-
placement of states Großräume ruled as empires.”57
Habermas’s reading of Schmitt is here contextualisedwithin the struggle again-
st Versailles and the whole system of thought, culminating in the Briand-Kellogg
pact of 1928, which regarded war as a crime, an aberration and a disease of inter-
national life: against this conception, Schmitt devoted a great deal of work. He
concentrated his eorts in trying to demonstrate that moral judgments poison in-
ternational relations and intensify wars.58 An agreedmoral conception of justice at
the international level is for Schmitt simply impossible, and he surmises therefore
that no such conception of justice between nations can exist: only one that is based
on formal rules, the aim of which should be the regulation and the institutionali-
sation of conicts, rather than their utopian abolition and prohibition. Habermas
criticises Schmitt’s position by stating that “the claim about a »moralisation« of war
is clearly void, as soon as the rejection of war is conceptualised as a step towards
the »juridication« (Verrechtlichung) of international relations”.59
is process of juridication must be grounded, in Habermas’s theory, on a
clear division between moral and legal judgements, whereby the dierentiation be-
tween just and unjust wars according to criteria grounded in material, natural law
or religious reasons has to be replaced by the distinction between legal and illegal
wars according to legal-procedural principles. Only in this sense can war take the
shape and the name of an international police operation. Taking the handling of ev-
idence proving Iraq’s possession ofWeapons of Mass Destruction as an example of
57Habermas, ibidem, page 187.
58Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, page 188.
59Habermas, ibidem , page 189.
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decient juridication in international law, Habermas moves on to make a general
argument about the necessity of establishing a regime of positive international law
solidly anchored in legal procedures, in a context where, “aer the establishment
of an International Criminal Court and the codication of the corresponding el-
ements of oences (Straatbestände), positive law would take eect also on this
international level and it would protect the defendants, under the shield of crimi-
nal procedural law, against moral prejudices (Vorverurteilungen)”.60
Habermas interprets Schmitt’s position as the direct consequence of his exis-
tentialistic conception of the political, the friend-enemy dialectic, which impedes
the reciprocal understanding of dierent political actors on a common denition
of justice, leading to the Schmittian idea that conceptions of justice are incommen-
surable (Schmitts non-Kognitivismus) and therefore need dierent and separated
spaces (physical territories) in which to be independently implemented. Schmitt
ghts against the universalism of Kant’s theory of law by attacking themechanisms
responsible for the rationalisation of authority (Herrschasrationalisierung).61is
is explained as the resilient core of the impenetrable conception of anti-parlia-
mentarian bureaucratic authority, which dominated the German Kaiserreich and
extended its inuence well beyond its historical end. But while many of Schmitt’s
followers continued to link this conception of the political only to the state, Schmitt
himself moved beyond the state during the late part of his career, in the second half
of the 1930s until the 1960s. He extended his friend-enemy dialectic — Habermas
remembers — to actors who go beyond the state: rst the Volk, as distinguished
from the Staat, when the former ismobilised within the fascist movement (Schmitt
dedicated his Staat, Bewegung, Volk—published in 1933 — to this topic); secondly,
Schmitt extended his conception of the political to partisans, guerrilla movements,
and freedom ghters. irdly and most importantly, he envisaged a model of
world order which looked beyond the state for the re-organisation of international
politics, namely the partition of the world into several imperial structures, called
Großräume, each dominated by a great power, on the model of the western hemi-
sphere as formulated according to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Habermas draws
60Habermas, ibidem , page 189.
61Habermas, ibidem , page 190.
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here a comparison between the situation of the world at the time in which Schmitt
was rst developing hisGroßraum theory, and the currentworld situation, discover-
ing a series of similarities. Schmitt started working on the idea ofGroßraum in the
early 1940s, particularly with his work Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung (1941),
reecting the eastward expansion of the German Reich. In this text he draed his
vision of a planet in which the legal ction of equality among states was no longer
tenable, and therefore world politics had to be re-organised in terms of a hierarchy
of peoples and their respective spheres of inuence, made up of state entities of
lesser might, economically and ideologically dependent upon a dominant, hierar-
chically superior state (and people). EachGroßraumwas delimited by clear borders
which excluded the intervention of any other foreign power within it.e similar-
ity of this idea to the international situation in the twenty-rst century lies not so
much in the hierarchical ordering of the states, but in the recognition that glob-
alisation processes have made the legal ction of their equality absolutely unten-
able, thus paving the way towards a dierent form of international structure built
around continental conglomerates of states. Schmitt’s basic conception of a world
divided into several continental Großräume “is tied to tendencies of denationalisa-
tion of politics, but without — unlike the neo-liberal and the post-Marxist design
— downplaying the actual role of political communities and governments with ca-
pability to act. It anticipates the construction of continental regimes, to which also
the Kantian project [here the reference is to Habermas’s re-elaboration of a project
of world governance inspired byKantian principles] attributes an important role”.62
While Habermas rejects the existence of any common philosophical feature
between the twoprojects, he recognizes that amodernised version of theGroßraum
theory can constitute a probable counter to the unipolar world order of hegemonic
liberalism, particularly in a scenario inwhich a possible »clash of civilisations«may
become the prevalent narrative, because it ts within a “dynamic-expressive con-
cept of power, which has found access into postmodern theories”63 and matches
a widespread scepticism towards the possibility of a general inter-cultural agree-
ment on the question of human rights and democracy. But as recently as 2008,
62Habermas, ibidem , page 192.
63Habermas, ibidem , page 192.
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Habermas has returned to these reections, following the events of the 2003 Iraq
invasion and the emergence of a visible decline pattern in us global hegemony.
Despite his philosophical-political inclinations still prompting him to think that
realist theories of International Relations do not capture the essence of contempo-
rary reality, Habermas can eventually concede that “under the realist key assump-
tions that justice among nations is fundamentally impossible, while the possible
balance [of power] alone can be achieved through a militarily secured equilibrium
of interest, Carl Schmitt’s Großraum theory still appears presently to oer the best
approximation to the scenario of a desirable world order”.64
is third movement in Habermas’s reading of Schmitt shows a considerable
shi in his understanding of the usefulness of reading Schmitt’s work, even and es-
pecially when the problem of international politics and law, and the issue of world
order, are all taken into account. Habermas seems to have returned to a stage in
which he indirectly acknowledges the power and relevance of Schmitt’s diagno-
sis of world politics, especially its early recognition of the potentially damaging
eects of globalisation processes for the nation state, and the eventual possible
outcomes.65 is convergence on the point of Zeitdignose is similar to these two
theorists’ shared initial diagnosis of the situation of parliamentarism in late capi-
talistic societies. Although Habermas has very dierent normative goals and ideal
orientations, he acknowledges the solidity of Schmitt’s analysis of the world’s situa-
tion when it comes to the contradiction inherent in a world of legally equal states
which nd themselves in extremely dierent conditions, in terms of eciency of
state apparatuses, control of territory and population, and independent manage-
ment of the economy. Schmitt argues indirectly, and would denitely argue today,
that of all states in the world there are only a handful of real ones.66 Habermas’s
investigation into the problematique of world order starts from very similar con-
64Jürgen Habermas, Ach, Europa, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008, page 118.
65See also William E. Scheuerman, Frankfurt School Perspectives on Globalization, Democracy and the Law,
New York: Routledge, 2008, Part 2.
66Cf. Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein
Beitrag zum Reichsbegri für Völkerrecht, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991 [1941], page 59: Nicht alle Völker
sind imstande, die Leistungsprobe zu bestehen, die in der Schaung eines guten modernen Staatsapparates liegt,
und sehr wenige sind einem modernen Materialkrieg aus eigener organisatorischer, industrieller und technischer
Leistungskra gewachsen.
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siderations: the ineciency of today’s organisational models is evident in many
regions of the world; globalisation weakens even the most ecient states; transna-
tional economic phenomena are eroding the political powers of established insti-
tutions, with the consequent loss of a conscious political control on social events,
and even more the possibility of enhancing and protecting democratic political
communities. Habermas appears favourable to the idea of regional (continental)
organisations adopting the task of shaping economic and political life, and recovers
Schmitt’s idea of Großraum — although without imperial implications, precisely
with the aimof preserving at least (1) the existence of a political-institutional dimen-
sion related to actual communities (although broadened) and (2) the possibility of
bringing globalisation phenomena under political control, by updating the ction
of state equality to the contingent reality of today’s world. Nevertheless, what ap-
pears troublesome in Habermas’s view is the role of international law as a solution
for international conicts and the regulation of international political life.67 While
an enhanced process of juridication of international politics is desirable within
the aim of ensuring the global diusion of emancipatory democratic practices and
institutions, it seems also that the same juridication process presupposes the exis-
tence of underlying political entities which are already working in the framework
of modern, participatory, “enlightened” politics. It is dicult to avoid the impres-
sion that the presupposition and the goal of a further international juridication
in the direction indicated by Habermas are indeed overlapping concepts. Further-
more, the acceptance of law as the preferable (or even: the only rational) response
to existing political problems (local or international) is in this case totally depen-
dent upon a previous acceptance of the Habermasian model of discourse democ-
racy (dependent in turn upon the acceptance of his philosophical system). Only in
that case it is possible to avoid the impression that Habermas may be falling again
into the trap of the neutralisation and de-politicisation of the political. Outside
the wholesome acceptance of the Habermasian theory, there is plenty of space for
a scepticism which regards law (as Schmitt did) largely as yet another politically
torn, and inevitably politicised, social domain, and even one at the very centre of
67For an overview of the role of international law in critical theories, see Richard Falk, Mark Jürgensmeyer
and Vesselin Popovski (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Aairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
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political struggles.68 is happens precisely because, in a world in which not every-
one has converted to the idea that authority should be the best argument, produced
in a free and fair (ideal) speech situation, what constitutes the ultimate source of au-
thority for normative orientation (and, within it, law) remains disputed. Habermas
has therefore to struggle in oering a view of the current global political situation
which, while tting the understanding of politics and law as outlined in his theo-
retical work, may also match the pragmatic necessities of policy making. In this
respect, it is dicult to execute the form of judgement Habermas seems to believe
possible, namely a distinction between ‘good’ aspects and ‘bad’ aspects in the idea
of Großraum. Schmitt envisages the Großraum as the translation into the contin-
gent world’s political reality of his basic ideas of political dialectic (friend-enemy)
and the incommensurability between dierent conceptions of justice: namely the
incommensurability of how dierent sources of authority (and law) are conceptu-
alised. Again, this ultimately derives from his particular understandings both of
law as social phenomenon and of the origin and destiny of modern conceptions
of political order. In all this, it is very dicult to distinguish an aspect that can
be viable, even provisionally, for a Habermasian Weltanschauung. e fact that
Habermas appeals to Schmitt in this case can be interpreted as a sign of growing
confusion in the progressivist camp, in relation to the unfolding political realities
of the early twenty-rst century.
4.4 concluding remarks
It is possible to draw some provisional conclusions on the subtopic of Habermas’s
reading of Schmitt. It has been shown thatHabermas’s reading of Schmitt is heavily
indebted to a tradition of negative interpretations of this author, emerging within
the Frankfurt School largely as a consequence ofMarcuse’s 1934 article.ismay be
at the root of a continuing tradition of scepticism and even open hostility towards
68An extensive recent study of international law from a sceptical position is for instance: Joshua Kleinfeld,
“Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law is Law”, in Fordham Law Review, 78 (5),
2010, pages 2451–2530.
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Schmitt within the context of critical theory. On the other hand, however, there
is no convincing evidence, despite Kennedy’s arguments, that Schmitt acted as a
direct source of inspiration for Habermas’s early book on the public sphere.ere
seems to be enough room for manoeuvre, nevertheless, for a reection about the
apparent continuity between the works of such diverse authors — in reference to
the topics covered and the political and legal problems analysed, despite the consid-
erable number of historically very intense years which separate them.is continu-
ity led to Schmitt’s presence in Habermas, but fundamental theoretical dierences
continue to persist, and their reduction as marginal elements appears to be out of
reach.
From the perspective of order, it is however important to capture the essen-
tial misreading of Habermas in relation to his unsuccessful engagement with the
Schmittian political theological argument. Particularly in his direct comment on
Schmitt in Die Schrecken der Autonomie, Habermas appears to have lost sight of
the specic legal-theoretical debates which Schmitt was primarily addressing at
the time he was writing, and only through this distorted perspective is it possible
to associate Schmitt so easily with Right Hegelianism and even political romanti-
cism. is has important consequences, particularly for the theorisation of order,
as in doing so Habermas systematically avoids confrontation with the recovery of
theological narratives within sociological perspectives, which are crucial for a con-
ceptualisation of order, unless on his own terms through the linguistication of the
sacred.
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WEBER , ORDER AND POL IT ICAL THEOLOGY IN
SCHMITT AND HABERMAS
introduction
Continuing from the previous investigation about the relevance of political theol-
ogy in the context of the problem of order (Chapter 1), and the study of the recipro-
cal relations between the two radical perspectives for a conceptualisation of order
as articulated in Chapter 3, this chapter explores the role played by Max Weber in
the denition of Schmitt’s political theology and Habermas’s theory of social ra-
tionalisation respectively, in order to show the existing, albeit somehow indirect,
connections between the two theoretical perspectives.
e link, even biographical, between Weber and Schmitt has been proven
by a number of inuential studies. It can be reected in the articulation of the
Schmittian political theology as a continuation of Weber’s sociological work on
the relation between religion and political economy, particularly in the parallel
between Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Schmitt’s Roman Catholicism and Political
Form. is chapter recapitulates how Habermas’s sociological theory is explicitly
indebted to Weber’s work for the creation of a theory of modernisation as secu-
larisation, but successively questions the way in which Habermas has framed the
social phenomenon of religion, and the intellectual legacy of theology. In Haber-
mas’s major argument for the grounding of a new concept of dialogical rationality,
the secularisation of religion (as linguistication of the sacred) appears to play an
ambiguous role, as both the premise and the conclusion of his overall reasoning.
is ambiguity is chiey reected in the way in which Habermas has responded to
the critiques of theologians.
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As remembered byDuncanKelly,1 a youngHabermas famously claimed at the 1964
Max Weber Conference in Munich that Carl Schmitt ought to be seen as the legit-
imate heir of Max Weber.2 is anecdote has to be correctly framed within the
context of contrasting readings of Weber, substantially oscillating between his por-
trait as a liberal, pro-democratic German patriot who contributed directly to the
writing of the Weimar’s constitution, and that of a precursor of an idea of politics,
and of democratic politics in particular, which would eventually lead to some sort
of legitimation of fascism.3 Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s historical reconstruction was
especially inuential at the time Habermas spoke in Munich, and continued to
be extremely inuential within the tradition of the Frankfurt School, which devel-
oped much of its work in political theory in opposition to Weber (and the Weber-
inspired Parsons), while on the other hand appropriating a signicant number of
elements from his sociological work. e prospected line of continuity between
Weber and Schmitt, which may be envisaged in relation to Weber’s ante litteram
legitimation of fascism and Schmitt’s subsequent adherence to the nsdap, as it has
been argued byWolfgang J.Mommsen, has had lingering eects, certainly reected
in Habermas’s early evaluation ofWeber (and Schmitt), as also in Karl Löwith.4 Ac-
cording to Gary Ulmen, however, the idea that “there exists a logical connection
between Weber and Schmitt” as a consequence of the latter’s membership within
the nsdap “is only an evidence of the unfortunate tendency in post-war Germany,
to write German history and intellectual history concerning theird Reich” as if
this was its “prologue and epilogue.”5
1Duncan Kelly,e State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State in theought of Max Weber,
Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
2e acts of the eenth Soziologentag, containing Habermas’s famous statement have been published in
MaxWeber und die Soziologie heute: Verhandlungen des fünfzehnten deutschen Soziologentages by theDeutsche
Gesellscha für Soziologie ,Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1964.
3Cf. David Beetham,MaxWeber and theeory of Modern Politics, London: Allen andUnwin, 1974, Chapter
5; Wolfgang J. Mommsen,MaxWeber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920, Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1959, pages
177–179.
4Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
5Gary Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert. Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt, Weinheim: vch, Acta
Humaniora, 1991, page 19.
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It is documented that Schmitt metWeber inMunich while serving in the First
Army Corps, and that he attended a number of speeches byWeber about the polit-
ical situation in Germany, as well as speeches along sociological themes.6 So while
there is an undisputed biographical link between the two authors, the relations
between their respective works remain more dicult to assess in depth. e rst
scholar who has worked on this question has been Johannes Winckelmann, who
has researched the relations between the two in the area of legal-political theories of
legitimation and legality. His contribution is particularly relevant for having high-
lighted Schmitt’s critique of Weber’s types of “legal rule” (legale Herrscha),7 de-
spite his questionable understanding ofWeber as interested in the technical formof
the state and its realisation of values in a republican sense, as opposed to Schmitt’s
alleged interest in the factual validity and reception of recognised principles or
“rules of the game”, whereby there would be — according to Winckelmann’s read-
ing of Schmitt — a Hobbesian state of nature outside those rules, something that
can hardly be a faithful reconstruction of Schmitt’s work on the borderline cases of
the state of emergency.8
Winckelmann’s work had also attracted direct comment from Schmitt, partic-
ularly on the point of the opposition within Weber’s work between instrumental
(strategic) rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value rationality (Wertrationalität),
whereby Schmitt, aer recognising the existence of such tension, goes further by
criticising this very division of the concept of rationality, when considering both
the historical conditions in which rationality had to operate at the time the theory
was envisaged, and the general philosophical orientation which Weber showed in
relation to his time. Schmitt argued indeed that “in the face of themodern divisions
of the modern concept of law (Gesetzesbegri ) and the recognition of »economic
legislative dispositions« (Maßnahmegesetze), [and] in the face also of Weber’s own
pessimism, which considered the transition toward sheer instrumental rationality
6Ulmen, ibidem, page 20.
7See JohannesWinckelmann, Legitimität und Legalität inMaxWebers Herrschassoziologie, Tübingen: Mohr
Verlag, 1952 and Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 25.
8Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, pages 24- 25.
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as fatal and unavoidable, the separation between value (Wert) and strategic aim
(Zweck) becomes a desperate postulate (zu einem verzweifelten Postulat)”.9
Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1880–1920 has
been much more important to the reception of Schmitt and his relation to Weber
in post-Second World War Germany.. Mommsen has concentrated on a critique
of Winckelmann’s interpretation of Weber in relation to his theory of (domestic)
political order and the issue of legitimacy/legality. He has criticisedWinckelmann’s
reading of Weber, according to which Weber put forward, or attempted to put for-
ward, a theory of legitimacy (Legimität) grounded on some sort of value-free under-
standing of political and social life, as opposed to Schmitt’s eventual capitulation
to the total contingency of any political order based on decisionism. According to
Mommsen, it was preciselyWeber whowas the rst to envisage the impossibility of
a rational and value-free scientic reection on politics, to elaborate foundational
values, which can only come, according to Mommsen’s interpretation of Weber,
from individuals, particularly charismatic leaders.10 Mommsen argues that “We-
ber has fully consciously not described the way [...] of building up a value-rational
(wertrational) foundation of a democracy of a new kind”.11
Mommsen articulates the view that Schmitt was a “docile disciple” (gelehriger
Schüler) of Weber, bringing Weber’s line of argument to the logical conclusions he
would have reached himself, if it were not for his premature death. However, “in
reality Carl Schmitt has only in a sense radically drawn the conclusions from the
premises which were already built by Weber’s doctrine of legality”.12
Mommsen’s work has been hugely inuential in shaping the interpretation of
Weber’s work in political terms, i.e. re-interpreting his oeuvre in the light of his (re-
constructed) political thought,13 Weber thereby becoming closely associated with
Schmitt and an idea of political legitimacy conducive to the dangers of authori-
tarianism. Gary Ulmen has criticised Mommsen’s position and the eects which
9Quoted by Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 24.
10Mommsen,MaxWeber, page 407; Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 28.
11Mommsen, ibidem, page 412.
12Mommsen, ibidem, page 479.
13Gregor Fitzi,MaxWebers politisches Denken, Konstanz: uvk Verlag, 2004, page 36–39.
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his work has produced in the reception of both Weber and Schmitt, arguing that
Mommsen has produced a simplistic image of the relations between the two. Ul-
men points instead to a much more complex picture where “[Schmitt] has taken
advantage of Weberian ideas for his own goals”,14 while Mommsen has projected
Schmitt back onto Weber, even reaching the extreme conclusion that Schmitt’s fa-
mous thesis “Sovereign is the one who declares the state of exception” is implicit
in Weber’s Economy and Society.15 A more fruitful parallel reading of Weber and
Schmitt leads instead to a re-appreciation of Schmitt’s originality and indepen-
dence, but insists on the continuity of many themes (particularly the theological
and religious) and methodologies (legal and sociological types), which have their
foundations in debatingmodernity, and the possibility of political and sociological
knowledge within it.
In his powerful but little known study of Weber and Schmitt, Gary Ulmen
has envisaged a way of reading the two authors which appears to be based on a
much more comprehensive appreciation of their intellectual context, but also on
the possibly divergent research interests which characterise their oeuvres.e cru-
cial point here is that both Weber and Schmitt have to be situated within an on-
going critical discourse of political economy, stretching back to the work of Marx.
Although admittedly there may be “no continuity between a »Marxist« and a »so-
ciological« [i.e. Weberian] critique”, nor “two sides of the same problem or two
answers to the same question,” nevertheless, in Ulmen’s view, there is the space to
envisage “two dierent questions, in dierent fashions, posed to one and the same
reality. Marx asks how a reality, which he can know (erkennen), may be changed,
while Weber asks how a reality, which he cannot know, can be understood (verste-
hen). In this context Schmitt takes a position somewhere betweenMarx andWeber,
and ask the question, how a concrete situation is to be dealt with (behandeln)”.16
Within this narrative, Schmitt’s position has been chiey reected in his early
works Politicaleology andRomanCatholicism and Political Form, which are both
concernedwith the problemof investigating the foundation of the political order in
14Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 29.
15Ulmen, ibidem, page 29.
16Ulmen, ibidem, page 173.
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modern societies.e apparent dialectical opposition is taken into account as the
starting point of a deeper reection about the re-contextualisation of a sociological-
philosophical assessment of religious ideas, in relation to the understanding of the
economic dimension and its inherent order. In Schmitt words indeed, “the spiri-
tualistic explanation (Erklärung) or material processes and the materialistic expla-
nation of spiritual (geistig) phenomena both try to ascertain causative correlations.
ey set up an opposition of the two spheres and then they dissolve this opposition
again in a nothingness, through the reduction of the one into the other”.17
Ulmen seems to have captured an important dimension in the relations be-
tween Schmitt, Weber and the critique of the political economy, which is arguably
still at the centre of today’s discussion of the problem of order, particularly when
considering critical ir, and especially in relation to the reformulation of critical the-
ories of International Relations as inuenced by Habermas’s work. Ulmen’s main
point is that “Schmitt [...] saw beyond this evident antithesis and looked at the
real synthesis in the »core area« (Zentralgebiet) of the economic (das Ökonomi-
sche) in order to show that the critique of political economy (Kritik der politischen
Ökonomie) had started with political theology or, more precisely, with a critique of
religion progressed over Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthropology to a materialistic con-
ception”, a critique which did not conceal, but rather expressly emphasised, a meta-
physical analogy. And it is in the metaphysical sphere that “Schmitt distances him-
self rst from Marx and then from Weber in a way that meets his own polemical
necessities”. According to Schmitt, “in a critique of the materialistic conception of
history one should proceed so that rst the historical and philosophical meaning
of the word »science« (Wissenscha) are worked out, and not reduced to the »sheer
technicality of natural science«”.18
For Schmitt indeed, Marxism entails a conception of scienticity (Wis-
senschalichkeit) aimed at achieving a method which, with the help of the laws of
nature and a strict deterministic Weltanschauung, would allow the improvement
of the human condition, in a relation similar to those existing between each natu-
17Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und Politische Form, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 2008, originally
published in 1923, page 57
18Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 173.
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ral science discipline and its technical application. But this is only a partial view
of the relation between Marxism and science. Schmitt explains that “when in this
laid the scienticity of socialism, so the leap into the kingdom of freedom would
be a leap into the kingdom of absolute technicity (Technizität). It would be the
old rationalism of Enlightenment and of one of those since the eighteenth century
popular attempts to attain a politics frommathematical and physical precision (Ex-
aktheit)”.19
e key to the relation between science and scientic materialism goes be-
yond this narrow conception of scienticity, and encompasses instead the very idea
of science as it appears in the Hegelian and Hegel-derived Marxist conception of
history, since “precisely the philosophical-metaphysical fascination of Marxist phi-
losophy of history and sociology does not lie in the scienticity of natural sciences
(Naturwissenschalichkeit), but in the fashion bywhichMarx retains the idea of the
dialectical development of human history and observes this as a concrete, unique
and antithetic process generated by a self-producing organic force.20
e essence of Marx’s argument lies instead in the Hegelian goal of the self-
consciousness of mankind, which in Schmitt’s reconstruction of Marxism “will
become conscious of itself, namely through a right knowledge of the social real-
ity (durch eine richtige Erkenntnis der sozialen Wirklichkeit)”. rough this, “con-
sciousness acquires an absolute character. Here it is about a rationalism, which
encompasses in itself the Hegelian evolution and it has in its concreteness an im-
mediateness (Evidenz), whereof the abstract rationalism of the Enlightenment was
not capable”.21
e core point of Marx’s position would therefore lie, in Schmitt’s reading, in
the concept of historicity, provided byHegel’s dialectic rationalism as applied to the
study of history, which allows the man of action to seize the essence of the contem-
porary epoch andmoment. With the help of a dialectical reconstruction of history,
this was held to be scientically possible.e scienticity ofMarxist socialism rests
19Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage, page 66.
20Schmitt, ibidem, page 66.
21Schmitt, ibidem, page 67.
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on the principle of the Hegelian philosophy of history.22 In Schmitt’s own words,
“scienticity means here the consciousness of a metaphysic of development (En-
twicklungsmetaphysik), which makes the consciousness a criterion of the progress.
e formidable poignancy with which Marx always caters from [anything] new to
the bourgeois economy, is then not academic-theoretical fanaticism nor a sheer
technical-tactical interest in the adversary. [is poignancy] is under a wholly
metaphysical coercion (unter einem durch und durch metaphysischen Zwang)”.23
is metaphysical bondage is reected in the reciprocal relation between con-
sciousness and the scientic understanding of reality, whereby “the right conscious-
ness is the criterion for [the ascertainment] that a new stage of the development has
begun. As long as this is not the case, as long as a new epoch is not really in front of
us, the previous epoch. i.e. the bourgeoisie [sic], cannot be correctly known, and
vice versa: [the fact that] it can be correctly understood contains on turn the evi-
dence, that its epoch is at end.e self-guarantee (Selbstgarantie) of the Hegelian,
and also of the Marxist certainty, moves in such a circle”.24
e metaphysical component in Marx, as envisaged by Schmitt, should be
contrasted to Max Weber’s engagement with the problem of the fundamental ori-
entation of his research in the light of its normative goal. As remembered byUlmen,
for Weber his work on the origin of capitalism did not have as a goal the fostering
of capitalism itself, but the “development of humanity (Menschentum), which has
been created by the encounter of religiously and economically conditioned compo-
nents”. Weber’s interest in the denition and the study of the ideal “spirit of capi-
talism” never went beyond the analytical dimension into a political one; indeed all
Weberian concepts, even the “development of humanity”, did not entail any meta-
physical meaning, but were conceived as approximations to historical reality.25
But the most crucial relationship between Marx, Weber and Schmitt lies in
the set of connections found in their critiques of religion, sociology of religion and
political theology. Ulmen envisages a general reading of this set of relations which
22Schmitt, ibidem, page 67.
23Schmitt, ibidem, page 75.
24Schmitt, ibidem, page 75.
25Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 175–176.
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translates political theology into a conceptual sociology (Begrisoziologie). When
normative claims in the transition from a critique of religion to a critique of soci-
ology of religion are abandoned, then the passage to political theology appears to
entail a dierent nature. While the critique of religion “has historically regarded re-
ligion as false consciousness, and the sociology of religion has interpreted it cultur-
ally in the sense of an elective anity”, political theology “explains itmetaphysically,
namely as ultimate cause of a structural analogy between theological and legal con-
cepts”.26 e link between political theology and the sociological investigation of
religion as a direct cause and central concept in the explanation and (possible) cri-
tique of political economy lies ultimately in this new conceptualisation of political
theology and its position relative to sociology and anthropology. When the critique
of religion “transmutes (verwandelt) theology in anthropology and the sociology
of religion considers religious phenomena from an anthropocentric perspective”,
so political theology “transmutes it back the anthropology not in theology, but it
considers anthropocentrism (understood meta-theoretically) as secularisation of
theocentrism”.27
e critique of religion’s repudiation of the ultimate foundation of theology
and its replacement with something else, the distance of the sociology of religion
from the values of believers and from the critics of religion, which broadens as a
consequence of the rationalisation of theological discourse and the consideration
of science as ideology, are both countered by political theology. Politicaleology
makes the metaphysical viewpoint of the critique of religion, namely the idea of
progress, and themethodological error of the sociology of religion, namely the idea
of value neutrality (Wertneutralität).28 e critical and sociological understanding
of the religious phenomenon, particularly in the light of the possible critique of
political economy, which is supposed to derive from its results, “does not need to
assume nor to reject the existence of God, as it concerns itself with the idea of God,
and the latter can only be replaced by another idea”.29
26Ulmen, ibidem, page 176.
27Ulmen, ibidem, page 176.
28Ulmen, ibidem, page 177.
29Ulmen, ibidem, page 177.
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e relation between Weber and Schmitt has to be correctly captured in re-
lation to this problematique, namely the clarication of religious ideas and the
embedded drivers of the rationalisation of religion, which took place historically
through a philosophical tradition of religious critique rst, and through the sociol-
ogy of religion aerwards. e point made by Weber in his work on sociology of
religion appears to be that, eventually, the “tension between the spheres of value of
science and sacred may not be bridged”.30 For Weber, every theology is “intellec-
tual rationalisation of religious salvation (Heilsbesitz). No science (Wissenscha) is
absolutely without presuppositions (voraussetzunglos), and none can give founda-
tion (begründen), for the one who rejects these presuppositions, to its own value
(Wert). But however: every theology adds some specic presuppositions for its
work and consequently for the legitimation (Rechtfertigung) of its own existence.
In dierent sense and range (Sinn und Umfang). For every theology [...] is valid
the presupposition: the world must have a sense (Sinn) — and the question is: how
should it be construed, so that it may be possible to think (denkmöglich)?”31
e dierence between sciences and theologies is normally thatwhile sciences
may content themselves with some sort of foundational philosophical argument,
theologies oen understand revelation to be a presupposition of their very exis-
tence and functioning. But what kind of knowledge is constituted by revelation?
Weber points to this question,settling the discussion between science and theol-
ogy/religion by arguing that revelation-based propositions “lie for theology beyond
what “science” is.ey are no “knowledge” (Wissen), in the currently understood
meaning, but a “have” (Haben).32 ose who do not possess this “quid” may not be
able to replace it with any theology, and even less so with another science.e ten-
sion between religion and intellectual knowledge continuously re-emerges in the
same point, where “rational, empirical understanding has made his way through
the disenchantment of theworld and its transformation into a causalmechanism”.33
30MaxWeber, Schrien 1894–1922, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 2002, page 509.
31Weber, ibidem, page 508.
32Weber, ibidem, page 509.
33Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 178.
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Schmitt has addressed the problem of political theology in several works, and
his oeuvre is lled with theological references, more or less explicitly indicating
the centrality of this topic. But the explicit elaboration of this theme emerges pri-
marily in two publications, both appearing in 1923, namely Politicaleology and
Roman Catholicism and Political Form. ese works represent a break with the
previous, pre-war juvenile production of Schmitt. While still conceiving his work
as eminently legal-theoretical, he turns more explicitly, both in terms of content
and in methodology, towards a sociological analysis of the state and of law. It is
probably no coincidence that this turn in his production and intellectual attitude
towards theoretical work took place aer his encounter with Max Weber. Indeed,
most of Schmitt’s discussion of state and law would revolve primarily, from this
point onwards, around the nature of politics and law in a modern, mechanical, in-
dustrial world engineered according to the narrow rationalism of the technical and
economical social organisation, and the fundamental irreconcilability of the two.
For Schmitt, today’s dominant kind of economic-technical thought “is absolutely
no longer able to perceive any political idea.e modern state seems to have really
become what Max Weber saw in it: a large factory (ein großer Betrieb)”.34
Schmitt’s link to Weber’s work, as well as the essence of Schmitt’s critical re-
ection about the nature of the modern world and the meaning of order in it, is
most explicit in Roman Catholicism and Political Form.is publication has been
clearly written against the background ofWeber’se Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism, although it does not represent a direct critique of it. On the contrary,
Schmitt is keen to accept Weber’s main hypothesis that the sociological ideal type
of the spirit of capitalism cannot be derived from Catholicism, but from the ethic
of certain Protestant sects, particularly Calvinism. Schmitt’s idea here is instead to
complement Weber’s Protestant Ethic, by juxtaposing it with a “metacritical anti-
type”.35 Just as Weber has investigated the origin of capitalism in the Protestant
ethic, so does Schmitt look for the origin of the modern conception of the state
in the tradition of the Catholic Church, particularly in the concept of represen-
34Carl Schmitt, Politischeeologie. Vier kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, third edition, Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot Verlag, 1979, originally published in 1922, page 82.
35Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 180.
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tation and in the creation of modern law and the modern state founded on law
(Rechtsstaat). While in previous works, particularly ine Value of the State and
the Meaning of the Individual [1914], Schmitt had addressed the problematiques
of state and state politics with a philosophical-analytical methodology, he now en-
gages directly with a sociological approach to the problem.
Weber has famously formulated in the Protestant Ethic a theory envisaging
the ideal type of the “spirit of capitalism” as originally arising from an ethic of thri
which derived directly from the ascetic orientation of Calvinism, in turn based on
theological concepts regarding the doctrine of predestination and the role of God’s
grace in salvation. Weber has envisaged this spirit of capitalism as a spirit of ratio-
nalisation of production which, aer apparently losing its connection to the urban
asceticism of the Calvinists, has been transformed into the modern concept of in-
strumental rationality, which animates the organisation of any capitalistic mode of
production.36
Schmitt wrote Roman Catholicism and Political Form with Weber’s work in
mind, organising his essay around the implicit opposition of Catholicism to Protes-
tantism. is opposition is not manifest in Weber. He did not develop his argu-
ment about the Protestant ethic in explicit opposition to the Catholic ethic or the
Catholic attitude towards material wealth and its accumulation, but Catholicism,
for unavoidable historical reasons, constantly remains in the background of his in-
vestigation of Protestantism. While Weber has investigated the protestant origins
of the spirit of capitalism, Schmitt intends to write a sociological study about the
other pillar of the modern world, namely the state. His aim is to trace the form
of the modern state back to the way in which the Catholic Church traditionally
organised and perceived its political function, namely through the preservation of
the Roman conception of law and the consequent rationalism which is embedded
in the theoretical construction of Roman law, through the principle of representa-
36On this aspect see also Joseph W.H. Lough,Weber and the Persistence of Religion: Socialeory, Capitalism
and the Sublime, New York: Routledge, 2006.
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tion and the consequent decisionistic understanding of the political, as ultimately
reected in the dogma of papal infallibility.37
According to Schmitt, the enquiry on the origin of the political form of the
modern state, the Rechtsstaat, has to be traced back necessarily to the Catholic
Church and its balance between contradictory tendencies, which takes the form of
a complexio oppositorum.
In the great history of the Roman Church there is, next to the ethos of
justice, also an ethos of its own power (der eigenen Macht). It is even
aggrandised to it by fame, splendour and honour. e Church wants
to be the bride of Christ; she represents the ruling, dominant and victo-
rious Christ. Its desire for fame and honour is based ultimately on the
idea of representation. It gives birth to the eternal opposition between
justice and glorious splendour.e antagonism lies in the generally hu-
man (liegt im allgemein Menschlichen), although pious Christians have
oen seen in it a form of special evil (Bosheit).38
e complexio oppositorum appears as an earthly compromise between the
moral ideals of justice and the temptations, but also the necessities, of power and
of politics. Crucially for Schmitt, “in the framework of the temporal domain (im
Rahmen des Zeitlichen) the attempt to evil [deeds], which lies in every power, is
certainly eternal, and only in God the opposition of power and [moral] good is
entirely abolished”.39
e Catholic complexio oppositorum, which Schmitt sees as the essence of the
political, is centred on the idea of representation (Repräsentation), the link between
the legal and the political in the form of a connection between the physical person
who exercises a particular authority, and the person or the idea in whose name
this authority is exercised. Authority is intrinsic to the idea of the Political, “be-
37See also Ionut Untea, “A Heretical Politicaleology: Carl Schmitt and the Hobbesian Concept of Representa-
tion”, ine International Journal of Humanities, 6 (2), 2009, pages 93–100.
38Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus, page 53.
39Schmitt, ibidem, page 54.
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cause there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of
persuasion (Überzeugung)”.40
e political power of the Catholic Church is grounded in the “pathos of au-
thority in its full purity”,41 as it does not rely on economic ormilitarymight.is be-
comes particularly relevant in the modern era, characterised as it is by the intense
processes of depoliticisation and of rationalisation in the sense of sheer “mechanisa-
tion” and instrumental rationality.e Church is a legal person (juristische Person),
but in a dierent way than a chartered company, as the Church embodies a “con-
crete, personal representation of a concrete personality” (Persönlichkeit).42 is
has to be contrasted with the mechanistic conception of politics and of economic
organisation in modern society. Schmitt argues that Catholicism is “ultimately po-
litical, as opposed to this absolute economic objectiveness (Sachlichkeit).” Political
means here not the Machiavellian “usage and domination of known social and in-
ternational power factors”, which makes of politics “a sheer technique, as it isolates
a single, exceptional moment of political life.e political mechanics has its own
laws, and Catholicism, exactly like any other historical greatness engaged in poli-
tics, will be captured by them”.43
In Schmitt’s narrative, the political dimension of the Catholic Church has al-
ways refused, nevertheless, to be completely absorbed by these laws and the mech-
anistic consequences of their implementation. e Church represents something
which lies beyond the persons who exercise authority in this world. In general, the
very concept of representation is a relationship: a person and an authoritative per-
son or an idea which, as soon as it is represented, is equally personied. God, or
the people (das Volk), or abstract ideas like freedom and equality “are a thinkable
content of a representation, but not [economic] production and consumption. Rep-
resentation gives to the person of the representative a dignity of her own, because
the representative of a higher value cannot be without value (wertlos)”.44
40Schmitt, ibidem, page 28.
41Schmitt, ibidem, page 31.
42Schmitt, ibidem, page 31.
43Schmitt, ibidem, page 27.
44Schmitt, ibidem, page 36.
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e political dimension of Catholicism, intrinsically linked to representation,
is informed by a kind of rationalism which appears to be the opposite of the me-
chanical rationalism of the modern world, as highlighted by Weber and his so-
ciological analysis of modernity. For Schmitt, modern rationalisation is essen-
tially equal to mechanisation, depoliticisation and de-humanisation. e reduc-
tion of the political to the economic-rational, equally shared by the capitalist and
the Marxist-Leninist, is antithetic to the rationalism of the Catholic tradition, as
the rationalism of the RomanChurch “encompassesmorally the psychological and
sociological nature of the human and does not concern, like industry and technol-
ogy, the domination and the exploitation of matter.e Church has its own ratio-
nality. [...] EvenMaxWeber himself declares that the [ancient] Roman rationalism
lives in the Church [...] is rationalism lies in the institutional and is essentially
legal”.45
Schmitt’s understanding of Catholic rationalism, which is the same rational-
ism animating the tradition of Roman law, has to be contrasted against the tera-
tological degeneration of the technical-economic rationalism of modern society.
e consequence of this widespread economic thought implies a marginalisation
of the political and the legal, and the disappearance of representation in its authen-
tic meaning. Economic thought leads to the idea that public life is able to regulate
itself automatically through public opinion, namely by private people, organised
around the press, which is also grounded in the private property system. Inter-
estingly, Schmitt identies the demise of both the political-representative and the
legal in the ascent of bourgeois society, andwith this the beginning of the degenera-
tion of themodern state (as already portrayed in hisCrisis of Parliamentary Democ-
racy) reected in the carving out of ever growing spheres of non-intervention on
the part of the state in the legal order of bourgeois society, the rst of these spheres
being religious life.46 Schmitt identies a constitutive link between the public and
the private sphere for the permanence of the theological in the secular and the de-
politicised, whereby the value of the religious has been transposed, with a whole
set of political consequences, from the public to the private (faith as a private fact),
45Schmitt, ibidem, page 23.
46Schmitt, ibidem, page 47.
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but in so doing this very private domain has absorbed qualities which were proper
to the sacred. Schmitt argues on this point that “wherever one puts the religious, it
will show everywhere its absorbent, absolute-making (verabsolutierend) eect, and
when the religious is the private, so consequently vice versa is the private religiously
sanctied. Private property is therefore sacred, precisely because it is private.is
so far little conscious relation (Zusammenhang) explains the sociological evolution
of the modern European society. In it too, there is a religion, namely the religion
of the private; without it, the building of this social order would collapse.”47
While Weber has found the antecedent of the spirit of modern capitalism in
the ascetic practices of certain Protestant sects, so Schmitt has investigated the in-
stitution which is complementary to capitalism, namely the modern state, from
the same genealogical perspective: taking into account, as a starting point of his
investigation, the results of Weber’s work, which he intended to complement.e
origin of the political, and of modern politics in the form of the state, lies in the
legal tradition of the Catholic Church and the complexio oppositorum which con-
tains an idea of representation: establishing a profound identication between on
the one hand the representative as a physical person and on the other the authority
which emanates from the entity he represents. Schmitt opposes this kind of Persön-
lichkeit to the Unpersönlichkeit of the mechanical relations issuing from technical
and economic thought and rationalism.e latter comes from the privatisation of
the political, which disappears in its true essence as part of state life, and derives
from the individualism of the Protestant theological position.e Protestant ethic
is conducive to a rationalistic-economic logic of accumulation and acquisition (Er-
werb), theCatholic ethic is one of synthesis between contradictory tendencies (com-
plexio oppositorum), conducive to the politicisation of life through representation
and authority, and to decisionism (Entscheidung).
On the one hand therefore, Schmitt continues Weber’s work in the sense of
highlighting the importance of theology, and its permanence under disguised terms
in the crucially important niches where economic rationalism cannot ultimately
defeat it (the sphere of the absolutely private, and therefore sacred), but also in
47Schmitt, ibidem, page 48.
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the still nominally valid concept of authority (which may re-emerge in the state
of exception) and the residual autonomous rationalism of law. Both Weber and
Schmitt’s work underscored the ineluctable importance of the theological concep-
tions that had shaped human behaviour at the social, economic, and political level
and which indirectly continue to do so. Schmitt, however, positions himself in an
anti-Kantian stance to the very idea of representation as the source of political au-
thority and the legitimation of political (and legal) order. Weber has followed the
Kantian idea that the form of the state arises from the objectivisation of the idea
of law,48 although he is then largely unable to explain the origin of the political
values which are supposed to be at the very core of political construction, and of
sovereignty: the relation between this Kantian conception of the state and a model
of political authority coming from charismatic leadership. Schmitt has indirectly
revealed the untenability of Weber’s contradictory position. e neo-Kantian at-
tempt to overhaul a subjective concept of sovereignty with the establishment of an
objective one has to be seen as an attempt to de-personalise the relation between
idea and form, to damage the authentic essence of legal thought and to deny the
decisionistic power of the legitimate authority. e very attempt to formalise the
law in an objective sense represents for Schmitt the creation of a counterpart to the
economic principle of self-regulation, which has to be rejected precisely against the
background of the sociological, genealogical study of the origin of modern, bour-
geois society.
5.2 weber and habermas
In this part the relations between Weber and Habermas will be highlighted, with
particular attention dedicated to the role played byWeber’s studies in the sociology
of religion for the Habermasian tca, which appears to be central to Habermas’s
argument, but also complex and eventually contradictory. In fact, as Habermas
has usedWeber’s sociological investigation in order to formulate an extremely am-
bitious theoretical systematisation of the rationality/rationalisation problematique,
48Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert, page 211.
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his treatment of the issue of religion and theology, despite its centrality, has suered
from a possibly over-simplistic understanding of those phenomena. An analysis of
the relations between Habermas and the theologians, both in the form of the use
made by theologians of the tca, and of the theological critique advanced against
the tca, reveals thatHabermas’s emphasis on a new conception of rationality based
on a science of language may have compromised a comprehensive understanding
of the religious and led to the failure of explaining secularisation, which oddly ap-
pears both as a input and as an output of the described process of rationalisation.
is appears to be even more visible in the context of the current “resurgence” of
religion.
Most of the current interest in Max Weber still revolves around his study of
the transition towards modernity as a process of enhanced rationalisation. Pecu-
liar to Weber’s contribution is the way in which he highlighted the achievements
of modernisation as well as the problematic and contradictory aspects of this very
process, by embracing a sceptical attitude towards modernity itself. But this scepti-
cism was never powerful enough to prompt a deconstructive rejection of the idea
of science (Wissenscha), which he tried to reformulate in relation to the social
domain.
Weber’s ambivalent relation to modernity as rationalisation was inuenced
by the Nietzschean n-de-siècle critique, and it prepared the ground, in a lucid and
analytical way, as opposed to the visionary and expressionistic style adopted by Ni-
etzsche, to the many issues characteristic of twentieth century sociology and phi-
losophy, namely the abandonment or re-formulation of the very idea of rationality,
the reection of the nature of power and legitimacy, the place and foundation of
morality within modernity.
Weber has an established relation to critical theory, despite its controversial
andmultifaceted reception. In the post-war reconstruction of critical theory in the
line of the Frankfurt School tradition, he has played a pivotal role in the discussion
of the destiny of the current age in its various manifestations, but with a particu-
lar focus on the elaboration of philosophical and sociological models which have
become central to the reconstruction of rationality.
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In the context of the Frankfurt School, Weber has been regarded with both
admiration and suspicion. On the one hand,Weber’s sociological thought has been
characterised, precisely as that of Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, by
the diagnosis of a modernity which encapsulates and possibly chokes humanity
with ever-incremental forms of domination through bureaucratic control, as a re-
ex of pervasive rationalisation.e way in which this process has been conceptu-
alised is nevertheless dierent, as Weber indicated the prevalence of instrumental
rationality as the key cause of this situation, and in the concrete manifestation as
mechanisation and bureaucratisation, to be contrasted against other, and still the-
oretically possible forms of rationality, which should be retained as the valuable as-
pect ofmodernity andmodernisation.e rst generation of the Frankfurt School,
particularly aer the SecondWorldWar, collapsed themeaning of instrumental ra-
tionality with rationality tout court, and tended towards a general condemnation
of the whole process.49
e suspicion came theoretically from the general orientation ofWeberian so-
ciology as counterargument to the orthodox Marxist model, and politically from
Weber’s advocacy of a constitutional reform of the German state in the line of a
liberal-authoritarian model. While Weber has been perceived as the bourgeois so-
ciologist par excellence, even as some sort of “bourgeoisMarx” (Lukács), the power
and richness of his theoretical work have made inevitable an in-depth engagement
with his ideas. is is particularly true with regard to the Weberian description
of the “ideal type” of the spirit of capitalism, which has its core structure in the
concept of rationalisation as the unfolding of the above mentioned aimed ratio-
nality (Zweckrationalität), which the Frankfurt School will later properly re-label
as instrumental rationality. In both cases, the two concepts converge towards the
clarication of capitalism as an apparently rationalising phenomenon, which is sup-
posed to eliminate pre- and non-rational forms of social and economic organisa-
tion, while in reality capitalism itself appears with closer scrutiny as an irrational
enterprise, a circular accumulation of capital for the sake of even more accumula-
tion. It is arguable that Weber became relevant to the Frankfurt School precisely
49Seyla Benhabib, “Modenity and the Aporias of Criticaleory” in Jay Bernstein (ed.) e Frankfurt School.
Critical Assessments, London: Routledge, 1994, st edition 1981, page 116.
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in the elaboration of an account of the intrinsic irrationality of capitalism, comple-
mentary to that advanced by Marx.50
Weber envisaged a way in which it was possible to re-conceptualise the role
of culture and of ideas generally without necessarily reducing the whole set of intel-
lectual phenomena to a mere superstructure of material conditions, while oering
on the other hand a possible link to psychoanalytical explorations of mass soci-
eties and therefore, through a reception of Freud, into a new formulation of criti-
cal theory. Weber has played a role as the provider of analytical frameworks and
methodological tools which the rst Frankfurt School intended to adapt to their
core normative goal, particularly clear in Horkheimer and Marcuse’s attempts to
re-formulate a concept of emancipation which may overcome the perceived limits
of earlier stages of emancipatory thought.51
e experiment of a critical theory along the lines of Horkheimer’s Marx-
ism eventually faltered in the face of the rise of fascism and the intellectual con-
sequences of the Second World War and the Holocaust, leaving behind a heritage
of extreme pessimismwith regard to the very possibility of organising a theory and
praxis of emancipation based on rationalisation: through a new understanding, a
new conceptualisation, of reason itself. In this senseHorkheimer andAdorno’se
Dialectic of Enlightenment surrenders to the Nietzschean radically pessimistic view
of modernity and post-Enlightenment philosophy, and consequently they seem to
yield to Weber’s existential Angst in his perspective on the modern age.52
As alreadymentioned in a previous chapter, Habermas stands out in this land-
scape as the one who has attempted a wide-ranging, ambitious and comprehensive
synthesis of the contradictions inherent to the modern age with a view to rescuing
the heritage of the Enlightenment by re-working the meaning of rationality, and
by systematising the sociological interplay between philosophical conceptions of
50Cf. Held, Introduction to Criticaleory, op. cit., pages 64–66; Martin Jay,Dialectical Imagination: AHistory
of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pages
259–260.
51See John Abromeit,Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
52Jürgen Habermas, “e Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment”,
in New German Critique, 26, 1982, pages 13–30.
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rationality and the shaping of modern society. In doing this, Habermas’s proposed
theory of communicative action, which assumes the double role of reconceptu-
alising as rationalisation past eorts to grasp modernisation and of proposing a
way forward, nds its starting point precisely in the appreciation, critique and re-
establishment of central Weberian themes. In the very summarisation of his over-
all argument in the tca, Habermas53 refers toWeber’s work in order to focalise the
main object of his reection, and his main thesis. In Habermas’s reading, Weber
had indeed conceived most of his mature work in an attempt to answer the ques-
tion of why nowhere outside Europe the development of science, art, state politics
and the economic organisation of the society took the path of rationalisation, as it
happened in the West, where this transformation occurred along the line of com-
pelling, necessary causes from the perspective of rational action, rational conduct
of life and rationalized world-images (rationales Handeln, rationale Lebensführung,
rationale Weltbilder).54 is question can be rephrased as the general goal in We-
ber’s theoretical work, namely the achievement of an explanation (Erklärung) of
Western rationalism.55 e answer to this question constitutes per se the construc-
tion of a whole sociology. And the formulation of a system of sociology is precisely
the aim of Habermas’s tca, as he intends to demonstrate how the Western path of
modernisation as rationalisation has systematic causes (as opposed to contingent).
Habermas recognises in his tca that Weber has correctly captured the three as-
pects in which any sociology with socio-theoretical claims must be developed if it
is to explore the problem of rationality, namely the meta-theoretical, the method-
ological and the empirical.56 He explicitly recognises that his eorts in the theory
of sociology can be largely congured as a re-appraisal ofWeber’s initial arguments
about rationalisation, which had then been neglected by professional sociology.57
Habermas has therefore dedicated extensive analysis toWeber’s sociology, not
only in relation to the mentioned concepts of rationalisation and modernisation
within a meta-theoretical reection, but also to the way in which these have gen-
53Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Volume 1, pages 22–23.
54Habermas, ibidem, page 225; Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, page 9.
55Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, pages 21–22.
56Habermas, ibidem, page 23.
57Habermas, ibidem, page 24.
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erated the set of social phenomena which famously Weber subsumed under the
label of disenchantment (Entzauberung).is is especially relevant for Habermas’s
overall argument, not only in relation to the tca but also in terms of broader his-
torical and political-theoretical claims, since he understands Weber as “the only
one among the classics of sociology, who broke with the premises of historical-
philosophical thought as well as with the fundamental assumptions of evolution-
ism, while at the same he wanted to grasp the modernisation of the old European
society as the result of a universal-historical process of rationalisation (Ergebnis
eines universalgeschichtlichen Rationaliserungsprozesses)”.58
In the rst volume of the tca, Habermas’s main preoccupation is that of work-
ing out a concept of rationality and rationalisation which would enable him to re-
cast the Weberian narrative of modernisation as rationalisation within a dierent
theoretical perspective, while maintaining most, if not all, the original empirical
and sociological ndings. e new theoretical perspective which Habermas pro-
poses intends to re-establish rationalisation as something broader than the deni-
tion given by Weber, namely as the “growing theoretical domination of reality by
means of increasingly precise abstract concepts, [...] the methodical achievement
of a particular, given practical aim through ever-increasingly precise calculation of
the adequate means.”59
In Habermas’s reading, Weber’s conceptualisation of rationality can be
grasped as a fusion of elements which may nevertheless still be analytically dif-
ferentiated. e rst dierentiation is between rationality in relation to the theo-
retical and practical mastery of reality.e focus in Weber’s work remains mainly
concentrated on practical rationality, which enables control of the environment by
orientation to ends, means and secondary results, but it cannot simply be reduced
to sheer purposive/instrumental rationality, as it entails a more complex dimen-
sion.60 Habermas is able to break down the instrumental rationality into its techni-
cal dimension and in the rationality of evaluating and choosing means in relation
58Habermas, ibidem, page 207.
59Weber inGesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (1963), quoted by Habermas,eorie des kommunika-
tiven Handelns, page 239.
60Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, pages 239 ss.
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to a certain end. Practical rationality includes value rationality, consisting of the
selection of the value which informs the purpose of the social action. Practical ra-
tionality is therefore dierentiated into the three perspectives of employing means,
setting means and being oriented to values.61 More generally, practical reason’s
conditions are fullled only with a combination of purposive and value rationality.
ese two kinds of rationality can work independently.
Habermas’s overall argument in the tca, as hemoved away from the premises
of Weberian sociology and sociological theory, becomes at this point dependent
upon a critique of Weber and the construction of an argument which, while re-
covering the sociological ndings of Weber in terms of his results in what can be
called intellectual historical sociology, goes beyond the aws that theHabermasian
critique is able to highlight in the structure of the Weberian argument. Without
going again into the details of Habermas’s reconstruction of dialogical reason as a
fusion of theory of language and pragmatic philosophy, it is important instead to
focus on the way in which he has explained Weber’s concept of rationality as par-
tial. ForHabermas, “Weber derives such of concept [of rationality] from structures
of consciousness that nd expression not directly in actions and forms of life, but
primarily in cultural traditions, in symbol systems”.62
e way in which Weber has conceptualised rationalisation is primarily re-
ected in the twin processes of “systematisation of worldviews” (Systematisierung
der Weltbilder) and “the inner logic of value spheres” (Eigenlogik der Wertsphären).
e importance given by Weber to these processes is central in both Weber and
Habermas’s argument, as the latter largely intends to re-organise the samematerial
around a theoretically enhanced denition of rationality and therefore of rational-
isation. It is not surprising that, as Weber put the study of symbolic systems of reli-
gions at the centre of this theoretical investigation, particularly revealed religions
of salvation, so Habermas as well becomes primarily concerned with the rational
understanding and the sociological systematisation of religious categories in order
to understand modernisation as the rationalisation of traditional worldviews (life-
61Habermas, ibidem, page 244.
62Habermas, ibidem, page 247.
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worlds in Habermasian terms).is systematisation of traditional worldviews can
present itself under the double aspect of formalisation, scientic systematisation
and professional specialisation, as in the case of the legal studies, which do repre-
sent probably the earlier form of rationally systematised normative lifeworld, or
an aspect of fullling “the requirements of a modern understanding of the world,
which categorically presupposes the disenchantment of the world.” is double
process lies at the core of the transformation towards modernity in the form of a
formal-operational reworking of the elements of tradition, although it is not iden-
tical to modernisation, as rationalisation in formal and operational terms may be
present in the intellectual organisation ofmetaphysical arguments or belief systems,
as in the case of theology.63 All in all, Habermas interprets Weber’s rationality as a
concept he has formulated in his investigations into historically dened structures
of consciousness, namely as emerging from personality and culture,64 but at the
same time recognises that Weber himself had already seen, beyond this cultural-
ist position, the “universal signicance and validity” of Western rationalism at the
level of methodological reection.65
e illustrated account of rationality put forward by Weber constitutes the
starting point of Habermas’s reection on the processes of modernisation as ra-
tionalisation, where modernisation assumes the form of secularisation, i.e. the
progressive abandonment of religious/metaphysical Weltbilder in intellectual dis-
cussions aimed at shaping and legitimising social and political orders.
Habermas is particularly concerned with the redenition of a rationality con-
cept which would enable a dierent account of the processes of rationalisation.
Habermas correctly recognises and acknowledges the fundamental scepticism wh-
ich animates Weber in relation to basic choices of value rationality. is feature
of Weber’s thought, which appears to be the sociological projection of Nietzsche’s
philosophical perspectivism, is especially problematic as it forms the core, in the
realm of sociological studies, of a possibly anti-modern attitude which can consti-
63Habermas, ibidem, page 248.
64Habermas, ibidem, page 252.
65Habermas, ibidem, page 253.
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tute the theoretical foundation for an anti-modern intellectual and political praxis
of a reactionary nature.
Within this perspective, the way in which Habermas has assessed the role
of religious traditions in their impact upon the construction of the collective nor-
mative orientations underpinning social and political orders, becomes rather com-
plex. On the one hand, Habermas’s concentration on the reconstruction of a ra-
tionality concept which distances itself from a Weberian culturalist model should
lead towards a corresponding reconstruction of the normative, and even ethical
discourses, which are based on procedural rules rather than on adherence to tra-
dition and its metamorphoses. Rationality in this sense has been reformulated by
Habermas as the inherent quality of social action aimed at intersubjective commu-
nication, which proceeds through constant verication of knowledge claims. Ratio-
nality therefore does not dier in dierent cultural contexts because of historical
and cultural preconditions, but because of dierent ways in which, in principle,
the process of verication can be carried out. On the other hand, however, ra-
tionality has to be formulated as the concept which enables rationalisation as the
social/historical phenomenon, and it is in the task of the theorist to produce narra-
tives of historical transformations of modernisation which may be coherent with
the theoretical model.
Habermas begins by accepting the bulk of Weber’s account of modernisation
as rationalisation, and in particular rationalisation of traditional (metaphysical and
religious) worldviews, raising critical remarks on the point of a reductionist con-
ceptualisation of rationality in Weber, which nevertheless does not invalidate We-
ber’smain narrative about the establishment of the keymodern social features (cap-
italism and the state). However, for Habermas this very narrative needs to be ex-
panded: whileWeber has concentrated his attention on processes of rationalisation
taking place in traditional cultures exclusively under the aspect of ethical rational-
isation, Habermas intends to introduce a more complex analysis of the problem.
As he portrays modernity culturally as a time of the gradual but constant dieren-
tiation and divergence of dierent spheres of knowledge (and of rationalisation),
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namely along the lines of the three Kantian Critiques66 in the direction of science,
ethics and aesthetics, so does he intend to describe how the process of modernisa-
tion as rationalisation is reected in a cognitivemodernisation, not just an ethical
one.is allows Habermas to twist Weber’s argument in a very dierent direction:
Weber seems to be pointing at the possibility that societies may be animated by
dierent forms of rationality, rather than giving an account of the hierarchical dif-
ferentiation of societies nding themselves at dierent stages of (the same) rational-
isation. Habermas argues instead for “a conception of rationality that will permit
judgements about how rational social arrangements are”.67 In order to promote
this argument, he investigates the distinction between mythic and modern soci-
eties, where the distinctive trait of modernity lies precisely in the abovementioned
dierentiation of “value spheres” (Wertsphären). On the contrary, themain feature
of non-modern, mythic societies is that they do not produce such distinctions, and
they fail to do so precisely because they confuse language and world, while mod-
ern societies operate such a distinction, which crucially allows them not to confuse
“reordering sentences” with “reordering the world”.68
It is now clear why the understanding of Habermas’s account of social and po-
litical action, as well as of political order, is crucially dependent on Weber, whose
main arguments are re-formulated into a more comprehensive theoretical scheme
in order to explain themodern phenomenon, and the centrality of religion, mythic
societies and metaphysics, which form the starting point of Habermas’s reection.
His engagement with religion and particularly with Christian theology is impor-
tant to understanding the dicult problems which this approach contains.
5.3 habermas and theology
Habermas’s work, well before the publication of the comprehensive tca in the early
1980s, has attracted the attention of scholars of religious studies and theologians.
66Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs, page 9 ss.
67Nicholas Adams, Habermas andeology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, page 126.
68Habermas,eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, page 80 ss.
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is is mostly due to the perceived nature of religious beliefs and traditions as a
form of intersubjective communication, as well as to the historical and sociologi-
cal account of secularisation/modernisation which Habermas’s critical theory puts
forth. Particularly on this rst point it is important to note that a decade-long dia-
logue between Habermas and the theologians has taken place, whereby a number
have attempted to elaborate theological concepts based on the theory of commu-
nicative action, which developed largely in the context of the re-discovery and re-
denition of theology itself as scientia pratica.69
Maureen Juncker-Kenny has identied various ways in which what may be
called practical theology has engaged with Habermas’s tca.e rst one concerns
that strand of theological thought, which has “realized the priority of a practical
faith in God’s self-communication”, oen in connection with feminist and libera-
tion theologies, and where “orthopraxis became the new criterion to balance and
test orthodoxy”.70 eologians like Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz and
Helmut Peukert have seen the possibility of using critical theory in order to ap-
proach the problem of political power in a dierent way, with critical insights en-
abling theology “to examine the basic conditions of agency to nd out whether
there could be any capability for transformative, innovative action”.71 Interestingly,
those theologians have pointed out the limitedness of Habermas’s theory in that
it concentrates on a concept of solidarity and consensus-reaching which includes
the present and the future only, but excludes the past, which is instead to be re-
considered as the foundation of a sort of anamnestic solidarity (Peukert), and the
privileged locus for the creation of an authentic critical theory, when the past is
considered as the repository of past memories of suering (Metz).
e other directions which Juncker-Kenny indicates as important areas of re-
ception of Habermas’s tca are the various sub-disciplines of practical theology, i.e.
thosemostly concerning pastoral care and theological education. A last interesting
direction is the one concerned with the translation of theological proposition into
69Maureen Junker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, London and New York: T & T Clark/Continuum, 2011,
page 7.
70Junker-Kenny, ibidem, page 7.
71Junker-Kenny, ibidem, page 8.
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ethical principles. Here authors like Andres Lob-Hüdepohl, Hille Haker and again
Johannes Metz have addressed the issue of the foundations of Habermas’s univer-
salist dialogical ethics — based on reciprocal recognition and on communicative
action, given that these may be considered insuciently grounded in actual hu-
man experiences and therefore exclude possibilities and valuable elements which
Habermas has not considered or has deliberately le outside his theory of morality.
Andreas Lob-Hüdepohl72 has pointed out the inadequacy of a theory on commu-
nicative action in elaborating the ethical dimension of the spontaneous oering
of opportunities to the other, even without expecting reciprocity.73 Hille Haker74
has instead criticised Habermas for not taking into account the problem of sub-
jective identity in relation to discussions of moral questions, highlighting as “the
question of identity arises rst at the level of ‘ethical’ evaluations of what one con-
siders as ‘good’ before these judgements become the matter of justication by the
standard of universalizability”.75 Expanding the point briey mentioned above, ad-
vanced by Johannes Metz on the role of past memories of suering as a starting
point of a critical theory, the same theologian (Metz 1996) explores the possibility
of democratic consensus withinmodern society in relation to the presence and the
possible contribution of social institutions, which Habermas would regard as the
embodiment of traditional lifeworlds, especially religious institutions.76 is point
is answered positively, as religious institutions are conceptualised byMetz as those
“which understand themselves as accumulated memories, which keep a reservoir
of memory accessible that is able to structural diuse, communicatively untame-
able lifeworlds”.77 Metz’s idea of the role traditional institutions may play in a mod-
ern society organised around a cognitive-dialogical consensus, as in Habermas’s
theory, has anticipated a move which Habermas himself has successively made in
72Andreas Lob-Hüdepohl, Kommunikative Vernun und theologische Ethik, Freiburg: Universitätsverlag,
1993.
73Junker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, page 30.
74Hille Haker, “Kommunitarische kritik an der Diskursethik”, in Ethik und Unterricht, 5, 1994, pages 12–18.
75Junker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, page 33.
76Johannes B. Metz, “Monotheismus und Demokratie. Über Religion und Politik auf dem Boden der Moderne“,
in Jürgen Manemann, Demokratiefähigkeit (Jahrbuch Politischeeologie I), Münster: lit Verlag, 1996, pages
39–52.
77Junker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, page 35.
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his reconsideration of current societies as “post-secular”, in the aermath of the
resurgence of religion from the mid of 1990s.
Habermas not only attracted the attention of theologians and sociologists of
religion who saw potential applications of the tca in their respective elds: he
was also criticised for philosophical positions which seemed to threaten the whole
enterprise of theology and its contribution to modern cultural life.
Habermas’s well know reformulation of a theory of progress (although not
necessary, and not intended as an explicit philosophy of history) through a strati-
cation of the social process of learning, conceptualises, as already illustrated, meta-
physical and theological explanations of reality as intermediate phases, which may
be overcome by further critical practices leading towards a fully post-metaphysical
age, in which the role of philosophy is re-formulated as that of an exegetic-hermen-
eutic work but is always tasked with preserving the unity of reason in the various
sciences.is formulation of a new era and a new philosophy (post-metaphysical)
has attracted critics who saw on the one hand an excessive condence in the very
idea that a paradigm shi from the philosophy of consciousness to a philosophical
science of language can successfully accomplish such a dramatic cultural change,
or that it may be feasible because of its inherent contradictions, and on the other
that such a transition would occur only at the cost of leaving behind, ignoring, and
losing, important elements of the “unspoken” which are nevertheless constituent
ingredients of the human condition. Both critiques seem to converge towards the
point that Habermas, despite his initial commitment to avoiding naturalistic ten-
dencies which have been proper to the philosophy of consciousness and which
would be one of the key elements to understanding the failures of previous critical
attempts, falls back into the mistake of naturalism himself.
Michael eunissen78 analyses Habermas’s defence ring against the risk of
the hypostatisation of nature, i.e. of reifying the foundation of subjectivity. is
defence seems to be established in Habermas’s rejection of theMarxian distinction
between labour and interaction as the two constitutive elements of social action,
78Michaeleunissen, “Society and History: A Critique of Critical eory” in P. Dews (ed.), Habermas. A
Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell), 1999, pages 241–271.
258
5.3 habermas and theology
which ought instead to be dierentiated along the model of Kantian categories
of the transcendental subject; the same Kantian theme is used in relation to the
“knowledge-guiding interests” when they are introduced as providing the “condi-
tions of possible objectivity” as opposed to “particular interests”. eunissen con-
siders all these elements to reect Habermas’s stated will to exclude naturalistic
tendencies, as there “can be no place for an objectivistic ontology of nature in a
picture which portrays the being of every entity as constituted by a transcendental
subject”.79 However,eunissen then highlights how Habermas has successively
interpreted “both objective and subjective nature in a way in which nature wins
out over history”,80 namely in his anchoring the transcendental achievements of
the subject once again in an objective nature of the human species and its “natural
history”. According toeunissen’s reading ofHabermas’s idea of subjective nature,
“nature creeps upward into the subject from its base, eventually objectifying it from
the inside... Nature penetrates the very activities of consciousness, and petries the
transcendental horizon of world constitution into what Habermas so oen refers
to as a ‘frame of reference’, which is inherently something static, [...] which man
carries around him, like a snail its shell.”81
Despite Habermas’s attempts to overcome the problems emerging in a phi-
losophy of consciousness in relation to the issue of reication through naturalistic
tendencies,eunissen’s critique points at the very limited, if any, success in achiev-
ing this goal, thus casting important doubt upon the very idea that a philosophical
shi from consciousness to language may be the decisive move in overcoming the
problems of twentieth century philosophy.
DieterHenrich82 has reiterated the critique of naturalistic tendencies inHaber-
mas, although his argument appears instead centred on the concept of the lifeworld.
e essence of Henrich’s critique, Henrich being favourable to the preservation of
the project of modernity, is that Habermas is trying to rescue modernity with the
wrong means, namely by uncritically accepting much of the framework of the phi-
79eunissen, Society and History, page 253; Juncker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, page 51.
80Juncker-Kenny, ibidem, page 51.
81eunissen, Society and History, page 254.
82Dieter Henrich, “What is Metaphysics — what Modernity?” in Peter Dews (ed.), op. cit., pages 291–319.
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losophy of language. He particularly sees this in the way in which Habermas uses
the concepts of lifeworld in an “unproblematic” way. e point here is less direct
than the one advanced byeunissen, in that Henrich does not blame Habermas
for open naturalistic bias, but he remarks how Habermas does not engage with
this problematique in an explicit way when it comes to the articulation of his the-
ory of society, by considering the concepts and terms of philosophy of language
as if they were unproblemantic, while they continuously depend on interpretation
and reconstructions. is has for theological thought two implications: rst, that
the relations between the self and the other are more complex than what emerges
from the discussion of linguistic-sociological categories. As Henrich argues, “the
self-understanding of human beings leads to conicts between equally convincing
self-descriptions [which] force us to seek some more comprehensive dimension
in which these conicts could nally be resolved, one which would make possi-
ble a self-description which reconciled the primary self-description”.83 e science
of language and its philosophical reformulation by Habermas cannot capture the
entirety of these processes, which may occur at dierent levels.
Secondly, Habermas’s idea of a lifeworld which appears per se as complete,
and in which everything has found its answer, becomes problematic for the theolo-
gians, who are committed to the openness of reason in order to defend the very
idea that human history is the unfolding history of its salvation by God, and there-
fore there cannot be a domain of reason which we regard as complete until the
completion of human history with its ultimate salvation.84
5.4 the resurgence of religion
In the last two decades, the in some ways unexpected comeback of religion has
posed questions which demanded a new conceptualisation of the role of religious
beliefs within Western societies, as the (apparently) simple dichotomy between
83Dieter Henrich, “What is Metaphysics”, op. cit., pages 296–297.
84Junker-Kenny, Habermas andeology, pages 55–56.
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religious-mythic and secular-modern societies appears less convincing.85 Haber-
mas’s position has been famously framed within the idea of post-secular societies,
i.e. social settings which have seen a return of interest in religious ideas but with-
out having amajor impact on the fundamentally modern orientation of the society.
Even more, Habermas argues that a postsecular society is the one in which “reli-
gious communities continue to exist in a context of ongoing secularisation”, and he
has articulated a view arguing for the separation of the theory of modernity from
secularisation theory.86 From the social and political perspective, Habermas has
rehearsed the liberal argument of the secular, liberal state which arises from com-
petition with religious worldviews but at the same time recognises the religious
freedom of their citizens, both individually and as religious communities. is
freedom is extended to the public sphere, in the form of the recognised possibility
of putting forth arguments in collective discussion in the form of religious argu-
ments. For Habermas, “insofar as they act in their role as citizens, secularized
citizens may neither fundamentally deny that religious convictions may be true
nor reject the right of their devout fellow-citizens to couch their contributions to
public discussions in religious language”.87
Despite this opening towards religion in terms of social practice, at a cognitive
level, the one which is for Habermas of primary importance, the resurgence of reli-
gion seems to have had a rather limited impact, and certainly it did not bring about
a fundamental change in his thought. e admissible arguments coming from re-
ligious individuals and communities, and formulated in a religious language, are
indeed admissible to the public sphere but essentially as reections of “common rit-
ual praxis” and “the specically religious discourse of the individual”.88 It is far less
clear whether the articulation of theological argument can have a full citizenship
within the post-metaphysical public sphere of a secular, modern state. Habermas
argues that the secular public sphere (and arguably the corresponding secular state)
85On this topic, seeomas Scott,e Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International
Relations:e Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2005.
86Jürgen Habermas, “Ein neues Interesse der Philosophie an der Religion?” in Deutsche Zeitschri für Philoso-
phie, 58, 2010, pages 3–16.
87Jügen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, Cambridge: Polity, 2008, page 310.
88Jürgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality, Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2002, page 73.
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can appropriate experiences characterizing theological argumentation, as well as
discoursive/cultural resources coming from a non-objectied, hermeutical under-
standing of references to the religious discourse, but at the same time “under the
conditions of postmetaphysical thought, [...] philosophy cannot appropriate what
is talked about in religious discourse as religious experiences.” ese experiences
could only be added to “the fund of philosophy’s resources, recognized as philos-
ophy’s own bases of experience, if philosophy identies these experiences using a
description that is no longer borrowed from the language of a specic religious tra-
dition, but from the universe of argumentative discourse that is uncoupled from
the event of revelation.”89
Crucially, Habermas advances the idea that the resurgence of religion should
not automaticallymean a resurgence of theology as themetaphysical elaboration of
religious praxis and experiences.ese latter are in a sense admissible, the former
not. He therefore continues to hold on to his idea that theology, like metaphysics,
has been superseded in the Weberian process of modernisation as rationalisation,
and it has no place in the current era. He is explicit in arming therefore that “un-
der the conditions of postmetaphysical thinking, whoever puts forth a truth claim
today must, nevertheless, translate experiences that have their home in religious
discourse into the language if a scientic expert culture — and from this language
retranslate them back into praxis”.90
Ultimately Habermas has reached a point where the extensive dialogue with
theologians, which started back in the 1970s, has yielded little result in terms of
acceptance of critiques and reconsideration of the initial argument. Particularly
the critiques of Peukert,eunissen, Henrich, Haker have tended to demonstrate,
with rather solid arguments, the point that Habermas may simply have a too nar-
row conception of the relations between religious practice and theology, or per-
haps an overly simplistic understanding of the religious phenomenon tout court,
as reected in the very idea of keeping religious experiences separated from their
theological projections (or underpinnings?). Nicholas Adams in his study of the
89Habermas, ibidem, pages 74–75.
90Habermas, ibidem, page 76.
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relations of Habermas to theology and religion eventually explains this attitude by
considering how reections on religion and theology do form, within the economy
of Habermas’s work, a rather contradictory role. On the one hand, it is centrally
important as the key to understanding modernity and the problem of organising
socio-political order within it, particularly as a consequence of theWeberian reec-
tion, which Habermas appropriates and expands. On the other, however, “Haber-
mas is interested in a generalised account of rationalisation. e speculative nar-
rative about religion, which is barely defended, is a wholly secondary matter”.91
e same seems to be valid for the narrative of rationality: “Habermas’s primary
concern is a generalised account of rationality, [...] His account of the decline of
religion is of a wholly dierent and lower order, and nothing he says here is of
suciently careful formulation to warrant detailed rebuttal”.92
Habermas’s approach to religion is marked by a sort of circularity, which ap-
pears to be dependent on his very attempt to bendWeber’s sociological enquiry to
the theoretical enterprise of creating a full-edged theory of rationality and ratio-
nalisation. Instead of explaining religion and its decline, Habermas takes this as a
given, as his “theory presupposes, but does not actually demonstrate, the overcom-
ing of religion”.93 In a recent article, Carlo Invernizzi Accetti has even articulated a
reading of Habermas’s theory as kind of political theology.94is position analyses
how, in the Habermasian model, the source of legitimation in a post-metaphysical,
post-theological phase of history should be the assembly of the citizens as polit-
ical deliberative body, according to the principles of self-legislation and popular
sovereignty, in an ideal speech situation, where the formal pragmatics are at the
core of this very theory, as discussed in Chapter 2. But interestingly, Invernizzi
argues, Habermas is also very clear in explaining that the ideal speech situation
will never be fully realised, but remains an unreachable model of normative purity.
erefore, because the fundamental criterion for assessing the legitimacy of polit-
ical forms of life retains a clear transcendental nature, Habermas appears to be in-
91Adams, Habermas andeology, page 152.
92Adams, ibidem, page 152.
93Adams, ibidem, page 153.
94Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, “Can democracy emancipate itself from political theology? Habermas and Lefort on
the permanence of the theologico-political”, in Constellations, 17 (2), 2010, pages 254–270.
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troducing in his political model an element that operates precisely as a theological
component in pre-modern historical stages. As medieval kingdoms were consid-
ered the imperfect copy of the perfect City of God, so deliberative democracies
would be imperfect copies of an ideal speech situation, and humans are doomed
to struggle in the hermeneutic eort of adapting their imperfect, earthly world to
the celestial perfection of a transcendental model.
5.5 concluding remarks
is chapter has highlighted another aspect of the reciprocal relation between
two radical possibilities in the theorisation of order at this juncture of modernity,
namely the indebtedness of both Schmitt and Habermas to Weber’s sociological
reections on secularisation andmodernisation. However, despite the existence of
this genealogical link, the two authors have used in their respective works readings
of Weber prioritising dierent aspects of his sociological understanding of moder-
nity. As shown in the case of Schmitt’s Roman Catholicism and Political Form, We-
ber’s is considered a model argument, against whose background, in a complemen-
tary fashion to the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Schmitt has en-
visaged the rise of the modern state from the historical example of the Catholic
Church, thus again strengthening the point, which for him is the most urgent, that
a sociology of the concept of the state is necessary in order to counter legal posi-
tivism. Schmitt has therefore expanded Weber’s sociological work in a direction
which was congenial to his own intellectual goals.
For Habermas, Weber is the key author for the explanation of modernisation
processes which have revealed themselves primarily in the transformation of the-
ological concepts by means of a universal-historical dynamics of rationalisation.
eWeberian heritage is then criticised and re-worked by Habermas with the goal
to re-orientate the core point of his sociological argument towards a dialogic con-
cept of rationality. From the perspective of the theorisation of order, the Haber-
masian engagement with the theme of religious and theological accounts of the
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world has remained initially limited to a rather straightforward account of secular-
isation as successful overcoming of metaphysical thinking. Successively, however,
Habermas has been driven towards a more direct engagement with the topic of re-
ligious resurgence in postsecular societies, and various critiques from a number of
theologians havemoved against his theoretical position. Even within this relatively
new context, Habermas has continued to defend, in its essence, the idea that aer
the occurrence of secularisation processes as described (among others) by Weber,
and which form the crucial component of a critical understanding of modernity,
theology and religion can only play a complementary role in the political ordering
of the world, which should continue to be driven by dialogic rationalisation for
the fostering of human emancipation.is complementary role is supposed to be
exercisedwithin the context of the public sphere, where religious communities con-
tribute arguments whichmust in any case undergo a process of translation into the
“language of scientic expert culture”, which is appropriate for a postmetaphysical
world.
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summary of the argument
is thesis has highlighted the inadequacy of the theoretical investigation on the
concept of order in the discipline, although the problem is not only related to the
quantity of published research. It appears clear that order may not be simply con-
sidered a primitive concept unsusceptible to further analytical reduction into its
more elementary, constitutive parts. On the contrary, order can be shown to be
the product of those elements which inform the way in which Being (as world, na-
ture, universe, God...) is conceptualised, and in the specic case of politics and
international politics, the political being. As illustrated in the Chapter 1, despite
the almost ubiquitous use of both the term and concept of order in the domain of
international studies, and evenmore specically of ir theory, this very concept has
been rarely subjected to an explicit process of deconstruction and reconstruction
within the discipline. ir theory lacks almost entirely, with the notable exception
of a few authors, an explicit discussion aimed at dening the concept of order, de-
spite its ubiquitous use in the literature. In this sense, therefore, the articulation
of a theory of order must start essentially from the beginning. Of course, the lack
of an explicit theorisation of order can be largely framed as a reex of the mis-
leading tendency to take order for granted while eectively hiding the question of
order from problematisation. e rst step in rethinking the question of order is
therefore the openness towards its critical problematisation, which largely goes in
the direction of considering the foundations of order in the discussion of political
theology, secularisation and modernity.
When a philosophical-historical perspective is assumed, order appears from
the very beginning as a concept arising from ancient philosophical theology, as
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notably in the case of Aristotle, where order is dened as the way in which the
supreme good is immanent in the world, it is the logos of the world.e divine na-
ture of the Aristotelian conception of order was destined to remain among the core
set of ideas for thinking about order throughout the centuries. Humans participate
in order only partially and in the varying measure and modes in which the divine
is immanent in the world in its various domains.is metaphysical conceptualisa-
tion of order, once adapted to the necessities of Christian theology in late antiquity
and in medieval thought, remained virtually unchallenged until the modern age.
e problem of order from the contemporary perspective is therefore essentially
the problem of re-dening political order within modernity, and that may only be
achieved through an interrogation of themeaning itself ofmodernity andmoderni-
sation processes for political concepts.e fundamental dichotomy introduced by
modern thinkers, and already in nuce by Descartes’s conceptualisation of order as
something inherent to themethod and the teleological disposition of the enquiring
spirit, is essentially one that either tries to translate the divine substance of order
into an apparently less religiously charged concept such as “nature” or “history”,
or instead pushes the argument that order is a category of human thought and a
product of subjectivity, not therefore a property of the observed object. But if or-
der arises from subjectivity, the risk of a relativisation dri in conceptualising what
order is becomes explosive.
From the perspective of ir studies, already in Raymond Aron’s reections,
order for international politics is something which should entail both a descrip-
tive and a normative component, and, from the peculiar perspective of this author,
should be aimed at the identication of ways to arrange peaceful coexistence be-
tween dierent political communities. Hedley Bull’s reection on order, arguably
the most articulated among those oered by the “classical” authors of ir studies,
expands the initial idea of order as a “pattern leading to a particular result”, namely
for the promotion of certain ideas and values. e problem becomes therefore
transposed onto those ideas and values which are supposed to confer to a simple
pattern the status of “order”, how to formulate them and how to make them en-
gage within the reality of politics. Precisely this point is what puts at the centre of
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any reection on order the problem of how to dene the language and the basic
principles of collective normative orientations, whereby the discussion inevitably
shis from the problem of “what is order/” to “how is it possible to construct a
stable normative system?”. Nicholas Rengger has correctly captured that the core
dimension of the question of order lies in the identication of a philosophical quid
conferring stability (“guaranteeing”) to any account of order, which has tradition-
ally been found in metaphysical and theological images of the world, but which
have been destabilised by modern rationalism.
is thesis has argued that the path towards rethinking the concept of order in
international political theory ought to start from an evaluation of the two possible
poles between which such a reconstructive work should take place, namely with a
full appreciation of the radical possibility of recovering theological narratives, or
of the opposite tendency, which aims to identify those elements which may sup-
port the continuation of a rational deconstruction of theological and metaphysical
narratives.
is research has identied Carl Schmitt as the prototypical author who has
envisaged the recovery of a theological dimension in the discussion of the political,
and who has most clearly attempted a theorisation of the constitutive link between
the theological and the political. is constitutive link lies, as Schmitt explains in
his Politicaleology, in both the historical continuum of theological concepts be-
coming absorbed into the theoretical construction of the modern state, but also in
terms of the continuous structural analogies between theology on the one hand,
Rechtswissenscha and Staatslehre on the other. e concept of order in interna-
tional politics for Schmitt emerges out of the discussion of the transition that such
an order was undergoing at the time he was writing, namely the disintegration of
the jus publicum Europaeum as the order of a world made of states, whereby this
crisis of international order is simply a reection of the more intimate crisis of the
state projected into the international dimension.e rising disorder of theworld re-
veals how order can only arise as the embodiment of the politics of a friend/enemy
dialectic, which dissolves into chaos once the distinction between friend and en-
emy becomes blurred (as in the Schmittian critique of liberal ideologies).
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Schmitt’s contribution to the question of order lies consequently in the way
in which he is able to provide an ante litteram answer to Rengger’s questioning
of what precisely can guarantee order in the modern condition. Schmitt’s answer
is that what guarantees order in modernity is the same which guaranteed it in
the past,the concepts of modern political theoretical constructions being no less
than secularised theological concepts, which have nevertheless not lost their con-
stitutive link to theological accounts of the world. Order depends still, as before,
upon a political theology. is political theology can then be articulated and bet-
ter explained as the continuation ofMaxWeber’s work on the sociology of religion,
when the Weberian heritage is pushed towards the extreme point of capturing the
supreme metaphysical concepts, and its language can no longer be the language of
sociology. Sociology of religion becomes sublimated into a political theology every
time it attempts to address the mysterious nature of the vantage point from which
order is constructed (i.e. the revelation or ἀpiοκάλυψις [apokálypsis]).
A second radical possibility for conceptualising international order in the
modern context has been identied in the work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas
attempted to save the project of modernity following the catastrophic setbacks at
the beginning of the twentieth century through a reconceptualisation of rational-
ity. Habermas’s idea of international order rests on the rationality immanent in
dialogic forms of intersubjective communication. As such, Habermas’s answer
to Rengger’s question can be that the “something” guaranteeing order in moder-
nity, aer the deconstruction of metaphysical and theological (and theologically
derived) foundations of political order, is the philosophical science of language
(i.e. Habermas’s own theoretical work) which grounds a rational political theory,
both domestically and internationally, from which order is articulated. Order in
Habermas, as in Schmitt, is essentially law, and especially at international level, it
is international law. Of course, the way in which Habermas conceptualises law is
radically dierent from Schmitt, as Habermas essentially recovers aspects of the
legal positivistic tradition but integrates it with instances coming from his theory
of democracy, in terms of the legitimation of legal norms in the context of the po-
litical community. e construction of a legal order, even at international level,
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is therefore dependent upon the existence of a public sphere in which arguments
are formulated with reference to legal norms, to be discussed within parliamentary
institutions, which have to remain porous to the discussions taking place within
the public sphere. Clearly, the Habermasian conception of order is centred on the
characteristic of its emancipatory nature, which directly descends from the eman-
cipatory drive inherent in Habermas’s reconstructed concept of rationality.
e key aspect of the Habermasian view on order is therefore its emergence
from a particular concept of rationality, dialogic and intersubjective, which ani-
mates the social and political processes of modernity as emancipation, and which
directly informs ir critical theory inspired by his work. From an historical per-
spective, then, order appears as the product of a stratication of social knowledge
generated by processes of social learning. At the very origin of the Habermasian
account of processes of this social, historical emancipation, lies the rationalisation
of metaphysical and religious accounts of the world, and particularly of political le-
gitimation.is rationalisation takes the form of an analysis of the validity claims
in theological and metaphysical propositions, which he terms linguistication of
the sacred, and which has determined the overcoming of the conceptualisation of
the political in metaphysical and theological terms. Modernity, the project of hu-
man emancipation which Habermas intends to re-elaborate and re-establish from
its philosophical and sociological foundations, is therefore essentially conceived
as the successful secularisation of religious forms of order and their theological
theorisation.
e two radical possibilities of a Schmittian re-appraisal of the inherent the-
ological nature of modern political concepts, and the necessity of a sociology tran-
scending into a political theology (or the Habermasian re-instatement of moder-
nity as secularisation proceeding from a linguistication of the sacred) highlights
how the problem of critically rethinking the concept of order in the modern con-
text necessarily depends upon a discussion of modernity as secularisation, and on
the evaluation of the theological and the metaphysical narratives which since the
beginning of the history of the concept have been at the core of its construction.
Unfortunately, despite the genealogical link between the two authors, traced back
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to Weber’s sociological work, it appears that the interaction between the two theo-
retical perspectives has been extremely limited and in many aspects unfruitful. As
shown in Chapter 4, Habermas’s reading of Schmitt appears heavily conditioned
by a traditionally dismissive approach to Schmitt in the context of the Frankfurt
School, whose origin can be traced back to Herbert Marcuse’s early engagement
with this author in the 1930s, and by the successive representation of Schmitt as a
theorist of fascism whose contributions to the eld of political and legal theory is
essentially destructive.
Relatively more fruitful has been instead the evaluation of the Habermasian
argument on secularisation from the perspective of the theologians and in the con-
text of the so called resurgence of religion.eological critiques of Habermas have
highlighted the problematic aspects of his reconstruction of rationality and of ratio-
nalisation in terms of secularisation and deconstruction of theological and meta-
physical images of the world.is critique has concentrated predominantly on the
one hand on underscoring rst the limitedness of the linguistic tool in grounding a
social theory which risks ignoring “the unspoken” and secondly the possible hypo-
statisation of nature in Habermas’s concept of subjectivity. On the other hand, as
put forward by Nicholas Adam, in his assessment of the overall systemic structure
of Habermas’s argument, the linguistication of the sacred, namely the rationali-
sation of the theological, oddly appears both as the premise and as the result of
the process of rationalisation itself, and consequently of the foundations and the
results of his reconstructed concept of rationality. In sum, from a theological per-
spectiveHabermas seems to have neglected, or not fully appreciated, the rationality
inherent in theological thinking. Finally, while Habermas appears to be aware of a
number of issues concerning the symbolic relation between the religious and the
political, he has nevertheless not envisaged the possibility of a re-assessment of the
theological and metaphysical within the context of his critical theory.
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is research has shown how ir studies have a problematic relation to the concept
of order, as its frequent and almost ubiquitous use does not seem to be matched
by an adequate theoretical investigation. ere is also a remarkable discontinuity
in the literature on the topic, which appears to proceed without a clearly dened
direction, whereby, rather oen, recent publications do not refer to established re-
search results and reections on the issue. As shown in Chapter 1, already in Aron
it is possible to nd a clear reference to the double dimension of order as both de-
scriptive and normative, while Rengger already articulated a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the relations between the problem of order and the stability of any such
concept within the context of the modern condition. However, Phillips’s recent
work seems to have largely overlooked this literature, being therefore compelled
to “rediscover” the descriptive/normative dualism of order, and highlighting the
inherent link between order and the great cultural traditions (largely religious), in
which the “normative complexes” (informing any concept of order) are embedded.
Indeed, there can be no conceptualisation of order, once its normative dimension
is accepted, which does not incorporate a discussion about what ties human soci-
eties at a deeper level, to use James’s words: “the sources of basic values regarding
human dignity, human motivation and conduct”.95 is research has explored two
radically dierent possibilities for the identication of those sources of basic values,
coming from two dierent understanding of modernity and secularisation. How-
ever, in both cases it has been shown how the search for normative foundations, in
theWestern tradition, leads in amore or lessmediatedway to theChristian roots of
much of the concepts which constitute the basic vocabulary ofWestern theories of
the law, of the state, and of the international. While this is obviouslymuch apparent
for Schmitt in his politico-theological thesis, it emerges nevertheless also in Haber-
mas’s complex relation with religion both in his sociological theory of rationality,
and in later works on the position of religious groups within liberal democratic
political systems.
95James, International Order Aer the Financial Crisis, op. cit., page 536.
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e trajectory for the re-conceptualisation of order clearly leads towards the
exploration of the normative drive that is supposed to inform any conception of
order, and such normative drive is constructed against the background of existing
denitions of good, of justice, and of historical (possibly eschatological) narratives.
Re-thinking the concept of order in international politics means therefore, as a
necessary step, the establishment of stronger links with existing literatures debat-
ing the above mentioned topics of the relations between religion and politics, espe-
cially on the specic point of political theology, and on the place of religion within
the current liberal-democratic constitutional framework, and of secularism. As
illustrated in this thesis with the example of Carl Schmitt, Jürgen Habermas and
their complex relation with religion for their political and sociological theories of
order, the political relevance of religious and theological concepts appears to con-
stitute a still largely unexplored literature for ir studies, as religion is still largely
taken, particularly in the context of constructivist theories, simply as a “variable”
for the denition of collective identities, but a variable whose complexity and po-
litical nature is oen not fully grasped.96
e theorisation of order has consequently to start precisely from the evalu-
ation of whether, and to what extent, the normative complexes underpinning the
various conceptualisations of order are indeed based on the secular re-elaboration
of religious and theological concepts, on the nature of this process of secularisa-
tion, and on the inherent relations between religion and politics. Eventually, the
path that this research wants to suggest as a trajectory for the conceptualisation of
what order is in international politics, is that of reconsidering the role of theologi-
cal propositions in the construction of normative complexes, propositions which
have to be evaluated in their political potential, not simply as a cultural manifes-
tation in a domain separated from political life, namely religion. is may con-
sequently also lead towards the appropriation within ir studies, on the point of
order, of the established literature on the deconstruction of the very category of
96MonaKanwal Sheikh, “Howdoes ReligionMatter? Pathways to Religion in International Relations”, inReview
of International Studies, 38 (2), 2012, pages 365–392.
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“religion” as a separated domain,97 at least in two dierent ways: rstly, in consid-
ering how stable and consistent the category of religion is in relation to history
and ethnography (religion as meaning dierent things in dierent times, and the
tenability of a category in which elements so diverse as Judaism, Shinto¯ and Confu-
cianism are still to be considered parts of the same set, the historical construction
of religions themselves); secondly, in considering how the very establishment of
the category of religion in the modern context has been historically a profoundly
political act, given its immediate connection with the issue of freedom of religion
as one of the pillars of the liberal order of Western societies.98 A re-organisation
of the ir conceptualisation of order may therefore encompass a dierent approach
to religious identities, which are (as they have been historically) subjected to being
shaped politically, and therefore it should entail a much more upfront discussion
of religious politics and the political manipulation and/or construction of forms
of religious identication. e debates about religion that a discussion of order
should re-appropriate are largely connected, of course, with the early sociological
enquiries conducted by Durkheim99 andWeber (as addressed in this thesis), there-
fore assessing the meanings of secularisation and the evaluation of its success in
the light of successive sociological and politics works, such as William Connolly’s
politics of becoming,100 Charles Taylor’s Secular Age 101and of course Habermas’s en-
gagement with the topic, as previously discussed.
e redenition of the concept of order in ir should also be more strongly
connectedwith a growing literature, already present in international studies, which
deals directly with the role of religion and the problem of secularisation, from dif-
ferent perspectives, and which it has already embraced the above mentioned philo-
sophical and political-theoretical discussions. is emerging literature within ir
studies concentrates predominantly on the place to be attributed to religious be-
97As addressed for instance in Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Chris-
tianity and Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
98is of course may make the academic work of deconstructing religion with the goal of re-politicising it, i.e.
to re-appropriate its content as a political one, particularly controversial from a Kuhnian perspective of the
viability of such a research project.
99Émile D. Durkheim (ed. William Pickering), Durkheim on Religion, London: Routledge, 1975.
100William Connolly,Why I am not a Secularist?, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
101Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge ma: Belknap Press, 2007.
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liefs and organisations in the context of the so called “global religious resurgence”,
as addressed in Jerey Haynes’s Religion and the International Relations in the 21st
Century,102 Eva Bellin’s Faith in Politics,103 Jack Snider’s Religion and International
Relationseory,104 Daniel Philippot’s assessment of global politics and religion,105
andMika Luoma-Aho’sGod and International Relations.106 Alongside with this set
of authors and studies about the place of religionwithin ir, important for the theori-
sation of order is therefore certainly the growing group of works on the nature and
the future of secularisation, especially Peter Berger’s edited volumee Desecular-
ization of theWorld (“the assumption that we live in a secularisedworld is false”),107
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’se Politics of Secularism in International Relations,108
Erin Wilson’s Aer Secularism: Rethinking Religion in Global Politics,109 and the
more recent work by Adrian Papst.110 In these works, the focus of the discussion is
still largely the assessment of secularization (in its various denitions) in the con-
text of a world where indeed numerous collective forces which have been tradition-
ally labelled as “religious” are becoming more and more inuential in the political
sphere, thus openly challenging the paradigm of (Western) secularised modern
politics, and the related political model.is line of argument has been recently re-
iterated by Friedrich Kratochwil in his recent Politics, Law, and the Sacred,111 where
102Jerey Haynes, “Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conict or Cooperation?”, inird
World Quarterly, 27 (3), 2006, pages 535–541.
103Eva Bellin, “Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics”, inWorld Politics, 60 (2), 2008,
pages 315–347.
104Jack Snyder (ed.), Religion and International Relationseory, New York: Columbia Univesity Press, 2011.
105Daniel Philippot, “Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?”, in American Review of Political Science,
12, 2009, pages 183–202.
106Mika Luoma-Aho, God and International Relations: Christianeology and World Politics, New York and
London: Continuum, 2012.
107Peter Berger (ed.),e Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999, page 2.
108Elisabeth Shakman Hurd, e Politics of Secularism in International Relations, Princeton ma: Princeton
University Press, 2008.
109ErinWilson,Aer Secularism: Rethinking Religion in Global Politics, Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan, 2012.
110Adrian Papst, “e Paradox of Faith: Religion beyond Secularization andDesecularization”, in Craig Calhoun
and Georgi Derlugian (eds.),e Deepening Crisis: Governance Challenges aer Neoliberalism, New York, New
YorkUniversity Press, 2011, pages 157–182; “e Secularism of Post-Secularity: Religion, Realism, and the Revival
of Grandeory in ir”, in Review of International Studies, 38, 2012, pages 995–1017.
111Friedrich Kratochwil, “Politics, Law and the Sacred: a Conceptual Analysis, in Journal of International Rela-
tions and Development”, 16, 2013, page 1–24. See also his previous contribution on this same topic: Friedrich
Kratochwil and Mariano Barbato, “Towards a Post-Secular Order?”, in European Political Science Review, 1 (3),
2009, pages 317–340.
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he openly challenges “the myth of a purely secular and contractarian international
order”,112 namely the one allegedly emerged from the Peace of Westphalia, and the
idea of progress. Kratochwil also wants to show how the “the narrative of progress
is hardly ‘progressive’ (in the sense of increasing our understanding)”, since the
problems addressed by religious and metaphysical accounts of human life “are not
passé, but still with us”.113 Even more, he intends to highlight that “religions have
not the monopoly for millennial derailments, since even ‘secular’ projects, such
as human rights, have that crusading potential”.114 However, even in the context of
this growing literature on secularism, the prevalent argument remains anchored in
a rather dichotomous scheme centred on the “secular” on the one hand as opposed
to the “religious” on the other — particularly with the development of a critique of
the Western “orientalist”, positivistic and allegedly secular position. From the per-
spective of order, while the reconceptualization of order in ir appears to be depen-
dent on a problematisation of these categories, rather than on their reinforcement,
the exploration of the normative drivers for the organisation of collective human
life, even at the international level, should be premised on an investigation of the
reciprocally constitutive relationship between theological and political concepts,
thus blurring this dichotomy, whose usefulness can be historically deconstructed
(and contextualised), thus paving the way for new re-conceptualisation according
to the mutated political circumstances.is last judgement, of course, completely
evades the connements of academic enquiry, but belongs to the domain of politi-
cal decisions.
Another relevant and growing literature which the re-conceptualisation of or-
der in ir should address in recovering the religious-theological roots of norma-
tive principles in political order is the one re-assessing the importance of religious
thought as a key driver in the intellectual work of early ir theorists, and the signif-
icance of the long “detour”, which the discipline has taken while embracing posi-
tivist epistemologies from the late 1950s onwards. is historical argument is not
112Kratochwil, Politics, Law and the Sacred, page 1.
113Kratochwil, ibidem, page 3.
114Kratochwil, ibidem, page 3.
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new, as it was rst articulated by Steve Smith in a 1992 publication,115 but it has
been growing in prominence with successive studies concentrating on the Chris-
tian roots of the English School’s realism,116 on Hans Morgenthau’s political the-
ology,117 and of course the relation between theology and international politics in
Reinhold Niebuhr.118
is growing literature on the pervasiveness of theological and religious con-
victions in a large number of key early ir scholars reveals the extent to which
the basic normative propositions in some of the most inuential early articula-
tions of international order have oen come directly from the sphere of religious
thought in the disguised way of simply “rational”, liberal, universal “values”, whose
de-politicisation and under-problematisation has also negatively contributed to
the limited theoretical work on a conceptualisation of order. If order is to be better
understood and theorised, also by means of a retrospective reading of classical ir
literature, the clarication of these relations between the religious background and
the political proposals of those authors assumes the important aspect of a fresh
reading of the discipline in its entirety, opening new research perspectives.
Clearly, this research cannot articulate a detailed model of order in interna-
tional politics as some sort of however sophisticated policy proposal, simply be-
cause this would be incoherent with the argument developed so far.
is research suggests indeed that, in parallel with philosophical discussions
on the concept of order in general, order in international politics as well appears
as a logos, and consequently as a dynamic energeia, rather than as a static ergon.
Order can be articulated in many dierent fashions in accordance with the histor-
ical circumstances in which the forces which shape it operate. Literature on the
topic agrees on the point that any conception of order should entail, along with an
115Steve Smith, “e Forty Years’ Detour: e Resurgence of Normativeeory in International Relations”, in
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1992, pages 489–508.
116Charles A. Jones, “Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School”, in International Relations,
17 (3), 2003, pages 371–387.
117Michael C.Williams,e Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005, Chapter 3.
118Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
See also his later work: Christian Realism and the New Realities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008.
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account of its dynamicity, both a descriptive and a normative dimension, as order
serves both as linguistic articulation of the arrangement of reality as a discourse,
and as the evaluation of the appropriateness of social action. e content of any
historically situated conception of order appears to be a function of underlying
foundational discourses informing the normative dimension of order, although
these in turn should not be separated from politics and power struggles. Under-
standing order, and even more draing innovative models of order, ought to start
from the problematisation of those underlying discourses. Eventually however, the
choice of what kind of order is supposed to inform a certain time remains an act
of political will.
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